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ABSTRACT 
The departure point of this study is Gilligan’s critique against 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. The main aim was to 
examine whether the proposed levels of care-based reasoning form 
a developmental sequence. Care and justice reasoning were 
studied among practical nursing, bachelor-degree social work and 
law enforcement students in the beginning of education (N=66) 
and after 2 years (N=59). Main measures were Skoe’s Ethic of 
Care Interview and Colby & Kohlberg et al’s Moral Judgment 
Interview. Participants’ real-life moral conflicts were also 
analyzed. 
Results showed that 34% of the participants progressed in care 
reasoning, and 48% in justice reasoning. Social work and nursing 
students progressed in care reasoning. All groups showed progress 
in justice reasoning. Care and justice reasoning were parallel in 
terms of internal consistency and regression. 5% regressed in care 
reasoning, compared with 3% in justice reasoning. Participants at 
the highest justice level also represented high-level care reasoning. 
Self-concept interviews involved descriptions of developmental 
transitions. Findings suggest that care reasoning constitutes a 
developmental sequence, from self-concern (Level 1) to caring for 
others and self-sacrifice (Level 2) to the balanced caring for self 
and others (Level 3). For women, age and androgynous gender 
role were positively related to care reasoning. At the posttest, 
participants at Level 3 were the most empathic and showed 
progress in empathy. Role taking was positively related to care 
reasoning for both genders, and to justice reasoning for men  
In real-life conflicts, the type of dilemma predicted moral 
orientation usage. Prosocial dilemmas pulled for care and 
antisocial dilemmas for justice orientation. Women with 
connected self-concept tended to use care orientation. Level of 
justice reasoning varied according to the dilemma type. Real-life 
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care reasoning was consistent with participants’ competence, with 
the exception of transgression-type dilemmas at the posttest. 
Participants reporting temptation-type dilemmas were the least 
developed in care reasoning. Levels of care and justice reasoning 
were strongly related to each other, and were integrated in mature 
reasoning. Care reasoning also involved values and ethical 
principles related to others’ welfare. These results underscore the 
importance of dilemma type, and suggest that care reasoning is a 
significant part of real life morality. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkimukseni lähtökohtana on Carol Gilliganin Lawrence 
Kohlbergin moraalikehitysteoriaa kohtaan esittämä kritiikki. 
Päätavoitteena oli selvittää, muodostavatko Gilliganin esittämät 
huolenpidon tasot kehitykselliset vaiheet. Tutkin huolenpidon ja 
oikeudenmukaisuuden ajattelun kehitystason lähihoitaja-, 
sosionomi- ja poliisiopiskelijoiden keskuudessa koulutuksen 
alussa (N=66) ja kaksi vuotta myöhemmin (N=59). Menetelmänä 
käytin moraaliongelmien eli dilemmojen ratkomista. Eva Skoen 
kehittämä the Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) mittasi huolenpidon 
ajattelua, ja Colbyn, Kohlbergin et al. kehittämä Moral Judgment 
Interview (MJI) mittasi oikeudenmukaisuuden ajattelua. Tutkin 
myös sukupuoliroolien, emotionaalisen empatian, roolinoton ja 
minäkäsityksen yhteyttä moraalisen ajatteluun, sekä analysoin 
tutkittavien oman elämän moraalikonfliktit huolenpidon ja 
oikeudenmukaisuuden etiikan näkökulmista. 
Huolenpidon ajattelussa kehittyi 34% osallistujista ja 
oikeudenmukaisuusajattelussa kehittyi 48% osallistujista. 
Lähihoitaja- ja sosionomiopiskelijat kehittyivät huolenpidon 
ajattelussa. Kaikki opiskelijaryhmät kehittyivät 
oikeudenmukaisuusajattelussa. Huolenpidon ja 
oikeudenmukaisuusajattelun kehitykset olivat samankaltaisia 
sisäisen konsistenssin ja regression suhteen. 5% osallistujista 
taantui huolenpidon ajattelussa, kun taas 3% taantui 
oikeudenmukaisuusajattelussa. Oikeudenmukaisuusajattelussa 
korkeimmalle kehittyneet edustivat myös kehittynyttä huolenpidon 
ajattelua. Minäkäsityshaastattelut sisälsivät kuvauksia huolenpidon 
kehityksellisistä siirtymistä. Tutkimustulokset tukevat oletusta, 
että huolenpidon ajattelu sisältää seuraavan kehityksellisen 
jatkumon (1) itsestä huolehtiminen ja selviytyminen (2) toisista 
huolehtiminen ja uhrautumisen etiikka ja (3) tasapainoinen 
huolenpito itsestä ja toisista. Naisilla ikä ja androgyyninen 
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sukupuolirooli (yhdistynyt feminiinisyys ja maskuliinisuus) olivat 
positiivisesti yhteydessä huolenpidon ajattelun kehittyneisyyteen. 
Toisella mittauskerralla ne osallistujat, jotka olivat huolenpidon 
korkeimmalla tasolla, olivat kaikista empaattisimpia. He olivat 
myös edistyneet emotionaalisessa empatiassa 2 vuoden aikana. 
Roolinotto oli positiivisesti yhteydessä huolenpidon ajatteluun 
molemmilla sukupuolilla ja miehillä myös 
oikeudenmukaisuusajatteluun. 
Oman elämän moraalikonflikteissa dilemmatyyppi ennusti, 
missä määrin osallistuja käytti huolenpidon tai 
oikeudenmukaisuuden orientaatiota. Prososiaaliset (toisten 
tarpeisiin ja hyvinvointiin suuntautuneet, sekä ristiriitaisia vaateita 
sisältävät) dilemmat olivat enemmän huolenpito-orientoituneita, 
kun taas antisosiaaliset (rikkomuksia ja kiusauksia sisältävät) 
dilemmat olivat enemmän oikeudenmukaisuusorientoituneita. 
Naiset, joilla oli kytkeytynyt minäkäsitys, olivat taipuvaisia 
käyttämään huolenpidon orientaatiota. 
Oikeudenmukaisuusajattelun taso vaihteli dilemmatyypin mukaan. 
Huolenpidon ajattelun taso aidoissa moraalidilemmoissa oli 
yhteneväinen osallistujien kompetenssin kanssa. Poikkeuksena 
olivat rikkomus-tyyppiset dilemmat toisella mittauskerralla. 
Kiusaus-tyyppisiä dilemmoja raportoineet osallistujat olivat 
vähiten kehittyneitä huolenpidon ajattelussa. Huolenpidon ja 
oikeudenmukaisuuden ajattelun tasot olivat voimakkaasti 
yhteydessä toisiinsa. Kypsä moraaliajattelu yhdisti ne. 
Huolenpidon ajattelu sisälsi myös arvoja ja eettisiä periaatteita, 
jotka olivat suuntautuneet toisten ihmisten hyvinvoinnin 
edistämiseen. Nämä tulokset korostavat dilemmatyypin tärkeyttä 
arkielämän moraaliajattelun ymmärtämisessä. Ne myös 
vahvistavat sen, että huolenpidon ajattelu on tärkeä osa arkielämän 
moraalia. 
 
Avainsanat: 
1. huolenpidon etiikka 2. huolenpidon ajattelu 3. moraalin kehitys 
4. oikeudenmukaisuusajattelu 5. sukupuoliroolit 6. empatia  
7. oman elämän moraalikonfliktit 8. moraaliorientaatio 
9. roolinotto 
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Läsnäolo ja tukihan 
 siinä on tärkeintä… 
Et se nainen tuntee, 
että siitä on välitetty. 
Ehkä se on jokaisen ihmisen perusvietti 
tai joku semmoinen. 
ett jokainen haluaa tulla hyväksytyksi 
ja semmoseks että välitetään. 
 
Välittämisen muotojahan 
on monenlaisia. 
On puolisoiden väliset, 
lasten väliset 
ja työtovereiden 
ja kenen tahansa. 
Eikä sitä voi sanoo, 
että on vain yhtä oikeeta. 
 
Mutta siinä on nyt mun mielestä 
tärkeintä se, 
että se toinen ihminen 
on sille toiselle ihmiselle tärkee 
ja jollain tavalla 
ainutlaatuinen 
ja yksilöllinen. 
Vaikka ei voi sanoa, 
että sä oot just mua varten. 
 
Mutta sillä hetkellä 
kun on sen ihmisen kanssa, 
läsnäolo on semmonen osoitus siitä 
että mä oon sitoutunut silleen 
tuohon ihmiseen. 
Että vaik sillä on huonoakin, 
mä en hylkää sitä. 
 
(Haastateltava 39) 
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1. WHY IN A DIFFERENT VOICE? 
Two students notice that a fellow-student turns up to at a lecture 
obviously a little tipsy. In the institute concerned, a school of 
medicine, drunkenness is a serious offence. The first person 
wonders, whether she should report the offence. Eventually she 
decides not to do so because the violator regrets her deed. The 
second person wants to know, before deciding, whether or not 
the use of alcohol is a problem for the person in question. She 
considers reporting her not the right solution; this would 
obstruct a potential relationship with the person in question and, 
in this manner hinders a way of helping. The first reaction, it 
will be understood, is typical for thinking in terms of justice, 
whereas by the second reaction, a perspective of care is 
expressed. 
(Gilligan & Attanucci 1988, cited by Vreeke 1991, p. 38) 
The moral problem quoted above is familiar also in the Finnish 
work-life (Ikonen-Varila, 1994) and gives a glimpse of two 
different moral voices interwoven in our experiences in daily 
lives. Although both persons made a similar decision, their reasons 
for doing so were different, as well as expected actions after 
decision-making.  
A more dramatic experience of different moral voices was 
given by one of the participants in this study. Her friend had got a 
sudden, fatal disease, and she often visited her in the hospital. 
Suddenly the friend’s condition broke down, and she was taken to 
the emergency ward. The staff of the ward refused to give any 
information to the friend, and forbade visits, referring to the law 
that forbids giving any information to other than close relatives. 
So, the patient died without the presence of her best friend, who 
was left troubled with her despair and moral anguish. From the 
viewpoint of justice, it can be argued that the nurses in charge did 
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the right thing when they followed rules and the law. But at the 
same time, they also prevented the maintenance of a significant 
relationship and consequently precluded care at the critical 
moment. From the viewpoint of care, hurt caused to the dying 
patient and her friend presents a fatal moral error. The ethic of 
justice, at least in its conventional forms, may remain blind to such 
personal details, whereas sensitivity to them is the strength of the 
ethic of care. This example from real life highlights the tension 
between care and justice, two different moral voices, paralleling 
academic debates in the fields of moral psychology and 
philosophy. 
The ethic of care has been defined as “an approach to ethics 
originating predominantly from feminist writing which focuses on 
close personal relationships and emphasizes emotional 
commitment as a basis for acting rather than reliance on abstract 
rules and principles” (Tadd, 1998, p. 367). From the 1980’s 
onwards, the ethic of care has been strongly associated with 
psychologist Carol Gilligan’s work. The present study leans on her 
theoretical framework of care, as it is presented in her book In a 
Different Voice: Psychological theory and Women’s development 
(1982). Gilligan defines care as “a responsibility to discern and 
alleviate ‘the real and recognizable trouble’ in this world” (1982, 
p. 100). Other theorists of care share this definition. Fisher and 
Tronto (1990, p. 40) write, ”On the most general level, we suggest 
that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything 
that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ’world’ so that we 
can live in it as well as possible.” In turn, Nel Noddings (1984) 
views care as an attempt to meet the other morally. All these 
authors, despite their different emphasis, share the view that the 
ethic of care springs from the presupposition that individuals are 
connected with rather than separated from each other, inevitably 
giving rise to the responsibility for caring others. As Noddings 
(1984, p. 4) puts it: ”Taking relation as ontologically basic simply 
means that we recognize human encounter and affective response 
as a basic fact of human existence” (emphasis original). So, care 
implies a reaching out to something other than the self, and 
implicitly suggests that it will lead to some type of action (Tronto, 
1993). 
When starting to review discussion and research centred on 
Carol Gilligan’s theory, a researcher meets a challenging task. For 
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example, the Social Science Citation Index yielded 5530 citations 
to In a Different Voice in May 2002.1 It is difficult to exaggerate 
the impact and the popularity of her book with 184 pages. As Time 
magazine (1996, p. 66) wrote: “How likely is it that a single book 
could change the rules of psychology, change the assumptions of 
medical research, change the conversation among parents and 
teachers and developmental professionals about the distinctions 
between men and women, boys and girls?” (ref. Jaffee & Hyde, 
2000). Beyond moral psychology, Gilligan’s work has been 
ground-breaking and important in the fields touched by feminist 
thought, such as philosophy, nursing and public policy. Especially 
philosophers have been eager to continue the care-justice debate 
that Gilligan initiated. As Olivia Little (1998, p. 191) puts it: ”In 
the richness of her discussion, Gilligan touches on a broad range 
of issues that are of interest to moral philosophers - from method 
to content, from right action to virtue, from motive to skills; and 
different elements may be at issue on different conversations.”2 
With regard to applications, the care framework has been regarded 
to offer the basis for a new approach to bioethics, and to the ethics 
of caring professions, such as nursing and medicine (Little, 1998). 
In addition, Gilligan’s work has been one of the few research 
enterprises that “breaches the ivied walls of academia and captures 
the public’s imagination” (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000, p. 703). It seems 
that Gilligan, named as ”the woman of the year” in 1984 by Ms. 
Magazine, caught something crucial to modern western society in 
                                                     
 
1A glance over Social Citation Index illuminates Gilligan’s position 
in social sciences very well. In addition to psychological studies 
conducted predominantly in the 1980’s, there is a growing number of 
studies conducted in applied sciences, such as law, nursing and 
education. Her thoughts also seem to have spread beyond the Western 
culture. Interestingly, a vast majority of citations to her refer to In a 
Different Voice, instead of her more fresh work. 
2As an example, following questions were outlined in the 
introduction of the 23. volume of Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
(1998) entitled “Chaos of Care and Care Theory”: Is the ethic of care 
meant to supplement or supplant traditional theories? How do categories 
of “care” and “justice” perspectives match to traditional categories such 
as deontology, consequentalism, or virtue theory? Is the care orientation 
meant to offer guidance on action, motive, method, or all? Is its value 
confined to personal encounters, or does it offer lessons applicable to 
questions of policy? 
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her writings. Her experiences and work resonated with the 
experiences of other women, thus validating their moral thought 
(see Gilligan, 1993).  
Similarly, my earliest interest in Gilligan’s work sprung from 
the recognition that many painful moral issues in everyday life, 
mine as well as that of others, centered on care embedded in 
relationships. It also seemed that care was not recognized as 
morally obligatory or binding by many men, a recognition that fit 
with Gilligan’s claim that care is more characteristic of women’s 
morality. Many moral issues by which I was touched were clearly 
conceptualized and made understandable in this relatively thin text 
book. Thus my experience resonated with the message of In a 
Different Voice that the ethic of care is overlooked in the realm of 
morality, but is a significant part of interpersonal conflicts in real 
life. Later on, while I was tutoring adult female students in a social 
care program as a part of my work, I observed an enormous 
personal process taking place during their education. Again, this 
process focused on the issues of care, because many students have 
started their studies at the expense of taking care of other family 
members. Many of them had also powerful crisis experiences, 
such as divorce or break-up in relationships in the recent past, and 
they considered further education as a channel for personal 
growth. It also seemed that after working through their confusion 
by themselves, the students grew into morally sensitive care 
workers, receiving positive feed-back about their empathic skills 
from clients and their supervisors in practical training periods. In 
their professional approach, these women also moved from total 
involvement with their clients’ needs towards more self-protective 
position, reflecting the change in their personal relationships. So, I 
was intuitively evidencing a transition from conventional, self-
sacrificing care towards balancing others’ and self’s needs, as 
conceptualized in Gilligan’s theory of care development. 
Furthermore, their moral reasoning displayed an interesting 
mixture of judgment and emotional responding, which was against 
the prevailing paradigm of rationally based morality. To conclude, 
I was guided by the recognition that care is central to women’s 
real-life morality and their development, consistent with Gilligan’s 
claim, and I was convinced that the ethic of care deserves to be 
further investigated.  
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Accroding to Gilligan (1993), she has structured In a Different 
Voice in two parts. In the opening and closing chapters (1, 2, 6) 
she introduces a relational “different” voice and develops its 
counterpoint with the traditional voice of justice. In the central 
chapters (3, 4, 5) she reframes women’s psychological 
development involving three developmental and two transitional 
levels, as an alternative to Kohlberg’s stages of justice 
development. She frames her research strategy as follows: ”But to 
derive developmental criteria for the language for women’s moral 
discourse, it is necessary first to see whether women’s 
construction of the moral domain relies on language different from 
that of men and one that deserves equal credence in the definition 
of development” (p. 70). When turning to literature, however, it is 
amazing to discover that researchers have been mainly 
concentrating in finding the different voices and their contexts, 
and the second part of the strategy, investigating care development 
is almost a neglected issue. Most studies conceptualize care and 
justice as moral orientations, a specific way to perceive and 
construe moral issues, as framed in the outer chapters in Gilligan’s 
books, using mainly a procedure developed by Nona Lyons 
(1983). Consequently, research up to date has focused on 
investigating gender differences in the two moral orientations, 
instead of developmental issues. Gilligan herself shifted her focus 
from women’s development onto that of adolescent girls’ (1990), 
and conceptualized care and justice as narratives about 
relationships, employing qualitative methodology (Brown, 
Debold, Tappan & Gilligan, 1991). 
Apparently researchers, including Gilligan’s own group, have 
adopted the view that the three suggested developmental levels 
represent modes of resolving care problems, rather than a 
progressing sequence (Gilligan, 1990; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). 
Nevertheless, a methodological turning point in the field is based 
on the work of Eva Skoe, who constructed and validated a care-
based developmental measure, consisting of four care dilemmas 
that are scored according to the levels initially presented in In a 
Different Voice. A series of studies with cross-sectional data has 
established those levels of care development, and found them to be 
related to other developmental constructs, but empirical evidence 
with longitudinal data is still lacking (Skoe, 1998). Thus, the 
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mission of this study was defined in In a Different Voice twenty 
years ago as follows (p. 126): 
The research findings about women’s responses to the abortion 
dilemma suggest a sequence in the development of an ethic of 
care where changes in the conception of responsibility reflect 
changes in the experience and understanding of relationships. 
These findings were gathered at a particular moment in history, 
the sample was small, and the women not selected to represent a 
larger population. These constraints preclude the possibility of 
generalization and leave to further research the task of sorting 
out the different variables of culture, time, occasion, and gender. 
Additional longitudinal studies of women’s moral judgments are 
needed in order to refine and validate the sequence described. 
Studies of people’s thinking about other real dilemmas are 
needed to clarify the special features of the abortion choice.  
 
Consequently, the goal of this study is to investigate care 
development, covering the aspects of different cultures, time, 
occasion and gender, as I will spell out later in detail. This study 
has been conducted in Northern European culture as opposed to 
North-American culture, twenty years later than Gilligan’s 
original study, comprising representatives of care and justice-
oriented fields of education, women as well as men. The 
participants’ real-life moral conflicts were also explored and 
analyzed with respect to these two moralities, care and justice. 
Therefore, this study is rooted in my interpretation of In a 
Different Voice. 
While the field of morality research seems largely to be 
satisfied with exploring gender differences in moral orientations, a 
question might be raised as to what is the point in exploring care 
as a developmental phenomenon. Recent researchers appear to 
share the view that care and justice represent complementary 
moralities and mature moral thought integrates them, even if the 
nature of integration has not been explicated in the recent 
discussion. What Gilligan argued, however, was that modern 
psychology is preoccupied by the justice orientation, echoing 
western moral philosophies since the Enlightenment. Even if these 
Enlightenment-influenced moral theories, such as Kant’s and 
Kohlberg’s, may accept the theoretical claims of both orientations, 
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researchers have still been interested in ”issues of rights more than 
responsibilities, the dangers rather than the benefits of emotion, 
the architecture of principles rather than the nuance of saliencies, 
the skills of abstraction rather than the skills of discernment”. And 
this emphasis matters in what gets attention in research and in 
society at large (Little, 1998, pp. 196-197.) 
According to Joan Tronto (1993), the ethic of care represents 
the morality of the powerless and the underprivileged, in terms of 
gender, class and race. The argument that women and men need 
both justice and care still does not change the relative assessment 
of the importance of justice and care. Thus barely admitting the 
existence of the complementary different voice mitigates a radical 
position Gilligan’s theory might offer, and far-reaching, 
transforming political effects are undercut. As a more recognized 
ethic it would make many implicit moral problems concerning 
people’s welfare more salient in society. Kroeger-Mappes (1994) 
points out that many moral dilemmas in biomedical ethics, such as 
reproductive technologies, abortion, and nurse-physician 
relationships are better understood if the relation between the 
ethics of care and justice becomes an explicit part of the 
discussion. The explication of the ethic of care helps to visualize 
new practices in female-dominated care work or teaching work 
(e.g., Tschudin, 2003). In order to make the ethic of care as equal 
to the ethic of justice, its distinctive quality as well as 
developmental path should be scientifically evidenced (cf. Puka, 
1990; Tronto, 1993).  
From the viewpoint of my study, examining students in the 
female-dominated fields of nursing and social work, the question 
whether the ethic of care constitutes a developmental sequence is 
of crucial importance. While the ethic of care is assumed to be a 
moral basis for caring work (Tschudin, 2003), it should be 
promoted through educational interventions. Subsequently, the 
means of promotion depend on whether care represents a virtue 
(Tong, 1998), a spesific moral orientation (Lyons, 1983), empathic 
capacities (Hoffman, 1987) or/and a developmental sequence of 
moral reasoning (Skoe, 1993). 
While reviewing literature, I was struck by the realization that 
I should write two different chapters, namely, on what Gilligan 
said and on what others think she said, the latter being obviously a 
gigantic task. I turned to the former, and refined my starting point 
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as what Gilligan herself actually said, by thoroughly reading her 
book several times, from different viewpoints. While reviewing 
the discussion I also became fully aware of the importance of 
distinguishing philosophical debates from empirical studies, in 
order to recognize the gap between psychology and philosophy. 
Although this gap is generally stimulating, much of confusion is 
caused by the fact that Gilligan is a psychologist presenting 
empirical observations but is interpreted to have presented a 
ready-made ethical theory (Little, 1998). To set the position for 
my study in the somewhat confused field, I have chosen to define 
it to represent moral psychology, which involves empirical study 
of individuals’ morality: how people define morality and how they 
solve moral questions. Nevertheless, psychological research is 
surrounded by philosophical assumptions made a priori as well as 
normative conclusions drawn from them, so I will discuss them to 
the extent to which they are relevant to my study. 
While the ethic of care is the first key word of this study, 
moral development is the second one. In the field of moral 
development, the Kohlbergian cognitive-structuralist approach 
that describes the ontogenesis of “the first voice”, justice 
reasoning, is the King and still forms the dominating paradigm. 
Gilligan developed her theory of care as a criticism against the 
proposed limitations of the Kohlbergian approach. In this study, 
the ethics of justice is to be described from the viewpoint of care, 
and consequently it does not do justice to the richness of the 
Kohlbergian paradigm, especially its philosophical grounding.3 
Kohlberg grounded his theory in the Piagetian framework, 
whereas Gilligan grounded her theory in neo-psychoanalytical, 
objection-relations framework. Nevertheless, they share the view 
that (1) morality is prescriptive, telling what one should do, and 
that (2) morality should be studied as people construe it (see for 
example Gilligan, 1982, pp. 2, 74). Both theories also describe 
development as a stage-like phenomenon and related to cognitive 
processes (Tronto, 1993). Gilligan, however, moved on from this 
position in her later writings, and regarded the language of 
                                                     
3The Kohlbergian approach is vast, multifaceted, and still 
developing. Interested readers can find more comprehensive 
presentations elsewhere (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Mogdil & Mogdil, 1986; 
Colby & Kohlberg & al., 1987; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma, 1999, for 
educational interventions, see Rest & Narvaez (Eds) 1994). 
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ordinary developmental psychology, in terms of stages and levels, 
as inadequate in describing women’s experience of the interplay of 
two moralities in the cycle of life (Gilligan, Rogers & Brown, 
1990).4 This study nevertheless leans on her initial interpretation 
of development involving a step-by-step progression. 
 
Phase describes change of a definite item within a certain period of 
time and it does imply no constraints as to the kind of change. This term 
is preferred when dealing with cyclical and recurrent changes. Stage 
does imply some form of progression towards an expected end state. A 
stage is constituted by a stretch of time that is characterized by a 
qualitative change that differentiated it from adjacent periods, and 
constitutes one step in progression. Level refers to a specific degree 
within a certain measurement or classification system, without any 
reference to time. It is a relative concept interpretable with regard to the 
kind of scale employed. Level implies hierarchical divisions within a 
system of measurement or classification, and not to any qualitative 
feature per se, even if they may be inherent in the measurement rules 
used to define levels (von Glaserfelder & Kelley, 1982.) Accordingly, it 
is appropriate to define Kohlberg’s hierarchy of moral reasoning as 
stages, because they have been established with longitudinal data 
(temporal change), and to define the hierarchy of the ethic of care as 
levels because they are not established with longitudinal data.  
 
Lawrence Kohlberg originally derived his theory of justice 
development from the longitudinal study of 58 Chicago high 
school boys, with over a 30-year follow-up. In comparison, 
Gilligan’s longitudinal data consisted of 21 women from different 
social backgrounds, aged 15-33, interviewed before and after an 
                                                     
4Kohlberg and his associates (1983) referring to Webster’s 
dictionary, defined development as follows: “to make active, to move 
from the original position to one providing more opportunity for 
effective use, to cause to grow and differentiate along lines natural of this 
kind; to go through a process of natural growth and differentiate along 
lines natural of this kind; to go through a process of natural growth, 
differentiation or evolution by successive changes” (pp. 68-69). Gilligan 
& al. (1990, p. 319) referring to Oxford English Dictionary, pointed out 
that the word ‘develop’ have also other, less common meanings such as 
‘to unfold more fully, bring out all that is potentially contained in’, which 
characterizes her group’s more recent approach. 
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abortion decision within a 1-year interval. This study pursues 
further Gilligan’s effort to establish the developmental path for the 
ethic of care, which remained halfway on her part. For this 
purpose, I interviewed 66 students representing fields of practical 
nursing, social work and law enforcement, 40 women and 26 men, 
aged 16-49, at the beginning of their studies and 59 of them two 
years later. My effort would not have been possible without the 
measure of care-based moral reasoning, the Ethic of Care 
Interview (ECI), developed and validated by Eva Skoe (1993). 
Studies by her and her associates form the backbone to my 
empirical questions. I also measured the students’ justice 
development using Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), 
and emotional empathy using Mehrabian and Epstein’s 
questionnaire of emotional empathy (QMEE). In order to 
illuminate the role of empathy in the domain of morality, I will 
review the literature on empathy, and draw on the framework 
presented by Martin Hoffman (2000). To explore the proposed 
link between the ethic of care and gender, gender roles were also 
examined using the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI). 
The second major concern of this study is to investigate 
participants’ real-life moral conflicts. This concern emerged from 
the data analysis, as I realized that the proper understanding of the 
ethic of care requires analysis in the real-life context. Dennis 
Krebs and Gillian Wark have studied real-life moral reasoning 
with interests that are similar to my own. Their innovations, as 
well as the theoretical revisions of Kohlberg’s theory by so-called 
Neo-Kohlbergians, James Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Muriel Bebeau, 
and Steven Thoma (1999), also contribute to the theoretical 
framework of this study. In addition, because I am a social 
psychologist, I will try to set my study into a wider societal 
context, referring especially to Joan Tronto’s (1993) insightful 
political analysis of the ethic of care, even if this is not necessary 
for the empirical part of this study. 
The literature on morality is filled with morality-related 
concepts that are used in various ways. In order to clarify the 
meanings of the concepts in the scope of this study, I define them 
as follows: 
 
Morality and moral refer to individual’s conceptions of good and 
right, whereas ethic(s) refers to self-chosen morality individual is 
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conscious of and is committed to follow. Ethics is a reflected, systematic 
conceptualization of the good and right, often presented as a moral 
philosophical theory (Airaksinen, 1990.) More specifically, ethics is 
defined as “a systematic attempt to understand moral concepts, such as 
right, wrong, permissible, ought, good, and evil; to establish principles 
and rules of right behavior; and to identify, which virtues and values 
contribute to a life worth living” (Tong, 1998, p. 261). Most studies I 
refer to do not use the concept of ethic(s) in this strict sense, but rather to 
point out that individuals’ morality has a self-conscious or reflective 
element. The concept of moral reasoning refers to cognitive processes 
in moral activity and it is used interchangeably with the concept of 
moral judgment that is used in the Kohlbergian tradition. Moral 
reasoning can be divided into care and justice reasoning. Within this 
study, moral development refers to the development of moral reasoning; 
justice development refers to Kohlberg’s theory and care development 
refers to Gilligan’s theory. The ethic of care and the ethic of justice are 
broader concepts than care and justice development/reasoning, and they 
imply also to other conceptualizations of care and justice, such as 
studying care and justice orientations in moral thought. Orientations 
refer to ways of perceiving and construing moral problems, representing 
also moral thought/reasoning, but lacking a developmental dimension 
(Lyons, 1983.) In literature, the ethic of care has also been called the 
morality of responsibility and relationships, and the ethic of justice 
has been called the morality of rights. For the sake of clarity, these 
concepts are avoided in this study. It should be noted that the morality of 
care/caring or care/caring morality implies to even broader domain, 
including theories of empathy (Hoffman, 1987, 2000) and prosocial 
reasoning (Eisenberg, 1986). The concept of caring is preferred in 
nursing literature, implying the practical connotation of care. Caring 
about refers to the motivational element of care, “paying attention to our 
world in such a way that we focus on continuity, maintenance and 
repair”, whereas taking care of involves responding to these aspects, and 
means taking responsibility for activities that keep our world going 
(Fisher & Tronto, 1990, p. 40). 
 
This study consists of four other parts in addition to the 
introduction (I). Chapters 2-6 form a theoretical framework for 
this study (II), Chapter 7 presents the results of the quantitative 
analyses (III) and Chapter 8 (IV) deepens the quantitative analysis 
with the qualitative analysis, based on the excerpts and 
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illustrations from the interview data. Finally, Chapter 9 (Part V) 
includes the summary and discussion, conclusions as well as 
suggestions for future study and education. In the theoretical 
framework, I will first elaborate how the ethic of care originated 
and what are the assumptions about it as a different voice, 
followed by viewing the ethic of care as a developmental 
phenomenon in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the ethic of 
care in the context of the ethic of justice. Chapter 5 focuses on 
real-life moral reasoning and broadens the perspective to include 
justice reasoning as well. Chapters 2, 3 and 5 are directly relevant 
to the empirical part of this study, whereas Chapter 4 analyzes the 
relation between the ethics of care and justice from the more 
philosophical viewpoint. 
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2. CARE AS A DIFFERENT MORAL 
VOICE 
2.1 Overview of In a Different Voice 
In a Different Voice (1982) was Carol Gilligan’s landmark book as 
a main critic of the dominating Kohlbergian approach in the field 
of moral psychology. From her point of view, cognitivist-
structuralist moral theory, developed in the 1970’s while she 
collaborated with Lawrence Kohlberg as a lecturer and researcher, 
seemed patriarchal and male-centered.  
In a Different Voice is based on three studies, which are 
referred to throughout the book. The literary writing style is 
characteristic of the book and reflects the central assumption of 
Gilligan’s methodology: the way people talk about their lives is of 
significance; the language they use and the connections they make 
reveal the world as they see it and in which they act. All the 
studies relied on semi-structured interviews and included the same 
set of questions: about conceptions of self and morality, and about 
experiences of conflict and choice. ”The method of interviewing 
was to follow the language and logic of the person’s thought, with 
the interviewer asking further questions in order to clarify the 
meaning of a particular response” (Gilligan 1982, p. 2). Interviews 
were analyzed from a hermeneutic interpretative stand, although 
this is not explicitly mentioned. Furthermore, to illuminate the 
historical and political context of genderized moralities, Gilligan 
draws examples and excerpts from literature.  
Nowadays, Gilligan’s method can be classified as a qualitative 
method, best suited to produce new hypotheses and theoretical 
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assumptions rather than prove or disprove them.5 In the early 
1980’s, within the prevailing positivist paradigm, this kind of 
qualitative approach was not yet common or highly approved. 
Many critics of In a Different Voice, while correctly demanding 
statistical analyses on gender differences, miss the different 
quality of Gilligan’s research, viewing it as “a handful of selected 
excerpts from women’s interviews” (e.g., Rest, 1994, p. 11). On 
the other hand, while psychologists have been dissatisfied with the 
modest empirical evidence, many philosophers have been 
dissatisfied with the modest conclusions Gilligan draws from her 
findings applied to ethics and society, demanding her to ”take a 
further step” (Sichel, 1985, p. 157). For example, Sharon Meagher 
(1990, p. 68) writes: ”Gilligan supplies a narrative in which 
characters are not very well drawn, and live on a barren landscape 
devoid of power, economics, sexism, racism and homophobia.” 
That Gilligan does not articulate such concerns more powerfully, I 
think, is due to her faithfulness to the participants’ own voices, not 
explicitly expressing such concerns in open-ended interviews.6 
  
In detail, Gilligan’s initial samples were as follows. The college 
student study included 25 college students, selected at random from the 
course on moral and political choice in the beginning of the studies. 
                                                     
5Banister et al. (1999) define qualitative research as follows: (a) an 
attempt to capture the sense that lies within, and that structures what we 
say about what we do; (b) an exploration, elaboration and 
systematization of the significance of an identified phenomenon; (c) the 
illuminative representation of the meaning of a delimited issue or 
problem. In light of these definitions, In a Different Voice perfectly 
exemplifies a qualitative study.  
6The view held by philosophers (e.g., Kroeger-Mappes, 1994) that 
Gilligan’s theory confirms women’s subordinate status in society, rather 
than helps to transform it, is obviously influenced by the fact that she has 
not been regarded as a psychologist, leaning on empirical observations. 
Quite contrary, Gilligan’s initial approach as a psychologist was radical 
in the context of the positivist paradigm. To quote herself: ”A new 
psychological theory in which girls and women are seen and heard is an 
inevitable challenge to patriarchal order that can remain in place only 
through the continuing eclipse of women’s experience. Bringing the 
experiences of women and girls to full right, although in one sense 
perfectly straightforward, becomes a radical endeavor” (Gilligan, 1993, 
p. xxiv.) 
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Those students were then interviewed as seniors in college and re-
interviewed five years after graduation. 16 women who were dropped 
from the course were also interviewed as seniors and are included in the 
sample. The themes of interviews were identity and moral development 
in early adulthood, ”by relating the view of self and thinking about 
morality to experiences of moral conflict and making of life choices” 
(Gilligan 1982, p. 2). The abortion decision study included 29 women, 
aged 15-33 years, diverse in ethnic background and marital status, clients 
on pregnancy counseling services and abortion clinics in a large 
metropolitan area. They were interviewed during the first trimester of a 
confirmed pregnancy while considering abortion. 21 women were re-
interviewed at the end of the year following their choice.  This study 
examined ”the relation between experience and thought and the role of 
conflict in development” (Gilligan 1982, p. 3). This study was previously 
reported elsewhere by Gilligan and Belenky (1980). The rights and 
responsibilities study further explored the hypotheses arising from the 
two previous studies. The sample consisted of 72 men and 72 women 
matched for age, intelligence, education, occupation and social class at 
nine points, between 6 and 60 years, across the life cycle. A subsample 
of 36 participants was interviewed in more depth, including also 
Kohlberg’s hypothetical justice dilemmas. 
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2.2 Two different voices 
When one begins with the study of women and derives 
developmental constructs from their lives, the outline of moral 
concepts different from that described by Freud, Piaget, or 
Kohlberg begins to emerge and informs a different description of 
development. In this conception, the moral problem arises from 
conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights 
and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is 
contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. The 
conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care 
centers moral development around the understanding of 
responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of 
morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding 
of rights and rules. 
(Gilligan 1982, p. 19) 
Gilligan’s (1982) main argument was that there exist two different 
moral voices, care and justice, that represent two different ways of 
construing moral problems. From the viewpoint of justice, moral 
problems mean conflicts between opposing claims, arising from 
rights and duties between individuals. From the viewpoint of care, 
tensions or ruptures in relationships are regarded as such. 
Accordingly, different actions constitute moral failures; interfering 
and violating rights (that are primary and universal) constitute a 
moral failure within justice perspective, whereas not responding to 
need is a similar failure within the care perspective. Actual 
consequences of moral failures differ as well; justice failure may 
result in violation and oppression, whereas a care failure leads to 
hurt and abandonment. Consequently, different ways of 
interpreting are related to different ways of reasoning about the 
solving of moral conflicts. In justice reasoning, a hierarchy of 
rights and rules is used to resolve moral conflicts by weighing the 
contradicting individual claims, and judging which one is the 
heaviest. In care reasoning, sensitivity to particularities of persons 
and situations, bound to each others’ needs, accompanied by 
judgments of responsibility, takes a central position (Gilligan, 
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1982; Vreeke, 1991.) In concrete, the ethic of justice is guided by 
a commitment to obligation, equity, and fairness, through 
application of rules and established standards, whereas the ethic of 
care is guided by a desire to maintain relationships through 
responding situationally compassionately to needs, feelings and 
desires of others (Gilligan 1982; Caputo, 2000).6 
Care and justice can also be contrasted with regard to their 
underlying conceptions of relationships. In the ethic of care, the 
underlying concept is connection; the image is that of a web which 
ultimately connects everyone. By contrast, the underlying premise 
in the ethic of justice is that people are separated from each other, 
and connection with others is freely contracted (Gilligan, 1982; 
Kroeger-Mappes, 1984). Both ethics implicate the view that 
morality is about relationships, but they take different orientations. 
Justice is “the structure of interpersonal interaction” (Kohlberg, 
Levine & Hewer, 1983, p. 93) basing on recognition of others’ 
rights as a part of widening social network. Rights and duties are 
being understood through the gradually evolving perspectives of 
interpersonal relations, of society, and ultimately of beyond 
society, resulting in understanding the universality of rights (ibid.). 
On the other hand, the ethic of care is centered on responding to 
the needs of others and self, as well as addressing the question of 
how the needs of others and self may tangle together, thus 
requiring more comprehensive understanding of dynamics of 
relationships (Gilligan, 1982). The contrasts between care and 
justice are conceptualized in the Table 1, adopted from Nona 
Lyons (1983) who constructed the most widespread measure of 
the ethic of care, the Moral Orientation Interview (1983). 
                                                     
6Gilligan or other theorists of care have not explicitly defined the 
concept of need, which implies that needs are regarded as subjective. In 
line with this, Tronto (1993) argues that needs cannot be interpreted as 
commodities within the ethic of care. She leans on Martha Nussbaum’s 
definition that meeting others’ needs means helping them to develop 
themselves to become such persons they have potential to become. This 
is close to Frankena’s (1973) view that the ideal state of affair is one in 
which everyone has the best life he or she is capable of. These definitions 
are nevertheless formulated in the context of justice that is required to 
ensure individuals’ equal treatment in society.  
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Table 1.  Conceptions of self and morality  
 
 
Morality of Justice 
Individuals 
defined as 
SEPARATE/ 
OBJECTIVE 
IN RELATION 
TO OTHERS: 
see others as 
one would like to be 
seen by them, in 
objectivity; 
Tend to use a 
morality of justice as 
fairness that rests on 
an understanding of 
RELATIONSHIPS 
AS RECIPROCITY 
between 
separate individuals, 
grounded in the 
duty and obligation 
of their roles. 
Moral 
problems are 
generally construed 
as issues, especially 
decisions, of 
conflicting claims 
between self and 
others (including 
society); resolved 
by invoking 
impartial rules, 
principles, or 
standards, 
considering (1) 
one’s role-
related obligations, 
duty, or 
commitments; or (2) 
standards, rules, or 
principles for self, 
others, or society; 
including 
reciprocity, that is, 
fairness---how one 
should treat another 
considering how 
one would like to be 
treated if in their 
place; 
 
and evaluated 
considering: (1) 
how decisions are 
thought about and 
justified; or (2) 
whether values, 
principles, or 
standards were/are 
maintained, especially 
fairness. 
 
Morality of Care 
Individuals 
defined as 
CONNECTED IN 
RELATION TO 
OTHERS: see others 
in their own 
situations and 
contexts; 
Tend to use a 
morality of care that 
rests on an 
understanding of 
RELATIONSHIPS 
AS RESPONSE TO 
ANOTHER in their 
own terms. 
Moral 
problems are 
generally construed 
as issues of 
relationships or of 
response, that is, 
how to respond to 
others in their 
particular terms; 
resolved through the 
activity of care, 
considering: 
(1) maintaining 
relationships and 
response, that is, the 
connections of 
interdependent 
individuals to one 
another; or (2) 
promoting the 
welfare of others or 
preventing harm; or 
relieving the 
burdens, hurt, or 
suffering (physical 
or psychological) of 
others; 
and evaluated 
considering: (1) what 
happened/will happen, 
or how things worked 
out; or (2) whether 
relationships were/are 
maintained  or 
restored. 
 
Note. Adapted and modified from Lyons (1988). 
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2.3 Genderized voices  
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but 
theme. Its association with women is an empirical observation, 
and it is primarily through women’s voices that I trace its 
development. But this association is not absolute, and the 
contrasts between male and female voices are presented here to 
highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and to 
focus a problem of interpretation rather than represent a 
generalization about either sex. In tracing development, I point 
to the interplay of these voices within each sex and suggest that 
their convergence marks times of crisis and change. No claims 
are made about the origins of the differences described or their 
distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through 
time.  
(Gilligan 1982, p. 2) 
Although Gilligan did not definitely claim that caring voice is 
gendered, her work has inevitably been interpreted to support a 
gender difference. Her most widespread claim is that Kohlberg’s 
theory of justice development is biased against women, describing 
the male-centered, narrow concept of morality. How could this 
proposed bias have arisen? Gilligan points out that in the 
Kohlberg’s critical, theory-building longitudinal study, consisting 
initially of 84 adolescent boys from Chicago, girls or women did 
not simply exist. Consequently, Kohlberg has generalized findings 
concerning men to women, as to represent all humanity. Thus, his 
theory replicates the gender bias also found in Freud’s and 
Piaget’s theories, pointing to female inferiority in morality, and 
establishing men as a normative standard of morality. If the 
original data had included women, different stages of moral 
development would have emerged, as Gilligan derived from her 
own, female data of the abortion decision study.  
Apparently, Gilligan did not conduct a systematic review of 
the literature on gender differences before making the statement 
that the justice-pulling scoring system downscores women (Rest, 
1986). At this time, however, there was some empirical support 
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available for gender differences in Kohlberg’s construct. Women’s 
typical moral thought tended to be scored as Stage 3, as 
interpersonal morality that equates goodness with helping and 
pleasing others, whereas men tended to be scored as Stage 4, 
morality of law and order (Fishkin, Keniston & MacKinnon, 1973; 
Haan, Smith & Block, 1968; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Poppen, 
1974). As an explanation, Stage 3 thought was considered to be 
functional in the lives of mature women as long as their life takes 
place at home. When women enter the arena of male activity, they 
will recognize the inadequacy of this moral perspective and 
progress toward higher stages, where relationships are 
subordinated to rules and universal principles of justice (Kohlberg 
& Kramer, 1969; ref. Gilligan 1982). 
It is worth noting that the earlier version of Kohlberg’s scoring 
system (1958) evidencing gender differences confused form and 
content of moral reasoning. Stage 4 was unified by a law-and-
order orientation, whereas stage 3 was unified by an affiliation-
orientation. Later on, it was noticed that law-and order responses 
could be reliably differentiated by level of sophistication, and 
consequently, law-and-order thinking could be present at other 
stages as well (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Within the renewed 
Standard Issue Scoring system (Colby, Kohlberg & al., 1987, Vol. 
2) judgments of care can be scored (in terms of norms and 
elements) as different stages with different sociomoral 
perspectives. Hence, at least in principle, care-based moral thought 
has been extended to cover all developmental stages (Colby & 
Damon, 1983).  
Nowadays Gilligan’s claim that Kohlberg’s theory is biased 
against women appears to be completely refuted. Walker’s (1991) 
updated review of 80 studies on the Moral Judgment Interview, 
with 10 637 participants, found that 86% of studies did not 
evidence significant gender differences at all. Furthermore, gender 
differences tended to disappear when education or/and occupation, 
which are significant determinants of moral development, were 
controlled by researchers. Thoma (1986) conducted a meta-
analysis of gender differences in 56 samples where the the 
Defining Issue Test, another measure based on Kohlberg’s theory 
was administered, and found a small effect favoring women. Thus, 
gender differences in justice reasoning seem to be virtually non-
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existent, gender accounting for less than 0.5% of variance in both 
meta-analyses.  
Nevertheless, non-existence of the gender bias in justice 
reasoning does not preclude the existence of a different voice from 
justice, which is widely admitted by Kohlbergians (Kohlberg, 
Levine & Hewer, 1983; Rest & al., 1999). Gilligan identified a 
caring voice expressed in many variants by women and believed it 
to be scored indifferently as Stage 3 reasoning within Kohlberg’s 
model. Accordingly, the different qualities of care were not 
recognized. While many deemed the question of the gender bias 
completely answered, Gilligan moderated her view but did not 
change it (Gilligan, 1988). As she later put it (1998, p. 132):  
Would bringing women’s voices into the human conversation 
change the conversation, or would it be just matter of granting 
women equality, meaning that women now could included in a 
conversation from which we had been excluded in the past? Like 
inviting someone into your house and telling them that they can 
go into all the rooms, yet it still is your house. 
2.4 The origin of moral voices 
A close reading of In a Different Voice reveals that Gilligan traces 
the bias in morality research back to Sigmund Freud’s and Jean 
Piaget’s work rather than to Kohlberg’s framework. Both men 
made explicit statements about women’s moral inferiority. While 
exploring children’s marble games, Piaget (1932) observed that 
girls had more tolerant attitude towards rules, were more willing to 
make exceptions and innovations; by contrast, boys were 
fascinated with the legal elaboration of rules and the development 
of fair procedures for emerging conflicts. As a result, the legal 
sense seemed to be more developed in little boys than in girls. In 
turn, Freud (1905) concluded that women’s failure to solve 
oedipal conflict satisfactorily resulted in a compromised superego 
that remained dependent from emotional origins, in contrast with 
men’s superegos. Freud interpreted this gender difference as moral 
inferiority in women, who “show less sense of justice than men... 
they are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of 
affection and hostility” (pp. 257-258). Therefore, girls’ strong and 
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persistent pre-oedipal attachment to their mothers which further 
intensifies in adolescence, would account for their moral failure 
that makes them deficient in relationships as well (ref. Gilligan, 
1982.) 
When tracing the origins of two different moral voices, 
Gilligan turns to Nancy Chodorow (1978) who has argued against 
the male bias in psychoanalytical theory. Chodorow replaces 
Freud’s negative description with a positive account of her own, 
seeing women’s weaker self-other boundaries as the strength men 
lack; girls emerge with a basis for “empathy” built into their 
primary definition of self in a way boys do not (quotation marks 
original). Being of the same gender, mothers experience a deeper 
sense of oneness and connection with their daughters than with 
their sons, and keep daughters longer in their proximity. 
Identification with the same-gender caretaker reinforces the 
daughters’ connection. By contrast, sons are encouraged and 
pushed to grow independent and separate in the prevailing 
mothering culture. As a result, girls come to experience self less 
clearly differentiated and more related to other people than boys 
do.  Due to more flexible self-other boundaries, they emerge “with 
a stronger basis for experiencing another’s needs and feelings as 
one’s own” (Chodorow, 1978, p. 167). 
Gilligan (1982) argues that the emergence of two distinct 
moralities is critically tied to the formation of gender identities. 
Separation from the mother is essential for the development of 
masculine gender identity. By contrast, achieving feminine gender 
identity does not depend on the separation-individuation process 
to the same extent, because girls do not have to define themselves 
by denying their pre-oedipal relational mode of attachment to 
mother, as boys have to do. “Since masculinity is defined through 
separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male 
gender identity is threatened by intimacy, while female gender 
identity is threatened by separation” (p. 8) 7. As evidence, Gilligan 
refers to Chodorow (1978), excerpts from the interviews of her 
data, and to Erik H. Erikson (1968), who maintained that while for 
men identity precedes intimacy in the optimal cycle of human 
separation and attachment, for women these developmental tasks 
                                                     
7For empirical evidence see Gilligan and Pollack (1982), Marongiu 
and  Ekehammar (1998). 
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seem to be fused. “Intimacy goes along with identity, as the 
female comes to know herself as she is known, through her 
relationship with others” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 12). 
Later on, Gilligan moderated her claim of genderized 
moralities. The two moralities, not to treat others unfairly and not 
to turn away from others in need, are present in everyone’s 
childhood experiences, because “all people are born into a 
situation of inequality and no child survives in the absence of adult 
connection” (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988, p. 115). Progress towards 
independence and equality with adults is reflected in justice 
thinking, whereas the experience of attachment is reflected in a 
growing capacity of caring. Due to diverging patterns of 
separation-individuation process, boys’ morality grows justice-
centeredly, and girls’ morality grows, or rather, remains care-
centered. 
However, this neo-psychoanalytic account appears to be a 
troublesome part of Gilligan’s theory. While raising criticism 
against Kohlberg’s cognitive-structuralist theory, she grounded her 
own in an incompatible framework. Neo-psychoanalytical theory 
deals with dynamic categories, whereas cognitive-structuralist 
theory deals with structures, which are relations of meanings, and 
they cannot be explained in terms of one another (see Vreeke, 
1991). Tronto (1993) argues that the continuing force of Gilligan’s 
claims of genderized moralities is based on support from 
prevailing ideological tendencies. Because her work has been 
equated with object-relations psychology, the dominating 
psychoanalytic paradigm and American clinical practice, it gives 
plausibility to her claims.8 There is no empirical research 
exploring “Gilliganian” gender-related moralities in early 
childhood, echoing general methodological difficulties of testing 
psychoanalytical claims (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Walker, 1997). 
Furthermore, even if these claims had had a real basis in the 
1970’s, nothing inevitable follows, because the nurturing culture 
of female mothering is culturally-bound. If fathers were primary 
caretakers, boys’ self-concept might develop as connected, and 
girls’ as separated just as well. It also seems plausible to expect 
that in everyday nurturing practices, care and justice cultivate both 
                                                     
8Later on, Gilligan (1987) acknowledged that Chodorow’s account is 
limited, due to its fundamental gender bias that cannot be abolished.  
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girls and boys, even if the emphasis may differ (Flanagan & 
Jackson, 1987).  
 
There are some other studies related to Gilligan’s claim of the 
origins of moralities. Benenson, Morash and Petrakos (1998) observed 
41 mother-child dyads in a play-setting and they found that girls, in 
comparison to boys, were physically closer to their mothers, engaged 
more in mutual eye contact with their mothers, and were rated higher on 
mutual enjoyment. Children were 4-5 years old. Lollis, Ross and Leroux 
(1996) studied parents’ intervention in property conflicts among 2-4 
year-old siblings, and found that mothers intervened more often and used 
more care reasoning than fathers, but they applied care reasoning to both 
genders equally (ref. Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Pratt, Arnold and Hilbers 
(1998) found that mothers use care orientation more with their 
adolescents than fathers do, and girls were given more care-based 
guidance by both parents. Moreover, Josselson (1987) found in her 
longitudinal study that women’s identity evolved in the web of 
relationships, independent from the type of the solution they had reached 
in the identity crisis. Significant relationships validated their professional 
pursuits and successes. In addition, the relationship with their mother 
determined the guidelines of women’s identity development up to the age 
of 30. 
2.5 The ethic of care and empathy  
By contrast, the care orientation rejects impartiality as an 
essential mark of moral, understands moral judgments as 
situation-attuned perceptions sensitive to others’ needs and to 
the dynamics of particular relationships, construes moral 
reasoning as involving empathy and concern, and emphasizes 
norms of responsiveness and responsibility in our relationships 
with others. 
(Carse, 1991, p. 6) 
As the quotation above indicates, the ethic of care has been 
equated with empathy, sympathy, and altruism, representing the 
affective domain of morality (see Rudnick, 2001). The affective 
domain, in turn, has sometimes been regarded as a motivational 
base for the cognitive domain, fueling cognitive processes of 
reasoning about moral problems (see Sichel, 1985; Hoffman, 
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2000). In Gilligan’s writing, at times concerns of care refer to 
reasoned justifications for actions, and at others they refer to 
passions and emotions. Nevertheless, she does not share the view 
that care merely fuels moral judgment, but rather, sees care as an 
independent form of moral judgment, with its own standards 
(Sichel, 1985). In general, emotionalism has been regarded as the 
trademark of the ethic of care that is based on reasoning from 
particulars and viewing relationships as a basic unit of moral 
analysis. This leads to advocating compassionate emotions rather 
than rule-guided conduct (Carse 1991; see Rudnick, 2001). 
Hence, the voice of care is regarded as affective-toned, but the 
function of affects and emotions within the voice remains 
unarticulated in Gilligan’s writing (1982). Outside of her book, the 
ethic of care has nevertheless been viewed as an affective-based 
alternative for the ethic of justice with the Kantian emphasis on 
rationality (e.g., Blum, 1988; Tong, 1991). Admittedly, the 
Kohlbergian approach recognizes affect as an integral part of 
justice judgment, but always mediated by or structured by 
cognitive processes, such as role-taking (Kohlberg & al., 1983). 
As philosopher Lawrence Blum (1988, p. 475) puts it: 
“Understanding the needs, interests, and welfare of another 
person, and understanding the relationship between oneself and 
that other requires a stance toward that person informed by care, 
love, empathy, compassion, and emotional sensitivity.”9 Finally, 
psychologist Martin Hoffman (2000) argues that affective-based 
empathy is congruent with actual responding as well as with the 
moral principle of caring that is activated through empathic 
distress a moral agent feels towards suffering people.10 
                                                     
9Kant viewed emotions and feelings as transitory, changeable and 
capricious, and accordingly, emotionally motivated conduct likely to be 
unreliable, inconsistent, unprincipled, or even irrational (Blum, 1980). 
Obviously much of the criticism against Kohlberg’s theory as “cold” and 
individualistic is due to the fact that it is associated with Kant’s theory, 
even if he explicitly rejected Kantian view of emotions (see Kohlberg, 
Levine & Hewer, 1983). Blum (1988) argues that despite this remark, 
Kohlberg almost always relegates care as involving emotion to a 
secondary moral status, which does not make his view significantly 
different from Kant’s, who also acknowledged a secondary place for 
emotions in some of his writings.  
10It is characteristic for this tendency that Scottish moral 
philosophers in the 1700s, especially David Hume, have been regarded 
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Working from Chodorow (1978), Gilligan (1982) sees 
empathic capacities arising from women’s fluid self-other 
boundaries that make others’ feelings accessible to them. She 
distinguishes the capacity of empathy necessary for taking the role 
of “the particular other”, which is evident in girls’ play in the best-
friend dyad. In contrast, the capacity of taking the role of the 
“generalized other” (Mead, 1934) is an abstraction of human 
relationship, and fosters sense of justice, as evident in boys’ 
competitive games. Gilligan makes the statement of affective-
based empathy as a critical component of care explicit in her 
article with Grant Wiggins (1988 p. 188):  
A more fluid conception of self in relation to others is tied to 
growth of the affective imagination, namely, the ability is enter 
into and understanding through taking on and experiencing the 
feelings of others (p. 122)... What appears as dispassion within a 
justice framework appears as detachment from a care 
perspective: the ability to stand back and look at others as if 
one’s feelings were disconnected from their feelings and one was 
not affected by what happens to them.  
 
Another theorist of care, Nel Noddings (1984, p. 30) raises the 
similar point:  
I do not ‘put myself in the other’s shoes’, so to speak, by 
analyzing his reality as objective data and then asking: ‘How 
would I feel in this situation?’ On the contrary, I set aside my 
temptation to analyze and to plan. I do not project; I receive the 
other into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a 
duality…. The seeing and feeling are mine, but only partly and 
temporarily mine, as on loan to me.11  
                                                                                                            
as forerunners of the ethic of care (Baier, 1987; Noddings, 1984; Tronto, 
1993). In a way, they can be regarded psychologists of their time, and 
their discussion of moral sentiments anticipated findings of modern 
empathy research.  
11Noddings contrasts the morality of “principle” vs. caring which she 
regards as “essentially nonrational” (p. 25). In her model of caring, 
“engrossment” is followed by motivational displacement, and caring is 
finally validated by the reception of the person-cared-for; caring “is 
complete when it is fulfilled in both” (p. 68). Ethical caring originates 
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The distinction between perspective or role-taking and 
emotional responsiveness pointed out by Gilligan and Noddings is 
congruent with the categories that have been established by the 
current empathy researchers who regard both as crucial elements 
in empathic capacities (Davis, 1983; Hoffman, 2000). Albert 
Mehrabian and Norman Epstein (1972), the constructors of a 
measure of emotional empathy (QMEE), stated that perspective 
taking recognizes another’s feelings, but emotional responsiveness 
also includes the sharing of those feelings, at least at the gross 
affect (pleasant-unpleasant) level. In turn, Davis (1980, 1983) held 
that empathy is a set of inter-related but discernible dimensions. 
Consequently, his construct of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI) measures dispositional perspective taking and empathic 
concern.12 Finally, Martin Hoffman (2000) has presented the most 
comprehensive model of empathic arousal, including three 
affective-based and two cognitive-based modes of arousal, 
including perspective or role-taking. In contrast with Gilligan and 
Wiggins’s (1988) outline, he asserts that affective and cognitive 
modes of arousal do reinforce and complement each other, rather 
than exclude each other, empathic response being basically multi-
determined. To summarize so far, both aspects contribute to 
empathy that is defined as “an affective response more appropriate 
to another’s situation than one’s own” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 4). 
 
                                                                                                            
from early experiences of natural caring in the child-mother dyad, and is 
based on maintaining and nurturing the ethical ideal of self as caring. For 
the well-grounded criticism of noncognitivism, see Flanagan (1991); of 
being female rather than feminist theory, see Tong (1998), and being 
unable to resolve moral conflicts and prevent oppression, see Tronto 
(1993). Despite the narrowness of Noddings’s approach, I regard her 
description of the qualities of care illuminating, especially her emphasis 
on the nonverbal essence of caring: “In a relationship of genuine caring, 
there is no felt need on either part to specify what sort of transformation 
has taken place” (p. 20). 
12In addition, it also includes the personal distress scale (assessing 
the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in response to 
extreme distress in others) and the fantasy scale (measuring the tendency 
to imaginatively transpose oneself into fictional situations, such as books, 
movies and plays). 
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Mimicry has two distinct steps that operate in rapid sequence. (1) 
The observer automatically imitates and synchronizes changes in her/his 
facial expression, voice and posture with the slightest changes in another 
person’s facial, vocal, or posture expressions of feelings. (2) This triggers 
afferent feedback that produces feelings that match the feelings of 
another person. Classical conditioning refers to conditioned responses 
that are acquired when one observes someone in distress at the same time 
as having one’s own independent source of distress. Later on, the 
conditioned stimulus e.g. seeing a fearful face can evoke one’s distress 
alone. In turn, direct association means that cues in another’s situation 
remind observers of similar experiences in their own past and evoke 
feelings that fit with another’s situation. These modes form an empathy-
arousing package that is automatic, quick-acting and involuntary, and 
assure a certain degree of match between feelings of empathizers and 
victims. In mediated association the other’s distressed state is 
communicated through language. This means that verbal messages 
informing about the other’s state must be semantically processed and 
decoded by observers. Decoded messages then enable empathic affect in 
observers, when they relate them to their own experiences, or 
alternatively, conjure up visual or auditory images of the other, 
responding to them through direct association or mimicry. Role-taking 
means cognitive-mediated processing of imagining how the other feels 
(other-focused role-taking) or how oneself would feel (self-focused 
role-taking) in the other’s place or situation (Hoffman, 2000.) According 
to Batson, Early and Salvarani (1997) it is of critical importance to 
differentiate between those two modes of role-taking, since they have 
different motivational consequences. Other-focused role-taking produces 
empathic response that in turn evokes willingness to help, whereas self-
focused role-taking produces empathic response and personal distress 
that may shift the focus to relieving one’s own negative state, instead of 
helping. Moreover, self-focused role-taking may lead to erroneously 
projecting one’s feelings onto the other (ibid.). Compared to the affective 
modes of empathic arousal, role-taking has a greater voluntary 
component due to cognitive demands. In a real situation, while coupled 
with affective modes, its controllability is however questionable 
(Hoffman, 2000). It is worth noting that in the definitions by other 
researchers, role-taking also entails understanding of others’ internal 
states and cognitions, in addition to feelings (see Eisenberg, Zhou & 
Zoller, 2001) and there are different measures for perceptual, cognitive 
and affective role-taking (Davis, 1994). 
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There has been much confusion about the concepts related to 
affective-based empathy in research literature. According to 
Nancy Eisenberg (2000), empathy is an affective response that 
stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s 
emotional state or condition and is similar to what the other is 
feeling or would be expected to feel. With further cognitive 
processing, purely empathic response may turn into sympathy, 
which is not the same as what the other person is feeling or 
expected to feel, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for 
the other. Alternatively, an initial response may turn into personal 
distress or some combination of distress and sympathy. Personal 
distress can be defined as “self-focused, aversive, affective 
reaction to the apprehension of another’s emotion”, such as 
discomfort or anxiety (see Eisenberg, 2000, pp. 671-672.)  
In Eisenberg’s terms, mimicry, classical conditioning and 
association often aroused automatically in face-to-face contacts, 
represent empathic response, because they assure a certain degree 
of match between feelings of the observer and the victim.13 In 
alignment with Eisenberg’s view, Hoffman (2000) postulates that 
both aspects, empathy and sympathy, are involved in an empathic 
reaction; empathic distress is based on the vicarious feelings of 
other, whereas sympathetic distress is based on the feelings of 
concern and compassion for other. In the beginning of life, 
empathic distress dominates, but later it is transformed in part into 
a feeling of sympathetic distress, when self-and-other-boundaries 
grow more differentiated. Empathic distress motivates to comfort 
one’s own distress, whereas sympathetic distress motives to help 
the other. Empathic distress, however, prevails as a part of 
advanced modes of emotional response in all ages (Hoffman, 
2000.) According to Hoffman’s theory of empathy development, 
cognitive and emotional aspects are inter-connected; the mode of 
empathic response depends on one’s cognitive role-taking level.  
 
                                                     
13This match is due to that (a) all humans have certain distress 
experiences in common (such as loss, injury, deprivation) (b) they are 
structurally similar and therefore likely to process distress-relevant 
information similarly and (c) they are likely to respond to similar events 
with similar feelings (Ekman, Friesen, O’Sullivan & Chan, 1987, ref. 
Hoffman, 2000). 
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The most rudimentary form of empathic distress is reactive 
newborn cry based on imitation. The newborn is responding to a cue of 
distress (cry) by the other newborn by feeling distressed himself/herself, 
indicating that he/she senses the other as part of the self.  During the first 
year of life, when the child has no reliable sense of the self as physically 
distinct from others, the empathic response is a general undifferentiated 
distress that is passive and involuntary, aroused by mimicry and 
conditioning. This is called egocentric empathic distress, child 
responding to another child’s distress as though she/he were suffering 
herself/himself. Early in the second year, when the more advanced self-
other differentiation emerges this mode of empathic distress gives way to 
quasi-egocentric empathic distress. The child is aware that it is 
someone else who is suffering, but she/he confuses other’s internal state 
with his/her own state. The child responds to the perceived distress in 
ways that would be helpful mainly for herself, for example giving one’s 
own favorite toy to other. At the end of the second year, veridical 
empathic distress begins to develop along with role-taking capacity. 
Children realize that others have inner states independent of their own 
and come closer to feeling what the other is actually feeling; one must 
respond to cues about the other’s state rather than to respond to one’s 
own distress. When acquiring language resources, the child becomes 
capable of empathizing with a variety of increasingly complex emotions. 
Finally the child can be empathetically aroused by information about 
someone’s distress even in that person’s absence. The most advanced 
level is empathy for another’s experience beyond the immediate 
situation, emerging in late childhood. This extends empathy from the 
other’s immediate situation to the larger context of the distress, such as 
life situation, including complex things. As one acquires the ability to 
form social concepts, one’s empathic distress may be combined with a 
mental representation of an entire group or class of people suffering, for 
example the homeless and bombing victims (Hoffman 2000.) 
Despite the assumed congruity between cognitive and 
affective aspects of empathy, research literature reveals that they 
have quite distinct contributions to behavior. Perspective-taking 
has been found to be associated with better interpersonal 
functioning, higher self-esteem and relatively little emotionality, 
whereas affective-based empathy has been found to be related to 
selfless concern for others (Davis, 1983) as well as to prosocial 
behavior in general (for review, see Eisenberg, 2000). In detail, 
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affective empathy is found to be associated with the ability to 
accurately recognize facial expressions of emotion (Riggio, Tuffer 
& Coffaro, 1989), with helping behavior and neuroticism 
(Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell & Hagen, 1985), as well as with 
adolescents’ prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Zhou & Koller, 2001; 
Raboteg-Saric, 1997). With regard to relationship skills, affective 
empathy obviously contributes to warmth and good 
communication, whereas perspective taking contributes to the 
avoidance of rude and egoistic acts and constructive conflict 
management (see Davis, 1994). Recent research further suggests 
that the affective dimension of empathy is more central to overall 
empathy as well as to prosocial behavior. Cliffordson (2002) 
found that within the IRI, empathic concern constitutes a general 
factor that underlies perspective-taking and fantasy scales. In their 
study among Brazilian adolescents, Eisenberg, Zhou and Koller 
(2001) elaborated a model within which both perspective taking 
and sympathy (= empathic concern, measured by the IRI) 
predicted prosocial moral reasoning, which in turn predicted 
prosocial behavior. Interestingly, sympathy predicted directly 
prosocial behavior as well, whereas the effect of perspective 
taking was indirect through moral reasoning. In addition, high 
sympathy or alternatively, high perspective taking predicted high 
moral reasoning, the latter being significant only for males. 
Eisenberg et al. (2001) concluded that perspective taking is like an 
information-gathering tool, which can obviously be used for good 
and bad, for example to manipulate others. They added that 
perspective taking skills may play more important role in the 
moral reasoning for males than for females. 
  
Gender differences in empathy-related capacities across life span are 
an issue closely related to Gilligan’s claim of gender-related moralities. 
The overall picture of research is mixed. 1-year old girls have been found 
to react with more empathy and distress than boys do, when 
experimenters pretend to hurt themselves (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 
Wagner & Chapman, 1992). At the ages of 6, 9 and 12 months, girls 
have been found to initiate more social interactions than boys do (Gunnar 
& Donahue, 1980). Females have been found to be more skilled encoders 
and decoders of nonverbal and emotional messages (Hall, 1978; 
Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; McClure; 2000; Riggio, Tucker & Coffaro, 
1989; Thayter & Johnson, 2000). Recognizing emotional expressions 
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seems to regulate girls’ behavior (Dunham, Dunham, Tran & Akhtar, 
1991; Rosen, Adamson & Bakeman, 1992), and is positively related to 
their social abilities (Leppänen & Hietanen, 2001). Riggio, Tucker and 
Coffaro (1989) found that women’s success in an empathy-related task 
was associated with emotional empathy, whereas men’s success was 
associated with cognitive empathy. Gibbs, Arnold and Buckhart (1984) 
found that female adolescents at Stage 3 in Kohlberg’s theory used more 
empathic role-taking in justifying their moral choices than their male 
counterparts, and Garmon, Basinger, Gregg and Gibbs (1996) replicated 
this result among the 9-81 year-old. A consistent gender difference, 
favoring women  has been found in studies of self-reported emotional 
empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983), but not in self-reported cognitive 
empathy and perspective taking, nor in most studies of physiological 
responding  (for review see Davis, 1994). To conclude, the greatest 
differences have been found in self-reports, potentially distorted by 
women’s willingness to present themselves emotionally empathic, in 
keeping with the traditional gender role expectations. Supporting this, 
self-reported femininity and empathy has been found to be associated 
with each other (Foushee, Davis & Archer, 1979; Karniol, Gabay, 
Ochion & Harari, 1998; Skoe, Cumberland, Eisenberg, Hansen & Perry, 
2002). However, to date actual affective responsiveness has not been 
studied extensively enough for any final conclusions to be drawn about 
gender differences (Davis, 1994). Nevertheless, it seems that affective-
based empathy plays more important role in social skills for females than 
males. 
 
Gilligan and Wiggins (1988) argue that the strength of 
empathy-based caring lies in its compelling emotion that 
necessitates ending a victim’s suffering instantly, allowing no 
excuses, while more cognitively sophisticated perspective allows 
to see both perspectives, a victim’s as well as a victimizer’s, 
potentially leading to rationalized inaction. According to Hoffman 
(2000), this compelling motivation is based on the primitive 
modes of empathic arousal, namely mimicry, classical 
conditioning and direct association that are largely involuntary and 
cognitively shallow and therefore can be aroused by the victim’s 
nonverbal cues alone. However, moral passivity pointed out by 
Gilligan and Wiggins (1988) can also be caused by empathic over-
arousal, rather than by adopting multiple perspectives of victims 
and victimizers, as they propose. If empathic distress grows too 
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excessive, an empathizer turns to alleviating one’s own uneasiness 
rather than alleviating the sufferer’s uneasiness. He/she may leave 
a situation, employ distancing perceptual strategies, or even 
derogate and blame a suffering other. For example, highly 
empathic nursing students had difficulties staying in the same 
room with their severely ill patients, even though they desired to 
help them (Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson & Richardson, 
1979). Drawing on some empirical evidence, Hoffman (2000) 
proposes however, that within committed relationships, empathic 
over-arousal is likely to intensify helping, especially when 
empathizers are able to help, when leaving a situation is not an 
option.  
In addition, empathy can be flawed in less acute situations as 
well; we are more empathic to those familiar/similar to ourselves 
than to those dissimilar to ourselves (familiarity bias). It is also 
likely that we empathize more with those present in the immediate 
situation than with those absent, or being distressed in the future 
(here-and-now bias) (for empirical evidence, see Hoffman 2000, 
pp. 197-213). These biases can however be reduced or controlled 
by using moral principles of justice as well as by multiple 
empathizing. That is, one should consider immediate and long-
term consequences of one’s action for all those who are 
concerned, being present as well as absent, sometimes even future 
generations (Hoffman, 1991, 2000).  
To summarize this part of the review, the current view on 
empathy is far more complex than that outlined by Gilligan and 
Wiggins (1988). Nevertheless, it seems that the link between 
affective-based empathy and care is more obvious than the link 
between affective-based empathy and justice. Empathy is 
congruent with some principles of distributive justice, such as 
need and effort, whereas it may be less congruent with some 
others, such as competence and productivity (Hoffman, 2000). The 
small number of studies has not found relation between affective-
based empathy and justice reasoning (Kalle & Suls, 1978; Keljo, 
1995). With regard to Gilligan’s ethic of care, Skoe, Hansen and 
Nickerson (2001) found that women at Level 2 scored higher than 
women at other levels. Hence, it seems that the taken-for-granted 
bond between the ethic of care and empathy has not been 
empirically established to date.  
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2.6 Findings on care orientation 
Since In a Different Voice was published, the ethic of care has 
been constructed in various ways in research endeavours. As 
James Rest (1986) analyzed care research in terms of his four-
component model of morality as follows: “At different times the 
care orientation is characterized in terms of moral sensitivity 
(Component 1), of judging what is morally right (Component 2), 
of a person’s values and what a person is most invested in 
(Component 3) and at times the care orientation seems to be a 
theory about the entire organization of personality. It is difficult to 
know what the care orientation is.” In keeping with Rest’s notion, 
different definitions of care, as well as methodologies purported to 
assess it, have been diverse. 
The most widespread measure of care, Lyons’s procedure 
(1983) conceptualizes care and justice as moral orientations, a 
specific way to perceive and orient to moral problems, indicating 
predominantly moral sensitivity (e.g., Gilligan & Attanucci, 
1988). Some studies have explored moral voices in terms of moral 
motivation, asking value preferences over care and justice 
(Forsyth, Nye & Kelley, 1988; Stimpson, Jeffson & Neff, 1992) or 
orientation preferences over real-life or hypothetical conflicts 
(Ford & Lowery, 1986; Yacker & Weinberg, 1987). Recently, 
studies by Skoe and associates (Skoe, 1998) have investigated care 
as a mode of moral judgment (Component 2) that is expected to 
provide “a description of the conceptual tools used to judge which 
course of action is the morally right one” (Rest, 1986, p. 116). 
Studies of prosocial reasoning by Eisenberg (1986) and her 
associates can also be placed into the component of moral 
judgment. Finally, Component 4 of moral character is lacking 
empirical studies, even if philosophers are eager to relate the ethic 
of care to the virtue ethics, implicating stable dispositions in 
personality (e.g., Tong, 1998). To conclude, the heterogeneity of 
methodology and conceptualizations makes the evaluation of the 
empirical status of Gilligan’s theory a complicated task. 
With regard to Gilligan’s most famous claim of gender-related 
moral orientations, there is a recent extensive meta-analysis 
available, covering all methodologies designed to assess her 
theory. Jaffee and Hyde (2000) analyzed 113 different studies 
(160 samples with 5783 men and 6654 women in measures of care 
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orientation, 95 samples with 831 men and 4307 women in 
measures of justice orientation). The meta-analysis showed that 
73% (care orientation) and 72% (justice orientation) of studies did 
not reveal a statistically significant gender difference. 
Furthermore, the detected gender differences were mediated by 
methodology and characteristics of samples. They were likely to 
be found in measures that did not include moral dilemmas (e.g., 
value questionnaires); and when they were included, gender 
differences were likely to be found on self-generated real-life 
dilemmas rather than hypothetical dilemmas. The measurement 
scale had an effect as well: a categorical coding of moral 
orientations produced more differences than a continuous 
outcome. Lyons’s (1983) original dichotomist scoring system 
yielded the most significant difference in justice orientation, 
whereas the modified versions of Lyons’s coding scheme with 
more refined classification (e.g., Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988, 
Krebs & al., 1994) did so in care orientation.14 Proposed 
differences were likely to be found among adolescents, aged 12-18 
years (in care orientation) and among younger adults, aged 20-49 
years (both orientations). By contrast, no differences were found 
in university samples, whereas samples of older adults were too 
few to make any generalizations. Overall, the magnitude of the 
effect size15 for gender differences in care orientation was d = -.28, 
and d = .19 in justice orientation, respectively, leading to the 
conclusion that “although distinct moral orientations may exist, 
these orientations are not strongly associated with gender” (Jaffee 
& Hyde, 2000, p. 719). 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the proposed gender differences are 
mediated by adopted gender roles in socialization process, rather than 
determined by biological sex per se. A handful of studies have 
investigated this issue. Pratt and Royer (1982) found that care orientation 
was associated with femininity for women, whereas Ford and Lowery 
(1986) found this to be a case for men. Wark and Krebs (1996) did not 
                                                     
14Respondents’ global response to actual real-life conflicts were 
originally classified into three categories (care, split, justice). Gilligan 
and Attanucci (1988) employed a 5-point classification.  
15The effect size d was defined as the mean for men minus the mean 
for women, divided by the means within-sex standard deviation (Hedges 
& Becker, 1986; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). 
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find any relation between moral orientation and gender role measured by 
the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence and Helmreich, 1978) 
among university students. By contrast, Haviv and Leman (2002), using 
the PAQ as well, found that for feminine and androgynous respondents, 
prosocial dilemmas pulled more strongly for care orientation, compared 
with masculine and undifferentiated respondents. The Bem Sex Role 
Inventory (BSRI) has also yielded nonsignificant findings (Barnett, 
Quackenbush & Sinisi, 1995; Glover, 2001). Furthermore, some 
dissertation studies have failed to find any significant gender role effects 
on moral orientation and reasoning (Abaris, 1990; Hagar, 1990; Stookey, 
1994). To summarize, the support for gender role-mediated moral 
orientations is modest. The sparsity of findings may also be due to that 
gender role measures established in the 1970’s are outdated in measuring 
potential modern gender differences, while cultural changes in traditional 
gender roles have taken place (Hoffman & Borders, 2001; Twenge, 
1997; Wilcox & Francis, 1997). 
 
Even if Gilligan did not argue for gender-specific but gender-
related moralities, some empirical results nevertheless question 
her initial claim about moralities as internal dispositions. Of most 
significance are the accumulating findings that the observed 
gender differences on real-life dilemmas (asked within Lyons’s 
Moral Orientation Interview) are mediated by contents of the 
dilemma. Men tend to report dilemmas involving impersonal 
relationships and eliciting predominantly justice orientation, 
whereas women tend to report dilemmas involving personal 
relationships and eliciting predominantly care orientation (Pratt, 
Golding & Hunter, 1988; Pratt & al., 1991; Walker, DeVries & 
Treventhan, 1987). Within a more defined classification, Wark 
and Krebs (1996, 1997, 2000) have found that prosocial 
dilemmas, involving reacting to the needs of others and reacting to 
conflicting demands, elicited mainly care-based judgments 
whereas antisocial dilemmas, involving reacting to transgressions 
and temptations to behave illegally and amorally, elicited mainly 
justice-based judgments across gender. Interestingly, in Wark and 
Krebs’s study (2000) the only gender difference emerged on a 
dilemma involving social pressure, eliciting more justice-based 
judgments among men, whereas among women, the distribution of 
moral orientation usage was roughly equal. In addition, 
standardized Kohlbergian dilemmas (Colby & al., 1987) tend to 
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elicit justice-oriented judgments among both genders (Krebs, 
Vermeulen, Denton & Carpendale 1994; Walker, DeVries & 
Treventhan, 1987; Wark & Krebs, 1996; 1997), and care 
orientation is found to be associated with Stage 3 reasoning (Krebs 
& al., 1994; Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997).16  
It has also been found that moral orientation is not very 
consistent over time. Walker (1989) found that only 50% of 
participants in a longitudinal study showed the same moral 
orientation when considering real-life conflicts 2 years apart. Pratt, 
Arnold and Hilbers (1998) interviewed 40 families with early 
adolescent children twice with the 2-year interval, and asked 
parents to tell a narrative, describing an incident in which she/he 
has tried to teach a value chosen as the most important for the 
child. The follow-up revealed that parents’ moral orientation in 
child-rearing was not particularly consistent over time. In turn, 
Ford and Lowery (1986) asked university students to describe 
three important real-life moral conflicts, read a paragraph 
outlining the care and justice orientations, derived from In a 
Different Voice, and then rate the extent to which they had used 
these orientations when considering their conflict. They found that 
female university students were more consistent in care orientation 
whereas their male counterparts were more consistent in justice 
orientation over the period of 3-4 weeks. To conclude, these 
studies show that the individual’s moral orientation varies 
according to the type of moral dilemma within the same time, and 
there is not particular consistency across time, at least over years. 
Consequently, as Walker (1991, p. 344) remarked, the term “moral 
orientation” referring to intraindividual consistency across 
different types of conflicts as well as time might be inappropriate 
in describing care and justice aspects in moral reasoning.  
                                                     
16Wark and Krebs (1996) classified criterion judgments of Colby et. 
al’s (1987) scoring manual according to Lyons’s (1983) procedure and 
found that the Moral Judgment Interview pulls for justice reasoning 
across all stages as follows: Stage 1: 100% justice; Stage 1/2: 94% 
justice; Stage 2: 83% justice; Stage 2/3: 67% justice; Stage 3: 68% 
justice; Stage 3/4: 77% justice; Stage 4: 92% justice; Stage 4/5: 88% 
justice and Stage 5: 90% justice. 
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2.7 Findings on self-concept 
An issue closely related to moral orientation is that of self-
concept. Divergent self-concepts originating from childhood 
should provide a basis for divergent moralities (Gilligan, 1982). 
While the childhood effects have not been directly scrutinized so 
far, participants’ self-concepts have been explored. In Lyons’s 
procedure (1983), in addition to a real-life conflict, participants are 
asked “How would you describe yourself to yourself” and then to 
discuss the changes happened in them within last five years. In the 
pioneering study (Lyons, 1983, N = 30) two self-concepts 
emerged; the separate one, defining himself/herself through 
his/her abilities, and the connected one, orienting toward others 
and seeing them in their own terms. Separate self-concept was 
related to the use of justice orientation and connected self-concept 
to the use of care orientation; women had more connected self-
concepts than men, as predicted from Gilligan’s (1982) theory. 
Pratt et al. (1988, N = 40) replicated these results, whereas Pratt et 
al. (1991, N = 64) found that the relation holds true only for men. 
Interestingly, connected self-concept was sparse, demonstrated 
only by 12% of those adults (35-85 years), whereas 60% were 
scored separate/individuated and 28% were scored mixed (Pratt, 
Pancer, Hunsberger & Manchester, 1990). Lyons (1992) 
investigated adolescent girls in a boarding school and observed 
both connected and separated self-concepts among them. 
Moreover, many connected girls seemed to face difficulties in 
sustaining their self-concept in adolescence. 
No longitudinal investigations about the stability of self-
concept have been conducted as of yet. Some studies with cross-
sectional data suggest that it does fluctuate over life-span, 
obviously according to the roles of parenting. Pratt et al. (1988) 
found that mothers had a more connected self-concept than fathers 
or non-parent women, and in addition, mothers were more care 
oriented than fathers. Pratt et al. (1990) replicated gender-related 
results among middle-aged adults, but not among older adults. 
There are no studies on self-concepts available asking about 
several moral conflicts from participants, where one could explore 
whether connected persons are consistent in their preference for 
care across different types of conflicts, or whether they choose to 
constantly report care-eliciting moral conflicts. If connected self-
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concept makes persons prone to care issues, this should be the 
case. However, it does seem that because moral orientation usage 
is largely determined by the type of dilemma, self-concept is a less 
important factor in moral reasoning than Gilligan (1982) and 
Lyons (1983) expected. From the methodological viewpoint, on 
the other hand, a question can be raised whether Lyons’s 
dichotomist measure masks the real complexity of self-concept, or 
whether it plainly reflects different cognitive styles, embedded in 
moral rhetoric, genders might prefer atomistic-separated and 
holistic-connected ones (Wingfield & Haste, 1987). 
To summarize, the status of “the different voice” remains 
somewhat unclear. While support for gender-related moral 
orientations is modest at best (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), it does not 
altogether eliminate the existence of the different voice. 
Interestingly, qualitative studies based on participants’ narratives 
continue to support even gender-related moral voices (Elwin-
Novak, 1999; Finlay & Love, 1998; Mitchell, 2002). Johnston’s 
(1988) study on 60 adolescents’ moral reasoning crystallizes much 
what is relevant at this point.17 Adolescents were asked to solve 
two dilemmas in Aesop’s fables, and after a spontaneous solution, 
they were cued to resolve it in another way. Despite gender 
differences on solutions, both genders were able to produce the 
alternative solution and both solutions were understood by both 
genders. Still, girls showed more competence at switching 
orientations than boys, and boys most often preferred only justice 
orientation in their reflected solution, whereas girls preferred both. 
Johnston also observed that the boys chose care orientation only 
when they judged the relationship to continue after conflict 
resolution. He interpreted this as a fundamental gender difference. 
Using care orientation signaled the existence of relationship, and 
for boys, it did not exist if the individual differences in the conflict 
counterparts appeared too great.18 Hence, there are two different 
ways to construe moral conflicts that are accessible to both 
genders, and individuals are capable of switching between them. 
                                                     
17Johnston’s study also remarked a watershed in Gilligan’s thinking 
(1988, p. xxii). 
18Interestingly, a gender-difference evoking fable presented a 
conflict between a dog and an ox. The dog wanted to sleep in the hay 
intended for the ox’s food. 
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Subtle individual or gender differences can best be revealed by 
qualitative methods that explore individuals’ narratives, rather 
than by outcomes of thought process, as Finlay and Love (1998) 
point out. 
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3. CARE AS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Carol Gilligan’s pioneering study  
The abortion study demonstrates the centrality of the concepts of 
responsibility and care in women’s constructions of moral 
domain, the close tie in women’s thinking between conceptions 
of the self and morality, and ultimately the need for expanded 
developmental theory that includes, rather than rules out from 
consideration, the differences in feminine voice. Such an 
inclusion seems essential, not only for explaining the 
development of women but also for understanding in both sexes 
the characteristics and precursors of an adult moral conception. 
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 105) 
Many reviews of Gilligan’s work summarize her claims as follows 
(1) there are two different moral voices (2) that are gender-related 
and (3) Kohlberg’s theory is biased against women (e.g., Jaffee & 
Hyde, 2000; Walker, 1991). As reviewed in the preceding 
chapters, the first one seems to be confirmed, the second one is 
ambiguous, whereas the third one is disconfirmed. The fourth one, 
which I discovered, is that the ethic of care follows a 
developmental path, is absent in most reviews, even if many 
counter-critics (Kohlberg & al., 1983; Rest, 1986; Sichel, 1985) 
demand further evidence for a parallel developmental path of care. 
It might be that the polemic style of Gilligan’s writing, tying 
development to neopsychoanalytical account, and her silence 
about specific developmental determinants has obscured this part 
of her work. Gilligan’s major point was that a different 
developmental path would have emerged if women had been 
included in Kohlberg’s original study, and she remains cautious to 
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make any explicit statements concerning the character of 
development. 
Crucially, participants in Gilligan’s longitudinal study were 
women who were undergoing a severe crisis. These women were 
referred to the study through pregnancy counseling services and 
abortion clinics, as some counselors saw participating in the study 
as an effective means of crisis-intervention. Consequently, the 
data came from women who had plausibly a greater conflict than 
usual over the decision. Gilligan considered this type of crisis as 
illuminating from the moral aspect, because “when a woman 
considers whether to continue or abort a pregnancy, she 
contemplates a decision that affects both self and others and 
engages directly the critical issue of hurting. Since the choice is 
ultimately hers and therefore one for which she is responsible, it 
raises precisely those questions of judgment that have been most 
problematic to women.” (p. 71.) She uses the magnification of 
crisis to reveal the process of developmental transition and to 
delineate “patterns of change” over a one-year period covering the 
time of a potential pregnancy. In her analysis, she outlines the 
levels of care reasoning. Based on them, Eva Skoe (1993) later 
constructed a developmental measure, the Ethic of Care Interview 
(see Appendix A). 
Based on the interview excerpts, it appears that these women 
struggled with moral crisis, using such deontic words as should, 
ought, right, but good, better, and bad as well.19 The character of 
individual crisis differed, giving rise to distinct developmental 
levels. There are adolescent girls at the first level, concerned 
selfishly with their own survival; not solely in financial and 
practical terms, but in terms of psychological survival, how to 
manage by themselves without emotional support. (As an example 
of this helplessness, one girl explained that she became pregnant, 
because nobody was willing to help her). The transition from 
selfishness towards responsibility means being socially included, 
because morality relies on adopted societal values, shared norms 
and expectations. At the second level, “the conventional feminine 
voice emerges with clear clarity, defining the self and proclaiming 
                                                     
19See Nunner-Winkler (1984) for another interpretation. She argues 
that the conflicts described are conflicts of ego interests and questions of 
good life, rather than moral conflicts. 
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its worth on the basis of the ability to care and protect others” (p. 
79). Because a decision entails the sacrifice of somebody’s needs, 
women are confronted with the seemingly impossible task of 
choosing the victim. Those who turn to a less self-sacrifice 
solution by reconstructing a moral conflict in an entirely new way, 
eventually progress towards a more mature conception of care, 
recognizing and asserting their own needs again. When the 
discovered “inner” voice replaces “outer” ones as the arbiter of 
morality of truth, it frees the woman from the coercion of others, 
but leaves her with responsibility for judgment and choice. At the 
third level, a new balance is gained through truth and honesty 
about relationships, in the realization that self and other are still 
interdependent and that life can only be sustained by care in 
relationships (Gilligan, 1982.) 
In Gilligan’s writing, the character of developmental change 
remains open. She refers to Piaget’s and Erikson’s concepts of the 
crisis that actually represent different, cognitive structuralist and 
ego psychological approaches. In general, she relates moral 
development to Eriksonian ego development. Thus, she also draws 
on his conception of the bipolarity of crisis, creating through a 
heightened vulnerability “a dangerous opportunity for growth”, 
resulting in positive or negative changes (p. 108). Consequently, 
the crisis also contains the potential for nihilism and despair. Even 
if this implies a possibility of regression in care development, 
Gilligan is unclear about this. This raises the question, whether 
women complete their development and remain at the perspective 
of highest level or whether major life crises create the potential for 
a new confrontation with all three perspectives? (Sichel, 1985). 
Some women were well off, whereas some others’ lives have 
taken a deteriorating course and they felt worse, paralleled by 
changes in their moral judgment. These women seem to be aware 
of their regression that Gilligan calls moral nihilism, having 
different versions. The one version of nihilism is related to 
women, who, by abortion, try to cut off their feelings and not to 
care any more. While pregnant and wanting to live in the 
expanding family, they encounter in their husbands and lovers 
refusal and rejection. This makes them to ask themselves “Why 
care?” in a world where the strong ones end relationships. When 
abandoned by others, their common response is to abandon 
themselves, sometimes in a way regressing into the minimal level 
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of physical and psychological survival, barely being able to take 
care of self in terms of daily activities. In another version of 
nihilism, women’s morality centers on care, but in the absence of 
care from others, they are unable to care for a child or themselves 
(Gilligan, 1982, pp. 124-126.)  
According to Gilligan’s interpretation, the nihilistic position 
signifies a retreat from care to a concern with survival. It still 
remains unclear how lasting this position might be, because “in 
attempting to survive without care these women return in the end 
to the truth about relationships” (p. 126). This, in fact, indicates 
the second transition and progress. But whether this nihilism 
potentially becomes a stabilized position beyond the actual crisis, 
perhaps across life span, is an interesting question, which remains 
unanswered. Later on, Gilligan (1990) concluded on the basis of 
her study of 12-15-year-old girls that the developmental sequence 
seemed to represent different responses to crisis in adolescence; 
girls are tempted or encouraged to solve problems of connection 
(characteristics for Western culture) by excluding themselves or 
excluding others. To summarize, developmental changes are 
obviously prompted by crisis experiences, and thus one can expect 
the proposed progress to be fragmentary rather than smoothly 
linear. 
In the light of close reading (e.g., Chapter 5), it appears that 
interpretations of Gilligan’s ethic of care have excessively been 
equated with the conventional feminine care at the second level. 
Gilligan was fully aware how pervasively this level is influenced 
by the surrounding culture when she was describing women’s 
pains to leave the position of self-sacrifice that is widely regarded 
as a female virtue in the society.20 Still, many of her feminist 
critics seem to be blind to this point, when arguing that Gilligan’s 
approach valorizes self-sacrificing female ethic, which is placed 
outside the spheres of public and power, into the spheres of family 
and private life (Kroeger-Mappes, 1993; Sichel, 1985; Tronto, 
1993). Indeed, Gilligan does emphasize that in order to challenge 
self-sacrifice, embedded in the traditional feminine gender roles; 
                                                     
20Gilligan argues (1987) that the equation of care with self-sacrifice 
fails to represent the activity and agency of care.  
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women have to grasp their rights and to adopt more assertive 
tactics.21 
Paradoxically, Gilligan sees that a shift from conventional care 
towards more mature modes of care, which is expressed in adult 
responsibility for one’s own decisions and taking control of one’s 
own life requires the ethic of justice. The premise of ethic of 
justice is that self and other are equal, and consequently, the 
interest of self can be considered legitimate. When assertion no 
longer seems morally dangerous, the concept of relationships 
changes from “a bond of continuing dependence to a dynamic of 
interdependence” (p. 149). As a result, the concept of care expands 
from the paralyzing injunction not to hurt others to an injunction 
to act responsively toward self and others and thus sustain 
connection. Care and justice interplay and complement each other 
in mature moral thought.  
Gilligan is still unclear about the way care and justice 
complete each other in mature moral thought. For women, the 
absolute of care, defined as not hurting others, becomes 
complicated through recognizing the need of personal integrity. 
This recognition invokes equality embodied in the concept of 
rights, leading women to transform the definition of care. On the 
other hand, for men the absolutes of truth and fairness are initially 
defined by the concepts of equality and reciprocity, but they are 
gradually confronted through such experiences that demonstrate 
                                                     
21Related to this issue, Sandra Bem (1974) established the concept of 
androgynous gender role that encompasses both feminine and masculine 
characteristics. This replaced a traditional way of thinking of gender role 
as a bipolar dimension. Androgynous individuals were found to be more 
flexible, and have better self-esteem than especially feminine individuals 
(Bem, 1975; Bem & Lenney, 1976). Gender role research of that time fits 
with the picture Gilligan draws, even if she does not articulate the 
concept of androgyny. More recent research has established that 
masculine and androgynous gender roles have positively related to 
identity development, and in order to achieve a self-chosen identity, 
women must accept either an androgynous or a cross-sex typed style 
(Matteson, 1993). It is also worth noting that the idea of moral autonomy 
being inherent in the highest level of care (Clement, 1996) is not shared 
by all care theorists (e.g., Noddings, 1984), as they see moral autonomy 
leading to compromise relationships. According to Clement’s 
interpretation of Gilligan, moral autonomy however means that 
relationships are not maintained at all costs. 
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that self and other are not similar. What is striking is that 
Gilligan’s interviewees did not seem to find satisfying solutions 
for their moral conflicts, mostly between loyalty in family 
relationships and “being true to oneself”. Although both care and 
justice perspectives underlie their moral thought, these 
perspectives remained in tension. Gilligan did not analyze what 
level concepts of justice are required to complement the ethic of 
care (Sichel, 1985), even if the judgments presented in the 
interview excerpts imply the definite stages: emerging subjective 
moral standards to Stage 3/4 reasoning, considerations of personal 
integrity and honesty to Stage 4 reasoning, and of relativized 
equality to Stage 4/5 reasoning (for the definition of justice stages, 
see Table 2, p. 70). Interestingly, Gilligan and Belenky (1980) 
reported elsewhere that women demonstrated higher justice 
reasoning on their abortion decision dilemma than on Kohlbergian 
hypothetical dilemmas. 
Obviously based on her interview data, Gilligan does not end 
up with the clear conclusion that care and justice are integrated in 
sophisticated moral thought, even if she has been interpreted to 
take a position that they ought to be integrated (e.g., Flanagan, 
1991). Betty Sichel (1985) remarked that the rights of the self take 
precedence only when such rights are universalizable. In turn, 
understanding of rights as universalizable necessitates advanced 
justice reasoning at the postconventional level, and Gilligan noted 
that none of female participants demonstrated this level in their 
reasoning (p. 101). Consequently, her narrow data base gives rise 
to two contradicting interpretations: (1) care is separate from 
justice, but equally adequate as justice (the separate-but-equal-
doctrine) and (2) care and justice are inadequate without the other 
and should be integrated (the integration-doctrine) (Flanagan, 
1991).  
Despite her restricted data, in terms of variation in justice 
stages, Gilligan continued to advance the separate-but-equal-
doctrine in her later writings (1987, 1988), and finally appears to 
have taken a stand that care and justice remain in a dialectical 
tension (see Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). She describes this tension as a 
metaphor of gestalt-shift. At the moment you see a vase, you 
cannot see two faces, and vice versa; similarly, when you see 
saliencies of persons and interconnections, you cannot see issues 
of fairness, rights and obligation. Yet even after seeing it in both 
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ways, one way remains often more compelling (Gilligan, 1987; for 
criticism, see Flanagan & Jackson, 1987).22 Because there is 
virtually no study to date exploring the interconnection between 
care and justice levels, especially in real-life contexts, it is not 
known how tension vs. integration between moral voices is 
influenced by the adequacy of justice concepts that individuals 
use. Kohlberg et al. (1983) were convinced that at the highest level 
of justice reasoning, care and justice tend to integrate, when 
justice reasoning is complemented by the notion of care. On the 
other hand, recent research suggests that the content of moral 
conflicts may regulate interplay between them, because different 
types of moral conflicts invoke different amounts of care and 
justice considerations (Wark & Krebs, 2000). 
3.2 Findings on care development by the 
Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) 
A series of studies have investigated care development using the 
Ethic of Care Interview, constructed by Eva Skoe (Skoe & Marcia, 
1991; Skoe, 1993). In addition to a real-life conflict, the measure 
consists of three care-focused hypothetical conflicts surrounding 
(1) unplanned pregnancy (cf. abortion study), (2) marital fidelity 
and (3) care for a parent (see Appendix A). These dilemmas were 
initially selected because they were expected to represent 
“frequently occurring, real-life situations of interpersonal concerns 
where helping others could happen at the price of hurting oneself” 
(Skoe & Marcia, 1991, p. 292). Open-ended interviews, cautiously 
                                                     
22Besides, Flanagan and Jackson (1987) regarded Gilligan’s gestalt-
shift metaphor as logically misleading, because it confuses visual 
perception with moral construal. While it is impossible to see the duck 
and the rabbit at the same time in the gestalt-shift, it is not impossible to 
see both the justice and care saliencies in a moral problem. 
Consequently, there is no logical reason why both care and justice 
considerations cannot be used in the same reasoning episode. Noticing 
saliencies of both, or using both orientations, however, do not necessarily 
make a moral problem clearer, and easier to solve, but might point out 
some hidden relevant aspects. Gilligan’s more recent research program 
seems to share this view; care and justice narratives are seen as 
intertwined with each other (Brown, Debold, Tappan & Gilligan, 1991). 
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probed by interviewer, are scored according to five levels, derived 
from In a Different Voice.  
The validation study by Skoe and Marcia (1991) comprised 86 
female university students, aged 17-26 years, focusing on the 
question whether women’s care and identity development are 
closely related. They found that the sequence of care levels 
paralleled the sequence of identity development, measured by 
Marcia’s Identity Status Interview that is based on the expansion 
of Erikson’s theory of identity development. More specifically, 
students with diffused identity, uncommitted to any definite 
directions in their lives, scored the lowest at the self-oriented 
level, along with students with foreclosed identity. It is worth 
noting that those foreclosed students indicated unquestioned 
commitment to childhood-based norms and values. By contrast, 
students with moratorium status, undergoing exploration of 
alternatives in their lives tended to score at Level 2.5 that 
correspondingly indicates questioning of the conventional care 
ethic. Finally, women with achieved identity status, having made 
both exploration and well-defined commitments, tended to 
evidence the highest level, balancing care for self and others. 
Hence, women’s care and identity issues were found to be closely 
related, as can be predicted from Gilligan’s theory. 
This research pattern was replicated in a sample of 76 female 
and 58 male high school and university students, aged 16-30 years 
(Skoe & Diessner, 1994). Findings about women were replicated, 
and men’s identity was also found to be related to care 
development, but to a lesser extent. Interestingly, care 
development was more related to identity development than 
justice development for both genders, but only for women was this 
difference significant. Recently, Skoe and Lippe (2002) have 
explored how care development is related to another ego 
development measure, Loevinger’s Sentence Completion Test, 
with a Norwegian sample of 144 participants, aged 15-48 years. 
Again, care development was more strongly related to ego 
development (r = .58) than was justice development (r = .20), 
measured by Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT). Thus, the study 
gives further support to the assumption that care reasoning is of 
more relevance to personality or identity development than justice 
reasoning. Furthermore, androgynous gender role orientation 
(having both traditional feminine and masculine characteristics in 
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self-description) has been found to be related to higher levels of 
care reasoning, but only for women (Nicholls-Goudsmid, 1998; 
Söchting, Skoe & Marcia., 1994; Skoe, 1995). It seems that in 
order to release themselves from the ethic of self-sacrifice, women 
have to adopt more assertive characteristics typical for traditional 
masculinity (Skoe, 1995). To summarize so far, these results 
indicate that women’s care development towards highest levels 
requires giving up the traditional feminine gender role and 
questioning tradition-based values, in line with Gilligan’s (1982) 
contention. 
With regard to Gilligan’s claim of female-specific care 
reasoning, none of the aforementioned studies found proposed 
gender differences in care reasoning. Interestingly, however, they 
emerged in two Canadian mature adulthood samples, aged 40-84 
years, women scoring higher than men (Skoe, Pratt, Matthews & 
Curror, 1996). Studies among early adolescents point out the 
similar gender difference in Canadian (Skoe & Gooden, 1993) and 
U.S. samples (Meyers, 2001), whereas it was not found in a 
Norwegian sample (Skoe & al., 1999). These results suggest that 
gender role stereotyping is stronger in North-America than in 
Northern Europe, especially among older age cohorts, and 
furthermore, they imply that Gilligan’s observation of female-
related care reasoning had some empirical basis in her own culture 
sphere. These results also underscore the relevance of cultural 
factors to care development, as well as point out that North 
American findings cannot be generalized to represent all Western 
cultures (Skoe, 1998). 
Studies have found positive correlations for care and justice 
reasoning, ranging from .21 to .63, (Skoe & Marcia, 1991; Skoe & 
Diessner, 1994; Skoe & al., 1996, Skoe & Lippe, 2002). There is 
some support as well to the assumption that care and justice 
reasoning are not related to each other. Skoe and Lippe (2002) 
found that the relationship between the ECI and the DIT was not 
significant any more after controlling for verbal intelligence, and 
Skoe et al. (1996) found that justice and care reasoning were not 
significantly related on real-life dilemmas (n = 27, was however 
small). These correlations nevertheless indicate that care and 
justice reasoning partly share an underlying developmental path, 
rather than being separate alternative developments. Both modes 
of moral development describe progress from the initial self-
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oriented concern towards other-concern, and thus may reflect 
certain elements of ego development, such as cognitive style, 
impulse control and character development (Skoe & Lippe, 2002; 
Snarey, 1998). In line with this assumption, fearful attachment 
style, based on self-reporting, has been found to be associated with 
the lowest levels of care, and secure attachment style with the 
other levels, indicating that a sufficient inner security is a 
prerequisite for moral progression beyond self-oriented level 
(Söchting, 1996). 
Furthermore, both modes of moral reasoning have been found 
to be positively related to such cognitive-developmental indexes 
as role-taking (Selman, 1980; Skoe & al., 1996) and integrative 
complexity of reasoning (Skoe & al., 1996). Söchting (1996) 
found that sophisticated cognitive appreciation of others’ 
subjective states was related to higher care levels, whereas 
affective-based appreciation was more related to Level 2. These 
findings indicate that care development really concerns cognitive 
processes of reasoning. With regard to empathy-related capacities, 
care reasoning has been found to be positively related to self-
reported perspective-taking, and negatively related to personal 
distress, whereas empathic concern was related to Level 2, and 
only for women (Skoe, Hansen & Nickerson, 2001). To date, 
cognitive-based role-taking seems to be important in care-
reasoning, whereas emotional capacities might have a curvilinear 
relationship, somewhat incongruent with the previous theory-
building (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988; Noddings, 
1984). 
Skoe (1998) argues that development in moral reasoning is 
based on questioning the previous positions and the formulation of 
a new, more inclusive position. These processes are similar to the 
Piagetian cognitive processes of disequilibration and 
accommodation. Still, Skoe and Lippe (2002) do not regard 
cognitive processes as central to care development, but refer to 
Loevinger’s concepts of internalization of interpersonal 
relationships, and motivation for mastery, derived initially from 
psychoanalytical theory. Care development appears to progress 
with crisis experiences, including interpersonal conflicts and 
losses (Gilligan, 1982; Skoe & Marcia, 1991) that also transform 
the experience of self in the interpersonal context. The systematic 
investigation of determinants of development is lacking, however, 
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with the exception of Pratt, Arnolds and Hilbers’s (1998) study. 
They examined the relationship between parenting style and 
adolescents’ care reasoning, and found that the mothers’ emphasis 
on care in socialization narratives was positively related to 
adolescents’ care reasoning. In addition, the mothers’ emphasis on 
care was positively related to the girls’ personal adjustment in 
terms of lesser loneliness and higher self-esteem, whereas it was 
negatively related to boys’ adjustment. This implicates that even if 
there are no gender differences in terms of developmental levels, 
care reasoning may operate differently in men and women, as 
argued by Skoe and Diessner (1994). 
To conclude, several findings confirm that the ECI is a valid 
measure of care development. The developmental trend is parallel 
to age. The youngest participants in studies have been 10 years 
old, demonstrating a self-oriented level (Meyers, 2001) and no 
adolescents have been found to score at the postconventional 
levels of 2.5 and 3 (Skoe & al., 1999).23 The distribution of late 
adolescents and adults across developmental levels has been found 
to be roughly similar in Canada and Norway; about 15% reaching 
Level 3, 35% scoring at Level 2.5, 20-25% scoring at Level 2, and 
20-30% scoring at Levels 1 and 1.5 (Skoe, 1998). Moreover, the 
ECI has been found to be positively related to volunteer helping 
work (Skoe, Pedersen & Hansen, 1997), consultation with others, 
sense of availability of cognitive support, self-reported health and 
positivity about one’s aging, whereas it is negatively related to 
authoritarism (Skoe & al., 1996). The ECI score has recently been 
found to be distinct from verbal intelligence, which is relevant for 
its validity as an open-ended interview measure (Skoe & Lippe, 
2002). 
Further research is needed to explore specific determinants, as 
well as general characteristics of care development. The only 
existing longitudinal study has been conducted in a small 
Canadian sample, showing that care reasoning was relatively 
stable in middle and mature adulthood over a 4-year period (Skoe, 
Pratt, Matthews & Curror, 1996). That study was 
methodologically restricted, however, because the standardized 
measure was not yet available and only real-life dilemmas were 
                                                     
23For adolescents, revised dilemmas, surrounding family and friends 
have been used (Skoe, 1998). 
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used as a measure. The goal of this study is contribute to these 
issues by exploring care development in the context of justice 
development. Consequently, it addresses the question whether care 
reasoning progresses in invariant and irreversible sequence, 
forming qualitative different wholes and being hierarchically 
integrated, i.e. satisfies the criteria for development put forward in 
Kohlberg’s theory (Colby & al., 1987). 
3.3 The puzzle of genderized moralities 
Although this study does not address the question of gender 
differences, its background is so deeply grounded in the studies on 
gender differences that it is impossible to proceed without forming 
a coherent view of the dilemma. Moreover, gender is an important 
factor to control for in most psychological studies. In order to 
summarize empirical evidence on this issue, a resolute answer is 
that gender differences in morality are modest at best (Jaffee & 
Hyde, 2000; Thoma, 1986; Walker, 1991). There is an exception; 
the gender difference in perceiving moral dilemma has been found 
in social pressure-type dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 2000), as 
well as on the mixed dilemmas involving both prevention of hurt 
and legal issues (Skoe, Cumberland, Eisenberg, Hansen & Perry, 
in press), where women evidence more care-oriented responses. 
Despite the infrequency of gender differences (when the content of 
dilemma is held constant), a crucial point remains constant: 
women tend to report care-eliciting and prosocial conflicts, and 
this trend has been found already in adolescence (Skoe & al., 
1999; Meyers, 2001). A plausible explanation is that women 
encounter them more in everyday life, being burdened by caring 
responsibilities more than men (Tronto, 1993). Some studies 
support the idea that women also regard care issues more 
important than men (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Wark & Krebs, 2000), 
whereas other studies do not (Friedman, Robinson & Friedman, 
1987; Wark & Krebs, 1997). There is also evidence that both 
genders regard care-based dilemmas more difficult than justice-
based dilemmas (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Skoe & al. (in press); 
Wark & Krebs, 1997). 
A firm belief in genderized moralities contrasted with sparse 
empirical evidence is puzzling, and it serves to remind us that we 
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are dealing with a mythic truth that meets our emotional and 
cultural needs (Brabeck, 1983). There are some tentative 
explanations for this gap. Despite its acknowledged position in 
recent research, the ethic of care represents the ethics of 
subordinated groups in modern societies (Stack, 1986). The view 
of gendered moralities helps to preserve the distribution of power 
and privilege not only along gender lines, but lines of race, 
ethnicity and education (Tronto, 1993). In keeping with this, 
Johnston’s (1988) study proved that many adolescent boys were 
not eager to apply care orientation to solving moral dilemmas, 
even if they were cognizant of it. From the cognitive viewpoint, 
subtle gender differences may function as markers of gender and 
get the exaggerated meaning in cognitive categorization: we need 
them in order to construct gender as a meaningful social category 
(cf. Augostinous & Walker, 1995). 
It may also be that contemporary research practices, in terms 
of samples and methodologies, fail to map gender differences. 
Firstly, most studies use university students as samples, i.e. 
privileged young adults, apparently open to the idea of equality 
between genders. Studies outside academic contexts are rare, even 
though most care activities take place outside universities. 
Published studies outside the Western culture are rare, too. 
However, Skoe et al. (1996) reported a gender difference in care 
reasoning among middle-aged and older Canadian adults, which 
points out that it is possible to find local gender differences, 
potentially relevant for care practices in everyday life. 
The presence or absence of gender differences might also be 
related to the ways care is conceptualized and operationalized. 
Standardized quantitative methods do not tend to yield gender 
differences, whereas qualitative methods based on participants’ 
narratives or discourses tend to do so (Finlay & Love, 1998; 
Mitchell, 2002). Moreover, self-reported moral conflicts tend to 
reveal the proposed gender difference (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), as it 
is a case for emotional empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; 
Davis, 1994). It is unclear to which extent the gender difference 
reflects adopted cultural role expectations, that is, women’s desire 
to see themselves as caring and empathic, versus actual 
differences in responding. Nevertheless, affective-based empathy 
has been found to be related to helping behavior (Chlopan & al., 
1985), consistent with the fact that women in modern societies 
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predominantly carry out official caring work. Interestingly, this 
gender difference has not emerged in cognitive-based empathy, 
neither in ability measures, nor in self-reported measures (Davis, 
1994).  
The puzzle of gender differences can also be related to the 
conceptual chaos in the domain of care ethics. Like justice, care 
does not belong to the realm of psychology alone, but extends to 
the fields of philosophy, political theory and applied sciences, 
such as social work and nursing as well. For this purpose, a model 
of caring process, developed by Fisher and Tronto (1990), is 
useful. They outline a four-fould caring process: caring about, 
taking care of, caregiving, and care-receiving. Caring about is 
defined as selectiveness and attentiveness to the features of our 
environment having influence on well-being. Tronto (1993, p. 
127) emphasizes that “attentiveness, simply recognizing the needs 
those around us is a difficult task, and indeed, a moral 
achievement.” In turn, taking care of deals with the responsibility 
for initiating and maintaining caring activities. The central skill is 
that of judgment: choosing one course of action rather than 
another. Caregiving means concrete work (sometimes called 
hands-on) involving the direct meeting of needs for care, and 
mostly necessitating contacts with the objects of care. Caregiving 
requires experience, judgment, and practical skills, in order to 
carry out and revise “a caregiving strategy” according to rapidly 
changing conditions. Finally, care-receiving is defined as the 
response to caregiving by those toward whom care is directed 
(Fisher & Tronto, 1991; Tronto, 1993.) 
One can easily realize that research derived from Gilligan’s 
theory does not cover all the aspects of caring process, but 
contributes most to subprocesses of caring about and taking care 
of. Fisher and Tronto’s model is informative in explaining the 
absence of gender differences in research versus common-sense 
perception of women as more caring than men. Caring process is 
fragmented in such a way that certain persons (mainly women) are 
caregivers, and some other persons (mainly men) make decisions 
concerning caring practices (e.g., resources). This split inflates 
caring, because those who make decisions do not know actual 
circumstances of caregiving (Fisher & Tronto, 1991; Tronto, 
1993). While men’s active roles in the caring process are mainly 
positions of responsibility (taking care of), it is necessarily not a 
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surprise that they manage as well as women in moral reasoning 
measures, designed to elicit judgments of responsibility on 
hypothetical dilemmas (arguably, decision-making disconnected 
from actual caregiving is more or less hypothetical, too). To 
furthermore mitigate gender differences, concrete caregiving does 
not necessarily require sophisticated skills of attentiveness or a 
developed sense of responsibility; indeed, one can perform caring 
tasks very mechanically. This means that not all women in caring 
work are morally motivated; perhaps they have just chosen jobs 
society provides for women.  
On the other hand, studies have focused on mapping gender 
differences in reasoning processes. Moral sensitivity, motivation 
and action, as well as interplay between different components of 
morality, have not been studied extensively enough, to determine 
whether there are some important variations between genders. For 
example, Bebeau and Brabeck (1987) found that female dentist 
students were more able to detect moral issues embedded in a 
professional situation. There might be differences in defining the 
domain of morality and in moral self-concept (Flanagan, 1991). In 
line with this, care reasoning has been found to be more related to 
women’s identity than men’s identity (Skoe & Diessner, 1994) 
and women have been found to experience more guilt over care 
issues than men (Helkama & Ikonen, 1986; Wark, 2000). Barnett, 
Quackenbush and Sinisi (1995) also found that women evaluated 
their critical moral experiences more care-orientedly than did men. 
Some findings suggest that women are more eager to apply care 
orientation to punitive and military issues (Crandall, Tsang, 
Goldman & Pennington, 1999; Finlay & Love, 1998) and 
furthermore, this gender difference is mediated by empathy (Gault 
& Sabini, 2000). Quite reasonably, women are more touched by 
care issues than men in their lives, although the implications of 
this difference have not been well captured by psychological 
research. Finally, given the fact that women report and plausibly 
experience more care-based conflicts than men do, the question 
arises as to what women actually benefit from them. Obviously, 
reflected crisis experiences in relationships foster care 
development (Skoe & Diessner, 1994) more than mere exposure to 
care issues. Continuous caring for others as such may reinforce the 
conventional ethic of self-sacrifice rather than to help to overcome 
it.  
56 
 
4. CARE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
JUSTICE 
4.1 Kohlberg’s reply to In a Different Voice 
In his book, co-authored by Charles Levine and Alexandra Hewer 
“Moral Stages: a Current Formulation and a Response to Critics” 
(1983), Kohlberg gives a detailed reply to Gilligan’s claims. Much 
of the reply deals with gender differences, and is not of relevance 
any more. But in addition, Kohlberg’s group takes their stand 
related to “the different voice”. Firstly, Kohlberg admits that the 
two different moral voices exist, consistent with philosopher 
William Frankena’s (1973) view, that there are two major virtues 
or moral principles, justice and benevolence or beneficence (the 
concept Frankena preferred to underline the fact that it requires 
doing good, instead of merely wanting to do so). A quotation from 
Frankena illuminates Kohlberg et al.’s position.24 
[In reply] I want to agree that beneficence is right and failure to 
be beneficent wrong under the conditions specified; however, I 
want to deny that they are, respectively, just or unjust, properly 
speaking. Not everything that is right is just, and not everything 
that is wrong is unjust. Incest, even if it is wrong, can hardly be 
called unjust… Giving another person pleasure may be right, 
without its being properly called just at all. The area of justice is 
                                                     
24Marilyn Friedman (1987) nevertheless argues that Frankena’s 
benevolence does not coincide with Gilligan’s care, because it is derived 
from universal principles, such as the principle of not injuring anyone or 
the principle of utility, rather than considering persons in their 
particularity, as individuals to whom one is specifically related (see 
Tong, 1991). 
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a part of morality but not the whole of it. Beneficence, then, may 
belong to the other part of morality…. Kant made a similar point 
by saying that beneficence is an ‘imperfect’ duty; one ought to 
be beneficent, he thought, but one has some choice about the 
occasions on which to do good. In any case, it is certainly 
wrong, at least prima facie, to inflict evil and pain on anyone, 
and to admit this is to admit that the principle of beneficence is 
partly correct (pp. 46-47.)… [For] the principle of benevolence 
does not tell us how we are to distribute goods and evils. It only 
tells us to produce the one and the prevent the other. When 
conflicting claims are made upon us, the most it could do is to 
instruct us to promote the greatest balance of good over evil 
and… we need something more. This is where a principle of 
justice must come in (p. 48.) 
 
Secondly, Kohlberg et al. (1983) admit that their moral 
dilemmas are centered on the issues of justice and rightness. 
Consequently, the principle of care has not been adequately 
presented in their group’s work and hypothetical research 
dilemmas designed to elicit justice reasoning. Thirdly, they do 
believe that morality of justice is more amenable to Piagetian 
structural stages than morality of care would be. Alternatively, 
they propose that care levels could describe soft stages, that is, 
adults’ self-reflective moral development. 
When Kohlberg’s group (1983) conceptualize their theory as 
“a rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning” 
(p. 5), they acknowledge that their approach does not fully reflect 
all moral domain, for example the Christian virtue of agape, and 
its modern version of the ethic of care, as they see it. But even if 
their dilemmas were not designed to deal with morality of “special 
relationships and obligations”, they at times elicited judgments of 
care. Kohlberg with his associates concluded that many moral 
situations or dilemmas do not present a choice between the two 
voices, but rather evoke judgments, which integrate them. This is 
most likely to occur at the highest, postconventional level of 
justice reasoning, while justice concerns lose their retributive and 
rule-bound nature for the sake of treating persons as persons, not 
as means but as ends themselves. Both moral voices share this 
Kantian categorical imperative, even if they articulate persons as 
ends from different bases; the ethic of care seeing persons 
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embedded in relationships, and the ethic of justice seeing persons 
as autonomous ends themselves, relating to each other through 
agreement and mutual contract. In addition to the postconventional 
stages, respondents at conventional stages also attempted to 
integrate care and justice concerns. Kohlberg et al. did not specify, 
however, how they succeeded in this. Predominant care 
orientation was still rare, even among women, and likely to be 
found among “early conventional” and Stage 3 participants, being 
replaced by justice orientation at later stages (see Snarey, Reimer 
& Kohlberg, 1984). 
To summarize, Kohlberg et al. (1983) acknowledged that 
justice is not the only way to view the morality of human relations. 
“We do believe that dilemma situations involving such special 
relationships can be handled by a universalistic justice ethic of 
respect for persons or rules, and with the concepts of reciprocity 
and contract. However, we also believe that such situations can 
also be handled by a morality of particularistic relations which 
differentiates such special relationships from universalistic 
relationships handled by justice reasoning.” (p. 20.) A further step 
was taken by Neo-Kohlbergians (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & 
Thoma, 1999), who viewed the de-emphasis of personal 
relationships as a limitation of Kohlberg’s theory. According to 
their redefinition, Kohlberg’s theory focuses on “macromoral” 
issues; how co-operation between people at a society-wide level 
should be arranged. Thus, it concerns the establishing of formal 
relationships between people with different backgrounds and 
unknown to each other. Even if these two perspectives on 
relationships overlap, justice perspective does not adequately 
describe the morality of personality relationships, family and kin. 
With regard to the proposed levels of care, Kohlberg et al. 
(1983) were skeptical about whether they meet the Piagetian 
criteria of hard stages, which are as follows:  
  
 1. Stages imply a qualitative difference in structures that still serve 
the same basic function (moral judgment/reasoning) at various points in 
development. 
2. The different structures form an invariant sequence, order, or 
succession in individual development. Cultural factors may speed up, 
slow down, or stop development; they do not change its sequence. 
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3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms “a 
structural whole”. A given stage response on a task does not just 
represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity 
with that task or tasks similar to it; rather, it represent an underlying 
thought-organization. The implication is that various aspects of stage 
structures should appear as a consistent cluster of responses in 
development. 
4. Stages are hierarchical integrations. As noted, stages form an 
order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures for fulfilling 
a common function. Accordingly, higher stages displace (or, rather, 
integrate) the structures found at lower stages (Colby & al., 1987.) 
 
Alternatively, Kohlberg et al. (1983) anticipated that the ethic 
of care might represent a soft structural stage model that resembles 
a hard stage model on the surface but is different in critical 
aspects. In brief, contrasted with the Piagetian hard stage model, a 
soft stage model (1) does not differentiate thinking of content from 
developmental structure and (2) does not have the inner logic of a 
hierarchical organization, later stages transforming earlier stages, 
and not just being added to them. Furthermore, (3) a soft stage 
model does not have a normative endpoint of development and (4) 
does dot relate to action, due to the lack of structural consistency.  
Soft structural stages focus on the development on ego or self, 
which is consciously creating meaning for itself while confronting 
the world. This self-reflective meaning-making is central to soft 
stage development and offers a unified view on morality that is 
broader than pure moral reasoning: it may include perceptions of 
human nature, of society or the nature of ultimate reality. By 
contrast, the development that hard stages constitute is largely 
unreflected by the individual. Later stages do not necessarily 
involve a self-conscious awareness of itself or the previous stage. 
Consequently, a soft stage model, like care development, is more 
appropriate in describing moral development in adulthood, 
whereas a hard stage model, like justice development, is the most 
adequate for describing moral development through childhood and 
adolescence until adulthood. While a hard stage model remains 
insensitive to the unique characteristics of adult development, a 
soft stage model constitutes hierarchical levels to depict the adult’s 
attempt to synthesize the different aspects of self and morality, 
such as the ideals of justice and love, philosophy and religion. 
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With Kohlberg and others’ (1983) warning in mind that soft 
stage development may erroneously resemble hard one, it can be 
speculatively argued that recent research on care development 
indicates certain features of a hard stage model. Firstly, 
theoretically new care levels seem to transform earlier ones, 
because the psychological logic of relationships transforms in a 
transition and an emerging new position offers a more inclusive 
solution to moral problems. Relative consistency across dilemmas, 
including real-life dilemma, indicates that persons possess an 
internal quality to assess different situations in similar ways (Skoe, 
1998). With regard to action, mature care reasoning has been 
found to be related to prosocial activities (Skoe, Pedersen & 
Hansen, 1997). Furthermore, care development does have a 
normative endpoint, the third level, governed by the standards of 
authentic relationship, corresponding to the highest stage of 
justice, governed by equality and respect for persons (Gilligan & 
Wiggins, 1988). 
Kohlberg et al.’s (1983) distinction of soft and hard stage 
models is, however, somewhat controversial in the light of recent 
knowledge. Rest et al. (1999) have argued, referring to findings on 
developmental psychology, that Kohlberg misinterpreted the 
Piagetian criteria of hard stages in many aspects, including the 
claims that (a) content of moral reasoning can be purged from 
structure of reasoning and that (b) later stages transform earlier 
stages, leading to the use of one (or sometimes two) stage or 
reasoning at one period of time.25 These misinterpretations lead to 
overemphasizing the structural consistency of moral reasoning, as 
studies on real-life moral dilemmas indicate (see Chapter 5, in this 
study). Paradoxically, it is not clear whether justice development 
represents a hard stage model itself, at least in terms of Kohlberg’s 
original conceptualization. What nevertheless makes the soft/hard 
stage distinction relevant for this study is that care development 
has been found to be closely related to Loevinger’s ego 
                                                     
25Rest et al. (1999) refer to Siegel (1997), in order to point out what 
is wrong about hard stage models in general (1) In all areas of cognitive 
development, children typically have multiple ways of thinking about 
most phenomena and (2) cognitive-developmental change involves shifts 
in the frequency with which children rely on these ways of thinking; 
change is better depicted as a series of overlapping waves, rather than as 
a staircase progression. 
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development (Skoe & Lippe, 2002), which is given as an analyzed 
example of soft stage models by Kohlberg et al. (1983).  
It is worth noting that later on Gilligan et al. (1990) clarified 
their position in a way that is aligned with Kohlberg’s view on the 
ethic of care. They deemed stage models which imply linear 
progress, as inadequate in describing care development alone: 
Development implies a telos - and the telos is a fuller and, in 
some ways, more adequate way to understand the world and to 
live one’s life. But to organize this growth into stages, and call 
some stages higher, or more complex, misses the point. 
Development is fraught with vulnerabilities; it entails both 
losses and gains, and it is open to the world beyond the 
individual’s personal control, including changes in relationships 
critical to growth. 
 (Gilligan, Roger & Brown., 1990, pp. 319-320) 
4.2 The ethic of care as complementary to the 
ethic of justice 
Vreeke (1991) claims that there are two interpretations of the 
fundamental relationship between the ethics of care and justice: 
(1) they represent the same form of reasoning but differ in content 
and alternatively (2) they represent different forms of moral 
reasoning, giving rise to two different developmental paths. The 
first interpretation has dominated the field. Many of characteristics 
of care Gilligan defines as distinctive can be also found in 
Kohlberg’s theory. Thus, it means that care judgments can be 
interpreted in terms of Kohlberg’s model (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), 
and care might even represent a sequence of substages within it 
(Kohlberg & al., 1983). Considerations of care, as far as these 
concepts are used prescriptively (telling what one ought to do) are 
regarded as moral, and accordingly can be scored at each stage 
within the recent scoring system (Kohberg & Kauffman, 1987). 
The complex scoring system allows content of moral reasoning to 
be classified in four different moral orientations that describe 
motives behind moral judgments, being sort of personal moral 
philosophies. The perfectionist orientation emphasizes perfection 
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of the self and others as moral beings, attainment of dignity and 
autonomy, good conscience and motives, harmony with self and 
others, akin to Aristotle’s and Plato’s virtue ethics. The utilitarian 
orientation defines morality as the maximization of welfare and 
happiness consequences, akin to the moral philosophy of 
utilitarianism. Judgments of justice are more explicit in the 
normative order orientation, defining rightness as the adherence to 
prescribed rules and roles (akin to Kantian ethics), and the most 
explicit in the fairness orientation, emphasizing reciprocity, 
equality and equity (close to Rawls’s moral philosophy). 
Judgments of care fall into the perfectionist and utilitarian 
orientations, and therefore, they implicitly represent justice 
reasoning. The utilitarian principle of maximizing welfare 
consequences requires that each individual or life is to count as 
one, implying the concept of equality, whereas perfectionist 
orientation is centred on treating self and others as not means but 
as ends, fellow men, avoiding exploitation of others and trying to 
benefit them (Kohlberg & al., 1983.) 
 
Yet, empirical studies (Pratt & al., 1984, 1988; Walker, 1991) do not 
support the assumption that perfectionist and utilitarian orientations can 
be equated with care orientation. Moreover, Jaffee and Hyde (2000) 
concluded that studies on Kohlberg’s orientations did not demonstrate a 
significant gender difference. Snarey and Keljo (1991) proposed that 
Gilligan brilliantly identified the missing voice but inappropriately linked 
it to gender, instead of culture. Their review of cross-cultural differences, 
based on 54 samples from 9 countries, revealed that many care-based 
judgments, voiced by representatives of communitarian-oriented 
societies and working class, could not be scored within Colby & al.’s 
(1987) manual. This Gemeinschaft voice “has tended to be heard as a 
Stage 3 construction, but under more detailed scrutiny, reveals evidence 
of reasoning at higher stages” (p. 418). Snarey and Keljo concluded that 
even if Kohlberg’s claim for the universality of his theory holds true, the 
current theory and scoring system does not recognize all cultural variants 
of postconventional reasoning. Similarly, Iwasa (1992) found that some 
of Japanese participants’ postconventional judgments, oriented to 
maintaining and improving relationships and social harmony could not 
be rated within the scoring system. A Polish study (Czyzowska & 
Niemczynski, 1998) points out that Stage 4 is also deflated in this sense. 
Polish participants expressed judgments viewing society in terms of 
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interpersonal relations. ”What is right is what establishes, support and 
deepens bonds between people as members of a society. People should 
undertake actions that support or create a good atmosphere and protect 
social integrity. These actions should be aimed at social welfare and the 
welfare of members of society as well as at harmony between all of 
them” (p. 449). 
To conclude, Kohlberg’s theory, at least the scoring system, seems to 
be biased against social conceptualizations of care. Stage 4 emphasizes 
formal and legal aspects of the functioning of society, and Stage 5 
emphasizes individual autonomy and freedom, “ignoring the fact that no 
human being can exist outside of a human relationship and forgetting the 
fact that too much emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy can 
lead to the breakdown of stable relationships” (Iwasa, 1992, p. 10). 
Similarly, Shimizu (2001) pointed out that Japanese adolescents consider 
care as a communal responsibility and a normative voice of a larger 
society, rather than as individual feelings and subordinate to justice 
voice. In order to revise the scoring system, Stage 4 should be 
supplemented by the judgments stressing the importance of relationships 
and affiliation values within society as a whole, and postconventional 
stages should be supplemented by the judgments expressing the 
“connected” aspect of human existence (Czyzowska & Niemczynski 
1998; Iwasa, 1992). The bias in the scoring system might partly be due to 
the fact that most match examples were derived from American 
participants’ interviews who are conceivably most familiar with 
liberalist-utilitarian ideologies. Kohlberg’s bias towards Rawlsian and 
Kantian moral philosophies is widely acknowledged (Rest & al., 1999).  
 
Given that care reasoning can be placed into the Kohlberg’s 
model, we can then ask what might be its position and function 
there. Nunner-Winkler (1984), using Kant’s conceptualization, 
argues that the ethics of care and justice constitute different kind 
of duties. Justice judgments constitute perfect duties, universally 
shared and obligatory for all to follow, whereas judgments of care 
represent imperfect, super-categorical duties that are not 
obligatory and morally binding, and have no moral standards, but 
only formulate a maxim to guide action. Imperfect duties 
complement perfect duties, and similarly the ethic of care deepens 
the ethic of justice. Both kind of duties constitute the unity of 
morality, which ultimately requires more than giving equal respect 
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and refraining from unduly interfering with others, that is, 
responding to need (Little 1998). 
Nunner-Winkler redefines Gilligan’s claim of genderized 
moralities to mean that women feel more obligated to fulfill 
imperfect duties than men do. Kroeger-Mappes (1994) makes a 
similar point and asserts that the ethic of care, while experienced 
morally binding by others (women), tends to be seen as morally 
deficient by those (men) who do not feel bound by it in the 
dominating context of justice. Thus, the ethic of care is relegated 
into the secondary position. Moreover, Kohlberg et al.’s (1983) 
assumption that “morally valid forms of caring and community 
presuppose prior conditions and judgments of justice” (p. 92), 
defines justice as the primary ethic also for the individual’s 
psychological makeup (Flanagan & Jackson, 1987). This 
assumption suggests that there are no persons who are caring but 
deficient in their judgments of justice, which is unlikely. Flanagan 
and Jackson (1987) argue that despite the seemingly equal 
conceptualization of care and justice as moralities, Kohlbergian 
framework regards care, as well as other virtues of morality, 
inferior to justice, offering them a secondary, complementary 
position.26 To crystallize Kohlbergian view on the ethic of care 
here, the following quotations from Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer 
(1983) are helpful. 
In our view, special obligations of care presuppose but go 
beyond the general duties of justice, which are necessary but not 
sufficient for them. Thus special relationship dilemmas may 
elicit care responses, which supplement and deepen the sense of 
general obligations of justice... We believe that what Gilligan 
calls an ethic of care is, in and of itself, not well adapted to 
resolve justice problems; problems which require principles to 
resolve conflicting claims among persons, all of whom in some 
sense should be cared about (pp. 20-21.)… Gilligan’s emphasis 
on the care and response orientation has broadened the moral 
domain beyond our focus on justice reasoning. However, we do 
not believe that there exist two distinct or polar orientations or 
                                                     
26Blum (1988) analyzed Kohlberg’s views on care ethics, and found 
out five different, incompatible positions that regard care more or less 
inferior to justice. 
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two tracks in the ontogenesis of moral structures... It remains for 
Gilligan and her colleagues to determine whether there are, in 
fact, ‘hard’ stages in the care orientation. If she wishes to claim 
that there are stages of caring in a Piagetian sense of the word 
stage, she will have to demonstrate the progressive movement, 
invariant sequence, structured wholeness, and the relationship 
of thought to action for her orientation in a manner to the 
similar way Kohlberg has demonstrated such ontogenetic 
characteristics for the justice orientation ( p. 139.) 
3.3 The ethic of care as a different form from 
the ethic of justice 
In order to explore whether care and justice represent 
fundamentally different forms of morality, this chapter explores 
their underlying assumptions guiding research as well as 
normative-ethical assumptions derived from philosophical 
analysis. Kohlberg’s research program was characterized by an 
interdisciplinary effort to integrate psychological, educational and 
philosophical approaches (Kohlberg, 1986), thus offering the 
complex analysis of its grounds. Contrasted with Kohlbergian 
approach, the ethic of care seems, to quote an expression by Little 
(1998, p. 204), like “a poor second cousin to justice”, as Gilligan 
herself did not base her study on any philosophical assumptions 
(Sichel, 1985).27 Nevertheless, the grounds of Kohlberg’s theory 
offer a starting point for comparing the two ethics. 
The basic assumptions underlying the Kohlbergian approach 
are phenomenalism, structuralism and constructivism. 
Phenomalism emphasizes that moral judgments are seen 
meaningful in their own terms, rather than treated as reflections or 
expressions of irrational feelings, of unconscious motives driven 
by guilt avoidance (as in psychoanalytical approach), or external 
forces (behaviorist approach). The researcher seeks to understand 
what the individual means in this study rather than to attribute 
meaning to the judgments from an outside system of interpretation 
                                                     
27Nevertheless, many others have been eager to do that. For more 
comprehensive presentations, see Meyers & Kittay (Eds.) 1987; the 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1998, Volume 23. 
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not shared by the subject. It is the subject’s interpretation of moral 
reality that matters (Kohlberg & al., 1983; Kohlberg & Kauffman, 
1987.) In turn, structuralism means that the content of moral 
judgment is distinguished from the structure or form of moral 
judgments. Structure means general organization of principles or 
patterns of thoughts, whereas content refers to moral beliefs, 
opinions and values. Moral concepts are not learned or used 
independently of one another, but they are bound together by 
common structural features. It is the structure of thinking that 
exhibits developmental regularity and generalizability within and 
across individuals. In order to understand the meaning of the 
individual’s specific moral beliefs, one has to understand the more 
general moral view or conceptual framework within which those 
beliefs are embedded and from which they arise (Kohlberg & 
Kauffman, 1987.) Developmental stages are those structural 
wholes that give the subject a specific sense of certainty when 
reasoning about moral conflicts (Rest, 1986). Finally, according to 
the assumption of constructivism, human beings actively construct 
and reconstruct reality in social interaction. Consequently, moral 
judgments are neither innate pre-dispositions known a priori (as 
Kant claimed) nor are they generalizations of empirical facts in the 
world, but they are meanings individuals construct for themselves 
(Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987; Kohlberg & al., 1983.) 
The assumptions of phenomenalism, structuralism and 
constructivism are closely interrelated. Developmental stages as 
“structural wholes” have been derived from the interpretation of 
meanings subjects have attached to moral dilemmas. This kind of 
interpretation can also be called hermeneutic, but not as a form of 
extreme hermeneutics that denies the validity of the scientific 
method (Habermas, 1983; Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). 
Establishing the Standard Issue Scoring system (1987) meant a 
shift from intuitive scoring to a more standardized scoring 
technique, “a research activity employing an objective and reliable 
method of observation”, still resting “on the communicative stance 
of an interpreter, not on the positivist stance of someone trying to 
classify and predict behavior as distinct from meaning” (Kohlberg 
& Kauffman, 1987, p. 40). 
Gilligan’s original approach appeared to remain close to that 
of Kohlberg’s in many respects. Firstly, her methodology, relying 
on individuals’ subjective narratives, is based on the assumptions 
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of phenomenalism and constructivism as well. Secondly, even 
though she rejected structuralism in favour of neo-
psychoanalytical framework, she established her developmental 
levels by searching for the whole in women’s thought with the 
same hermeneutic stance as Kohlberg did with the reference to 
William James’s remark: “Building up an author’s meaning out of 
separate text means nothing unless you have first grasped the 
center of his vision by an act of imagination” (Kohlberg & 
Kauffman, 1987, p. 3). Finally, her study was centered on 
cognitive processes, even if care-based reasoning is toned by 
affects and emotions (Tronto, 1993; Vreeke, 1991). Gilligan’s 
early criticism against Kohlberg’s methodology and theory-
building can be summarized in two points: using male rather than 
female data, and using hypothetical rather than real-life moral 
dilemmas.  
According to Kohlberg et al. (1983), justice as the primacy of 
moral domain is basically a normative-ethical claim, but it is also 
indirectly based on the empirical evidence that has not falsified 
this claim (according to their interpretation, empirical studies can 
never verify normative-ethical claims, but can instead falsify 
them). The continuing research program, guided by the 
assumptions of constructivism, phenomenalism and structuralism, 
has not found any other moral concepts developing through 
Piagetian stages. So, the most important reason for focusing on 
justice is that it is the most structural feature of moral judgment.. 
The normative-ethical claim of the moral primacy of justice is 
based on neo-Kantian Hare’s (1963) concept of the moral point of 
view that include the criteria of prescriptivity and universality. 
Moral language is not descriptive but fundamentally prescriptive, 
and consequently, moral judgments direct, command or obligate 
us to take some action. They are derived from some rule or 
principle of action, however idiosyncratic, which the individual 
takes as binding upon on his or her actions. Moral judgments must 
also be universalizable, meaning a viewpoint, which any human 
being could or should adopt in reaction to the moral conflict 
(Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). The search for moral universality 
implies the search for some minimum value conceptions on which 
all people could agree, regardless of their differences in terms of 
their detailed goals or aims. Hence, “morality as justice best 
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renders our view of morality as universal” (Kohlberg & al., 1983, 
p. 93.)28 
With regard to the criteria of prescriptivity and 
universalizability, Gilligan’s theory appears to meet the former 
criterion, and to fail to meet the latter. The voice of care involves 
moral judgments prescribing what one ought to do, even though it 
admittedly also includes conceptions of good life and ideals of 
character, which refer to the virtue-areatic ethic. Consequently, 
Gilligan’s theory has been interpreted to contribute to feminist 
virtue ethics (for an example, see Tong, 1998). A closer reading 
reveals, however, that Gilligan’s description of women’s language 
is more aligned with their historical caring role than with virtue-
areatic ethic in moral philosophy; society expects women to 
possess an inherent virtue of self-sacrifice (see Sichel, 1985). The 
prescriptivity of care is not however derived from rules, norms or 
principles, which is a case for justice, but from the unique 
particularities of persons and situations that evoke responsibility 
for care. Individuals retain their particular identities, and moral 
situations are bound by time and place; care is based on a 
representation of a concrete situation as fully as possible, 
individuals involved and their relationships (Carse, 1998; Sichel, 
1985; Vreeke, 1991.) Most care situations are virtually so 
                                                     
28Kohlberg derived his original nine research dilemmas from 
Aristotle’s view on justice, and based his claim of justice as moral 
primacy also on his and, to a lesser extent, Plato’s moral philosophies. 
According to Aristotle, justice is the first virtue of society, because it 
governs relations among persons in a society; according to Plato, the first 
virtue of a society must also be the first virtue of a person. (Kohlberg & 
al., 1983.) Both claims have been criticized as highly controversial, as 
Kohlberg himself admits (p. 92), aligned with liberal political theory (see 
Flanagan & Jackson, 1987). Arguably, it might be that the stability of a 
just society and individuals’ ability to keep contracts presupposes caring 
relationships from early childhood (Baier, 1986). The deontological 
emphasis in Kohlberg’s theory can also be traced to Piaget’s study of 
children’s morality (1932), defining morality as a respect for rules 
(heteronomous morality) and as a respect for persons (egalitarian, 
autonomous morality). In case of moral primacy of higher stages, this 
claim is supported by “subjects themselves”. People regard judgments of 
higher stages more adequate, and prefer them, whereas they regard 
judgments below their current developmental stage as immature and 
childish (Rest & al., 1999.) 
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idiosyncratic that judgments about them cannot be generated from 
a universal rule or a principle (Blum, 1988; Flanagan, 1991). 
According to this interpretation, the ethic of care not only 
differs from justice in terms of the content of reasoning, but also 
stands for a different form of reasoning, a particularistic one 
(Vreeke, 1991). If the ethic of justice represents a universalizable 
form of moral judgment and the ethic of care a particularistic one, 
it also suggests qualitatively different contributions to morality, 
incompatible with each other. Vreeke (1991, p. 39) gives an 
illuminating example. ”You find yourself in difficulties and 
someone helps you. Subsequently this person informs you that he 
would have helped anyone who was in a similar situation. Even 
though you don’t know the person in question, an effect of 
estrangement would still be produced from such a motivation of 
action. This is due to the fact that you do not register as a unique 
individual in his perception and thinking.” A moral imperative of 
care cannot be expressed in terms of rights and duties without 
losing its distinctive quality. Kroeger-Mappes argues (1994) that 
even if general moral duties existed towards dependent ones, such 
as children, the elderly and the sick, taking care of them plainly 
out of a sense of duty make those relationships deficient. 
Noddings (1984) makes this point in extreme, when she defines 
the honest reception by a care-receiver as the ultimate criterion of 
morally valid caring. 
By contrast, within the ethic of justice, prescriptivity bases 
descriptions and duties on the recognition of others’ rights 
Reversibility is the ultimate criterion of justice, which enables the 
construction of solutions to dilemmas in such a way that these 
solutions can be considered acceptable or just from the point of 
view of all relevant parties (Kohlberg & al., 1983, p. 95). 
Reversibility is constructed from the concepts of reciprocity and 
equality which develop through the maturing socio-moral 
perspective towards the full reversibility at Stage 6. In other 
words, progress through developmental stages means that moral 
judgment gradually grows more reversible (see Kohlberg, 1981).
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Table 2. Six stages of moral judgment according to Kohlberg (1976) 
 
Level and stage What is right Reasons for doing right Sociomoral perspective of stage 
Preconventional level 
 
Stage 1. 
 
Heteronomous morality 
To avoid breaking rules backed 
by punishment, obedience for its own 
sake, and avoiding physical damage 
to persons and property 
Avoidance of 
punishment and the superior 
power of authorities 
Egocentric point of view. Doesn’t consider the 
interests of others or recognize that they differ from 
the actor’s, doesn’t relate two points of view. 
Actions are considered physically rather than in 
terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion 
of authority’s perspective with one’s own. 
 
Stage 2.  
 
Individualism, 
instrumental purpose, and 
exchange 
Following rules only when it is 
to someone’s immediate interest; 
acting to meet one’s own interests and 
needs and letting others do the same. 
Right is also what’s fair, what’s an 
equal exchange, a deal, an agreement 
To serve one’s own 
needs or interests in a world 
where you have to recognize 
that other people have their 
interests, too. 
Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that 
everybody has his own interests to pursue and these 
conflict, so that rights are relative (in the concrete 
individualistic sense). 
Conventional level 
 
Stage 3 
 
Mutual interpersonal 
expectations,relationships,and 
interpersonal conformity 
Living up to what is expected by 
people close to you or what people 
generally expect of  people in your 
role as son, brother, friend etc. “Being 
good” is important and means having 
good motives, showing concern about 
others. It also means keeping mutual 
relationships, such as trust, loyalty, 
respect, and gratitude. 
The need to be a good 
person in you own eyes and 
those of others. Your caring 
for others. Belief in the 
Golden Rule. Desire to 
maintain rules and authority 
which support stereotypical 
good behavior. 
Perspective of the individual in relationships 
with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, 
agreements, and expectations which take primacy 
over individual interests. Relates points of view 
through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself 
in the other guy’s shoes. Does not yet consider 
generalized system perspective. 
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Level and stage What is right Reasons for doing right Sociomoral perspective of stage 
Stage 4 
 
Social system 
and conscience 
Fulfilling the actual duties to which 
you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld 
except in extreme cases they conflict with 
other fixed social duties. Right is also 
contributing to society, the group, or 
institution. 
To keep the institution going as a 
whole, to avoid the breakdown in the 
system “if everyone did it,” or the 
imperative of conscience to meet one’s 
defined obligations. 
Differentiates societal point of view 
from interpersonal agreement or motives. 
Takes the point of view of the system that 
defines roles and rules. Considers 
individual relations in terms of place in the 
system. 
Post- 
conventional level 
 
Stage 5 
 
Social contract 
or utility and 
individual rights 
Being aware that people hold a 
variety of values and opinions that most 
values and rules are relative to your group. 
These relative rules should usually be 
upheld, however, in the interest of 
impartiality and because they are the 
social contract. Some nonrelative values 
and rights like life and liberty, however, 
must be upheld in any society and 
regardless of majority opinion. 
A sense of obligation to law because 
of one’s social contract to make and abide 
by laws for the welfare of all and for the 
protection of all people’s rights. A feeling 
of contractual commitment, freely entered 
upon, to family, friendship, trust and work 
obligations. Concern that laws and duties 
are based on rational calculation of overall 
utility, “the greatest good for the greatest 
number.” 
Prior-to-society perspective. 
Perspective of a rational individual aware 
of values and rights prior to social 
attachments and contract. Integrates 
perspectives by formal mechanisms of 
agreement, contract, objective impartiality, 
and due process. Considers moral and 
legal points of view; recognizes that they 
sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to 
integrate them. 
 
Stage 6 
 
Universal 
ethical 
principles 
Following self-chosen ethical 
principles. Particular laws or social 
agreements are usually valid because they 
rest on such principles. When laws violate 
these principles, one acts in accordance 
with the principle. Principles are universal 
principles of justice: the equality of human 
rights and respect for the dignity of human 
beings as individual persons 
The belief as a rational person in the 
validity of universal moral principles, and 
a sense of personal commitment to them. 
Perspective of a moral point of view 
from which social agreements derive. 
Perspective is that of any rational 
individual recognizing the nature of 
morality or the fact that persons are ends 
themselves and must be treated as such. 
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At Stages 1 and 2 there is a concrete reciprocity. If Eskimos kill and 
eat seals, it is right to kill and eat Eskimos (Stage 1). Reciprocity is 
interpreted in terms of exchanging acts, what one would do in another’s 
place. Stage 3 equates reciprocity with ideal role-taking, explicated by 
the Golden Rule (= putting oneself in another’s shoes). Ideal role taking 
entails differentiating the self’s perspective from the other’s one and 
coordinating them so that the other’s perspective influences one’s own in 
a reciprocal fashion. Stage 4 evidences a social order of roles and rules 
that are accepted by the entire community or society and that constitute 
the community. Each actor must orient to others’ perspective as a part of 
a larger, shared system to which they all belong. Positive reciprocity 
means a reward for effort or a merit. Negative reciprocity means that 
vengeance is the right of society, and is not conceived as vengeance any 
more but as “paying one’s debt to society”. A person who obeys the law, 
fulfills her/his duty expecting other people also to fulfill their duties; 
equality means uniform and standard administration of law among all 
citizens (Kohlberg, 1981.) Rest et al. (1999) point out that reciprocity at 
Stage 4 is still partial; obeying the law might not benefit all participants 
in an equitable way. 
Stages 5 and 6 require more reversible role-taking and recognition of 
universal human rights. As an example of Stage 6, Kohlberg refers to 
John Rawls’s (1971) formalization of procedural justice under a “veil of 
ignorance”, in which participants have to agree to organize principles in 
a society, each ignorant of their future actual position, leading to an 
agreement of the principles of justice. Another formalization of 
reversible role-taking is Habermas’s (1984) ideal communication 
situation, a dialogue among free and equal persons considering and 
modifying their claims in light of one another (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 
1987, pp. 30-31). Kohlberg (1981) himself constructed a procedure of 
“moral musical chairs” which leads to a fully reversible solution as 
follows: (1) The decision maker is to successively put himself 
imaginatively in the place of each other actor and consider the claims 
each would make from his point of view. (2) Where claims in one party’s 
shoes conflict in another’s, imagine trading places with them. If so, a 
party should drop his conflicting claim if it is based on non-recognition 
of the other’s point of view” (Kohlberg, 1981.) 
Thus, Kohlberg (1986) critically distinguishes the first-order Golden 
rule, embedded in Stage 3 ideal role-taking (“what would you like to do 
in her/his place”) from the second-order Golden Rule, embedded in the 
procedure of moral musical chairs, because the first one does not yield 
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fully reversible, that is, just solutions, but rather can be based on the 
projection of self into the other’s place. 
The two Golden Rules also constitute differences in emotional 
responsiveness. The first-order Golden Rule does not correspond to the 
actual feelings of the other, whereas the second-order Golden Rule 
requires an “emphatic” and “compassionate” component, while it is 
based on respect for the feelings and dignity of others (Kohlberg, 1986.) 
In Hoffman’s (2000) terms, the first one indicates self-focused role-
taking, and the second one other-focused role-taking. To interpret 
Kohlberg; even if empathy and sympathy are cognitively regulated, they 
inform high-level moral reasoning about unique characteristics of other 
persons, in order to respect them as ends themselves. 
 
Full reversibility as the ultimate criterion of justice is a 
normative-ethical claim (Kohlberg & al., 1983), but it is supported 
by the empirical evidence for development of sociomoral 
perspective that underlies the stage sequence (see Table 2, p. 70). 
The sociomoral perspective is the characteristic point of view from 
which the individual formulates moral judgments. It is distinctive 
from cognitive or social perspective taking which are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for moral perspective taking 
(Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Development of sociomoral 
perspective leads gradually to more comprehensive understanding 
of co-operation, finally extending to ideals for guiding the creation 
of cooperative societies (Rest 1986). By contrast, the ethic of care, 
at least its recent formulations, does not require society-level 
perspective taking, because the ethic of care deals with actual 
relationships. Besides, Kohlberg (1986) remarks that Gilligan et 
al. make an unnecessary dichotomy between immediate response 
to feelings of the other, embedded in care reasoning, and role 
reversal, embedded in justice reasoning. In line with his criticism, 
Skoe et al. (1996) found that role-taking was more related to care 
reasoning than to justice reasoning on real-life dilemmas. Even 
though skillful role-taking is regarded as a cornerstone of justice 
reasoning (Selman, 1980), its role within care reasoning is far 
from mapped. 
The contrast between particularistic and universalistic modes 
of thinking is closely related to the contrast of contextual vs. the 
abstract. The ethic of care is seen as a contextual mode of 
judgment, depending on the maximal representation of situation, 
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whereas within the ethic of justice, rules, norms and principles 
guide the selection of relevant information (Vreeke, 1991). 
Gilligan (1982) and especially Noddings (1984) have mistakenly 
interpreted this different emphasis to mean that justice reasoning is 
totally insensitive to contexts of moral problems, leading to obey 
rigidly rules and principles. However, principles, norms and rules 
are applied across different contexts that make them meaningful, 
as expressed by Kohlberg and Kauffman (1987, p. 58): 
“[Morality] is not just a matter of using abstract concepts like 
justice. It concerns the use of such concepts to guide our moral 
choice.” Especially at the postconventional level, justice reasoning 
loses its rule-bound nature, because it is grounded in principles. A 
person would realize that it is not sufficient to simply refer to a 
certain duty, but would be able to give an ultimate reason or 
principle underlying a duty in question. Principles, as distinct from 
culture-specific rules, resolve conflicts between rules, generate 
particular rules, and define a mode of viewing concrete moral 
situations (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987.) 
Nevertheless, justice reasoning remains less context-related 
than care reasoning, especially because it also includes the 
“personal philosophy” of the normative order orientation that 
emphasizes consistent upkeep of general rules. There is a concern 
for maintaining the stability of a system, whether of conscience or 
social order, sometimes at all costs, as in Kantian deontological 
ethics. According to Kant, it is morally wrong to lie even to a 
murderer seeking a victim, because lying contradicts the 
universality of the norm of truth (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). It 
is obvious that critics of justice have had especially this Kantian 
ethic in mind. For example, in the issue of the blindness of justice 
both Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) cite the biblical story of 
Abraham, who was ready to sacrifice his son in order to fulfill the 
absolute duty towards an invisible God. On the other hand, 
Nunner-Winkler (1984, p. 352) sees Kant’s view of moral duties, 
which do not allow for exceptions as an extreme which “is shared 
by scarcely anyone”. Nunner-Winkler quotes Hare (1963, p. 40): 
“Moral development... consists in the main in making our moral 
principles more and more specific by writing into them exceptions 
and qualifications to cover kinds of cases of which we have had 
experience.” 
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Even if moral rules might allow for exceptions, as Nunner-
Winkler argues, it is nevertheless suggestive that the normative 
orientation within justice reasoning has been empirically 
established. Related to this issue, Rest et al. (1999) have suggested 
that the relatively high Stage 4, with uniform adherence to norms 
and laws, can offer the conceptual bedrock for fundamentalist 
ideologies to be meaningful. Because Stage 4 reasoning does not 
appeal to moral criteria beyond the law itself, protection of social 
order might lead to curtailing basic human rights and liberties. 
Furthermore, because Stage 4 is part of human development, the 
threat of fascism and authoritarian regimes is present in every 
generation; fascism is not tolerated but can seen right and good as 
well. Certainly this form of justice reasoning is in the full 
contradiction with the ideals of care, and furthermore, it overrides 
situational considerations, while emphasizing the maintenance of 
orderliness and obedience to social or religious laws. 
76 
 
5. MORAL REASONING IN REAL-
LIFE CONTEXT 
5.1 Moral reasoning as a part of real-life 
morality 
To ordinary people, it is clear that morality has something to do 
with real-life. This is not as obvious to moral researchers, 
psychologists in particular, because studies using hypothetical 
moral dilemmas have dominated the field for three decades. 
Nevertheless, people’s actual moral conflicts have been a target of 
growing interest during the last decade. From the viewpoint of this 
study, reasoning about real-life moral conflicts is of particular 
interest, because Gilligan (1982) believed that the ethic of care is 
far more relevant to women’s natural moral conflicts than the ethic 
of justice.  
Before turning to the issue of empirical studies tell about care 
and justice in real-life morality, we must regard the question of 
how real moral action is constituted, and what the role of 
reasoning is there. While according to Kohlberg et  al. (1983), 
moral judgments are prescriptive, obligating someone to take 
some action, the Neo-Kohlbergian approach (Rest & al., 1999) 
determines moral judgment as only one, albeit definitively 
significant, component of moral action. According to James Rest’s 
widespread Four Component Model, moral action necessitates at 
least four psychological processes which occur as follows: (1) 
Moral sensitivity: involves perceiving a moral problem, 
interpreting the situation, role-taking to see how various action 
would affect the parties concerned. (2) Moral judgment: judging 
which action would be the most morally justifiable and right (3) 
Moral motivation: commitment to moral values or prioritizing 
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moral values over other values, and taking personal responsibility 
for moral outcomes. (4) Moral character: persisting in a moral 
task, having courage, overcoming fatigue and implementing 
subroutines that serve a moral goal. The sequence does not 
represent a temporal order but comprises a logical analysis of 
moral behavior, and the interactions between components are 
supposed to be complex. The basic idea is that those four 
components co-determine moral behavior and by combining 
information from all four components, it is possible to predict 
behavior more precisely. There is accumulating empirical 
evidence for four, relatively independent moral processes (Rest & 
al., 1999; see also Rest, 1994).29 
 
In recent conceptualizations, justice reasoning is seen to fall into the 
component of moral judgment (Rest & al., 1999). The question is which 
components of morality might Gilligan’s ethic of care serve. In this 
study, the ethic of care has been conceptualized as moral orientation and 
moral reasoning. The moral orientation approach (Lyons’s procedure) 
has been interpreted to serve moral sensitivity (Peltonen, 1993) even if it 
arguably also deals with the content of moral judgment. On the other 
hand, care-based reasoning (the ECI) can be seen as contributing to the 
judgment of which line of action is the right one; whose needs should be 
prioritized or how needs should be balanced. It is worth noting at this 
point that empathy has been regarded as serving moral sensitivity 
(Bebeau, Rest & Yamoor, 1985; Rest, 1986), and possibly it contributes 
to the component of moral motivation as well (Hoffman, 1991). 
 
                                                     
29For a critical evaluation of the Four Component Model, see Walker 
(2002). Although Walker sees the model as having heuristic value, 
according to him, its potential is not yet fully realized. Specifically, he 
suggests that that dispositions other than self-control embedded in the 
component of moral character are unclear (courage, perseverance, 
integrity). Rest himself (1986, p. 15) elaborates a rather obscure 
Component 4 as follows: “(it) involves figuring out the sequence of 
concrete actions, working around impediments and unexpected 
difficulties, overcoming fatigue and frustration, resisting distractions and 
allurements, and keeping sight of eventual goal... Psychologists 
sometimes refer to these processes as involving ‘ego strength’ or ‘self-
regulation’... A biblical term for failures in Component 4 is ‘weakness of 
flesh’.” 
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Real-life moral reasoning has been investigated mainly in 
terms of Lyons’s (1983) moral orientations. The research reviewed 
in Chapter 2.6 suggest that after a moral problem has been 
perceived, the type of dilemma determines which moral 
orientation the person takes; different types of dilemma elicit 
different amounts of care and justice reasoning. In other words, it 
seems that both orientations are not potentially equally accessible 
(cf. Gilligan, 1988), but rather, prosocial dilemmas related to the 
needs of others and conflicting demands, tend to invoke care-
based judgments whereas antisocial dilemmas related to 
transgressions and temptations, tend to invoke justice-based 
judgments (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997, 2000). Although the 
proportions of moral orientations within real-life moral reasoning 
are well observed, the quality of reasoning, in terms of 
developmental stages (justice) and levels (care) people use when 
solving different kind of moral problems, has not received equal 
attention. Several studies have, however, explored stages of justice 
reasoning on real-life and real-life-like dilemmas. 
5.2 Justice reasoning on actual and real-life 
dilemmas 
Most moral dilemmas people face in everyday life do not resemble 
Kohlberg’s hypothetical justice dilemmas, which are dilemmas 
planned to measure the competence, “upper limits of subjects 
thinking” (Colby & al., 1987, p. 5), centered on complex situations 
of conflicting claims. Because moral reasoning is supposed to be 
structurally homogeneous, individuals should then use judgments 
from their current or adjacent developmental stage (if in transition) 
across varying contents, and reasoning on hypothetical dilemmas 
should predict reasoning on real-life dilemmas fairly well (Krebs, 
Vermeulen, Carpendale & Denton, 1991).  
Krebs and his colleagues have studied moral reasoning on 
different types of more genuine real-life conflicts (for the 
elaboration of the scoring procedure, see Krebs, Vermeulen & al. 
1991). In general, they have found convincing support for relative 
heterogeneity of moral reasoning; participants’ justice reasoning 
tended to vary according to the type of dilemma, and the variance 
was often greater than the allowed ½ stage. Dilemmas concerning 
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business deals and driving while intoxicated invoked lower 
reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas, whereas the more 
Kohlbergian AIDS-dilemma invoked consistent reasoning 
(Carpendale & Krebs, 1992, 1995; Krebs, Denton & al., 1991, 
Krebs, Vermeulen & al., 1991). In keeping with the 
aforementioned results, Wark and Krebs (1996, 1997) found that 
antisocial dilemmas, concerning transgressions and temptations, 
tended to elicit Stage 2 reasoning, whereas prosocial dilemmas, 
concerning others’ needs and conflicting demands, tended to elicit 
Stage 3 reasoning. It is worth noting that participants’ justice 
reasoning, even though lower, has nevertheless been found to be 
related to their competence, (measured on hypothetical dilemmas) 
It seems that the higher the subject’s moral competence, the less 
likely is that he/she invokes Stage 2 self-serving judgments. Wark 
and Krebs (1997) interpret this to be due to the fact that 
inadequacies of lower-stage reasoning are clearer to high-stage 
reasoners, and therefore they are more prone to reject them.  
Some studies have nevertheless found that participants’ 
reasoning is consistent across real-life moral conflicts and 
Kohlbergian dilemmas. These situations involve actual conflicts 
(Walker, deVries & Trevenhan, 1987), relations in high school 
(Higgins, Power & Kohlberg, 1984), Israeli soldiers’ justifications 
for refusing to fight in the Lebanon war and the Intifada (Linn, 
1995, 1996) and reactions to sexually transmitted diseases 
(Conley, Jadack & Hyde, 1997). Personal decisions about abortion 
evoked even higher judgments than hypothetical dilemmas 
(Gilligan & Belenky, 1980). Then again, moral conflicts about 
daycare (Linn, 1984) and the actual strike of physicians (Linn, 
1987), as well as work-related conflicts reported by shop-stewards 
(Ikonen-Varila, 1994) elicited lowered justice reasoning. In turn, 
Walker, Pitts, Hennig, and Matshuba (1995) scrutinized how 
ordinary people define the domain of morality, and how it is 
related to the Kohlbergian framework. They asked participants to 
discuss a recent real-life moral dilemma, the most difficult real-
life dilemma they have ever faced, and a prototypic difficult moral 
dilemma. Most of participants’ real-life dilemmas were found to 
be scorable within the Kohlberg’s model, and 80% of the 
participants evidenced the same or adjacent stage across all three 
dilemmas, despite the considerable variation in the moral issues 
reported. In review, these findings suggest that real moral conflicts 
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do not necessarily invoke lowered reasoning, as has been found to 
be the case when moral dilemmas are defined by researchers. It 
might be that personal experience of conflict as moral requires 
much contemplation and pushes the thinking toward upper limits, 
like Kohlbergian dilemmas do. 
There are alternative and/or complementary explanations for 
lowered and inconsistent reasoning in real-life context. Firstly, 
from the methodological viewpoint, interviewing with real-life 
dilemmas does not include high stage-pulling probe questions that 
are systematically asked in the MJI procedure (Wark & Krebs, 
1997). For example, when a participant is telling about a case of 
shoplifting, an interviewer does not ask: “Should people in general 
obey the law? Why or why not?” Consequently, participants’ 
capacities of higher reasoning, advocating the upholding of social 
order, remain hidden. On the other hand, Krebs, Vermeulen et al. 
(1991) observed that probe questions sometimes made participants 
even annoyed while they were making judgments about driving 
while intoxicated. This observation hints at the second 
explanation, coming from outside cognitive-structuralist 
framework. Socioconstructivist Rom Harre (1983) argues that 
Kohlberg’s developmental stages represent different moral orders 
that constitute rules and norms people obey within the order. For 
example, the moral order of business constitutes the rule of equal 
exchange, based on the rationale of justice reasoning at Stage 2.  
Krebs, Vermeulen et al. (1991) elaborated that definite moral or 
legal norms, such as not to drink and drive, are a salient part of our 
moral order; they are widely accepted and socially sanctioned, and 
as a consequence, sufficiently regulated by Stage 2 justifications.  
Thirdly, Carpendale and Krebs (1992) found that moral 
reasoning is influenced by the audience it is intended for. 
Participants gave higher stage judgments when they expected to 
participate in a study conducted by a professor in philosophy than 
by a professor in business studies. This finding is consistent with 
other findings pointing out that situational factors, such as moral 
atmosphere in a prison (Kohlberg, Hickey & Scharf, 1972) or in 
army (Krämer-Badoni & Wakenhurt, 1985) may influence moral 
reasoning, making lower stage judgments psychologically more 
appropriate. But Kohberg maintained that “lower levels are used 
only in situations with a significant downward press” (Kohlberg & 
Kaufmann, 1987, p. 8). As a consequence, immoral action can be 
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dictated by collectively shared norms that are somewhat distinct 
from the individual’s moral stage (Kohlberg & al., 1983). In 
general, the moral atmosphere can serve either to limit or to 
enhance both judgment and action, as studies conducted in high 
schools indicate (see Kutnick, 1986). As the fourth explanation, 
real costs and outcomes of moral decision-making, while totally 
neglected in hypothetical dilemmas, play a central role in real life, 
leading to lowered moral reasoning. Anticipated practical 
consequences tend to pull for self-serving judgments that are 
classified as lower stages (Walker & al., 1995; Wark & Krebs, 
1997.) Interpreted in terms of the Four Component Model, 
reasoning might be influenced by the components of moral 
motivation and moral character as well. One should prioritize 
moral values over other values, and have psychological toughness 
and implementing skills to execute moral action. Possible failures 
in these components influence the component of moral judgment 
afterwards; low-stage judgments may serve justifications for a 
moral failure in action (cf. Carpendale & Krebs, 1995). 
To conclude, these findings indicate that even though moral 
judgment tends to be structured in terms of developmental stages, 
individuals also retain their old stage structures after acquiring 
new ones (Krebs, Vermeulen & al. 1991), and contradict 
Kohlberg’s claim that new stages also transform earlier ones, 
leading to high structural consistency within the individual 
(Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Indeed, it is consistent with the 
recent Neo-Kohlbergian view (Rest & al., 1999, 2000), which 
envisions moral development as shifting distributions of moral 
stages rather than as a rigid staircase.  
5.3 Advantages of higher justice reasoning 
When it is argued that the ethic of care is not applied in resolving 
conflicting claims, it actually means that those claims are derived 
from rights and duties embedded in a larger and more abstract 
system than personal networks. Justice reasoning should offer 
conceptual tools to grasp moral problems concerning people that 
are strangers to each other, as well as those concerning society as a 
whole, even mankind. This contribution becomes evident beyond 
Stage 3 of interpersonal morality, when the sociomoral perspective 
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of the society as a system gradually emerges (see Table 2, p. 70). 
Especially postconventional reasoning beyond Stage 4 has been 
argued to be superior to reasoning at lower stages because it 
encompasses a beyond-the-society perspective, and offers a moral 
groundwork for a critical attitude towards conventional-societal 
morality (Kohlberg & al., 1983; Rest & al., 1999). Kohlberg 
(1984) also argued that persons with postconventional morality 
grow into more autonomous moral agents. Increased 
differentiation and integration in cognitive processes is paralleled 
in increased prescriptivity and universality in moral thought; and 
consequently, the reasoning is more related to action, is less 
disturbed by low moral atmosphere, and is more likely to lead to 
agreements among other (postconventional) moral agents. These 
proposed advances suggest that postconventional reasoning might 
be of critical importance in real-life context.30  
 
Several studies in the past support the claim that the higher the 
individual’s moral reasoning, the more likely it is to lead a moral action. 
Kohlberg and Candee (1984) concluded that there is a monotonic 
relationship between justice stages and judgments of responsibility; the 
more developed person’s moral reasoning, the more likely she/he is to 
judge her/himself as responsible for carrying out an action she/he judges 
to be right in a situation. This was pointed out by Helkama’s (1979) 
study on the Heinz dilemma: subjects at Stage 5 did not only think that 
Heinz should steal the drug in order to save his wife’s life, but they also 
                                                     
30Kohlberg et al. (1983) derived from Piaget’s and Kant’s theories 
autonomous and heteronomous substages, called later Types, within 
justice reasoning. Type A refers to heteronomous orientation to rules and 
authority in terms of unilateral respect, whereas Type B refers to 
autonomous orientation to fairness, equality and reciprocity in terms of 
mutual respect. Type B reasoning displays certain formal features that 
are more or less lacking in Type A reasoning, such as reversibility, 
prescriptivity, universalizability, and a hierarchical ranking of values. In 
other words, Type B reasoning explicitly fulfills the formal criteria of 
justice reasoning, whereas in Type A reasoning they remain implicit. The 
more reasoning progresses towards the highest stage 5, the better it 
coincides with the Type B criteria. Type B reasoning, also at lower 
stages, has been found to be more related to action than Type B 
reasoning (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Tappan et al., 1987). Because 
Kohlberg’s group did not complete their work on A and B types, they are 
excluded from this study. 
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tended to judge him as responsible for doing it. A series of experimental 
and real-life studies, from the 1960’s onwards have lent support for this 
claim. A study of Free Speech Movement participants, originally 
reported by Haan, Smith and Block (1968), showed that 83% of students 
at Stage 4/5 or higher thought that it was right to illegally occupy the 
administration building in order to advocate civil rights (= to take an 
action) and 73% of them were involved in this action. In the famous 
obedience experiments by Milgram (1974), most participants at Stage 4 
refused to give painful electric shocks to their victims, whereas most 
participants at lower stages continued to give them at the experiment 
leader’s order. In McNamee’s (1978) study, only students at Stage 5 
intervened personally in order to help an “occasional” drug-stooge 
searching for help, when the experiment leader refused to help him. 
Krebs and Rosenwald (1977) found that Stage 4 and Stage 5 subjects 
kept a given promise to return a research questionnaire by mail, whereas 
most Stage 3 subjects returned it late or failed to return it, and most Stage 
2 subjects did not return it at all. Cheating in experiments has also been 
found to be inversely related to moral stages (see Kohlberg & Candee, 
1984). An impressive example of the actual adequacy of higher moral 
reasoning is Kohlberg and Candee’s (1984) analysis of the massacre by 
American troops at My Lai during the Vietnam War, based on the 
soldiers’ interviews in media, trial data, and Kohlberg’s dilemmas (sic). 
The only soldier who refused to shoot civilians against the super-
ordinate’s command demonstrated the highest reasoning among the 
observed soldiers, a mixture of Stages 4 and 5. Linn (1995, 1996) found 
as well that postconventional reasoning was proportionally high among 
soldiers objecting to military actions they found unjustified in Lebanon 
war and Intifada (42% and 37%). To conclude, higher stage subjects are 
less likely to orient to quasi-obligations, such as obeying an experiment 
leader in a simulated situation, more capable of keeping contracts beyond 
interpersonal relationships, and more autonomous in resisting authorities’ 
commands they judge immoral. As Tronto (1993, p. 68) puts it: 
“Kohlberg’s portrayal of postconventional reasoner presumes that the 
person understands himself (or herself) to be an actor, a person who acts 
as an agent in creating and comprehending the moral world. People who 
passively accept the way the world works cannot arrive at 
postconventional moral reasoning. Thus, Kohlberg’s interest in 
postconventional morality is also an interest in moving individuals to an 
understanding of their moral agency; those at the higher stages are not 
84 
 
only more moral, they are also more fully agents in control of their 
destiny.”  
 
Postconventional reasoning (when measured by the MJI) has 
been found to be rare across all samples from different cultures, 
and even lacking in some rural cultures (Snarey & Keljo, 1991). In 
Kohlberg’s longitudinal data, 13% reached the postconventional 
stage of 5 at the ages of 24-36 (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984). 
Armon and Dawson (1997) reported that 20% of their 
longitudinal, academic participants reached at least Stage 4/5, and 
none of them reached Stage 5 before the age of 35. Exceptionally, 
Snarey (1982; Colby & al., 1987) found that postconventional 
reasoning among Israeli kibbutz founders was quite common. 
Moral development seems nevertheless to continue across the 
middle age (Bakken & Ellsworth, 1990). Stage 6 has not been 
empirically established in any samples, even if some cases have 
been found and intensively studied (see Kohlberg & Higgins, 
1984). Consequently, the current scoring system (Colby & al., 
1987) does not distinguish Stage 6 from Stage 5 any more. To sum 
up, these findings indicate that postconventional stages describe 
moral development exclusively in adulthood. 
General prerequisites of moral development are (a) sufficient 
logical-cognitive development, (b) socio-cognitive development 
through enlarged role-taking opportunities and (c) the experiences 
of cognitive-moral conflicts, leading to transforming the current 
modes of moral reasoning. According to Kohlberg and Higgins 
(1984), these factors are responsible for moral development up to 
Stage 4, and can be based on vicarious moral experiences, rather 
than on personal moral choices. Higher post-secondary education, 
providing cognitive stimulation and role-taking opportunities, has 
been found to be related to moral development up to Stage 4 
(Nucci & Pascarella, 1987). Indeed, participants in the U.S. 
longitudinal sample reached postconventional stages only after 
completing university education (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984), 
whereas some Kibbutz youths without high formal education 
reached them as well (Snarey, Kohlberg & Reimer, 1984).  
  
Kohlberg and Higgins (1984) analyzed the adulthood development 
of postconventional cases in the U.S. longitudinal sample with the 
following conclusions: The shift from conventional to postconventional 
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reasoning seems to be more radical and difficult than previous ones, 
because it not only represents more adequate perception of a social 
system as the previous shifts, but a postulation of principles and ideals, to 
which the society and self ought to be committed. The transition process 
is two-fold: At first, moral relativism that differentiates personal and 
societal moralities emerges, leading to criticism against social reality 
instead of conforming to it. The transition is complemented by the 
commitment to self-chosen moral principles for self and society. 
Kohlberg and Higgins suggest that achieving postconventional reasoning 
requires two different types of experiences of personal moral 
responsibility: (1) responsibility for self in contexts of moral conflicts, 
and (2) social responsibility, often in work contexts. They point out that 
job responsibilities for decisions about other people’s welfare appear to 
consolidate Stage 5 reasoning in adulthood. A job should encourage and 
require empathic role-taking, stepping into the shoes of those for whom 
one feels responsible (e.g., patients), instead of strategic role-taking with 
those in positions of authority, to whom one is accountable or responsible 
(e.g., superordinates, emphasis original). As examples, two physicians 
with high job responsibilities achieved Stage 5 smoothly, whereas a 
lawyer who used strategic role-taking in his work as an attorney, had 
difficulties to get his potential postconventional reasoning consolidated 
through his young adulthood. Consequently, different professions seem 
to provide different opportunities for moral role-taking, even though they 
were of the same social status and responsibility (Kohlberg & Higgins, 
1984.) Lempert (1994) did a longitudinal study of skilled manual 
workers, and found out that taking responsibility for oneself and others, 
as well as coping with contradictory explanations, rules and values 
contributed to the postconventional transition. Moral atmosphere at 
workplaces appears to be a significant determinant of adult moral 
development, providing both opportunities of improvement and 
stagnation.  
Interestingly, emerging moral relativism at Stage 4/5 does not 
inevitably result in the consolidation of Stage 5 reasoning. Indeed, 
Kohlberg & Higgins report some cases that remained in the phase of 
moral relativism with the outside-of-society perspective over several 
adulthood years. What is also striking in Kohlberg & Higgins’s analysis 
is that responsible moral choices affecting others’ welfare outside work 
context, in the spheres of family and intimate relationships, were lacking 
in this young adult male sample. It is an open question whether they 
would have emerged if women had been included in the sample. 
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To date, postconventional reasoning has been even more 
infrequent on actual or real-life dilemmas than on hypothetical 
dilemmas. This is partly due to the fact that in many studies, 
participants’ competence does not evidence higher stage reasoning 
beyond Stage 3/4 even on hypothetical dilemmas (Carpendale & 
Krebs, 1992; 1995; Krebs, Denton & al. 1991; Wark & Krebs, 
1996, 1997). Indeed, Armon (1998) found that her educationally 
privileged participants (at Stage 4 on average on hypothetical 
dilemmas) were able to make higher-stage judgments, but were 
nonetheless scored ¼ stage lower on their real-life moral conflicts. 
Moreover, she found that moral events in societal context elicited 
higher reasoning than moral events in personal context, suggesting 
that “face-to-face interpersonal moral conflicts often do not 
involve the most complex social relations and therefore, may not 
require the highest level of socio-moral complexity for their 
resolution” (p. 348). 
It has been widely acknowledged that the rarity of 
postconventional reasoning poses a serious problem for 
Kohlberg’s theory, especially because he defined morality from 
the perspective of the higher stages (Rest & al., 1999). The recent 
Neo-Kohlbergian view has pointed out several flaws in 
Kohlberg’s conceptualization of postconventional stages that may 
account for the scarcity of empirical evidence. Firstly, Kohlberg’s 
view was greatly influenced by Kant’s and Rawls’ moral 
philosophies which represent deontological moral theories based 
on certain moral principles. Accordingly, moral agents are 
assumed to apply their conscious moral principles to the moral 
dilemmas they encounter. The assumption that deductive logic is 
the only mode of moral reasoning seems to be erroneous, 
however. It has been found that specialists in ethics could reach 
moral agreement on specific cases even if they could not agree on 
which moral principles they constructed their judgments. 
Secondly, postconventional reasoning may include other ideals 
and principles than Rawlsian and Kantian conceptions of justice.31 
                                                     
31Based on Beuchhamp and Childress (1994), Rest et al. (1999) 
outline a new type of philosophical approach that combines inductive 
and deductive approach. Members of a community may reflect specific 
cases and develop consensus over time in open debate. Consequently, 
some cases become paradigmatic, with which new cases are compared. 
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Thirdly, the Moral Judgment Interview, based on subjects’ explicit 
verbal expression, tends to underestimate their understanding, 
compared with a recognition task, such as Defining Issues Test 
(DIT). As a conclusion, the Neo-Kohlbergian approach has 
redefined the criteria of postconventional moral reasoning as 
follows: 
 
1. The primacy of moral criteria. The person realizes that laws, 
codes and contracts are all social arrangements that can be set up in a 
variety of ways. She/he views social norms and conventions as alterable 
and non-universal. Rights and duties follow from the moral purpose 
behind the conventions, not from de facto norms, as at the previous Stage 
4.  
2. Appealing to an ideal. A constructive ideal is offered, by which to 
transform society. 
3. Sharable ideals. Acts or practices based on ideals must be 
justifiable to those whose participation is expected. Moreover, one’s 
justifications are open to rational critique, and can be challenged by new 
experience, by logical analysis, and by evidence. 
4. Full reciprocity. Unlike partial reciprocity at Stage 4, full 
reciprocity acknowledges that social norms and laws themselves can be 
biased, in favor of some at the expense of others.32 
 
                                                                                                            
Emerging rules and principles are again checked against the more settled 
specific moral cases, and examined for their logical coherence and fit 
with moral experience. This dialectical process may lead to establishing 
reflective common morality with sharable moral ideals that are particular 
for each community. 
 
32While the Neo-Kohlbergians take a critical position against 
Kohlberg’s definition of the highest stages, they nevertheless see a shift 
from conventional to postconventional thinking as a critical 
transformation in modern societies. “The crux of the ideological 
disputes... does not concern the refinements of modern philosophy... 
Rather the ideological division is over fundamentalism versus 
secularism, orthodoxy over progressivism, and conventional versus 
postconventional ideology. A case can be made that the broad-gauged 
distinction we draw between conventional and postconventional is more 
urgent to understand than the many finer points of modern moral 
philosophy” (Rest & al., 1999, p. 31.) 
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What makes the prevalence of postconventional justice 
reasoning relevant from the viewpoint of care is the Kohlberg et 
al.’s (1983) claim that the ethics of care and justice are integrated 
at this level. What concrete forms or modes this integration might 
take is largely an unexplored issue. Kohlberg, Boyd and Levine 
(1990) later explicated that the integration happens at Stage 6 (that 
unfortunately does not exist so much), when sympathetic 
understanding and the equal consideration of the dignity of all 
persons takes place. The theorists of care have nevertheless 
maintained that the postconventional position emphasizes the 
independence from group loyalties, leading to actual insensitivity 
to social injustices (e.g., Tronto, 1993).  
Another interesting issue is whether the conceptualizations of 
postconventional stages may involve more care-based moral ideals 
than has been the case to date. This pertains to the question 
whether the ethic of care can be transformed into a sharable 
political idea crossing the boundary between private and public 
life, as Tronto (1993) in her theorizing envisages. 
5.4 Care reasoning in real-life context 
The proclivity of women to reconstruct hypothetical dilemmas in 
terms of the real, to request or to supply missing information 
about the nature of the people and the places where they live, 
shifts their judgment away from the hierarchical ordering of 
principles and the formal procedures of decision making. This 
insistence on the particular signifies an orientation to the 
dilemma and to moral problems in general that differs from any 
current stage descriptions.  
 (Gilligan, 1982, pp. 100-101) 
Gilligan was convinced that the ethic of care was inherent in 
women’s real-life morality that cannot be adequately understood 
through justice concepts. Consistent with her position, current 
research indicates that women are oriented more to care-based 
issues in real life than men, as discussed previously. What is not 
yet investigated is how consistent this care reasoning is across 
different types of moral conflicts people encounter in real-life. 
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More specifically, levels of care reasoning, measured by the ECI, 
have not been investigated as a function of the type of dilemma. 
Given that care reasoning includes a developmental sequence, 
each new level representing more complex, differentiated and 
adaptive patterns of thought, as justice reasoning has been argued 
to do (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987), it can be asked whether 
people consistently use their current highest level across different 
moral issues or is the level of care reasoning influenced by the 
dilemma content, as it seems to be the case for justice reasoning. 
Within the ECI methodology, self-generated moral conflicts are 
highly correlated with hypothetical care dilemmas (over .70) and 
total scores of interviews (over .80) (Skoe, 1998). However, given 
that real-life dilemmas involve also justice-pulling dilemmas with 
sparse care content, one might presume that care reasoning elicited 
by them is not necessarily so sophisticated.  
The dynamics between care and justice reasoning have not 
been fully investigated yet from the aspect of moral development. 
There are however some relevant studies available. Gremmen 
(1999) analyzed visiting nurses’ moral conflicts and found that 
nurses tried to integrate moral imperatives derived from both 
ethics of care and justice. Most conflicts involved a contradiction 
between the clients’ preferences and the nurses’ professional 
values and norms of good caring, presenting the moral conflict 
between care and respect for a client’s autonomy. Nurses tended to 
solve this conflict by preferring autonomy, by going along with a 
client’s wish, even if it apparently deteriorated her/his well-being, 
but simultaneously keeping a constant eye on how a situation 
develops. Thus, respect for autonomy was complemented by 
sustaining relationships, instead of withdrawing at the moment 
when disagreements emerged. Moreover, nurses tried to settle 
disagreements through discussion and negotiation to the point 
where a client expressed his determined will against nursing acts. 
In turn, Caputo (2000) reported that law students tended to exhibit 
both care and justice considerations when considering criminal 
sanctions. Care-focused penalty choices were associated with the 
custodial nature of sanctions. Justice-oriented students tended to 
shift from normative sanctions towards care when they were given 
further information about the offender. These findings from 
opposite professional fields indicate that professional moral 
reasoning involves an effort to integrate care and justice aspects.  
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Integrating care and justice might be more complicated in 
more ambiguous conflicts which involve greater personal risks. 
Linn and Gilligan (1990) pointed out that those soldiers’ justice 
reasoning who objected to immoral commands by authorities was 
centered on not acting (e.g., not shooting civilians) reflected their 
hesitation and resistance to social pressure and did not provide 
them with the capacity to take altruistic action on the behalf of 
victims. Interestingly however, in the Lebanon war, conscientious 
objectors’ forceful justice reasoning was complemented by 
particular care considerations. After solitary decision-making 
about refraining from military action and being sentenced to 
prison, most of them voiced desire to return to their units, in order 
to maintain solidarity and be attached to other soldiers. Linn and 
Gilligan concluded that objectors were not at peace “until they 
prove themselves, and particularly to their society, that their action 
was motivated by concerns about connection and care as well as 
by justice reasoning” (p. 199). Hence, care and justice appear to 
go hand in hand within complicated moral conflicts, as also 
Gremmen’s (1999) study suggests.  
5.5 Other voices of morality 
This study focuses on two moral voices, care and justice, defined 
from the perspective of deontic theory, namely in terms of moral 
obligation, answering questions such as: what we ought to do? 
How shall we judge what is right? (Haste, Helkama & Markoulis, 
1998). Many philosophers nevertheless interpret the ethic of care, 
with its emphasis on moral ideals, as a form of virtue-areatic ethic 
and want to develop it as such (Flanagan & Jackson, 1987; Tong, 
1998). My departure point does not imply that the other 
interpretations of these voices are necessarily less valid, or that 
other voices of morality do not exist. In fact, studies have 
identified at least a third one, Confucian morality of filial piety 
voiced by Asian participants (Lei & Cheng, 1982; Walker & al., 
1995). Filial piety refers to respect for and duty to elders within a 
structured hierarchy in which moral order is maintained by 
fulfilling role interdependencies, and in which a key virtue is 
harmony (Walker & al., 1995). In addition, Walker et al. point out 
that religion provides a meaningful framework for many ordinary 
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peoples’ moral reasoning but is not fully acknowledged within 
Kohlbergian scheme.  
Generally, it seems that religion and community-based 
moralities are distinguished from justice-based morality. 
Convergent with these findings, anthropologist Shweder with 
Murch, Mahapatra and Park (1997) has proposed that there are 
three distinct major moral orders in diverse cultures. (1) The ethic 
of autonomy defines the individual primary moral authority, and 
centers on the individual’s rights as long as her/his behavior does 
not cause any harm to others, or violate the others’ rights. By 
contrast, (2) the ethic of community defines individuals as 
members of groups to which they have commitments and 
obligations. The responsibilities of roles in family and community 
are the basis of one’s moral values. (3) The ethic of divinity 
defines the individual as spiritual entity, subject to spiritual or 
natural order; and it involves values based on traditional religious 
authorities and religious texts. Within this classification, 
Kohlberg’s theory seems to describe the ethic of autonomy, 
whereas the position of the ethic of care is not clear, even if it 
seemingly implies to the ethic of community. For example, Arnett, 
Ramos and Jensen (2001) conceptualized the ethic of community 
as a focus on the needs, desires, and interests of others. They 
found that young American adults presented equally the ethics of 
autonomy and community, whereas the ethic of divinity was 
sparse. In turn, Annukka Vainio (2003) found out that the ethic of 
divinity was common among religious Finnish adolescents. 
Gilligan’s conception of care has also been interpreted to 
represent a complementary suborder to the morality of justice, 
following the distinction between the private and public spheres 
(Harre, 1991; Tronto, 1993). The discussion on the position of the 
ethic of care within the wider scope of moral philosophy is still in 
process. The ethic of care can be interpreted as a major virtue 
theory, or alternatively as a theory of right action, or it might even 
represent an entirely new branch of ethic, that is an ethic of 
relationships, construing relation between persons as the basic 
units of analysis rather than individuals themselves. However, this 
question has not yet been properly elaborated and answered in the 
field of moral philosophy (Rudnick, 2001; Veatch, 1998.)  
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6. METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY 
6.1 Context of this study 
6.1.1 Practical nursing and bachelor-degree social 
work and education 
The main goal of my study is to investigate care development in 
the context of justice development. For this purpose, I selected 
three educational subsamples that are presumably differently 
related to care and justice issues. Practical nursing students (n = 
21) were chosen, because practical nurse represents a care-
oriented basic-degree vocation. Since 1994, the training for 
practical nurse combined all former basic-degree vocations in 
social services and health care in Finland, corresponding to the 
work previously performed by assistant nurses and assistant 
workers in different care settings, such as daycare, disabled 
people’s care, and household care. Practical nurses work broadly 
at the grass-roots level, and their tasks involve basic nursing and 
caring tasks, and psychosocial support and guidance (National 
Board of Education, 1999). The education of this study’s 
participants lasted 2.5 years (80 Finnish credits = 120 ECTS 
credits), but it has recently been extended to 3 years (120 credits). 
Due to its broad applicability, practical nurse is one of the most 
common secondary-level vocations in Finland. The entrance age 
for education is 16 years, and therefore practical nursing students 
are relatively young.  
Students from second-career program in social services (n = 
22) were chosen in order to ensure that participants might cover 
also the highest levels of care development. My assumption was 
that this subsample is likely to include subjects with sophisticated 
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care reasoning, due to higher age as well as their prior care-related 
work experience. A second-career program in social services at a 
Polytechnic requires a previous basic-degree education in social 
and health care, for example that of practical nurse, and care work 
experience of three years as admission criteria. The program takes 
about 3.5 years (140 Finnish credits). The bachelor-degree social 
service worker 33 (‘sosionomi’ in Finnish) is a new degree within 
the recently reformed Finnish educational system involving two 
kinds of higher-level institutions, universities and polytechnics. 
Roughly, their division of labor is supposed to be that universities 
are focused on scientific work, whereas polytechnics are focused 
on work development and applied research. In the social care field 
this division is superficial, however, and the position of the 
bachelor-degree social worker is controversial between university-
level social workers and former college-level social service 
workers (Markkanen, Rantanen & Rouhiainen-Valo, 2003). 
According to a recent account (Borgman, Dal Maso, Hakonen, 
Honkasalo & Lyhty, 2001) the bachelor-degree social work 
involves social support, social rehabilitation and counselling, 
upbringing, guidance and caring tasks, as well as management in 
client work. Compared with practical nurses, their work is more 
focused on psychosocial client work and less focused on concrete 
caregiving tasks, and they are also qualified for management 
positions. On the other hand, compared with master-degree social 
workers, they lack a legalized status to intervene in peoples’ life, 
such as making decisions on child protection. From the viewpoint 
of this study, it is worth noting that the newly formed polytechnic 
programs involve a considerable amount of social sciences that 
might stimulate the emergence of society-level sociomoral 
perspective in students (e.g., Espoo-Vantaa Polytechnic, 2000).  
Care work embedded in practical nursing appears to be deeply 
rooted in the connotations of the ethic of care. Borgman (1998) 
found that secondary-level care workers’ vocational choices were 
quite unanimously motivated by a desire to be a virtuous human 
                                                     
 
33The term ‘social worker’ is used there because there is not yet the 
established translation for the Finnish title ‘sosionomi’, and the recent 
education corresponds to the education of a social worker in many 
European countries (T. Karpela, personal communication, January 2003). 
Alternatively, the term ‘social welfare work student’ could have also 
been used, but ‘social work student’ was chosen because of its brevity. 
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being, to help other people, and to improve oneself and one’s work 
in order to reinforce one’s virtues. Their conception of care was 
focused on the general motivation of caring about (Fisher & 
Tronto, 1988). These workers were committed to taking care of 
their clients, feeling concern or pity for their clients and their 
coping even outside working hours. Congruent with these 
observations, it can be argued that skills in practical nursing are 
grounded in an emotional-moral competence; it involves empathic 
capacities as well as readiness to encounter moral conflicts, and 
trying to search for a right solution from the viewpoints of all 
concerned. It is worth noting that emerging emotions in interaction 
with clients have been regarded as an integral part of work and 
therefore they should be recognized, reflected and utilized 
(Rikkinen, 1996.) Emotions are regarded also as informative in the 
context of care-giving; a client’s joy means positive feedback and 
evokes joy in a worker as well, whereas lack of connection to 
others elicits feelings of irritation (Borgman, 1998).  
The curricula for practical nursing and social work have an 
emphasis on ethical skills as well. On the basis of their emotional 
and ethical skills, practical nursing students should be able to 
commit themselves to work, to act in a responsible and just way as 
citizens and workers, and to deal with and solve moral and ethical 
problems. One should also be able to internalize the ethics of 
nursing. Relationship skills take a central position in terms of 
supporting people of different backgrounds and ages and 
considering their culture and values. A skilled worker is empathic, 
honest, reliable, and cares genuinely about people. Furthermore, 
according to the ethical codes, she/he is responsible to a client in 
the first place (National Board of Administration, 1999.) In turn, a 
bachelor-degree social worker should be sensitive to clients’ 
needs, resources, and strengths. She/he should have a capacity to 
regulate relationships according to clients’ needs; perceive when a 
client needs intimacy, safety and support, or alternatively equality, 
or distance. She/he should also be willing to participate in 
meaningful conflicts, and to set herself/himself as a target for 
negative feelings. As a worker, she/he is ultimately responsible for 
actions and goals in a working process (Borgman & al., 2001.) 
In addition to these care-related skills, social work education 
has an emerging concern for justice-based values and action. 
Work should be guided by such ethical principles as human 
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dignity, justice, autonomy, self-determination, privacy, the 
prevention of marginalization, as well as the objection of violence 
and oppression. Accordingly, a worker should advocate the 
clients’ social participation and rights, and she or he should be 
able to reason logically, and argue for her/his decisions from the 
ethical point of view (Borgman & al., 2001.) These outlines are 
consistent with the general mission of social work which has been 
defined as “a profession in which the primary mission is to 
enhance human well-being and to help people meet basic human 
needs, with particular attention to the needs of people who are 
vulnerable, oppressed, living in poverty” (Reamer, 1998, p. 169). 
To conclude, it seems that social work represents an effort to 
integrate care and justice aspects, whereas nursing in general leans 
more on the ethic of care with the emphasis on empathic capacities 
(Reynolds, Scott & Austin, 2000). 
The definitions of practical nursing competence in particular 
involve personality attributes rather than qualifications arising 
from the demands of work process. This kind of approach which 
considers specific human characteristics, such as emotionality, as 
a part of qualifications is a new one. In the background, there is a 
change towards service-based society in general (Rikkinen, 1996.) 
The referred descriptions of the goals represent ideals and 
guidelines of education, and their effects in practice have not been 
explored. It seems obvious, however, that the altruistic motivation 
forms a basis for practical nursing and social work. 
The purpose of this study is not to investigate the effectiveness 
of education per se, but rather, it leans on the assumption that 
nursing and social work education might facilitate care 
development. Education programs with long practical training 
periods provide strong experiences related to caring that are 
reflected through group-discussions and writing assignments that 
stimulate moral growth (see Sprinthall, 1994). Moreover, practical 
nursing students are entering young adulthood with emerging 
experiences of responsibilities and changes in dating, friend and 
parent relationships, whereas adult social work students 
presumably encounter life crises in connection with their decision 
to start further studies, which both obviously nurture care 
development (Skoe & Lippe, 2002). It is worth noting that there is 
no empirical evidence to date that education in general is related to 
care development (Skoe & al., 1996), as it has been found to be 
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the case for justice development (King & Mayhew, 2002; Nucci & 
Pascarella, 1987). Concerning the students in this study, no special 
ethical intervention programs were undertaken in their schools 
within a research period of two years. 
6.1.2 Law enforcement work and education 
Law enforcement students (n = 24) were chosen to represent 
subjects with pronounced justice orientation, due to their career 
choice. Police officers’ daily work is related to the issues of 
justice, and justice-mindedness has been found to be one of the 
characteristics for Finnish police culture as well (Korander, 1999). 
Participants are students in the basic-degree education that takes 
about 2.5 years (108 Finnish credits). Law enforcement education 
represents post-secondary education within Finnish educational 
system, having an internal vertical educational system with 
polytechnic and university studies that qualifies for different 
officer ranks. Admission criteria for basic-degree education 
include age of 19 years, matriculation exam or a basic vocational 
degree, military service with a rank of officer (for men), and work 
experience of one year in minimum (Police School, 1998). A 
practical training period of 8 months is a crucial part of the basic 
education. The goal of the training is to educate students “to carry 
out ordinary work tasks, to internalize right values from the 
viewpoint of police ethics, to understand the service-mindedness 
of police work, to get a realistic view on policing with its different 
sub-fields as well as on demands directed to police forces” (Police 
School, 1996; Honkonen, 2000.) Furthermore, it has been found 
that for law enforcement students, police culture is the primary 
agent of vocational socialization rather than education which 
underlines the importance of the practical training period in their 
studies (Honkonen & Raivola, 1991). 
The admission criteria to basic-degree police education 
emphasize that personality as well as physical characteristics have 
to suit the vocational demands. An applicant should be tolerant, 
service-minded, and broadminded, and he/she should demonstrate 
appropriate behavior without recorded legal transgressions (Police 
School, 1998). Law enforcement students have been found to be 
strongly pre-socialized towards their forthcoming vocation when 
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entering school, but their motivational base seems to be somewhat 
mixed. Honkonen and Raivola (1991) found that law enforcement 
students’ vocational choices were motivated by a desire to obtain a 
position of power and authority, as well as a moral mission in 
terms of a desire to maintain order, to serve one’s country, and to 
help individual citizens. Options for career progress and 
improving oneself were also mentioned.34 
Furthermore, Honkonen and Raivola (1991) observed that 
three different types of socialization emerged among law 
enforcement students during education (1) Practical orientation 
which underscores the short duration of education, interesting 
work and secure income as reasons for career choice, and views 
protecting citizens’ security and rights as a base for work. (2) 
Social orientation which underscores social interaction and 
interesting work as reasons for career choice, and views helping 
citizens and protecting their security as a base for work (3) 
Patriotic orientation which underscores a police officer’s 
authority and mission as reasons for career choice, and views a 
police officer as a moral example to other citizens, and serving 
one’s country as a base for work. This typology is somewhat 
consistent with the types of work roles Korander (1999) found 
among Finnish police officers. (1) Virtahanska (action man) who 
is very policeman, searching for action and enforcing law, 
focusing on fighting against disorder and crimes. (2) Reinikainen 
(neighborhood police) who is oriented to community policing and 
wants genuinely to help people with their problems, emphasizing 
the role of police officer as a service-oriented, social and mental 
health worker. His actions are guided by calm, careful reasoning, 
instead of haphazard hurrying. (3) Professional who is ambitious 
and career-oriented, and has a reflective approach to all aspects of 
policing. He educates himself and rehearses his public relations 
skills. Neighbourhood and especially action policemen may 
become cynic, pessimistic and passive, as they grow old, 
transforming into the role of (4) Lyijytasku (pencil pusher) who 
tries to actively avoid work tasks. 
                                                     
34Applicants’ motives are explored in interviews; desires to help 
others and to maintain justice are common motives voiced by them (J. 
Kauppila, personal communication, October 1998). 
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A recent Finnish reader in the police ethics defines enhancing 
basic and human rights as a police officer’s primary task and 
emphasizes the significance of interpreting law instead of its rigid 
following. When applying a law, a police officer should 
understand the spirit of law, that is, purposes behind the law 
(Ellonen & al., 2000.) In terms of Kohlberg’s theory, there is an 
educational effort to promote postconventional justice reasoning 
based on ethical principles that might be relevant to the Finnish 
police culture as a whole. In his ethnographical study, Korander 
(1999) found that the Finnish police culture is characterized by 
moral integrity, honesty and fairness, and aims at the impartial and 
just treatment of citizens. Accordingly, incidences of violence and 
corruption are infrequent. On the other hand, police culture 
maintains solidarity, isolation, moral and political conservatism 
and pragmatism, and there is occasional prejudiced thinking 
against minorities. In other words, the values of police culture 
reflect the mission of maintaining status quo in society that is best 
supported by Stage 4 justice reasoning, with the dark side that its 
fixation may prevent innovations within the police organization 
(see Korander, 1999). 
Another characteristic of police culture that is relevant to this 
study is masculinity, having been regarded as a primary cultural 
determinant for “cop” culture. According to Honkonen (1999), 
Finnish police culture encompasses different kinds of masculinity 
that roughly takes two main forms: (1) strong physical masculinity 
that is more characteristic of lower-ranking police officers (2) and 
aristocratic moral masculinity that is more typical for higher-
ranking police officers with long education. Police officers are 
encountered with the Tarzan’s dilemma when they are required to 
combine independent “physical” coping with the “aristocratic” 
commitment to responsibility for taking care of family and 
protecting the weak and dependent ones. Honkonen (1999) found 
that police officers’ masculinity was characterized by competition 
for higher ranks and education opportunities, commitment to 
duties towards their families, and devotion to sports and physical 
training. 
Within the scope of this study, police education is assumed to 
promote students’ justice development. It is not clear whether the 
potential development should be attributed to theoretically 
oriented studies or a practical training period of 8 months in 
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minimum. Law enforcement students regard the training period as 
more important than theoretical periods, and see many general 
subjects (such as ethics) as somewhat irrelevant for their 
forthcoming practical vocation (Honkonen, 2000). However, it 
might be premature to assume that the ethics of care is excluded 
from police work. A police officer may offer juridical, 
psychological and social support, and recent models of community 
policing represent an intentional effort to make a shift towards 
service-oriented face-to-face work that might invigorate a care-
based approach (see Kiehelä, 1997; Korander, 1999). Desire to 
help others is one of major reasons to choose police profession 
(Honkonen & Raivola, 1991). In line with this, a recent reader by 
Neyroud, Beckley et al. (2001) introduces the ethics of care as one 
model for police ethics, in order to maintain and repair 
relationships at interpersonal and communal levels. In the context 
of education, ethical issues are nevertheless focused on the 
questions of rights (Ellonen & al., 2000). There were no special 
ethical intervention programs undertaken in the Police School 
within the period of this study. However, taking the police 
officer’s oath was established at this time (Hyvärinen, 2001) 
which reflects the current official emphasis on the police ethics in 
Finland. 
6.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
Based on the reviewed discussion, I put forward the interpretation 
that the ethic of care represents an independent mode of morality, 
different from the morality of justice but related to it. According to 
my analysis, its distinguishing feature is sensitivity to the 
particularities of persons, and it is (normatively) best applied as an 
ethic of relationships. In the literature, the ethic of care receives 
three interrelated interpretations: (1) Care is a moral orientation to 
perceive and construe moral problems. (2) Care is a specific way 
of reasoning about moral dilemmas (3) that forms a developmental 
sequence. My study scrutinizes all these interpretations by using 
respective methodologies of Lyons’s moral orientation and self-
concept interviews, and Skoe’s Ethic of Care Interview (the ECI). 
Care as a moral orientation will be explored in terms of real-life 
conflicts, care as a mode of reasoning will be explored in relation 
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to gender roles, emotional empathy, role-taking and justice 
reasoning, and care as a developmental sequence will be studied 
with longitudinal data. In this study, sensitivity to particularities of 
persons is operationalized as affective-based empathy, measured 
by Mehrabian and Epstein’s questionnaire of emotional empathy 
(QMEE). Based on Hoffman’s (2000) claims, emotional empathy 
is expected to be more congruent with care reasoning than with 
justice reasoning, whereas role-taking is expected to be related to 
both modes of moral reasoning (Hoffman, 2000; Selman, 1980; 
Skoe & al., 1996).  
Related to the nature of care reasoning, I will investigate 
relations between different constructs derived from Gilligan’s 
(1982) theory: Lyons’s Self-Concept and Moral Orientation (1982, 
1983) Interviews and Skoe’s (1993) the Ethic of Care Interview 
(ECI), across hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. Based on the 
previous research (Lyons, 1983; Pratt & al., 1988) it is predicted 
that participants with connected self-concept score higher in care 
orientation than those with separate or mixed self-concepts, and 
also score higher in emotional empathy, predicted from the 
theories by Chodorow (1978), Gilligan and Wiggins (1988). 
Participants with mixed self-concept are predicted to score the 
highest on the ECI, subjects with separated self-concept to score 
the lowest, and those with connected self-concept falling between 
them (Gilligan, 1982). With regard to a relationship between the 
ECI and Moral Orientation, there are no prior studies available, 
and therefore, no hypotheses are set. Nevertheless, given the 
previous nonsignificant findings for the Moral Orientation and the 
Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) (Pratt & al., 1988; Walker, 
1991), non-significant findings for the relationship between the 
ECI and the Moral Orientation might not be a surprise. 
With regard to the developmental aspect of care, I lean on 
Gilligan’s (1982) initial outlining of care levels that represent a 
hierarchy of more inclusive solutions to moral dilemmas grounded 
in the underlying development of relationships. Based on 
Kohlberg et al.’s (1983) criticism, Gilligan et al.’s (1990) renewed 
interpretation of care development, empirical findings (Skoe & 
Marcia, 1991; Skoe & Diessner, 1994; Skoe & Lippe, 2002) and 
general criticism against hard stage models (Rest & al., 1999), it is 
nevertheless reasonable to expect  the ethic of care show a “soft 
stage” rather than a “hard stage” development. Accordingly, in the 
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context of this study, justice development should display more 
features of a hard stage model than care development, in terms of 
greater internal consistency across dilemmas and less regression 
cases.  
In order to validate care development as distinguished from 
justice development, two care-related student groups (practical 
nursing, bachelor-degree social work) and one justice-related 
student group (law enforcement) were selected as a sample, and 
their moral reasoning was measured at the beginning of their 
studies and 2 years after. If Gilligan’s claim for divergent 
developmental paths for care and justice were valid, practical 
nursing and social work students should progress predominantly in 
care reasoning, and law enforcement students should progress 
predominantly in justice reasoning. Yet because justice 
development has been seen to be related to education (Nucci & 
Pascarella, 1987; Rest & Narvaez, 1994), all student groups are 
also expected to progress in justice reasoning. Furthermore, based 
on Kohlberg et al.’s (1983) and to some extent Gilligan’s (1982) 
claims, both modes of moral reasoning are expected to integrate at 
the highest levels of development. 
Moral reasoning in real life is the second major concern in this 
study and it is investigated from real-life moral conflicts reported 
by participants as a part of the ECI procedure. Most hypotheses 
concerning the usage of justice reasoning (measured by the MJI) 
and moral orientations (Lyons, 1983) on real-life moral dilemmas 
are directly derived from the recent studies presented in the 
review. Care reasoning is expected to be more consistent across 
different types of moral dilemmas than justice reasoning, based on 
the reported high correlations between real-life and hypothetical 
dilemmas (Skoe, 1998).  
More precisely, my study addresses the questions related to 
three domains or section (I) the nature of care reasoning, (II) the 
nature of care development and (III) the nature of real-life moral 
reasoning. The following hypotheses under each section and 
research questions are derived from the reviewed literature. 
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I Nature of care reasoning 
 
Research Question I a. How is care-based reasoning related to 
gender-role orientation, emotional empathy and role-taking? What 
are the connections among these variables?  
 
(1) Androgynous gender role orientation is positively related 
to care reasoning for women 
(2) Feminine gender role orientation is positively related to 
emotional empathy 
(3a) Emotional empathy is positively related to care reasoning 
(Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988; Hoffman, 2000) or alternatively,  
(3b) Participants at Care Level 2 are more empathic than 
others (Skoe & Nickerson, 1995)  
(4) Spontaneous role-taking on real-life dilemmas is positively 
related to both modes of moral reasoning (Skoe & al., 1996) 
 
Research Question I b. How are different constructs derived 
from Gilligan’s theory (moral orientation, self-concept and care 
reasoning) related to each other? 
 
(5) Participants with connected self-concept score higher in 
emotional empathy than those with separated and mixed self-
concepts 
(6) Participants with connected self-concept score higher in 
care orientation on real-life dilemmas than those with separated or 
mixed self-concepts 
(7) Participants with mixed self-concept score the highest in 
care reasoning and those with separated self-concept score the 
lowest 
 
II Nature of moral development 
 
Research Question II a. How does moral reasoning change 
over a 2-year period? 
  
(8) All student groups progress in justice reasoning 
(9) Nursing and social work students progress in care 
reasoning, whereas law enforcement students remain stable 
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(10) Participants progress in care reasoning without skipping 
any levels 
 
Research Question II b. How is care reasoning and 
development related to justice reasoning and development? 
 
(11) There are more regression cases in care reasoning than in 
justice reasoning 
(12) Care and justice reasoning are related to each other 
(Kohlberg & al., 1983; Skoe, 1998) 
(13) Participants at the postconventional level of justice 
development (Stages 4/5 and 5) score more often at the 
postconformist levels of care reasoning (Levels 2.5 and 3) than 
participants at the conventional and preconventional levels (Stage 
4 and below) 
 
III Nature of real-life moral reasoning 
 
Research Question III a. How are different types of real-life 
dilemmas reported as a function of gender and education? 
 
(14) Women report predominantly prosocial moral conflicts, 
and men report predominantly antisocial moral conflicts  
(15) Nursing and social work students report predominantly 
prosocial moral conflicts, and law enforcement students report 
predominantly antisocial moral conflicts  
 
Research Question III b. How is moral orientation related to 
different types of dilemmas? 
 
(16) Prosocial dilemmas elicit more care-based (=less justice-
based) judgments than antisocial dilemmas 
 
Research Question III c. How is care and justice reasoning 
related to different types of dilemmas? 
 
(17) Prosocial dilemmas invoke higher level of justice 
reasoning than antisocial dilemmas  
(18) All types of real-life dilemmas invoke lower level of 
justice reasoning than hypothetical MJI dilemmas 
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(19) Justice reasoning is consistent across hypothetical and rel-
life dilemmas among participants at the postconventional level of 
justice reasoning (4/5, 5) 
(20) Care reasoning is consistent across real life and 
hypothetical ECI dilemmas 
6.3 Methods and reliability findings  
Data collecting and analyzing methods are summarized in 
Table 3. 
6.3.1 Skoe’s Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) 
The ECI is a semi-structured interview, consisting of four 
dilemmas administered in a structured interview format. In 
addition to a self-generated real life conflict, there are three 
interpersonal dilemmas surrounding (a) unplanned pregnancy, (b) 
marital fidelity and (c) care for a parent (see Appendix A). These 
dilemmas were included into the measure to present usual real-life 
situations of interpersonal concerns where the helping of others 
could be at the price of hurting oneself (Skoe & Marcia, 1991). A 
real-life dilemma is first probed for in several ways: Have you 
ever been in a situation you were not sure what was the right thing 
to do? Have you ever had a moral conflict? Could you describe a 
moral conflict? These questions are followed by questions: Could 
you describe a situation? What were the conflicts for you in that 
situation? What did you do? Did you think it was the right thing to 
do? How did you know it was the right thing to do? Due to the 
lack of established set of probe questions, the validity and 
reliability of the measure depends on the manner in which the 
interview is conducted and scored. If the participant is not made 
comfortable or if the interviewer is over-directive, then responses 
may not accurately represent the participant’s level of 
development (Skoe, 1993.) A recent study has shown that the ECI 
is conceptually distinct from verbal intelligence (Skoe & Lippe, 
2002). 
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Table 3.  Participants and methods 
Participants 
The first round (1997-1998)  
N = 66 
21 practical nursing students 
22 social work students 
23 law enforcement students 
 
The second round (1999-2000)  
N = 60 
16 practical nursing students 
20 social work students 
24 law enforcement students 
 
Data collecting methods1 
The Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) 
The Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) 
The Bem Sex-Role Inventory, the short form (BSRI) 
Questionnaire of Emotional Empathy (QMEE) 
Lyons’s Self-Concept Interview (Time 2) 
 
Analyzing methods 
Scoring of the MJI dilemmas (Colby, Kohlberg & al., 1987) 
Scoring of the ECI dilemmas (Skoe, 1993) 
Scoring of real-life dilemmas (Krebs, Vermeulen & al., 1991) 
Classification of real-life dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1996) 
Lyons’s (1983) coding scheme for moral orientations2 
The Bem Sex Role Inventory Manual (1981) 
Chap’s (1986) classification of spontaneous role-taking 
Lyons’s (1983) coding scheme for self-concept (Time 2) 
 
 
1The first round of data collecting involved a questionnaire of 
demographic characteristics and of participants’ conceptions of a good 
worker. Both data collecting rounds also involve the Schwarz Value 
Survey that is not reported here.  
2In rating of Lyons’s Moral Orientation Interview (1983), a 
modification adopted from Gilligan & Attanucci (1988) is used. 
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The interviews are tape-recorded, transcribed and scored 
according to the Ethic of Care Interview Manual (Skoe, 1993). 
Even though scores can be assessed by listening to interview 
tapes, the majority of present interviews were also transcribed for 
the sake of clarity. The scoring contains five ethic of care levels. 
Level 1 is survival (caring for self). The perspective is 
characterized by caring for self to ensure survival and personal 
happiness. The questions of rightness emerge mainly if the 
person’s own needs are in conflict. There is little, if any, evidence 
of caring for other people. Level 1.5 is transition from survival to 
responsibility that entails attachment to others. The person can 
criticize her/his own judgment and behavior as selfish. There is 
some concern for other people, but survival of self is still the main 
aim. Level 2 is conventions of goodness (caring for others). This 
perspective is characterized by the elaboration of responsibility 
and providing care for the dependent and unequal ones. 
Conventionally defined goodness becomes the primary concern 
because survival is seen to depend on the acceptance of others that 
define “right”. S/he feels responsible for actions of others and 
others are responsible for her/his choices. Good is equated with 
self-sacrificing caring for others. Level 2.5 is transition from 
conventional to reflective care perspective, a shift from goodness 
to truth about relationships. There is a reconsideration of the 
relationship between self and others, as the person questions 
goodness of protecting others at one’s own expense. The new 
sense of responsibility to oneself places an emphasis on personal 
honesty. Psychological survival again becomes a central concern. 
Level 3 is ethic of care (caring both self and other). The 
perspective focuses on the dynamics of relationships and 
dissipates the tension between selflessness and responsibility 
through a new understanding of the interconnection between 
others and self. The person takes responsibility for choices she or 
he makes, as criteria for goodness become internal. There is now a 
balance of moral considerations between self and other, and both 
are included in the compass of care. 
The participant is given a level score for each dilemma, 
ranging from 1 to 3. The ECI yields a total score across the four 
dilemmas. The ECI overall score was calculated as an average of 
the four dilemmas and overall level score was determined by 
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rounding to the nearest 0.5 Level. In cases where the score falls 
between two levels (e.g., 2.25), a second scorer assesses the 
interview and classifies the score into one or the other level. 
6.3.2 Scoring and reliability findings for the ECI 
The author scored all the interviews as blindly as possible in order 
to avoid scoring bias favorable to the hypotheses. In order to 
diminish any potential bias, the ECI and the MJI were scored at 
different times. Interviews were scored three times, the first one 
was preliminary, in order to get a feeling over the total data; the 
second one was a detailed one, and the third one was a check. 
Some of the scorings were changed after negotiation with a second 
rater. Scoring of Time 2 interviews was conducted as blindly as 
possible to Time 1 scores. Because the author conducted 
interviews herself each time, it was not possible to be totally 
unaware of some respondents’ general reasoning level at Time 1. 
However, special effort was given to avoid biased scoring. 
At Time 1, 8 participants did not provide a scorable real-life 
dilemma, and according to the manual instructions, their real-life 
dilemmas were scored as the average of three hypothetical 
dilemmas, but were not included in the correlation analyses 
between dilemmas. At Time 2, 1 participant failed to provide a 
scorable real-life dilemma. 
Random samples of 15 interviews of each time (23% and 25% 
of the data) were selected and scored by a second scorer who was 
familiar with the theoretical background of the ECI but had no 
prior experience of the ECI scoring. Inter-rater agreements within 
¼ level were 87% on a 5-point level scale for both times, and 
inter-rater correlations were r1(14) = .95, and r2(14) = .90, ps < 
.001. Cohen Kappas were 0.73 and 0.74, exceeding substantially 
chance (.13 and .28). Skoe (1998) reported inter-rater correlations 
ranging from 0.87 to 0.96, and Cohen Kappas ranging from 0.63 
to 1.00 in other studies. Hence, current inter-rater findings are 
consistent with the previous findings on the ECI.  
Internal consistency on the ECI has previously been measured 
by intercorrelations of scores on the four dilemmas. Table 4 shows 
intercorrelations among the ECI dilemmas for the longitudinal 
data. As can be observed, intercorrelations between the dilemmas 
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ranged from .51 to .81, dilemma total-score correlations ranging 
from .61 to .85. Real-life dilemmas showed the lowest correlations 
with other dilemmas, ranging from .51 to .71, as well as with total 
scores, .61 (Time 1) and .69 (Time 2). In turn, correlations among 
the standard care dilemmas ranged from .74 to .85, and 
correlations of standard dilemmas with total scores ranged from 
.81 to .85. In comparison, previous studies have found between-
dilemma correlations ranging from .73 to .92, and the dilemma-
total score correlations from .82 to .97. Cronbach’s alphas were 
.89 (Time 1) and .91 (Time 2), compared with .94 - .97, reported in 
previous studies (Skoe, 1998.) To conclude, internal consistency 
findings are somewhat lower than found in previous studies, 
largely due to real-life dilemmas. 
 
Table 4. Correlations between the ECI dilemmas at Times 1 and 2 
 
 
 
Real-life Care for 
a parent 
 Marital 
fidelity 
Unplanned 
pregnancy 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Real-life 
-- .57 
.62 
.51 
.57 
.60 
.71 
Care for 
a parent 
 -- .85 
.78 
.77 
.74 
Marital 
fidelity 
  -- .78 
.81 
Total .61 
.69 
.81 
.81 
.81 
.82 
.81 
.85 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. All Pearson’s correlations are significant at the level p < .001. 
Cronbach’s alphas are   .89 (Time 1) and   .91 (Time 2). 
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6.3.3 Colby & Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment 
Interview (MJI), Form B 
The MJI (Colby, Kohlberg & al., 1987) is a semi-structured 
interview, comprising three parallel forms of three standard 
hypothetical moral dilemmas with standardized probe questions 
designed to elicit justifications, elaborations, and clarifications of 
the individual’s moral judgments. For each dilemma, these 
questions focus on the two moral issues that were chosen to 
represent the central value conflict in that dilemma, and the 
probing questions are designed to elicit information on the 
individual’s conceptions of these two issues. The Form B was 
selected, because it was presumed to be the most motivating to 
participants, due to their vocation/profession (see Appendix B). 
The first dilemma, Doctor Jefferson (Miettinen) considering 
mercy killing at the request of a terminally ill patient, is 
represented as a conflict between the value of the quality of life 
dilemma (should one take the life of another person who is dying 
and requests to be killed) and the value of upholding the law or 
preserving life (should one preserve the life of a sick person even 
when that person wants to die). The second dilemma concerns a 
conflict between morality/conscience, as Doctor Jefferson is taken 
into court (should one release a conscientious person even if he is 
a criminal or lawbreaker) and punishment (should one punish 
another person who has broken the law). The third dilemma deals 
with whether an older sister should tell about a younger sister’s lie 
to their mother, involving a conflict between contract (should a 
daughter uphold her sister’s contract or property rights) and 
authority (should a daughter help her mother exercise authority).  
The respondent’s responses to a dilemma are classified into 
the two categories (for/against). The judgments the respondents 
uses presciptively, accept as valid and provide reasons or 
justifications are then matched with the criterion judgments in the 
manual. (e.g., the doctor should not give the woman the drug, 
because he would risk losing his job or going to jail). The manual 
also includes descriptions of critical indicators (what a match 
requires as justifications) and of stage structure, followed by 
match examples. 
A match gives a stage score for each judgment. Calculating a 
total score for each interview is a step-by-step process, in which 
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the scores for chosen and non-chosen issues across three dilemmas 
are first calculated, and scores for the chosen issue are given 
greater weight than those for non-chosen issues. Calculation for 
each interview yields two scores: the global stage score is a 
discontinuous, 9-point, ordinal scale (1, 1/2, 2, 2/3, 3, 3/4, 4, 4/5, 
5), which is based on the percentages of stage reasoning on issues, 
those exceeding 25% being taken into account. The Weighted 
Average Score (WAS) is a continuous variable on a 500-point 
equal-interval scale. It is worth noting that the MJI scoring 
procedure pulls for higher stages within the subject’s moral 
reasoning, because it (1) gives greater weight for the chosen issue, 
usually giving more mature responses than the non-chosen issue 
and (2) eliminates judgments with less than 25% percentage when 
calculating the issue score, being often low-stage judgments (see 
Krebs, Denton & al., 1991) 
The MJI measures the individual’s judging on both sides of 
each dilemma according to moral stages embedded in different 
sociomoral perspectives (see Table 2, p. 70). 
Moral Stage 1 (heteronomous morality) and Stage 2 
(individualistic, instrumental morality) can be grouped to present 
the preconventional level of morality within the concrete 
individual perspective. This level has been found to be the level of 
most children under age 9, some adolescents, and many adolescent 
and adult criminal offenders. Stage 3 (interpersonally normative 
morality) and Stage 4 (social system morality) are grouped to 
represent the conventional level of moral reasoning within the 
member of society perspective, being the level of most adolescents 
and adults. Morality consists of socially shared systems of moral 
rules, roles, and norms, which individuals at the preconventional 
level have not yet come to really understand and uphold. Stage 5 
(human rights and social welfare morality) and Stage 6 (morality 
of universalizable, reversible and prescriptive general ethical 
principles) represent the prior-to-society perspective. Individuals 
at the postconventional level understand and generally accept 
society’s rules, but their acceptance of society rules is based on 
formulating and accepting the general moral principles that 
underlie those rules. This level is reached by a minority of adults 
and usually only after the age of 20-25 (Colby & al., 1987). Stage 
6 has not been empirically established, so it is not defined in the 
current scoring manual any more. 
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6.3.4 Scoring and reliability findings for the MJI 
I participated in a training seminar for the MJI scoring prior to the 
scoring of the recent data, so I was somewhat familiar with the 
scoring procedure. With some advice from the supervisor, I scored 
the two interviews independently at separate times, following the 
scoring instructions in Colby et al. (1987), as blind as possible to 
each other as well as to the ECI interviews. Scoring was 
conducted three times: initial scoring, scoring for ambiguous 
responses, and a check for final scoring. 20% of interviews (24 
protocols) were randomly selected from the longitudinal data and 
scored independently by an expert scorer, trained in Harvard 
workshops. Inter-rater exact agreement was 83% on a 9-point-
scale, and 100% within ½ stage, with the correlation of r(24) = 
.87, p < .001. These findings are consistent with those Colby et al 
(1987) reported previously for Form B (exact agreement of 78% 
for less experienced scorers and 88% for experienced scorers on a 
9-point scale, and 100% within 1/3 stage). 
Correlations between the MJI dilemmas in the longitudinal 
data, indicating the degree of internal consistency, are shown in 
Table 5. Correlations between dilemmas ranged from .60 to .70, 
and correlations between dilemmas and total scores ranged from 
.69 to .81. As can be observed, the euthanasia dilemma showed the 
lowest correlations with total scores. Cronbach’s alphas were .88 
(Time 1) and .86 (Time 2), somewhat lower than previously 
reported for the Form B (cf. .96, based on six items (issues) 
instead of three, however). Compared with the U.S. longitudinal 
data, the euthanasia dilemma in the current study yielded lower 
correlations, but they were however consistent with the previous 
pattern that its correlations with the Doctor at court dilemma were 
higher than those with the loyalty dilemma (see Colby & al., 
1987). Hence, it seems that the euthanasia dilemma was a main 
source for internal variation. 
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Table 5. Correlations between the MJI  dilemmas at Times 1 and 2  
 Euthanasia Doctor 
at court 
Loyalty 
_____________________________________________________ 
Euthana- 
sia 
-- .69 
.70 
.63 
.60 
Doctor 
at court 
 -- .79 
.70 
Total .70 
.70 
.81 
.78 
.77 
.69 
__________________________________________________________ 
Note. All Pearson’s correlations are significant at the level  p < .001. 
Crohnbach’s alphas are   .88 (Time 1) and   .86 (Time 2) 
6.3.5 Scoring of real-life dilemmas 
Real-life dilemmas were scored for the level of care reasoning 
according to the ECI as described above. In order to score the 
level of justice reasoning, a method described and justified by 
Krebs, Vermeulen et al. (1991) was used. Even though the content 
of real-life judgments usually differs from the content of criterion 
judgments, it is possible to match the stage structure of real-life 
judgments with the underlying stage structure of criterion 
judgments. Real-life judgments were scored by searching for 
matches with criterion judgments with the same content and stage 
structure in the coding manual, and if not found, searching for 
matches with the different content but the same stage structure. As 
also found in previous studies (Krebs, Denton & al., 1991; Krebs, 
Vermeulen & al., 1991; Walker & al., 1995; Wark & Krebs, 
1996), 96% of real-life dilemmas involved judgments that could 
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be matched with criterion judgments, with the average of 2.5 
judgments for one dilemma (ranging from 1 to 6). Participants 
tended to make more arguments for their chosen issue than non-
chosen issue which sometimes remained rather unarticulated. A 
score for a real-life dilemma was calculated following scoring 
instructions yielding Weighted Average Score (WAS) (Colby & 
al., 1987). Two dilemmas were considered non-moral and were 
not scored. 
25% of dilemmas were randomly selected and scored by a 
senior expert scorer. The exact agreement was 87% on a 9-point 
scale, 91% within 1/3 stage, and 100% within ½ stage. The inter-
rater agreement here is consistent with other studies, reporting 
agreements within 1/3 stage ranging from 75% to 94% (see Krebs, 
Vermeulen & al., 1991). 
6.3.6 Content analysis of real-life dilemmas 
The classification developed and justified by Wark and Krebs 
(1996) was adopted, because it appeared to be sensitive to the data 
in preliminary analyses. The classification is as follows: (1) 
Philosophical: Abstract dilemmas that do not directly involve the 
participant or his/her friends, but have been discussed and debated 
by participants in everyday lives. (2) Antisocial: (a) Reacting to 
transgressions. A decision must be made how to react, what to do 
about a transgression, injustice, crime, violation of rules that has 
occurred; (b) Reaction to temptation: The participant is faced with 
temptation to meet his/her needs, fulfil his/her desires, acquire 
resources, advance his/her gain by behaving dishonestly, 
immorally, unfairly, ungratefully. (3) Social pressure: The 
participant feels pressured, either implicitly or explicitly, by 
another person or group to engage in identity-inconsistent 
behaviors that violate his or her values (4) Prosocial (a) Reaction 
to conflicting demands: The participant is faced with two or more 
people making inconsistent demands on him or her, often with 
implications for their relationship, and he/she must decide whom 
to help or whose expectations to fulfil. (b) Reacting to the needs of 
others. The participant feels conflicted about whether or not he or 
she is responsible for engaging in some proactive behavior in 
another’s behalf and what his/her duties or responsibilities toward 
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the person in question are. Wark and Krebs (1996) also had main 
categories for impersonal and personal dilemmas indicating 
whether a participant was directly involved within a dilemma. 
This classification appeared unnecessary for this study because all 
but 3 participants reported a personal dilemma. 
Because none of the participants reported a philosophical 
dilemma, this category was dropped from of the analysis. 2 (Time 
1) + 2 dilemmas (Time 2) failed to be classified within the system, 
2 of them involving intraindividual moral concerns, being 
included into some other analyses, 2 of them considered to be non-
moral. In general, the categories developed by Wark and Krebs 
(1996) were meaningful to the data with some refinements. 
Dilemmas were classified as reacting to conflicting demands when 
a participant articulates inconsistent demands or expectations of 
those involved in a dilemma, whether those demands were derived 
from actual demands, or anticipations based on a participant’s 
role-taking. In turn, dilemmas were classified as social pressure-
type when a participant mentions feeling pressured by other 
persons, group or institution, to violate or act against her/his moral 
standards, with some reference to the fact that those standards are 
internalized. Some dilemmas which presented conflict between 
one’s own and others’ needs were difficult to categorize 
(especially decisions about abortion or divorce). They were 
classified predominantly into the category of reaction to needs of 
others, and sometimes to the category of conflicting demands, 
when others were also in conflict with each other and finally, 
rarely to the category of reaction to temptation when self-serving 
interest was clearly present. A supplement of prosocial category 
with a subtype of conflict between one’s own and others’ needs 
(self-sacrifice) is recommended for future research. In ambiguous 
dilemmas, the emphasis was put on participant’s interpretation of 
the moral dilemma as a primary criterion. For example, a dilemma 
may consist of elements of reaction to temptation, reaction to 
transgression and conflicting demands (for example whether to 
participate in committing petty crimes with classmates). The 
themes of all dilemmas are presented according to the type of 
dilemma in Appendix C. 
A second rater rated 23 (20%) randomly selected dilemmas. 
Inter-rater agreement was 82%, consistent with 80% reported by 
Wark and Krebs (1996) for personal real-life dilemmas. This inter-
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rater agreement can be considered good, because some ambiguous 
dilemmas were difficult to be classified. Some of the 
disagreements were reclassified. 
6.3.7 Lyons’s moral orientation 
Moral orientation scores were assessed by Lyons’s (1983) 
procedure. Moral considerations concerned with caring for others 
and self, the promotion of welfare of others and the avoidance of 
conflict, as well as practical considerations (how it worked out) 
and maintaining/restoring relationships as the criterion of moral 
resolution are defined as care. Considerations concerned with 
obligations and duties, as well as standards, rules and principles 
and maintaining principles, such as fairness or reciprocity, as the 
criterion of moral resolutions are defined as justice (see Table 1, 
p.18). 
Following Gilligan and Attanucci (1988), each consideration 
was categorized as care orientation, justice or both. A 5-point 
scale was used to assess participants’ moral orientation. Dilemmas 
that were exclusively care-based received a score of 1.00 and 
predominantly care-based a score of .75. Dilemmas balanced or 
equal received a score of .50, whereas predominantly justice-based 
dilemmas received a score of .25 and exclusively justice-based 
ones received 0. Thus the moral orientation score describes the 
percentage of care considerations in a dilemma. Because moral 
orientation scores tend to yield different results, depending on 
whether they are used as categorical or continuous variables, both 
ways were used in analyses, in accordance with Jaffee & Hyde’s 
(2000) recommendation. 
23 (20%) randomly selected dilemmas were scored by the 
second rater familiar with the moral orientation theory, with inter-
rater agreement of 70%. Relatively low agreement may partly be 
due to some ambiguous expressions participants frequently used, 
such as ‘empathic’ and ‘good at interaction’ that are difficult to 
determine exclusively care or justice responses. Nevertheless, the 
latest inter-rater-agreement is comparable to those reported by 
Gilligan & Attanucci (1988), ranging from 67% to 95%, Lyons 
(1983) ranging from 75% to 84%, and Krebs et al. (1994), 
reporting inter-rater agreement of 75%.  
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6.3.8 Lyons’s self-concept 
At Time 2, participants were asked to describe themselves in an 
open-ended way (“how would you describe yourself to yourself?”) 
and then discuss any changes in the self, perceived in the past five 
years, following Lyons’s (1983) procedure. The self-descriptive 
responses were categorized according to the coding scheme. 
Connected in relation to others is categorized by the references in 
the interview as follows: natural existence of relationships, 
abilities to make and sustain relationships, to care and to do things 
for others, having the trait/disposition of helping others, concern 
for the good of others in their terms, as well as preoccupations 
with doing good for one another and with how to do good. In turn, 
separate/objective relation to others is categorized by the 
references as follows: having relationships as part of obligations or 
commitments, having instrumental relationships, having skills in 
interacting with others, having the traits/ dispositions/of acting in 
reciprocity, of living up to duty/obligations, being committed and 
fair in relationships, concern for others in light of 
principles/values/beliefs/general good of society, as well as 
preoccupations with doing good for society and with whether to 
do good for others.  
Each individual was scored by counting the number of 
separate/objective and connected characterizations and classified 
categorically into (1) predominantly separated (70-100% of 
considerations being separated) (2) mixed (both considerations 
roughly equal 40-60%) or (3) predominantly connected (70-100% 
of consideration being connected). In a case that the percentage of 
either mode fall between 30-40%, a self-concept was categorized 
based on the global apprehension of the interview. A second rater 
scored 15 (26%) randomly selected interviews, with inter-rater 
agreement of 80%, being consistent with Lyons’s (1983) study, 
reporting 70-82 percentages in agreement. 
6.3.9 Mehrabian & Epstein’s Questionnaire of 
Emotional Empathy (QMEE) 
The Questionnaire of Emotional Empathy developed by Albert 
Mehrabian and Norman Epstein (1972), is an 8-point Likert scale, 
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including 33 items. The scale consists of the following subscales: 
(1) susceptibility to emotional contagion, (2) appreciation of the 
feelings of unfamiliar and distant others, (3) extreme emotional 
responsiveness, (4) tendency to be moved by others’ positive 
emotional experiences, (5) tendency to be moved by others’ 
negative emotional experiences, (6) sympathetic tendency and (7) 
willingness to be in contact with others, who have problems. The 
score is the total sum of all items ranging from -132 to + 132. 
Despite the subscales, the overall score is employed virtually in all 
studies, measuring the tendency to react emotionally to the 
observed experiences of others (Davis, 1994). A split-half 
reliability of .84 is reported (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972.) 
The QMEE has been found to be positively related to helping 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), to 
emotional arousability by others’ positive and negative feelings 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) to accuracy in judgments regarding 
facial expressions (Riggio & al., 1989), as well as to personal 
distress (Eisenberg, Miller & al., 1989). In terms of concurrent 
validity, it has been found to be closely related to emotional 
concern within the IRI (Davis, 1983; Riggio & al., 1989). It is 
worth noting that the QMEE has repeatedly yielded significant 
gender differences (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983), average scores 
being 23 for men (SD = 22) and 44 (SD = 21) for women in the 
initial study (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). 
Dillard and Hunter (1989) have raised the criticism that the 
QMEE is not a unidimensional construct, but consists of several 
factors, only one (emotional contagion) corresponding with any of 
the components delineated by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). In 
this study, however, the preliminary factor analyses indicated 
reasonable unidimensional solutions for both times, with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of 0.55 and 0.51. 
Cronbach’s alphas for the scale were .86 (Time 1) and .85 (Time 
2), indicating a coherent construct. 
6.3.10 The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI)  
Sandra Bem constructed masculinity and femininity as 
conceptually and empirically distinct from each other. Originally, 
the items were derived from 100 undergraduate students’ 
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judgments about cultural desirability of 200 personality 
characteristics for each gender in the American society. 
Consequently, the BSRI was “designed to assess the extent to 
which the culture’s definitions of desirable female and male 
attributes are reflected in an individual’s self-description” (Bem, 
1979, p. 1048).  
When taking the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Short Form), 
individuals rate themselves using a 7-point Likert scale on 30 
personality characteristics. 10 items describe culturally desirable 
male traits, 10 culturally desirable female traits, and 10 are filler 
items initially measuring social desirability in response. Feminine 
items are: affectionate, sympathetic, sensitive to others’ needs, 
understanding, compassionate, eager to soothe hurt feelings, 
warm, tender, loves children, and gentle. Masculinity items are: 
defend my own beliefs, independent, assertive, strong personality, 
forceful, have leadership abilities, willing to take risks, dominant, 
willing to take a stand and aggressive (Bem, 1981.) Hence, the 
measure yields both a femininity score and a masculinity score. 
Sandra Bem (1975, 1981) constructed the concept of 
psychological androgyny to denote the integration of femininity 
and masculinity within a single individual. According to the Bem 
Sex Role Inventory Manual (1981), the androgyny score is 
calculated as the difference between individual’s standardized 
femininity and masculinity T-scores. The closer the androgyny 
score is to zero, the more the person is androgynous, high negative 
scores indicating masculinity and high positive scores femininity. 
Thus, the person is androgynous when her/his ascribed femininity 
and masculinity are roughly equal. Because this method does not 
differentiate those scoring low on both masculinity and femininity 
from those scoring high on both, a median-split method was 
developed. Based on sample medians weighted in order to 
equalize the number of females and males, subjects are classified 
into four categories: feminine, masculine, androgynous (high on 
both masculinity and femininity) and undifferentiated (low on 
both masculinity and femininity (Bem, 1981.) 
The test-retest reliabilities for the short BSRI are .76 - .91 over 
four weeks, and its coefficient alphas range from .84 to .86 for 
masculinity, and from .86 to .87 for femininity (Bem, 1981). 
Frable and Bem (1985) were critical of using the short BSRI, 
because it did not classify subjects as sex typed as powerfully as 
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the original BSRI with 20 masculine and 20 feminine items. 
Nevertheless, femininity items of the original BSRI have been 
criticized to be socially undesirable and accordingly, have been 
found to lead lower consistency compared to the short femininity 
scale (Bem, 1981; Campbell, Gillaspy & Thompson 1997; 
Kauppinen-Toropainen, 1987). 
In this study, Cronbach’s alphas were .79 (Time 1) and .72 
(Time 2), for the masculinity scale, .87 (Time 1) and .88 (Time 2) 
for the femininity scale, respectively. Compared with the alphas of 
.82 for masculinity and .83 for femininity in a previous Finnish 
study, the masculinity scale appeared to be less and the femininity 
scale more reliable (cf. Kauppinen-Toropainen, 1987, N = 253). 
The item aggressive (‘hyökkäävä’) had the lowest reliability 
findings, and its omission would have improved the reliability of 
masculinity scale to some degree ( .80 for Time 1 and .75 for Time 
2, respectively). It was however included in the scale, because 
reliabilities were still acceptable. At Time 1, participants were also 
asked to rate items with regard to what they would like to be like, 
purported to measure ideal-self femininity and masculinity. 
Cronbach alpha for the constructed ideal femininity scale was .84, 
and for the ideal masculinity scale it was .65 (willing to take risks 
reducing it from .70). 
Following Bem’s (1981) instructions, use of the median split 
method was considered. However, the medians of the sample 
appeared to be higher than previous Finnish medians in a sample 
of 1844 participants from different occupational backgrounds (see 
Högbacka, Kandolin, Haavio-Mannila & Kauppinen-Toropainen, 
1987). Consequently, the median-split method was considered 
potentially flawed due to high ratings and a small number of 
subjects in the current sample. No updated referent medians were 
available, either. Androgyny scores were calculated following the 
BSRI manual instructions. 
Several analyses have explored whether the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory, constructed in the 1970’s, is still valid for measuring 
gender role differences. In the meta-analysis of 36 samples, 
Twenge (1997) found that women’s scores on masculinity scale 
have increased steadily over time, leading to the decrease of 
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gender differences.35 Wilcox and Francis (1997) succeeded in 
validating only three of masculinity and femininity items among 
English female adolescents, and Ballard-Reich and Elton (1992) 
validated only two in a U.S. middle-class nonacademic sample, as 
well as Hoffman and Borders (2001) among U.S. college students. 
By contrast, Holt (1998) managed to validate all but two of the 
items. These results suggest that BSRI may be best used to 
examine one’s instrumentality or assertiveness and expressiveness, 
rather than one’s stereotyped masculinity or femininity (Hoffman 
& Borders, 2001). While the validity of the BSRI as a measure of 
gender roles has largely been questioned, studies have found that it 
still entails two independent dimensions (e.g., Ballard-Reich & 
Elton, 1992; Campbell & al., 1997; Kauppinen-Toropainen, 1987), 
indicating instrumentality or “agentic orientation” and 
expressiveness or “communal orientation”, in line with Bem’s 
(1981) initial definitions. 
6.3.11 Spontaneous role-taking 
Real-life dilemmas were scored for level of spontaneous role-
taking on a 1-4 scale, following a procedure described by Chap 
(1986). Role-taking can be called spontaneous, because 
participants are not probed to take antagonists’ perspectives in 
interviews. Level 1: The participant discusses the dilemma from a 
single point of view. It is not acknowledged that other points of 
view could or do exist. If other points are mentioned, it is with the 
assumption that these will coincide with the participant’s own. 
Level 2: The participant acknowledges that there are at least two 
different ways of looking at the situation described, but indicates 
that these are incompatible. Level 3: The participant discusses at 
least two different perspectives on the situation and indicates that 
one character should try to understand the other’s point of view 
but not vice versa. Level 4 is similar to Level 3 except that 
reciprocity between these several points of view is indicated. A 
                                                     
35In Bem’s original sample (1981), the median for the short form 
femininity score was 5.50 and for the masculinity score 4.80 among 
undergraduate college students. In comparison, twenty years later, 
Hoffman & Borders (2001, N = 371) reported medians 5.39 for the 
femininity score and 5.00 for the masculinity score. 
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second rater rated 15 randomly selected protocols. Inter-rater 
agreement was 77%, equal to that reported by Chap (1986). 
6.4 Characteristics of the sample  
The sample provides four different databases that are displayed 
with gender and mean ages in Table 6. The first round of data 
collecting including initially 66 students offers a database for 
investigating gender roles and their relation to emotional empathy 
and moral reasoning. A longitudinal data for exploring care and 
justice development, as well as changes in emotional empathy 
involves 59 students who were reinterviewed again 2 years later. 
Two databases for exploring real-life moral reasoning is provided 
by those 57 (Time 1) and 59 (Time 2) participants that generated 
real-life moral conflicts in their interviews. As can be seen in 
Table 6, the practical and social work subsamples are female-
biased, 76% of practical nursing students and 91% of social work 
students being female in the initial sample. In contrast, 82% of law 
enforcement students were male. These biases reflect well-known 
actual gender distributions in these occupations, rather than being 
due to the drawing of the sample.  
Marital status. At Time 1, 67% of practical nursing students 
were single, and 23% were married or cohabited. 10% had 
children. 27% of social work students were single, 59% married or 
cohabited, and 14% were divorced. 50% had children. Among law 
enforcement students, 61% were single, 35% were married or 
cohabited, and 4% were divorced. 22% had children. 
All participants were Finnish citizens. Law enforcement and 
practical nursing students were full-time students, whereas several 
social work students had a job, often related to social work or 
practical nursing, and they were working alongside their studies. 
43% of practical nursing students still lived in their childhood 
homes, as well as 43% of law enforcement students before 
entering the police school. 
Selection criteria for education. Practical nursing students 
were selected on the basis of psychological tests, through the joint 
national application program and the minimum age was 16 years. 
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Table 6. Gender and age in years with standard deviations and age 
range across student subsamples in the databases 
 
 
Student 
group 
First round 
data 
n = 66 
Longitudinal
data 
n = 59 
Real-life 
dilemmas 
Time 1 
n = 57 
Real-life 
dilemmas 
Time 2 
n= 59 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Practical 
nursing 
16 women 
19.2 (4.7) 
16-34 
 
5 men 
23.2 (3.9) 
18-26 
13 women 
20.5 (4.8) 
19-36 
 
3 men 
24.0 (3.5) 
22-28 
14 women 
18.9 (4.6) 
16-34 
 
4 men 
22.5 (4.1) 
18-26 
13 women 
21.5 (4.8) 
19-36 
 
3 men 
26.0 (3.5) 
22-28 
 
Social 
work 
20 women 
33.9 (6.7) 
24-49 
 
2 men 
35.0(1.4) 
34-36 
18 women 
35.7 (7.1) 
26-51 
 
2 men 
37.0 (1.4) 
36-38 
19 women 
34.2 (6.7) 
24-49 
 
2 men 
35.0 (1.4) 
34-36 
18 women 
35.7 (7.1) 
26-51 
 
2 men 
37.0 (1.4) 
36-38 
 
Law 
enforcement 
4 women 
28.3 (2.1) 
26-30 
 
19 men 
23.2 (2.8) 
20-28 
4 women 
30.3 (2.1) 
28-32 
 
19 men 
25.2 (2.8) 
22-30 
4 women 
28.3 (2.1) 
26-30 
 
14 men 
23.3 (2.9) 
20-28 
4 women 
30.3 (2.1) 
28-32 
 
19 men 
25.2 (2.8) 
22-30 
Total 40 women 
27.3 (9.0) 
16-49 
 
26 men 
24.1 (4.3) 
18-36 
35 women 
29.8 (8.9) 
19-51 
 
24 men 
27.3 (4.3) 
22-38 
37 women 
27.8 (9.1) 
16-49 
 
20 men 
24.3 (4.7) 
18-36 
35 women 
29.8 (8.9) 
19-51 
 
24 men 
27.3 (4.3) 
22-38 
__________________________________________________________ 
Note. Ages in the longitudinal data are from Time 2. 
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Their average grade point ratio for the comprehensive school 
certificate was 7.5 (SD = 0.6). Social work students were selected 
on the basis on written applications and teachers’ interviews. Their 
average point ratio for the comperehensive school certificate was 
7.7 (SD = 0.8) They were required to have a basic-degree in social 
or health care and a minimum of three years’ work experience. 
Law enforcement students originated from the total of 11% 
applicants accepted to apply for the Police School at that particular 
time. The entrance tests included physical fitness tests, aptitude 
and personality tests, Finnish language test, reading 
comprehension test and an interview by teachers. Their average 
grade point ratio for the high school certificate was 8.0 (SD = 0.8). 
The participating law enforcement students were randomly 
selected from the total of 48 beginning students who were 
assessed by various methods as a part of this study. Comparisons 
between the selected participants and the remaining students 
revealed that they did not differ from each other with regard to 
age, high school grades, marital status, gender roles, values and 
emotional empathy. 
6.5 Procedure 
The first round of data was collected in 1997-1998, and the second 
round of data was collected in 1999-2000. Practical nursing and 
social work students came from a college and a polytechnic in 
Helsinki district, and law enforcement students came from the 
only police school in Finland. Practical nursing and social work 
students were interviewed within three months from the beginning 
of the studies, and law enforcement students were interviewed at 
the second week of their studies. The second round interviews 
took part 2.0-2.2 years later. Initial information about the study 
was given by the author to practical nursing and social work 
students, and by teachers to law enforcement students. Social work 
and practical nursing students were volunteer participants, 
representing roughly 30% of the classes informed about the study. 
Law enforcement students were randomly pre-selected by 
alphabetical order and they represented 50% of the new students. 
All pre-selected students volunteered to participate. 
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Time 1. The author interviewed all participants individually 
during their lessons. The ECI and the MJI were presented in a 
counter-balanced order. However, the real-life dilemma was asked 
about first. The interviews took 45-90 minutes. Social work and 
nursing students were asked to fill out the QMEE, the BSRI and 
the questionnaire about demographic characteristics and 
background as well as the Schwarz Value Survey (not dealt with 
in this study) after classes and to return them to the author next 
day. Law enforcement students filled out questionnaires in class.  
Time 2. Two years later the author contacted participants 
individually and fixed interview times suiting to the participants’ 
timetables. 5 practical nursing and 2 social work students dropped 
out of the original 66 students. 3 participants had changed the 
college, 3 had interrupted studies and 1 refused to participate. 
Most interviews took place in schools, except that 10 law 
enforcement students were interviewed at their practical training 
places and 2 social work students were interviewed at home due to 
baby-sitting problems. Lyons’s self-concept procedure was 
covered first, followed by the real-life dilemma, and the other ECI 
dilemmas or the MJI in a counter-balanced order. 
Participants were asked to fill out the QMEE and some other 
measures, not dealt with in the present study, and to return them in 
a few days. The interviews took about 1 hour.  
Observations on procedure. I found interviewing on the ECI 
more demanding than on the MJI with standard probe questions, 
even though I made some preliminary interviews on the ECI. 
Interviewing on the ECI requires more sensitive probing in order 
to find out grounds for the interviewee’s reasoning without 
pushing too much in a definite direction. Especially when 
interviewing on real-life dilemmas, I tried to avoid too intensive 
probing, and to derive my questions from what the interviewees 
actually said. Interviewing at Time 2 was naturally more skilled, 
and that might have some effect on the results. Participants were 
interviewed by the same person at both times, which does increase 
reliability across time. According to my experiences, interview 
rapport was easily established with most interviewees who were 
highly motivated in participating. Only one participant with the 
realistic option of participating in the re-interview refused 
(interestingly, she was the first one interviewed at Time 1). At 
Time 2, after an interview, many initiated an informal discussion 
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of changes that had happened in their thinking during the 2-year 
interval.  
It is worth noting that 7 out of 22 social work student 
participants were in contact with the author as a part of their 
studies within the 2-year interval. This might have some influence 
on their interviews in terms of efforts for social desirability. As 
such, it does not present a methodological problem, because the 
ECI as well as the MJI have purported to measure competence, 
unless other participants’ evidence lowered motivation for some 
reason. Preliminary analyses did not reveal any significant 
difference on the MJI or ECI between those 7 and the remaining 
15 social work students. 
My personal observation was that law enforcement students 
were somewhat less motivated than others at Time 1 interviews, 
obviously due to the fact that they might have interpreted 
participation as a quasi-obligation ordered by their teachers. 
Indicating this, 5 law enforcement students did not generate a real-
life moral conflict at Time 1. At Time 2, law enforcement students 
were flexible to fix their time-tables for interviews, and showed 
high self-disclosure with regard to their real-life dilemmas. They 
also returned their measures by mail in time, which can be 
considered as a sign of high motivation or commitment. To 
summarize, there might be somewhat more motivational push 
upwards among social work students in their interviews. It is also 
worth noting that practical nursing and especially social work 
students scored high on emotional empathy (see results) which has 
generally been found to be related to helping, which might have 
contributed to their motivation to participate in the study. 
Missing data. 2 nursing students (Time 1) and 4 nursing and 2 
social work students (Time 2) failed to return the measure package 
including the QMEE and the BSRI to the author. One interview 
tape of a law enforcement student was destroyed at Time 1, and he 
was dropped from the data, but the participant was interviewed 
again at Time 2 and included into the analysis of real-life moral 
conflicts (initial N = 67). One interview tape of a social work 
student was deficient at Time 2, and she was reinterviewed.  
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7. RESULTS OF STATISTICAL 
ANALYSES 
7.1. Gender roles, emotional empathy, role-
taking and self-concept related to care and 
justice reasoning 
7.1.1 Gender role orientation, gender and field of 
education 
2 X 3 X 2 (Gender X Field of Study X Time of Testing) analyses 
of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor 
were conducted on masculinity, femininity and androgyny scores 
in order to explore gender and education differences, as well as 
changes over the 2-year period. The analyses did not reveal any 
significant within-subject effects, or between-subject effects on 
any sex role scores.  
At Time 1, participants were also asked to fill out the BSRI 
items according to what they would like to be like, in order to 
measure gender roles for ideal self. A 2 X 3 (Gender X Education) 
multivariate analysis (MANOVA) on ideal-self femininity and 
masculinity scores did not reveal any significant gender or 
education differences. 
Gender role scores for both times are shown in Table 7 
according to gender and education. As Table 7 shows, the most 
powerful contrast between the groups can be found between 
female and male practical nursing students (the highest and the 
lowest in ideal femininity). Female law enforcement students 
showed a sex-reversed trend at both times, as well as male social 
work students to some extent at Time 2. These trends however did 
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Table 7. The Bem Sex Role Inventory scores according to gender and 
education 
Gender 
role 
Practical 
nursing 
______________ 
Social work 
 
_____________ 
Law 
enforcement 
_____________ 
 
 wo-
men 
men wo-
men 
men wo-
men 
men total 
_____________________________________________________ 
Femininity 
Time 1 
5.7  
(0.78) 
5.3 
(0.98) 
5.5 
(0.62) 
5.4 
(0.49) 
4.9 
(0.72) 
5.2 
(0.82) 
5.4 
(0.77) 
 
Time 2 5.6 
(0.94) 
5.0 
(0.49) 
5.5 
(0.55) 
5.6 
(0.35) 
4.6 
(0.87) 
5.2 
(0.77) 
5.3 
(0.74) 
 
Ideal 
femininity 
6.2 
(0.69) 
5.4 
(0.54) 
5.7 
(0.58) 
5.6 
(0.78) 
5.7 
(0.97) 
5.6 
(0.67) 
5.8 
(0.67) 
 
Masculinity 
Time 1 
4.7 
(0.63) 
4.9 
(1.17) 
5.0 
(0.62) 
5.1 
(1.27) 
5.3 
(0.54) 
5.1 
(0.64) 
5.0 
(0.68) 
 
Time 2 4.8 
(0.79) 
5.1 
0.42) 
5.0 
(0.40) 
4.6 
(1.63) 
4.9 
(0.68) 
4.9 
(0.57) 
4.9 
(0.59) 
 
Ideal 
masculinity 
5.4 
(0.56) 
5.6 
(0.79) 
5.4 
(0.37) 
5.6 
(1.20) 
5.5 
(0.27) 
5.4 
(0.56) 
5.4 
(0.52) 
 
Androgyny 
Time 1 
6.6 
(13.38) 
3.2 
(18.58) 
- 0.5 
(9.63) 
- 4.0 
(22.63) 
-12.3 
(8.06) 
-4.6 
(12.37) 
-1.2 
(12.93) 
 
Time 2 4.3 
(19.57) 
-9.0 
(11.31) 
- 0.3 
(9.15) 
9.1 
(16.26) 
-10.8 
(13.67) 
0.0 
(9.80) 
-0.1 
(12.13) 
 
 
Note. Ideal feminity and masculinity have been measured at Time 1.  
A scale for femininity and masculinity scores is 1-7. The closer the androgyny 
score zero, the more androgynous the individual is, negative scores indicating 
masculinity and positive scores indicating femininity. 
.
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not yield significant differences. It is also worth pointing out that 
students reported higher scores for ideal femininity and 
masculinity than for perceived femininity and masculinity across 
gender and education. Strong personality, independent, forceful 
and assertive were the most desirable masculine characteristics, 
accompanied by defend my own beliefs and have leadership 
abilities. In turn, aggressive and dominant were the least desirable. 
Love children, sensitive to needs of others and understanding were 
the most desirable feminine characteristics, whereas 
compassionate was clearly the least desirable36. Strong personality 
and independent were ranked the highest on ideal masculinity as 
well. 
Preliminary analyses of the data revealed that medians of 
masculinity (Md1 = 5.0 and Md2 = 4.9) and femininity (Md1 = 5.6 
and Md2 = 5.5) were higher than medians of the large national 
sample with wide occupational backgrounds (Mds 4.7 for 
masculinity and 5.1 for femininity, respectively, for the BSRI 
short form; Högbacka & al., 1987). As a result, subjects of this 
sample appeared to be more androgynous than subjects roughly a 
decade before: 55% being classified according the previous 
medians as androgynous, 23% as feminine, 14% as masculine, and 
8% as undifferentiated at Time 1. Reported high ratings for ideal 
femininity and masculinity give further support for this 
observation. 
To summarize, current results pointed out that there were no 
gender or student group differences at either time. Although no 
hypotheses were set, this is a counter-intuitive result because the 
sample consisted of gender-related educational groups. Even 
though police officers have been claimed to represent strong 
masculinity (Honkonen, 1999), law enforcement students did not 
show exceptional masculinity compared with practical nursing or 
social work students; or alternatively expressed, practical nursing 
and social work students were no less masculine than the law 
enforcement students. Their reported masculinity even decreased 
(though not significantly) in the two years interval. The most 
powerful contrast in this sample can be found between female 
                                                     
37Low scores for compassionate may be due to the poor translation 
of this item in Finnish ‘säälivä’(pitying), which might have a negative 
connotation of looking down on someone.  
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practical nursing and female law enforcement students, the former 
ones tending to be gender-stereotyped, and the latter gender-
reversed. From the methodological point of view, the lack of 
differences may be due to small numbers in subgroups. It can be 
assumed that a larger sample might have produced some 
statistically significant differences at least in femininity. In the 
light of these results (means ranging from 4.6 to 5.7 for perceived 
femininity from 4.6 to 5.3 for perceived masculinity across Gender 
X Education subgroups) it is however questionable, how 
psychologically meaningful these contrasts might be. 
These nonsignificant findings among young Finnish adults are 
nevertheless consistent with Murphy and Brown’s (2000) study 
which failed to find gender role differences, measured by the 
BSRI, between nurses, engineers and radiographers, as well as 
with Wark and Krebs’s (1996) study that did not find any gender 
differences, measured by the PAQ, among Canadian university 
students. The alternative or complementary explanation supported 
by more substantive samples (e.g., Ballardreich-Elton, 1992; 
Hoffman & Bordiers, 2001) is that gender role descriptions in the 
BSRI are out-dated, and consequently, the construct validity of the 
measure is questionable. The BSRI may best be used to examine 
one’s instrumentality and expressiveness described as human traits 
rather than synonyms for masculinity and femininity (Hoffman & 
Bordiers, 2001). It is worth noting that following the manual’s 
instruction, participants were not told that gender roles were being 
measured. They seemed to value most of the characteristics 
highly, regardless of whether they attributed them to gender roles 
or not. 
7.1.2 Correlations of gender role orientation with 
age, emotional empathy, care and justice reasoning 
Table 8 displays correlations among the main variables separately 
for both genders. As shown here, age had nonsignificant 
correlations with all gender role scores at both times. (For means 
of emotional empathy, care and justice reasoning, see Table 11, p. 
149). 
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Table 8. Pearson’s correlations between main variables for women and men at Times 1 and 2 
 
 Justice  Empathy Role-taking Femininity Masculinity Androgyny Orientation Age 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
women 
 
Care   .67*** 
 .61*** 
-.15 
 .36a 
 .60*** 
 .42* 
-.36* 
-.28 
 .24 
 .42* 
 .45** 
 .39* 
-.03 
-.27 a 
 .49** 
 .41* 
Justice   -- -.12 
 .42* 
 .29 
 .36 
-.33* 
-.29 
 .27 
 .36* 
 .44** 
 .32 
-.14 
-.13 
 .67** 
 .70*** 
Empathy  -- -.18 
 .11 
 .67*** 
 .39* 
-.23 
 .11 
-.60*** 
-.31 
 .22 
-.14 
-.11 
 .34 
Role-taking    --  .35* 
 .03 
-.07 
 .32 
 .21 
-.13 
-.01 
 .12 
 .34* 
 .12 
Femininity     -- -.09 
-.30 
 .74*** 
 .87*** 
 .23 
 .04 
-.23 
-.12 
Masculinity      --  .71*** 
 .73*** 
-.17 
-.14 
 .05 
-.13 
Androgyny       -- -.24 
 .01 
 .23 
 .01 
Orientation        -- -.14 
-.13 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Justice  Empathy Role-taking Femininity Masculinity Androgyny Orientation Age 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
men 
 
Care   .63*** 
 .55** 
 .06 
 .27 
 .72*** 
 .76*** 
 .09 
 .13 
 .25 
 .16 
-.10 
 .12 
 .34 
 .34 
-.01 
 .10 
Justice   --  .05 
 .08 
 .58* 
 .58** 
 .25 
 .04 
 .36 
 .59** 
 .07 
 .37 
 .18 
 .46* 
 .14 
-.05 
Empathy   -- -.05 
 .33 
 .52** 
 .45* 
-.11 
-.08 
 .44* 
 .48* 
 .14 
 .02 
 .56** 
 .42* 
Role-taking    --  .20 
 .14 
-.07 
 .25 
 .20 
 .03 
 .31 
 .29 
 .03 
 .20 
Femininity     -- -.05 
 .17 
 .73*** 
 .66*** 
 .14 
-.36 
 .07 
-.01 
Masculinity      --  .68*** 
 .61*** 
-.19 
 .00 
-.16 
-.34 
Androgyny       --  .24 
 .29 
-.15 
-.21 
Orientation        --  .13 
 .17 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Care refers to the ECI, Justice refers to the MJI, and Orientation refers to Moral Orientation Interview. n1 = 38 and n2 = 28 for 
women, n1 = 27 and n2 = 24 for men, concerning gender roles and empathy. 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level, ** at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, a marginally significant p < .10, two-tailed. 
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Consistent with the Hypothesis 1, androgyny scores were 
positively related to care reasoning (ECI scores) for women at 
both times, r1(38) = .45, p <. 01 and r2(28) = .39, p <. 05. For men, 
this relation was nonsignificant at both times, as predicted. These 
results replicate previous findings (Skoe, 1995; Söchting & al., 
1994). The correlates point out also additional findings beyond 
hypotheses, especially for women. Femininity for women was 
negatively related to both to ECI and MJI scores (justice 
reasoning), reaching significance at Time 1 (r1(38) = -.36, with the 
ECI , and r1(38) = -.33, with the MJI respectively, ps < .05). By 
contrast, masculinity scores for women tended to be positively 
related to ECI as well as MJI scores, reaching significance at Time 
2, (r2(28) = .42 with the ECI and r2(28) = .36, with the MJI ps < 
.05). Complementarily, women’s androgyny was also positively 
related to MJI scores, reaching significance at Time 1 (r1(38) = 
.44, p < .01). The only significant finding for men was that their 
masculinity scores were positively related to MJI scores at Time 2, 
r(24) = .59, p < .01.  
As predicted (Hypothesis 2), femininity was positively 
correlated with emotional empathy across gender at both times. 
Complementarily, androgyny was negatively related to emotional 
empathy for women at Time 1, r1(38) = -.60, p < .001, whereas 
androgyny was positively related to empathy scores for men at 
both times, r1(27) = .44 and r2(24) = .48, ps < .05. These findings 
are consistent with previous studies that have reported association 
for femininity and affective-based empathy (Foushee & al., 1979; 
Eisenberg & al., 2001; Karniol, Gabay, Ochion & Harari, 1998). 
7.1.3 Gender roles across care levels 
 
The association for androgyny and care-based reasoning for 
women were predicted from Skoe’s (1995) and Söchting et al.’s 
(1994) studies. Those studies used however slightly different 
methodology from this study. Söchting et al. (1994) used subjects 
pre-selected according to gender roles, measured by the PAQ 
(Spence & Helmreich, 1978). They found that combined Levels 1 
and 1.5 included predominantly masculine women, Level 2 
feminine women, and combined Levels 2.5 and 3 androgynous 
women. Nicholls-Goudsmith’s (1998) study replicated these 
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results with the exception that self-oriented Levels were also 
associated with the undifferentiated gender role (low on both 
masculinity and femininity) which category was not used by 
Söchting et al’s (1994) analysis. In turn, Skoe (1995) compared 
Care Levels with regard to BSRI scores and found that women at 
Levels 2.5 and 3 were more androgynous than women at Level 2. 
To compare the current data with previous studies, 2 X 4 (Gender 
X Care Level) multivariate analyses (MANOVA) on femininity, 
masculinity and androgyny scores for both times were conducted. 
A MANOVA on gender role scores for Time 1 failed to find 
any differences between care levels, whereas the respective 
analysis for Time 2 revealed a between-subject effect for Care 
Level on masculinity scores, F (3, 43) = 2.96, p < .05, unqualified 
by any interaction effects Post hoc comparisons with Duncan’s 
procedure pointed out that participants at Level 3 (n = 15, M = 
5.25, SD = 0.41) obtained higher masculinity scores than 
participants at Level 2.5 (n = 21, M = 4.69, SD = 0.63), at Level 2 
(n = 10, M = 4.80, SD = 0.58), and Level 1.5 (n = 5, M = 4.82, SD 
= 0.62). Furthermore, a Gender X Care Level interaction for 
androgyny scores was found, F(3, 63) = 3.10, p < .05. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that women at Level 3 (n = 9, M = -6.80, SD 
= 3.56) tended to be more androgynous (or rather, sex-role 
reversed, as the negative value of mean indicate within the BSRI 
procedure) than those at Level 2.5 (n = 11, M = -2.27, SD = 
13.86), Level 2 (n = 11, M = 0.64, SD = 12.73) or Level 1.5 (n = 2, 
M = 7.73, SD = 9.75). Also Levels 2 and 1 differed from each 
other. In addition, a marginally significant Gender X Care Level 
interaction effect was found on femininity scores, F(3, 63) = 2.51, 
p = 0.68, that was identified among men. Men at Level 2 obtained 
the highest femininity scores (n = 13, M = 5.48, SD = 0.68), 
whereas men at Level 1.5 obtained the lowest femininity scores (n 
= 2, M = 4.25 SD = 0.78), men at Level 2.5 (n = 6, M = 5.27, SD = 
0.76) and at Level 3 (n = 5, M = 5.08, SD = 0.60) falling between 
them. 
To summarize so far, the analysis for Time 2 discriminated 
Care Levels with regard to gender roles, whereas at Time 1 the 
differences between them seem to be less pronounced, not 
yielding significant differences between Levels (despite the 
significant correlation reported above). At Time 2, Level 3 seems 
to be qualified in high masculinity across gender, and especially 
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for women who tended to obtain sex-reversed scores in androgyny 
at this level. Women’s sex-reversed pattern can be found at Levels 
3 and even 2.5, whereas androgyny scores at Level 2 indicated 
more balanced femininity and masculinity (M = 0.64, SD = 12.73) 
and those at Level 1.5 indicated femininity (M = 7.73, SD = 9.75). 
To compare with the previous findings, Skoe (1995) found more 
balanced androgyny for women at Levels 2.5 and 3 and a tendency 
for femininity at Level 2, which underscores high androgyny in 
this sample. 
7.1.4 Summary of findings on gender roles and 
moral reasoning 
This study replicates previous findings that androgynous gender 
role orientation is associated with care reasoning for women, but 
not for men (Söchting & al., 1994; Skoe, 1995). To complement 
this pattern for women, femininity was significantly negatively 
related to their care reasoning at Time 1 and masculinity was 
significantly positively related to their care reasoning at Time 2. In 
sum, the preference to give higher ratings on the masculinity scale 
than on the femininity scale is associated with higher care 
reasoning for women in this study. In turn, masculinity and justice 
reasoning were significantly related to each other at Time 2, 
inconsistent with Skoe’s (1995) results but consistent with some 
other studies (Lifton, 1985; Pratt & al., 1984). This association 
was powerful especially for men at Time 2. It is worth noting that 
law enforcement students (89% of men in this analysis) primarily 
contributed to this finding. This finding is consistent with the 
recent observation that both masculinity and justice-mindedness 
are pervasive characteristics of Finnish police culture (Korander, 
1999). To conclude, these results indicate that assertiveness or 
instrumentality embedded in the masculinity scale is associated 
with both modes of moral reasoning across gender to some extent, 
and this pattern was more evident at Time 2, after a 2-year 
educational period. 
Beyond hypotheses, it is worth pointing out that moral 
orientation, measured by Lyons’s (1983) procedure showed 
nonsignificant correlations with all gender role scores at each time 
(see Table 8, p. 130), consistent with some previous findings 
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(Hagar, 1990; Glover, 2001) but inconsistent with some others 
(Haviv & Leman, 2002; Skoe & al., in press). 
7.1.5 Correlations of emotional empathy with age, 
care and justice reasoning 
Pearson’s correlations between emotional empathy, age, and both 
modes of moral reasoning are shown in Table 8 (p. 130). As can 
be observed, emotional empathy was positively related to age for 
men at both times (r1(26) = .56, p < .01 and r2(24) = .42, p < .05), 
whereas for women respective correlations were nonsignificant.  
At Time 1, emotional empathy was not significantly related to 
care reasoning for either gender, contrary to Hypothesis 3a. When 
both genders were combined into the total sample, emotional 
empathy was negatively, yet nonsignificantly related to both 
modes of moral reasoning, r1(64) = -.23, p = .065, for the MJI, and 
r1(64) = -.21, p = .095, for the ECI, respectively. When age was 
partialled out, correlations turned out to be negatively significant, 
r1(61) = -.31 for empathy and justice reasoning, r1(61) = -.25 for 
empathy and care reasoning, ps < .05.  
At Time 2, emotional empathy was positively but not 
significantly related to care reasoning in the total sample, r2(53) = 
.26, whereas the correlation for emotional empathy and justice 
reasoning was nonsignificant, r2(53) = .02., n.s.. At Time 2, 
emotional empathy was positively related to both modes of moral 
reasoning for women, (r2(30) = .36, for care reasoning, p = .051, 
and r2(30) = .42, for justice reasoning, p < .05). For men, 
correlations failed to reach significance. 
Additionally, this study explored how emotional empathy was 
related to moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas. At Time 1, the 
correlation for emotional empathy and care reasoning was 
nonsignificant, r1(55) = -.16, n.s. By contrast, at Time 2, the 
respective correlation was positive and significant, r2(53) = .35,  
p < .01. Correlations for empathy and justice reasoning on real-life 
dilemmas did not reach significance at either Time, r1(55) = -.18, 
n.s. r2(55) =  .25, p = .07, but nevertheless paralleled the 
correlations for empathy and care reasoning. 
To summarize so far, marginal findings for Time 2 lend weak 
support for Hypothesis 3a that emotional empathy is positively 
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related to care reasoning, whereas a negative tendency at Time 1 
was contrary to the prediction. The finding that emotional 
empathy was positively related to levels of care reasoning on real-
life dilemmas at Time 2 provides, however, some support for the 
relation between emotional empathy and care reasoning. 
7.1.6 Emotional empathy across ECI levels 
In order to explore the alternative Hypothesis 3b that care 
reasoning and emotional empathy have a curvilinear relationship, 
respondents at Level 2 being more empathic than others, 
emotional empathy scores were examined across ECI levels within 
the longitudinal data. There were no subjects scoring at Level 1, so 
it was dropped from the analysis. 2 X 4 (Gender X Care Levels) 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on Time 1 empathy scores, 
with age as a covariate, revealed only a significant main effect for 
Gender, F1(1, 48) = 13.97, p < .001, unqualified by any interaction 
effects. A corresponding ANCOVA on Time 2 empathy scores 
revealed a significant main effect for Gender F2(1, 44) = 25.48,    
p < .001, as well as for Care Level, F2(3, 44) = 4.80, p < .01 and 
for Age F2 (1, 44) = 5.30, p <. 05. There were no interaction 
effects. As reported above, age was positively related to empathy 
for men, and a positive yet nonsignificant trend can also be noted 
for women (see Table 8, p. 130). Post hoc t-tests proved that 
women obtained higher scores than men at both times, as can be 
observed in Table 11 (p. 149). Furthermore, post hoc comparisons 
revealed that participants at the highest level of care scored higher 
compared with those at all other levels at Time 2, p < .05. Both 
genders shared a similar pattern, although gender difference was 
also evident, as can be observed from Table 9. 
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Table 9. Means of emotional empathy (QMEE) across care levels by 
gender at Time 2 
 
 
Care Level 
 
Women 
 
Men  
 
Total  
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Level 1.5 43.63a 
(25.21) 
11.30a 
(21.68) 
32.85a 
(27.46) 
Level 2 
 
47.69a 
(12.16) 
17.74a 
(16.68) 
29.69a 
(21.41) 
Level 2.5 
 
45.29b 
(20.76) 
20.76a 
(16.78) 
34.26a 
(22.03) 
Level 3 69.42
 c 
(13.57) 
40.49b 
(16.36) 
59.77b 
(19.85) 
Total  53.51 
(20.59) 
23.44 
(18.44) 
40.46 
(24.63) 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. Means within the 
same column that share the same subscript did not differ from each other 
at the level p < .05. Genders differ from each other, t(51) = 5.51, p < 
.001. 
     Level 1.5 includes 4 women and 2 men, Level 2 5 women and 6 men, 
Level 2.5 11 women and 10 men, and Level 3 10 women and 5 men. 
 
In order to examine the emergence of the main effect for Care 
Level at Time 2, empathy scores across levels for each time were 
scrutinized in detail. The investigation revealed that means of 
emotional empathy showed only increase at Level 3 (n1= 10, M1 = 
33.96, SD = 21.04 and n2 =15, vs. M2 = 59.77, SD = 19.85). This 
further suggested that those participants who were scored Level 3 
at Time 2, consisting of those participants who achieved Level 3 at 
Time 2 or held it over time, had advanced more than others in 
emotional empathy. A one-way ANOVA on change scores 
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(measured as a difference between Time 2 and Time 1 scores) 
affirmed this, F(3, 47) = 6.51, p < .001. Means for change, 
according to Time 2 ECI levels, are as follows: M3 = 15.11, SD = 
15.42; M2.5 = 0.00, SD = 15.00; M2 = -5.87, SD =18.54 and M1.5 = 
-6.13, SD = 7.03). The additional scrutiny revealed that the group 
of 15 participants scored Level 3 at the second interview 
comprised of 7 participants being stable across time and 8 
participants having progressed. 2 participants had dropped from 
Level 3 to lower levels over time. It was also of interest to study if 
these participants differed from each other with regard to changes 
in empathy. The stable and progressed participants showed 
somewhat similar increase (16.6 and 13.3 points on average), 
whereas regressed participants showed a decrease of the same 
magnitude (14.0 points on average). 
To summarize, these results failed to support Hypothesis 3b 
that subjects at Level 2 score the highest in emotional empathy.37 
Instead, the analyses pointed out that subjects at the highest level 
of care were qualified with the highest empathy scores at Time 2, 
lending support for the alternative hypothesis 3a that emotional 
empathy and care reasoning are related to each other in a linear 
way. This finding is consistent with the marginally significant 
correlations for care reasoning and emotional empathy at Time 2. 
That this finding emerged only after the 2-year education suggests 
that education might be an important intervening factor.  
 7.1.7 Emotional empathy across MJI global stages 
There were no predictions concerning the relationship between 
emotional empathy and justice reasoning. Nevertheless, exploring 
this relationship was of interest in the context of this study. In 
order to investigate the potential curvilinear relationship between 
emotional empathy and justice reasoning, empathy scores were 
explored across global justice stages, measured by the MJI. Stages 
                                                     
37It is worth noting this data was biased towards higher levels at 
Time 2 especially. 10% (Time 1) and 5% (Time 2) were scored at Care 
Level 1.5, whereas the Level 1 totally lacked subjects. This presents 
difficulties to explicate the potential curvilinear relationships between 
empathy and care reasoning. 
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4/5 and 5 (1 participant at Time 1) and Stages 2/3 and 2 (2 
participants at Time 1) were combined. Global stages thus ranged 
from 2/3 to 4/5. 
2 X 5 (Gender X Global Stage) analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVA) on empathy scores of both times were performed, 
with age as a covariate. At each Time, Gender had a significant 
effect F1(1, 55) = 18.74, and F2(1, 46) = 43.84, p < .001, 
replicating previous results. There was neither effect for Global 
Stage nor a significant interaction effect at Time 1. By contrast, at 
Time 2, a main effect for Global Stage was significant, F2(3, 46) = 
3.53, p < 05, qualified by a significant Stage X Gender interaction, 
F2(2, 46) = 3.53, p < .05. The interaction effect was found among 
women, while women at Stages 4/5 scored higher than women at 
other Stages, as well as women at Stages 4 and 3/4 scored higher 
than those at Stage 3. Post hoc comparisons with the total sample 
revealed that the justice stages did not differ from each other 
significantly (p = .097), so that women seemed to have contributed 
to the significant main effect for Global Stage. Hence, these 
results are consistent with the positive previous correlation found 
only for women. Table 10 (p. 140) represents means for empathy 
across global stages according to gender.  
To summarize so far, nonsignificant findings for Time 1 are 
consistent with the previous studies (Kalle & Suls, 1978; Keljo, 
1995). The finding for Time 2 that women at Stage 4/5 scored 
highest in emotional empathy is consistent with Kohlberg’s (1986) 
assertion that when it comes to respect for others’ feelings, the 
postconventional level is more qualified with empathic capacities 
than other levels. It is worth pointing out that while Justice Stage 
4/5 as well as Care Level 3 were qualified with the highest 
empathy scores for women, subjects in these categories somewhat 
overlap. 71% of women at Justice Stage 4/5 were scored at Care 
Level 3, and conversely, 50% of women at Level 3 were scored at 
Stage 4/5. 
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Table 10. Means of emotional empathy across justice global stages by 
gender at Time 2 
 
Justice stage Women Men Total 
__________________________________________________________ 
Stage 3 29.29a 
(21.45) 
-- 29.29
 
(21.45) 
Stage 3/4 
 
55.29b 
(12.96) 
15.96 
(20.69) 
46.21
 
(22.24) 
Stage 4 
 
47.35b 
(20.58) 
26.87 
(13.75) 
37.11
 
(20.04) 
Stage 4/5 73.95c 
(13.56) 
21.74
 
(23.49) 
46.62
 
(32.89) 
Total  53.51 
(20.59) 
23.44 
(18.44) 
40.46 
(24.63) 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. Means that share 
the same subscript within the same column does not differ from each 
other at the level p < .05. 
 Stage 3 includes 3 women and 0 men, Stage 3/4 10 women and 3 
men, Stage 4 11 women and 11 men, and Stage 4/5 6 women and 9 men. 
 
7.1.8 Longitudinal analysis of emotional empathy 
In order to investigate whether students’ empathy had undergone 
changes in two years, a 2 X 3 X 2 (Gender X Field of Study X 
Time of Testing) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with repeated 
measures on the last factor, was conducted on empathy scores. 
There was not a significant within-effect with Times of Testing, 
F(1, 46) = 0.17, n.s., nor any significant within-subject effects. 
Between-subjects effects for Gender, F(1, 46) = 7.38, as well as 
for Education, F(2, 46) = 6.46, were significant, ps < .01, 
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unqualified by any interaction effects. At both times, women 
exceeded men, as reported above. Post hoc comparisons with one-
way ANOVAs revealed that social work and nursing students 
exceeded law enforcement students at Time 1, whereas at Time 2, 
social work students exceeded both other groups, and nursing 
students exceeded law enforcement students, ps < .05. Means are 
displayed in Table 11 (p. 149), according to gender and education. 
At this point, it is appropriate to mention that the changes in 
empathy scores over time were neither related to the changes in 
ECI scores r(51) = -.07, nor to changes in MJI scores, r(51) = .09, 
n.s. Hence, the previous finding that the participants who scored 
Level 3 at the second interviews had progressed more than others 
in emotional empathy failed to make the association of changes in 
care reasoning with those in emotional empathy significant. 
The finding that participants did not generally progress in 
emotional empathy during the 2-year-educational period is 
consistent with previous findings. Medical school (Diseker & 
Michielutte, 1981) or nursing education (Arangie-Hangell, 1999) 
as well as intervention programs (DeHaan, Hanford & al., 1997; 
Keljo, 1995; Scott, 1990) have failed to promote affective-based 
empathy in students, whereas they have succeeded in promoting 
justice reasoning at the same time.  
In terms of the level of emotional empathy, compared with the 
average means initially reported (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; M = 
23 for men, and M = 44 for women), social work and female 
nursing students appeared to score above the average, male 
nursing and law enforcement students approximately on the 
average. Instead, female law enforcement students scored below 
the average. Empathy scores for practical nursing and social work 
students are roughly equal to those for Finnish social science 
students reported by Myyry and Helkama (2001), furthermore 
being higher than those found for business students and male 
technology students in their study. To conclude, these results 
support the general view that care workers are qualified by 
empathic capacities (e.g. Administration of Education, 1999). 
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7.1.9 Correlations of role-taking with care and 
justice reasoning and emotional empathy 
Spontaneous role-taking was significantly related to both modes of 
moral reasoning at both times, in accordance with Hypothesis 4. 
Correlations between role-taking and justice reasoning were r1(57) 
= .40, and r2(58) = .35, ps < .01, in the total sample. Role-taking 
correlated even higher with care reasoning: r1(57) = .64, and r2(58) 
= .57, ps < .001. The separate examination for genders however 
revealed that among women, correlations between role-taking and 
justice reasoning did not reach significance at either time. As 
Table 8 (p. 130) shows, correlations were more powerful for role-
taking and care reasoning than for role-taking and justice 
reasoning across gender (p < .05) and in general, correlations were 
more powerful for men than women at both times (p < .01). 
Correlations for role-taking and emotional empathy were 
nonsignificant across gender at both times, even though a positive 
trend among men at Time 2 can be noted. 
The findings concerning women are consistent with the study 
by Skoe et al. (1996), who found significant correlations for role-
taking and care reasoning, but not for role-taking and justice 
reasoning among women. By contrast, correlations for men were 
not significant in their study. Pratt et al. (1991) found a modest 
positive association between spontaneous role-taking and justice 
reasoning (with both real-life and the MJI dilemmas) in a larger 
sample (N = 64).38 To conclude, men in the current study showed 
exceptionally strong association between role-taking and both 
modes of moral reasoning. 
Correlations for role-taking and emotional empathy were 
nonsignificant across gender at both times, even though a positive 
tendency for men at Time 2 can be noted (see Table 8). There are 
no comparable studies available, but nonsignificant findings are 
                                                     
38The recent methodology is slightly different from those used in the 
aforementioned studies. In this study, role-taking was measured on real-
life dilemmas and it was compared with moral reasoning on hypothetical 
dilemmas (the ECI and the MJI), whereas conversely, Pratt et al. (1991) 
and Skoe et al. (1991) measured role-taking on hypothetical MJI 
dilemmas, comparing it with moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas. 
However, they used Chap’s (1986) classification which was also used in 
this study. 
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nevertheless in line with several studies pointing out that 
perspective-taking (embedded in role-taking) and emotional 
concern represent distinct factors in empathy (see Davis, 1994).  
7. 1.10 Self-Concept domain 
Self-Concept was measured only at Time 2. According to Lyons’s 
(1983) classification, 17% of the participants were connected 
(20% of women and 13% of men), 36% mixed (31% of women 
and 41% of men) and finally, 47% were separate ones (49% of 
women and 46% of men). The infrequency of the connected self-
concept is consistent with Pratt et al.’s (1990) study; only 12% of 
their adult subjects were scored connected in their study, followed 
by 28% for mixed and 60% for separate self-concepts. A chi-
square analysis did not reveal a significant Gender X Self-Concept 
association, χ 2(2, N = 59) = 0.65, n.s. This results is at odds with 
Lyons’s (1983) initial study, reporting that 67% of women were 
predominantly connected, and 79% of men were separate ones, but 
consistent with the nonsignificant findings of Pratt et al. (1990). 
It was predicted (Hypothesis 5) from existing literature that 
self-concept is related to moral orientation (Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 
1983). Because moral orientation is based on the analysis of real-
life dilemmas, this hypothesis will be investigated later in the 
context of real-life moral reasoning. Instead, Hypothesis 6 and 7 
will be explored here. In addition, self-concept classification also 
offered an option to explore its relation to developmental indexes, 
age and justice reasoning.  
In order to investigate Hypothesis 6, which claims that 
subjects with connected self-concept are more empathic than 
subjects with more separate self-concepts, one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted on Time 2 empathy scores within each gender, 
given the huge gender difference previously reported. For women, 
Self-Concept had a significant effect, F(2, 27) = 3.89, p < .05, 
whereas it was nonsignificant for men, F(2, 20) = 0.21, n.s. Post 
hoc comparisons revealed that women with separate self-concept 
(n =16, M = 62.45, SD = 16.61) obtained higher empathy scores 
than women with mixed self-concept (n = 9, M = 42.62, SD = 
24.72) or connected self-concept (n = 5, M = 44.49, SD = 11.37). 
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A 2 X 3 (Gender X Self-Concept) on ECI scores revealed 
nonsignificant main effects for Self-Concept, F (2, 53) = 0.16, and 
for Gender, F(1, 53) = 0.64, n.s, nor were there interaction effects, 
hence not supporting Hypothesis 7. Additionally, a 2 X 3 (Gender 
X Self-Concept) ANOVA on the MJI scores did not reveal any 
effect for Self-Concept F(2, 53) = 0.23, whereas a main effect for 
Gender was significant, F(1, 53) = 8.23, p < .01, unqualified by 
interaction effects.  Men (M = 414.42, SD = 27.59) scored higher 
than women (M = 383.23, SD = 46.40), t(1, 57) =  -3.04, p < .01. 
Finally, age was not related to Self-Concept, F(2, 56) = 1.38, n.s.  
To summarize, the only significant finding here was that 
separate women scored higher in emotional empathy, which is 
exactly opposite to Hypothesis 6. The finding that separate women 
scored the highest in empathy is at odds with Gilligan’s (1982) 
assumption, derived from Chodorow (1978) that connected self-
concept enables higher empathic capacities, and requires further 
explanation. With regard to gender differences, while Lyons 
(1983) initially found a powerful association for gender and self-
concept, this has been replicated neither in following studies (Pratt 
& al., 1988, 1990) nor in this study. Extra analyses revealed no 
links between gender roles and self-concept either, even if they 
have been previously found, measured by the PAQ (Pratt & al., 
1988, 1990). 
According to Gilligan (1982) connectedness in self-concept 
provides the groundwork for the ethic of care. The lowest level of 
care is supposed to be associated with separation and isolation 
from others, turning into connection and dependence at Level 2, 
and finally, dependence on others is transformed into the 
dynamics of interdependence at the postconventional level of care 
development.39 Alas, this proposal (Hypothesis 7) did not gain any 
support from this data. The separate concept, being the most 
frequent self-concept in this sample, was found to be frequent 
among subjects at the highest levels of care as well. 50% of men 
and 70% of women at Level 3, followed by 43% of women and 
                                                     
39On the other hand, Gilligan and Wiggins (1988) argue that 
connectedness and attachment exists from the early beginning of life “in 
the embryo form” and those capacities are lost in the course of 
development. It is difficult to conclude, how the connected self-concept 
may actually be related to care levels, as Gilligan seemed to drop the 
developmental levels from her theory in her later writings. 
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30% of men at Level 2.5 were scored to have separate self-
concept. Connected self-concept, which proved to be the least 
common, was most strongly associated with Level 2.5, as all 
connected men and 71% of connected women were scored this 
level.  
7. 2 Development of care and justice 
reasoning 
7.2.1 Consistency across justice dilemmas (MJI) 
29% (Time 1) and 25% (Time 2) of participants scored at the same 
global stage on a 9-point-scale across all three justice dilemmas of 
the Moral Judgment Interview. Within ½ stage (same or adjacent 
stage), 81% (Time 1) and 78% (Time 2) showed the consistency 
across three dilemmas. The remaining 19% (Time 1) and 22% 
(Time 2) showed inconsistency of the whole stage or more across 
dilemmas. To compare, Krebs et al. (1991) reported consistency 
within ½ stage for 87% of participants and Wark and Krebs (1997) 
95% across two dilemmas. In this study, 7% showed the 
inconsistency of 1½ stage at Time 1, to compare with 3%, reported 
for Form B in Colby et al. (1987). 
To sum up the above findings, roughly 80% of participants 
were consistent in their reasoning across all dilemmas when the 
variation of ½ stage is allowed. This consistency is lower than 
those reported by Colby et al. (1987) but in line with other 
previous studies focusing on moral judgment consistency (Krebs, 
Denton & al. 1991, Wark & Krebs, 1997). 
 At this point, it is appropriate to remind that real-life 
dilemmas were also scored according to the MJI. Consistencies 
were much lower, when the real-life dilemma was taken into 
consideration. Only 52% (Time 1) and 38% (Time 2) of 
participants showed consistency within ½ stage across all four 
dilemmas. 
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7. 2.2 Consistency across care dilemmas (ECI) 
20% (Time 1) and 24% (Time 2) of participants showed the same 
care level on a 5-point Care Level scale. Within ½ level (same or 
adjacent level) 76% (Time 1) and 78% (Time 2) showed the 
consistency across all four dilemmas. Complementarily, 24% 
(Time 1) and 21% (Time 2) showed the inconsistency of 1 level. 
At Time 2, one participant (2%) showed the inconsistency of 1½ 
level. When the real-life dilemma was excluded from the analysis, 
consistencies were higher. Across three hypothetical dilemmas, 
41% (Time 1) and 46% (Time 2) showed consistency within the 
same level, and 95% even showed consistency within ½ level at 
both times. Complementarily, 5% showed inconsistency of 1 level 
at both times, whereas nobody showed greater inconsistency 
across all four dilemmas at either time. 
In light of these findings, it seems that the ECI and the MJI are 
somewhat equally coherent measures of moral reasoning. It is 
however worth pointing out that the ECI hypothetical dilemmas 
yielded highly consistent scores, when 95% were consistent within 
½ level at both times. Consistent with Krebs et al.’s (1991) 
studies, heterogeneity of justice reasoning increased, when the 
real-life dilemma was taken into consideration 
7.2.3 Longitudinal analysis of justice reasoning 
 
A 2 X 3 X 2 (Gender X Field of Study X Time of Testing) 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was 
conducted on MJI scores. There was a significant effect for MJI 
scores with Time of Testing, F(1, 53) = 9.17, p = .004. Within-
effects for Gender F(1, 53) = 1.37 and for Education F(2, 53) = 
0.28 were not significant, n.s., nor were there within-subject 
interaction effects. Hence, MJI scores increased significantly 
across time, in accordance with Hypothesis 8. 
Furthermore, a between-subject effect for Gender was 
significant, F(1, 53) = 10.29, p = .002, qualified by a significant 
Gender X Field interaction F(2, 53) = 3.98, p = .024. A between-
subject effect for Field remained nonsignificant, F(2, 53) = 2.21, 
n.s. One-way ANOVAs identified the Gender X Field interaction 
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for practical nursing students. At both times, male nursing students 
(M1= 416.33, SD1 = 9.45; M2= 415. 33, SD2= 13.86) exceeded 
female ones (M1 = 303.00, SD1 = 50.43; M2 = 346.77, SD2 = 
35.54), ps < .01. Controlling for age by using it as a covariate did 
not remove this gender difference, F1(1, 13) = 10.26, p < .01 and 
F2(1, 13) = 6.790, p < .05, respectively. The scrutiny within 
educational subsamples revealed that male nursing students at 
both times contributed to the detected main effect for Gender. 
Figure 1 displays justice development according to field of 
education. 
 
 
500450400350300250200
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
Education
Law
Enforcement
Social Work
Practical 
Nursing
 
 
 
Figure 1. Development in justice reasoning. MJI scores at Time 2 as a 
function of MJI scores at Time 1 with linear regression lines. 
Note. Regression cases have been marked. 
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Alternatively, a respective analysis was conducted on MJI 
scores with age as a covariate. Controlling for age (even 
nonsignificant itself) removed a significant effect on the repeated 
measures, F(1, 52) = 0.08, n.s. There were not significant within-
subject effects, but the significant between-subject Gender X Field 
of Study interaction effect was replicated, F(2, 52) = 62.02 , p <  
.05. 
As shown in Table 11, the increase on MJI scores held across 
field of education and gender. Practical nursing students 
progressed 1/3 stage (35.4 points) and social work students ¼ 
stage (24.2 points), whereas law enforcement students showed the 
smallest progress of 1/6 stage (15.0 points). For women, progress 
was 1/3 stage (30 points) on average, and for men 1/6 stage (14.3 
points). It is nevertheless questionable whether the statistically 
significant increase among law enforcement students and men 
(overlapping each other) can be considered as meaningful, because 
it does not exceed 16 points, the established measurement error for 
Form B interviews. Nevertheless, 35% of law enforcement 
students showed progress of ½ stage that exceeds the established 
test-retest error of 23% for the Form B interviews (Colby & al., 
1987.) In comparison, 63% of practical nursing students, and 40% 
of social work students showed progress of at least ½ stage. 
Additionally, 10% (n = 2) of social work students, 5% (n = 1) of 
practical nursing students, and 4% (n = 1) of law enforcement 
showed decrease of ½ global stage over time. Given a potential 
ceiling effect due to high scores already at the first time of 
interviewing, the conclusion can also be drawn that law 
enforcement students showed modest progress in justice reasoning 
on average, 1/3 of them nevertheless showing a psychologically 
meaningful increase of ½ stage. Hence, Hypothesis 8 that all 
student groups progress in justice reasoning was supported. 
Justice development over the 2-year period, ranging from 1/6 
to ½ stage across student groups on average, is greater than found 
in other longitudinal studies, reporting progresses of 1/3 stage or 
less over four years in young adulthood (Colby & al., 1987). The 
speed of progress here is approximately of the same degree 
Walker (1989) reported among adults, ¼ Stage over a 2-year 
period. Dawson and Armon (1997) found less significant progress 
(1/10 - ¼ stage) among 23-44 years over a 4-year period. The 
recent accelerated progress can be attributed to the effect of  
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Table 11. Means of care reasoning (ECI), justice reasoning (MJI) and 
emotional empathy (QMEE) according to field of study and gender 
 
 Care reasoning Justice reasoning Empathy 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Nursing 7.75a 
(2.17) 
8.78b 
(1.87) 
324.25a 
(64.30) 
359.63b 
(42.43) 
42.09a 
(30.20) 
34.63a 
(23.16) 
Social work 9.25a 
(1.72) 
10.13b 
(1.53) 
383.10a 
(38.22) 
407.25b 
(40.64) 
53.66a 
(19.66) 
62.40b 
(15.10) 
Law 
enforcement
9.23a 
(1.66) 
9.47a 
(1.77) 
392.26a 
(36.17) 
407.26b 
(31.01) 
21.64a 
(17.23) 
24.02a 
(17.31) 
Women 8.44a 
(1.92) 
9.41b 
(1.80) 
352.29a 
(56.64) 
382.29b 
(46.40) 
53.17a 
(23.94) 
53.51a 
(20.59) 
Men 9.41a 
(1.80) 
9.59a 
(1.86) 
397.58a 
(35.22) 
411.92b 
(29.70) 
20.52a 
(15.21) 
23.44a 
(18.44) 
Total 8.84a 
(1.92) 
9.50b 
(1.77) 
370.71a 
(53.63) 
394.34b 
(42.75) 
36.95a 
(26.28) 
39.64a 
(24.69) 
__________________________________________________________ 
Note. Standard deviations are in the parentheses.  
Means for Time 1 and 2 that do not share the same subscript differ 
from each other in t-tests for paired samples as follows. Care reasoning 
for practical nursing students: t(1, 15) = -2.17, p < .05; for social work 
students: t(1, 19) = -3.14, p < .01; 
 
for women: t(1, 34) = -4.89, p < .001; 
for the total sample:
 
t(1, 58) = -3.79, p < .001. Justice reasoning for 
practical nursing students: t(1, 15) = -3.86, p < .01; for social work 
students:  t(1, 19) = -2.55, p < .05,  for law enforcement students: t(1, 22) 
= -3.83, p < .001, 
 
for women:  t(1, 34) = -4.48, p < .001; for men: t(1, 23) 
= -3.51, p <.01; for
 
the total sample: t(1, 58) = -5.38, p < .001. Emotional 
empathy for social work students: t(1, 17) = -1.96, p = .066, marginally 
significant. 
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education which has been found to promote justice development at 
least up to Stage 4 (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984; Nucci & 
Pascarella, 1987). In keeping with this, practical nursing students, 
with the least preceding education and being youngest ones, 
showed the greatest gains in justice reasoning. 
7.2.4 General level of justice reasoning 
 
Means for the MJI scores indicate that law enforcement and social 
work students’ reasoning revolved around Stage 4 at both times 
(slightly below and above), whereas female nursing students 
showed Stages 3 (Time 2) and 3/4 reasoning (Time 2) and male 
nursing students showed Stages 3/4 (Time 2) and 4 reasoning on 
average. Compared with the representative Finnish adult sample 
with average Stage 3 for young adults (Helkama & al., 2001) 
participants appear to be more advanced in justice reasoning. 11% 
(Time 1) and 20% (Time 2) of participants obtained Weighted 
Average Scores (WAS) 425 or more. According to Global Stage 
classification, 14% (Time 1) and 25% (Time 2) of participants 
were scored at Stage 4/5.40 Compared to Finnish university 
students at the roughly same age (Helkama, 1981), the proportion 
of subjects at the postconventional stages was equal (14%) at Time 
1. The proportion of respondents at Stage 4/5 at Time 2 is higher 
than found in other previous studies, nevertheless consistent with 
age trends reported (Colby & al., 1987). The mean age for 
respondents at Stage 4/5 was 32.5 years at Time 1, and 30.4 years 
at Time 2, in line with previous findings that postconventional 
reasoning seems to emerge in late twenties at the earliest 
(Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984). It is also worth pointing out that 
postconventional participants in this study are predominantly early 
postconventionals at the transitional level; only one was scored at 
Stage 5 at Time 1. Actually, it means that their Stage 4 
                                                     
40It is worth noting that the scoring procedure for Global Stage 
(Colby & al., 1987) pulls for higher stages. Consequently, some 
participants scoring below 425 on the WAS were scored Stage 4/5 
because at least 25% of their judgments nevertheless represented Stage 5 
reasoning even though they also made Stage 3 or 3/4 judgments. 
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reasoning was qualified by some postconventional judgments. 
This again is consistent with Armon’s (1998) observation on her 
longitudinal data that Stage 5 is not attained before the age of 35. 
7.2.5 Longitudinal analysis of care reasoning  
 
Similarly, a 2 X 3 X 2 (Gender X Field of Education X Time of 
Testing) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was 
conducted on ECI scores. There was a significant effect for ECI 
scores with Time of Testing, F(1, 53) = 5.15, p = .027. Within-
subject effects for Gender, F(1, 53) = 2.15, and for Field F(2, 53) 
= 0.79, were not significant, n.s. Thus, ECI scores showed the 
expected increase across Time, but this increase was not qualified 
by the effect of Field, contrary to Hypothesis 9. 
Between-subject effects for Gender, F(1, 53) = 2.62, as well as 
for Field F(2, 53) = 0.62 were nonsignificant, but there was a 
significant Gender X Field interaction effect, F(2, 53) = 3.88, p = 
.027. One-way ANOVAs further revealed a gender difference for 
practical nursing students at Time 1. Men (M = 11.00, SD = 1.73) 
exceeded women (M = 7.00, SD = 1.46), p < .001. This gender 
difference was significant even though the age was controlled for, 
F(1, 13) = 12.58, p < .01. Figure 2 displays care development 
according to field of education. As can be observed, especially 
practical nursing students showed substantial progress towards 
higher levels.  
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Figure 2.  Development in care reasoning. ECI scores at Time 2 as a 
function of ECI scores at Time 1 with linear regression lines. 
Note. Regression cases have been marked. 
 
A respective analysis was conducted on care scores with age as a 
covariate. Controlling for age, being nonsignificant, removed a 
significant effect for repeated measures F(1, 52) = 0.45, n.s., but 
there was a marginally significant within-subject interaction effect 
for Gender and Field of Study, F(2, 52) = 3.04, p = .056. 
Moreover, the analysis replicated the previous between-subject 
effect for Gender X Field of Study interaction, F(2, 52) = 3.46,  
p < .05. The marginal interaction effects were found among 
nursing students, as women progressed in care reasoning t(1, 12) = 
-4.21, p < .001, (M1 = 7.00, SD1 = 1.43; M2 = 8.46, SD2 = 1.70) 
whereas men did not,  t(1, 2) = 0.41, n.s. (M1 = 11.00, SD1 = 1.73; 
M2 = 10.17, SD2 = 2.31). Similarly, female social work students 
progressed, t(1, 17) = -2.70, p < .05 (M1 = 9.19, SD1 = 1.76; M2 = 
10.03, SD2 = 1.55), whereas men did not show significant 
progress, t(1, 1) = -5.0, n.s. (M1 = 9.75, SD1 = 1.76; M2 = 11.00, 
SD2 = 1.41). Note, however the small number of men. There were 
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no interaction effects among law enforcement students that in 
general did not show significant progress across time. 
Table 11 (p. 149) shows the means for the ECI scores 
according to field of education and gender. Although the repeated-
measures ANOVA did not confirm the predicted within-effect for 
Field, planned comparisons with paired-sample t-tests revealed 
that law enforcement students failed to evidence a statistically 
significant increase in the ECI scores, t(22) = -1.17, p = .25. 
Furthermore, the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 ECI 
scores also remained nonsignificant for men, t(23) = -0.48, p = .63 
(See Table 11 for paired-sample t-tests). An increase for law 
enforcement students was 1/16 level (0.24 points) on average, 
whereas practical nursing students showed the increase of ¼ level 
(1.03 points) and social work students almost ¼ level (0.88 
points). With regard to gender, the average increase was ¼ Level 
(0.97 points) for women, and 1/10 Level (0.38 points) for men. 
According to Overall Level classification, 26% of law 
enforcement students showed progress of ½ level, whereas 45% of 
social work students and 50% of practical nursing students showed 
a minimum progress of ½ Level. Additionally, 8% (n = 2) of law 
enforcement students showed a drop of ½ 1evel, as well as 6% of 
nursing students (n = 1) showed a drop of 1 level. To conclude, 
these results lend support for Hypothesis 9 that practical and social 
work students progressed in care reasoning, whereas care 
reasoning for law enforcement students was virtually constant 
over the 2-year period. More specifically, it seemed to be social 
work and female practical nursing students that contributed to the 
findings. 
7.2.6 General level of care reasoning 
As Table 11 (p. 149) points out, subjects in this sample were 
advanced in care reasoning, paralleling the findings on justice 
reasoning. In terms of Overall Levels, their reasoning revolved 
around Level 2.5 (transition from conventional to reflective care) 
except for female nursing students revolving around Level 2 
(conventions of goodness; caring for others). At Time 1, 21% were 
scored Level 1.5 (transition from survival to responsibility) and 
38% were scored Level 2, followed by 26% at Level 2.5 and 15% 
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at Level 3. At Time 2, consequently, percentages were 10% for 
Level 1.5, 22% for Level 2, 41% for Level 2.5 and 27% for Level 
3 (see also Table 13, p. 162). In comparison, Norwegian data, 
comprising 183 late adolescents and adults, yielded the following 
respective percentages: 3% at Level 1, 20% at Level 1.5, 24% at 
Level 2, 37% at Level 2.5, and 16% at Level 3 (Skoe, 1998). The 
distribution of percentages at Time 1 resembles that in the 
Norwegian data. At Time 2, the achieved progress can be observed 
in strikingly higher percentages at Level 3, and correspondingly, 
in strikingly lower percentages at Levels 1 and 1.5. 
7.2.7 Changes in moral reasoning over time 
Table 12 presents the changes in moral reasoning in total and 
separately across dilemmas. In total, 34% of participants 
progressed in care reasoning and 48% in justice reasoning, when 
the progress is defined as an increase of ½ stage/level or more. 7% 
progressed 1 level in care reasoning, compared that of 10% in 
justice reasoning. Participants’ stronger progress in justice overall 
was reflected in a greater number of participants with ½ stage 
improvement in justice reasoning. Progress was the most evident 
on the euthanasia dilemma, 46% demonstrating progression. 
Increases varied from 37% to 41% across other dilemmas. 
Participants showed the least progress (35%) on the real-life 
dilemma. 
Two care dilemmas, real-life and unplanned pregnancy 
showed greatest decreases 18% and 12% (½ and 1 level decreases 
combined) whereas the marital fidelity and all justice dilemmas 
showed a decrease of 9% and the care for a parent dilemma that of 
5%. Total regression was 7% for justice reasoning and 5% for care 
reasoning, when a decrease of ½ stage/level or more is defined as 
regression. Appendix D contains examples of progressive shifts on 
the parent dilemma at each level. 
Three participants skipped one ½ level in care reasoning either 
at the pretest or the posttest. More exactly, one participant, 
showing progress over time, skipped Level 1.5 in her reasoning at 
the pretest, and two participants not showing progress skipped 
Level 2.5 at the pretest or the posttest. Nobody skipped any levels  
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Table 12. Change across time according to dilemmas in percentages 
 
Dilemma 
 
-1 stage 
 
-½ stage Same 
 
+½ stage + 1 stage 
_____________________________________________________ 
Care 
 
Pregnancy 3.4 8.5 50.9 25.4 11.9 
Fidelity 1.7 6.9 51.6 27.6 12.1 
Parent - 5.1 57.7 28.8 8.5 
Real-Life 4.1 14.2 46.9 20.4 14.3 
__________________________________________________________ 
Justice 
 
Euthanasia 3.4 5.1 45.7 30.5 15.3 
Court  3.4 5.1 49.1 33.9 6.8 
Loyalty 1.7 6.8 52.5 28.8 10.2 
__________________________________________________________ 
Total 
 
Care 1.7 3.4 61.1 27.2 6.8 
Justice -  6.8 45.8 37.3 10.2 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. A difference within a ¼ stage/level is defined as the same. 
Percentages on the rows do not always sum up to 100, due to rounding. 
 
over time. To compare with justice reasoning, two participants 
skipped Stage 4 on the MJI within a single interview, scoring on 
the euthanasia dilemma strikingly higher than on other dilemmas. 
To summarize, evidence for invariant reasoning was lacking only 
in 5% of participants in care reasoning, and 3% in justice 
reasoning, and this can be attributed to the measurement error. To 
conclude, Hypothesis 10 that care reasoning progresses in 
invariant sequence was supported. In light of these findings, it 
seems that care and justice progress in very parallel ways. 
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7.2.8 Regressed participants in moral reasoning 
One participant regressed in care reasoning more than 1 level (4.5 
ECI scores). At the first interview Participant 18 evidenced Level 
3 reasoning across all dilemmas, whereas his second interview 
yielded scores of Level 1.5 on the marital fidelity and the 
unplanned pregnancy dilemmas, of Level 2.5 on the parent 
dilemma, and Level 2 on the real-life dilemma. 1.5 years after the 
second interview, this participant was contacted again and re-
interviewed, and at this time he demonstrated thinking at Level 2.5 
across all hypothetical care dilemmas. Furthermore, he told that 
under the previous interview he was undergoing a severe divorce 
crisis with a custody problem that resembled those ECI dilemmas 
on which he demonstrated the regressed reasoning. More exactly, 
at the pretest he had reported a real-life moral dilemma on how to 
build a caring relationship with his partners’ child and what are his 
responsibilities to the child, evidencing highly sophisticated moral 
reasoning. Later on he had to give up that significant relationship, 
resulting in deep disillusionment. When reflecting the morality he 
had shown at the time afterwards, he concluded that he had been 
“a very selfish person” due to the painful interpersonal losses he 
had experienced. Nevertheless, Participant 18 showed a slight 
progress in justice reasoning simultaneously with his regression in 
care, moving from Global Stage 4 to 4/5. The quotations from his 
marital fidelity dilemmas are presented in Appendix E, in order to 
exemplify regression. 
Two other participants showed decreases of ½ level in care 
reasoning, while justice reasoning remained stable over time. 
Participant 42 (at 4/5 Justice Stage) had regressed from Level 3 to 
Level 2.5 on two dilemmas, and showed reasoning at Level 2 on 
the real-life dilemma (whereas he did not generate that at Time 1). 
Participant 49 (3/4 at Justice Stage) showed decrease of ½ level 
across all dilemmas, from Level 2 to Level 1.5. The closer reading 
of his first interview revealed that reasoning did not appear much 
consolidated at the scored Level 2, however. For example, on the 
marital fidelity dilemma he devotes much attention to the children 
that might be influenced by psychology lessons (see Appendix E). 
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It is however interesting to note that both these participants 
reported a work-related real-life dilemma that contained signs of 
frustration and cynicism. Participant 49 had worked without 
remarkable success with juvenile delinquents for several weeks, 
trying to make them confess a series of serious car thefts and 
robberies. In turn, Participant 42 reported conflicted feelings about 
his sympathy for a minor law-breaker and stated that “pity is 
sickness” in police work and he thinks certainly he is “healthier” 
nowadays than in the very beginning of his career.  
With regard to justice reasoning, four participants were found 
to have regressed ½ stage, all simultaneously holding the same 
level of care reasoning over time. It is worth noting, however, that 
regression cases are calculated according to Colby et al.’s (1987) 
scoring procedure for global stages that had somewhat artificial 
cut-off points. In terms of continuous WAS scores the decreases 
were not so substantial. In fact, participants 7 and 56 showed 
drops of 8 and 16 points that can be included within the 
established measurement error of 16 points for Form B Interview. 
So, meaningful regressions were found in two participants. Closer 
scrutiny revealed that in the case of Participant 24, a decrease of 
24 points was mainly due to not emphasizing an individual’s 
rights for autonomous life decisions any more at the second 
interview (Doctor Jefferson at Court). In turn, Participant 32 (a 
decrease of 49 points) had invoked Stage 5 judgments on the 
euthanasia dilemma at the first interview, inconsistent with her 
reasoning on other dilemmas. At the second interview she 
demonstrated Stage 3/4 reasoning across all dilemmas. This 
decrease might be accounted for by measurement error (she could 
have been more intensely probed) or alternatively, can be linked to 
the general trend in this study to occasional higher scores on the 
euthanasia dilemma. 
To conclude, different participants showed regression in 
justice and care reasoning, and regression cases were rare and 
roughly equal in numbers. The proportion of regression in justice 
reasoning in terms of global stages (7%) was almost identical with 
Kohlberg’s follow-up study (6% for Form B) and was lower than 
the established test-retest error of 23% for Form B (see Colby & 
al., 1987). However, actual regression may concern two 
participants (3%). One severe regression and two milder cases 
were found for care reasoning (5%). Hence, regressions were 
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infrequent for both modes of moral reasoning, not confirming 
Hypothesis 11 that there are more regression cases for care 
reasoning. Moreover, it is also possible that the observed 
regressions reflect measurement errors rather than genuine 
regressions, if the respondents were not pushed enough to reveal 
their potential higher-stage structure in care reasoning. As 
examples in Appendix E show, the answers to dilemmas were 
relatively short at the second interviews. The case of Participant 
18 nevertheless suggests that care reasoning might be more prone 
to fluctuating in crisis experiences than justice reasoning is. These 
observations imply that there is an opportunity for regression in 
care reasoning through crisis experiences (Gilligan, 1982), even if 
the nature of the regression remains an open question in this study. 
7.2.9 Overlapping of care and justice developments 
If we look at all the participants who showed progress, 20% of 
them progressed in care reasoning, 30% in justice reasoning and 
50% in both modes of moral reasoning. 71% of those that 
progressed in care reasoning (½ level) also progressed in justice 
reasoning, and conversely, 63% of those that progressed in justice 
reasoning, also progressed in care reasoning. As previously 
reported, different participants showed regression in care and 
justice reasoning. Despite the considerable overlap, changes in 
ECI and MJI scores were only modestly related to each other r(59) 
= .26, p < .05. 
7.2.10 Correlations between age, care and justice 
reasoning 
Age was related to both moral measures among women at both 
times (see Table 8, p. 130). In the total sample, age was 
significantly related to the MJI, r1(59) = .35, p < .05 and r2(59) = 
.44, p < .001, and at Time 2 to the ECI, r(59) = .29, p < .05. A 
smaller standard deviation for men’s age may account for 
nonsignificant correlations among them (4.3 for men vs. 8.9 for 
women, respectively). Partial correlations, controlling for age, 
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nevertheless parallel bivariate correlations and therefore are not 
reported. 
ECI and MJI scores were related to each other in the total 
sample, r1(59) = .63 and r2(59) = .55, ps < .001. As Table 8 shows, 
significant correlations hold across gender. Partial correlations 
controlling for age paralleled bivariate correlations, except for 
correlation between ECI and MJI scores for women at Time 2, 
notwithstanding significant, r2(38) = .50, p < .001. 
These findings are in accordance with Hypothesis 12 that care 
and justice reasoning are related to each other. The correlations are 
however more dominant than previously found between the MJI 
and the ECI among college students (r = .25 for women, and r = 
.35 for men, Skoe & Diessner, 1994) but are better in line with the 
correlation of .52, found in an adulthood sample of 35-80 year-old 
(however, care reasoning was calculated based on real-life 
dilemmas in that study, Skoe & al., 1996). Higher correlations 
may partly be accounted by the obviously larger variance in 
justice scores in this study than in the aforementioned studies.  
7.2.11 Care reasoning across justice stages 
Care Levels 2.5 and 3 are defined as postconformist levels of care 
reasoning, whereas Stage 4/5 alone represents postconventional 
level of justice reasoning, because only one participant scored 
Stage 5 (Time 1). The 2 X 2 chi-square analyses (Conventionality 
X Moral Reasoning) were conducted for each Time and revealed 
significant associations, χ2(1, N = 59) = 5.98 (Time 1) and χ2(1, N 
= 59) = 3.90 (Time 2), ps < .05. The proportion of subjects at 
Levels 2.5 and 3 as a function of justice stages is represented in 
Figure 3 (p. 160), pointing out a steep increase for Level 2.5 
reasoning at Stage 4, as well for Level 3 reasoning at Stage 4/5. 
Hence, Hypothesis 13 that participants at the postconventional 
level of justice reasoning are at the postconformist levels of care 
more often than those at the conventional and preconventional 
levels was supported. 
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Figure 3. Postconformist care reasoning across justice stages. 
 
In order to examine relations between care and justice 
reasoning in detail, Table 13 (p. 162) presents cross-tables for care 
levels and justice stages, and Table 14 (p. 163) presents means for 
ECI scores according to justice global stages.  
The general important observation is that there are many more 
subjects at the postconformist care levels than at the 
postconventional justice level. 41% was scored at the highest care 
levels, whereas 10% was scored at Stage 4/5 at the first round of 
interviews. Two years later, proportions of both had increased, but 
postconformist care reasoning was still much more common than 
postconventional justice reasoning: 68% were scored at the 
highest care levels and 25% were scored at Stage 4/5. This 
suggests that mature care levels are achieved prior to mature 
justice stages in the individuals’ developmental schedule. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to examine the development of care 
from the perspective of justice development in this context. As 
Table 13 shows, the highest care levels emerge at Stage 3/4 which 
also covers almost full range of care levels, from Level 1.5 to 
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Level 3. However, it is worth noting at this point that the complete 
Time 1 data (N = 66) included 3 participants who evidenced the 
highest level in care reasoning at Stage 3. Thus, the current data 
suggests that the highest levels of care development can be 
achieved even at Stage 3 at the earliest. Among the current 
participants, however, postconformist care transition was most 
powerfully associated with Stage 4. From the perspective of care 
development, means for justice scores at Level 2.5 were: M1 = 
390.93, SD1 = 22.95; M2 = 399.75, SD2 = 35.75.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 13, most participants at Stage 4/5 
evidenced the highest level of care reasoning. Nevertheless, a 
considerable number of them (31%) were still at the 2.5 transition, 
and the minority (25% and 13%) was also scored at Level 2. 
Percentages for Level 2 indicate two participants at both times 
(Another participant at Time 2 was a regression case discussed 
earlier). Those participants nevertheless evidenced 2.5 level care 
reasoning on some of the care dilemmas. Further scrutiny revealed 
that 50% of participants who entered Justice Stage 4/5 at Time 2 
(having scored lower stages at Time 1) simultaneously reached 
care Level 3 (having scored lower levels at Time 1). 20% were 
continuing their transition at Level 2.5 across interviews, and 20% 
were moving from Level 2 to Level 2.5, thus entering 
postconventional transition in both modes of moral thought 
simultaneously. Finally, 10% (1 participant) regressed in care 
reasoning. In other words, half of the participants reaching the 
transitional Stage 4/5 were consolidating their transition of 
postconformist care thought, whereas almost another half was 
undergoing both transitions simultaneously. 
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Table 13. Crosstables for care overall levels and justice global stages 
in the longitudinal data 
 2/3 3 3/4 4 4/5 Total 
_____________________________________________________ 
Time 1 
3 -- -- 3 
30% 
13% 
2 
20% 
11% 
5 
50% 
63% 
10 
100% 
2.5 -- -- 6 
40% 
25% 
8 
53% 
42% 
1 
7% 
13% 
15 
100% 
2 1 
4% 
20% 
2 
9% 
67% 
10 
44% 
42% 
8 
35% 
42% 
2 
9% 
25% 
23 
101% 
1.5 4 
36% 
80% 
1 
9% 
33% 
5 
46% 
21% 
1 
9% 
5% 
-- 11 
100% 
_____________________________________________________ 
Total 5 
100 % 
3 
100% 
16 
101% 
24 
100% 
8 
101% 
59 
__________________________________________________________ 
Time 2 
3 -- -- 2 
13% 
13% 
5 
31% 
21% 
9 
56% 
6% 
16 
10% 
2.5 -- 1 
4% 
100% 
3 
13% 
19% 
15 
63% 
63% 
5 
21% 
31% 
24 
101% 
2 -- -- 8 
62% 
50% 
3 
23% 
13% 
2 
15% 
13% 
13 
100% 
1.5 2 
33% 
100% 
-- 3 
50% 
19% 
1 
17% 
4% 
-- 6 
100% 
_____________________________________________________ 
Total 2 
100% 
1 
100% 
16 
101% 
24 
101% 
16 
100% 
59 
__________________________________________________________ 
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Table 14. ECI scores across justice global stages 
Stage n Mean SD Range Confidence 
interval of 
95 % 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Time 1 
 
2/3 5 1.51 0.22 1.25-1.75 1.24-1.79 
3 3 1.81 0.29 1.56-2.13 1.10-2.52 
3/4 24 2.14 0.43 1.50-2.88 1.96-2.33 
4 19 2.33 0.37 1.50-3.00 2.15-2.51 
4/5 8 2.71  0.37 2.13-3.00 2.40-3.02 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Time 2 
 
2/3 1 1.63 -- -- -- 
3 2 1.94 0.62 1.50-2.38 -3.62-7.50 
3/4 16 2.12  0.45 1.89-3.00 1.88-2.36 
4 24 2.43  0.36 1.50-2.88 2.28-2.58 
4/5 16 2.65 0.34 1.88-3.00 2.47-2.83 
__________________________________________________________ 
Note. Original ECI scores have been divided by four, in order to describe 
the range of care development from survival (1) to reflective care (3).  
 
Interplay between lower levels is relevant with regard to the 
past theory building. Stage 3 morality is conceived as the morality 
of interpersonal relationships, with “having good motives, 
showing concern about others” (Colby & al., 1987, p. 18). The 
ethic of care, especially its conventional forms, has been widely 
equated with Stage 3 reasoning (Gilligan, 1982; Wark & Krebs, 
1997). However, as Table 13 shows, participants at Levels 1.5 and 
2 were most frequently scored Stage 3/4. Means of justice scores 
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at Level 1.5 exceeded Stage 3 (M1=316.36, SD1 = 55.52, M2 = 
341.16, SD2 = 47.39). Skoe and Diessner (1994 p. 282) also 
reported a similar finding concerning self-oriented levels, with a 
larger sample (n = 29, M = 340.55, SD = 24.79, for self-oriented 
levels) (Differing from this study, their respondents at all care 
levels evidenced approximately Stage 3/4 justice reasoning). This 
indicates that self-oriented subjects are nevertheless capable of 
reasoning about justice concerns at the interpersonal level of 
morality. 
To summarize these findings, care and justice tended to 
integrate in mature moral thought, and this integration was most 
likely to happen at Justice Stage 4/5 where the proportion of Level 
3 reasoning sharply increased. Consequently, if a respondent 
showed capacity of postconventional justice reasoning, it could be 
that her/his capacity in care reasoning is beyond the 
conformist/conventional level as well. By contrast, one cannot 
predict the level of justice reasoning from the respondent’s level 
of care reasoning in a similar fashion. In this sample, 50% (Time 
1) and 56% (Time 2) of the participants at Level 3 were 
postconventional justice reasoners, and at the highest Care Levels 
(2.5 & 3 combined) the proportion of postconventional reasoners 
was 24% (Time 1) and 35% (Time 2). 
These results suggest that the postconformist are levels are 
likely to be achieved before postconventional justice stages, even 
though the reverse trend is possible but less probable. The highest 
care level can be attained even at Stage 3. This further indicates 
that care and justice represent differential paths of development, 
even though those paths tend to integrate at the postconventional 
level of justice reasoning, as claimed by Kohlberg et al. (1983). 
Strikingly, Stages 3/4 and 4 covered the range of Care Levels from 
1.5 to 3. Even though considerations of care, relationship, and 
interpersonal trust are represented as norms and elements at each 
stage in the MJI scoring scheme (Colby & Damon, 1983), the MJI 
and the ECI measure different aspects of interpersonal morality, 
corroborating Gilligan’s (1982) criticism that Kohlberg’s theory 
and measurement is insensitive to care reasoning.  
On the other hand, these findings do not support Gilligan’s 
(1982) radical position that care and justice represent separate 
developments, so that some persons could end up with the high 
capacities in justice reasoning but being deficient in care reasoning 
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or vice versa. For example, this sample did not include any 
participants combining mature (Stage 4/5) justice reasoning with 
self-oriented care reasoning (Levels 1 and 1.5). The most extreme 
contrasts were two participants with the Stage 4 and Level 1.5 
combination (the same participants across time) and three 
participants with the Level 3 and Stage 3 combination. Rather, 
these results fit well with Gilligan’s (1982) another point that 
progress toward the highest levels of care obviously requires 
grasping justice concepts. As the high correlations just reported 
between care and justice reasoning indicate they obviously share 
some underlying general development (Skoe & al., 1996; Skoe & 
Lippe, 2002). To conclude, these results support the moderate 
interpretation that even though care and justice represent distinct 
developmental paths, they are interrelated. 
7.3 Real-life moral reasoning 
7.3.1 Type of dilemma, gender and field of education 
In this chapter, moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas will be 
investigated in terms of the type of dilemma. 56 (Time 1) and 57 
(Time 2) real-life dilemmas were classified according to Wark & 
Krebs’s classification (1996) into the following categories: (1) 
reacting to transgression (2) reacting to temptation (3) reacting to 
needs of others (4) reacting to conflicting demands or (5) social 
pressure. Transgression and temptation dilemmas represent the 
major category of antisocial dilemmas, and needs of others and 
conflicting demands dilemmas represent the major category of 
prosocial dilemmas, social pressure forming the third major 
category. Appendix C presents the themes of real-life dilemmas 
listed according to the dilemma categories. 
The distribution of real-life dilemmas is displayed in Figure 4, 
showing very similar distribution of types of dilemma across time. 
In terms of the major categories, percentages were 43% (Time 1) 
and 48% (Time 2) for prosocial dilemmas, 43% (Time 1) and 42% 
(Time 2) for antisocial dilemmas, and 14% (Time 1) and 11% 
(Time 2) for social pressure dilemmas. As Figure 4 shows, there 
was a shift within the category of antisocial dilemmas over time; 
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at Time 1 temptation dilemmas dominated, and at Time 2 it was 
transgression dilemmas. This shift emerged predominantly among 
law enforcement students who reported a considerable amount of 
work-related transgression dilemmas at Time 2. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of types of dilemma 
 
Table 15 shows percentages for each type of dilemma 
according to gender and field of education. Men reported more 
antisocial dilemmas than women, and correspondingly, women 
reported more prosocial dilemmas than men at both times, in 
accordance with Hypothesis 14. Women also reported more social 
pressure dilemmas than men, even though this category was in 
minority for both genders. χ2 (2, N = 56) = 14.12 (Time 1) and χ2 
(2, N = 58) = 13.99 (Time 2), ps < .001. At both times, law 
enforcement students reported more antisocial dilemmas than 
practical nursing and social work students, who both reported 
more prosocial dilemmas than law enforcement students, in 
accordance with Hypothesis 15. Social work students reported 
more social pressure dilemmas than others at both times.χ2 (4, N = 
56) = 10.56, p < .01 (Time 1) and χ2 (4, N = 58) = 20.16, p < .001 
(Time 2). 
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Table 15. Antisocial, prosocial and social pressure dilemmas according 
to gender and field of study 
 
 
 
Antisocial 
 
Prosocial 
 
Social pressure 
__________________________________________________________ 
  
n 
 
% 
 
n 
 
% 
 
n 
 
% 
 
Time 1 
 
Women 
 
7 19.4 22 61.1 7 19.4 
Men 
 
14 70.0 5 25.0 1 5.0 
Practical 
nursing 
7 41.2 9 52.9 1 5.9 
Social 
work 
3 14.3 13 61.9 5 23.8 
Law 
enforc. 
11 61.1 5 27.8 2 11.1 
Total 
 
21 37.5 27 48.2 8 14.3 
 
Time 2 
 
Women 
 
8 23.5 21 61.8 5 14.7 
Men 
 
16 69.6 4 17.4 3 13.0 
Practical 
nursing 
6 40.0 8 53.3 1 6.7 
Social 
work 
2 10.0 12 60.0 6 30 
Law 
enforc. 
16 72.7 5 22.7 1 4.5 
Total 
 
24 42.1 25 43.4 8 4.5 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Means on the rows do not always add up to 100, due to rounding. 
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To summarize the reported findings so far, the distributions of 
dilemmas for Time 1 and Time 2 paralleled each other, the 
proportion of antisocial and prosocial dilemmas being roughly 
equal, and social pressure dilemmas representing a clear minority. 
Wark and Krebs (1996) reported a somewhat different distribution 
among Canadian university students. Both women and men in the 
present study reported more prosocial dilemmas, but less social 
pressure dilemmas, than in participants in their study. Binfet 
(2003) also found a smaller proportion of prosocial dilemmas 
among U.S. university students. Hence, participants in this study 
tended to report more prosocial dilemmas than university 
participants in the aforementioned studies, indicating that they are 
more focused on prosocial issues. 
This study nevertheless replicates Wark and Krebs’s (1996) 
finding that women report prosocial dilemmas more than men and 
men report more antisocial dilemmas than women, while both 
genders report the same amount of social pressure dilemmas. The 
education-related trends in types of real-life dilemma were in 
accordance with the prediction. Taking the field of education into 
consideration, it was additionally observed that social work 
students reported more social pressure dilemmas than others. A 
content analysis further revealed that those dilemmas were mostly 
work-related. 
7.3.2 Dilemma and orientation consistency over time 
No hypotheses concerning orientation consistency were set 
because of previous findings that orientation usage is a function of 
the content of a dilemma a subject chooses to report (Jaffee & 
Hyde, 2000). In addition, there were no studies exploring 
consistency in terms of the type of dilemma. Within the broad 
classification of dilemmas (prosocial, antisocial, social pressure) 
53% of participants reported the same type of dilemma over time, 
χ2 (4, N = 49) = 9.45, p = .051, marginally significant. Percentages 
across fields of education were 65% for law enforcement students, 
53% for social work students and 42% for law enforcement 
students. Within more detailed classification with 5 dilemma 
types, the consistency was not significant any more. Only 24% of 
participants chose to discuss the same type of dilemma both times. 
With regard to educational groups, 38% of law enforcement 
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students and 17% of social work and practical nursing students 
were consistent in the type of dilemma over time. 
In order to explore the consistency of care orientation scores 
(Lyons’s procedure) over time, a procedure used by Wark & 
Krebs (1996, 1997) was employed. Consistency was assessed in 
terms of the same or adjacent score on a five-point scale (J, J(C), 
J/C, C(J), C). Results showed that 69% of participants used the 
same or adjacent moral orientation at both times: 82% of law 
enforcement students, 79% of social work students, and 39% of 
practical nursing students. Percentages were 82% for men and 
63% for women respectively. 
Jaffee and Hyde (2000) reported that moral orientation 
analyzed as a categorical or alternatively as a continuous variable 
yields divergent results and they recommended using both ways. 
Accordingly, Pearson’s correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 
care orientation scores were calculated. They were significant in 
the total sample r(49) = .40, p < .01, and for men r(17) = .48, p < 
.05. Correlation for women approached significance, r(32) = .34, p 
= .058. With regard to field of education, law enforcement 
students showed the most powerful correlation, r(17) = .63, p < 
.01, followed by social work students , r(19) = .48, p < .05, 
whereas for practical nursing students the correlation was 
nonsignificant, r(13)= -.03, n.s. Thus, alternative ways of 
measuring showed parallel results. 
These results show that law enforcement and social work 
students tended to use the same orientation at both times. Further 
analyses revealed that modal moral orientation was mixed over 
time for social work students (37% and 32%) as well as for law 
enforcement students (35% for both times). Among practical 
nursing students, the exclusive care orientation (46%) was the 
most common at Time 1, whereas the mixed orientation was the 
most common at Time 2 (46%).  
These results seemed to be in contradiction with Walker’s 
(1989, 1991) study, reporting that consistency in orientation usage 
over 2 years on a 3-point scale (predominantly care, mixed, 
predominantly care) hold only for 50% of subjects. Alternatively, 
the current moral orientation scores were also calculated on a 3-
point scale, leading to much less powerful results, yielding 
marginally significant consistencies for law enforcement students 
and men, p < .10. Because the 5-point scale is more sensitive, it 
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seems accurate to conclude that law enforcement and social work 
students evidenced moderately consistent moral orientation over 
the 2-year period. Consistency was not as evident in the types of 
dilemma reported at different times, indicating that social work 
and law enforcement students tended to orient with somewhat 
similar (mainly mixed) orientation focus to the different types of 
dilemma. 
These results are hard to interpret in terms of consistency, 
however. Even though they indicate some consistency over time, 
they are in the contradiction with Gilligan’s (1987) claim that 
individuals have an internal predisposition to focus on either care 
or justice issues, because the present participants rather tended to 
show a more of less balanced mixture of both orientations. This, in 
turn, can be interpreted to indicate flexibility to switch and use 
both orientations among prospective police officers and social 
workers. Weaker consistency in moral orientation usage among 
women is consistent with Johnston’s (1988) notion that female 
adolescents were more flexible in changing orientation than male 
adolescents.  
7.3.3 Relations between moral orientation, care and 
justice reasoning 
In order to distinguish hypothetical moral reasoning from real-life 
reasoning, an index for hypothetical care reasoning was 
established. It was calculated as an average score for three ECI 
hypothetical dilemmas, whereas the index for real-life care 
reasoning is a score for real-life dilemma.41 Hypothetical justice 
reasoning is defined as Weighted Average Score (WAS) derived 
through the MJI scoring procedure, whereas real-life justice score 
was calculated following the procedure developed and justified by 
Krebs, Vermeulen et al. (1991, see Method section). 
In accordance with Hypothesis 12, care and justice reasoning 
were positively related to each other at both times: on hypothetical 
                                                     
41For the sake of clarity, the expression “hypothetical care 
reasoning” is used, even though it is arguable whether the hypothetical 
ECI dilemmas, related to real-life events, are hypothetical in a sense like 
the MJI dilemmas are. Nevertheless both are aimed at measuring 
competence in moral reasoning. 
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dilemmas, r1(57) = .65 and r2(59) = .53, and on real-life dilemmas, 
r1(57) = .78, and r2(59) = .72, all p < .001. Care and justice 
reasoning were more strongly integrated in real-life dilemmas than 
in hypothetical ones (p < .05 for Time 1,and p < .01 for Time 
2).These findings are not in accord with Skoe et al.’s (1996) study 
that reported nonsignificant findings between care and justice 
reasoning on real-life dilemmas. Instead, they are in line with the 
earlier observations that the two modes of moral reasoning are 
integrated in real-life conflicts among care workers (Gremmen, 
1997), objecting soldiers (Linn & Gilligan, 1990) and high school 
students (Higgins, Power & Kohlberg, 1984). 
Moral orientation showed nonsignificant correlations with 
both modes of hypothetical moral reasoning in the total sample: 
r1(57) = .01 and r2(59) = -.14 with care reasoning, and r1(57) = -
.11 and r2(59) = -.17 with justice reasoning, respectively. This was 
also the case with real-life dilemmas, r1(57) = .15 and r2(59) =.11 
with care reasoning, and r1(57) = -.05 and r2(59) = -.14 with 
justice reasoning, respectively. Exploration of correlations 
separately within genders revealed mainly nonsignificant 
correlations (see Table 8, p. 130). As an exception at Time 2, 
men’s care scores correlate positively with hypothetical justice 
reasoning r(24) = .46, p < .05. Notably, women’s care scores 
showed instead marginally negative correlation to hypothetical 
care reasoning, r(35) = -.31, p = .07. In other words, for men, care 
orientation was positively related to justice development, whereas 
for women, justice orientation tended to be positively related to 
care development. 
Some previous studies have reported significant relations 
between moral orientation and justice reasoning (Pratt & al., 1988, 
1990; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Recent empirical evidence however 
suggests that it is premature to examine moral orientations without 
taking the type of dilemma into account (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 
1997; Haviv & Leman, 2002). The current, predominantly 
nonsignificant findings replicate Pratt et al.’s (1988) and Walker’s 
(1991) findings, corroborating their conclusions that Lyons’s 
Moral Orientation Interview (1983) and the Moral Judgment 
Interview map different aspects of morality (Walker, 1991). 
Nonsignificant correlations with care reasoning here suggest 
further that it is a case for the ECI as well. Differential patterns for 
genders at Time 2 still fit in with Gilligan’s (1982) claim that at 
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the highest levels of development, men’s justice-centered 
reasoning is complemented by considerations of care, whereas 
women’s care-centered reasoning is complemented by 
considerations of justice. 
The finding that moral orientation and reasoning measures are 
not related to each other can also be considered a methodological 
problem. In more specific terms, the finding raises the question of 
how dilemmas lacking considerations from a definite orientation 
can even be scored within the respective developmental 
framework. Namely, 9% (Time 1) and 21% (Time 2) of 
participants used only justice orientation in their moral reasoning, 
and 11% (both times) used only care orientation. At both times 
those with the exclusive care orientation obtained the lowest 
justice scores (M1 =304.83, SD1 = 50.24, M2 = 310.73, SD2 = 
33.13), and correspondingly, those with the exclusive justice 
orientation obtained the lowest care scores (M1 = 1.85, SD1 = 0.34, 
M2 = 1.91, SD2 = 0.54).  
Given interpersonal morality embedded in Stage 3, it is not 
surprising that exclusively care oriented respondents could be 
scored at Justice Stage 3 on real-life dilemmas. Indeed, it is more 
surprising how exclusively justice oriented respondents succeeded 
to be scored almost Level 2, (conventional caring) (80% at Time 1 
and 46% at Time 2 were scored Level 2 or more). A further 
investigation revealed that the exclusively justice-oriented 
dilemmas consisted of antisocial and social pressure dilemmas. T-
tests revealed that at Time 2, social pressure dilemmas (n2 = 3, M2 
= 2.50, SD2 = 0.37) obtained significantly higher scores than 
antisocial dilemmas (n2 = 8, M2 = 1.69, SD2 = 0.37), t(9) = -2.97, p 
< .05. At Time 1, the difference between them was not significant 
(n1 = 2, M1 = 2.00, SD1 = 00 vs. n1 = 3, M1 = 1.75, SD1 = 0.37), 
t(3) = - 0.78, n.s. Hence, justice-oriented social pressure dilemmas 
in particular tend to evoke relatively high levels of care reasoning. 
These findings will be further discussed in the context of the 
analysis of social pressure dilemmas in Chapter 8.3.5. 
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7.3.4 Moral orientation, dilemma, gender and self-
concept 
2 X 5 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVA was conducted on moral 
orientation (care) scores. At Time 1, only the main effect for 
Dilemma was significant: F(4, 46) = 7.57, p < .001, unqualified by 
any interaction effects. Post hoc comparisons revealed that both 
prosocial dilemmas elicited more care-based judgments than other 
dilemmas. Antisocial dilemmas also differed from each other. The 
temptation dilemma elicited more care-based judgments than the 
transgression dilemma (for dilemma differences, see Table 16, p. 
176). 
At Time 2, self-concept was also measured (Lyons, 1983) and 
added into the ANOVA as an independent variable (separate, 
mixed, connected). Again, the main effect for Dilemma was 
significant, F(4, 33) = 3.03, p < .05. The main effect for Gender 
was significant as well, F(1, 33) = 9.45, p < .01, qualified by a 
marginally significant Gender X Self-Concept interaction, F(2, 33) 
= 2.98, p = .065. Dilemma differences partially replicated Time 1 
results. The needs of others dilemma again elicited more care-
based judgments than both antisocial dilemmas and social pressure 
dilemma, and the conflicting demands dilemma elicited more care-
based judgments than the social pressure dilemma (see Table 16, 
p. 176). Men (n = 24, M = .29, SD = .24) made less care-based and 
more justice-based judgments than women (n = 35, M = .61, SD = 
.33), t(1, 56.82) = 4.31, p < .001. A marginally significant self-
concept effect was identified among women. Women with a 
connected self-concept (n = 7, M = 1.00, SD = 0.00) tended to 
make more care-based judgments than women with mixed (n = 
11, M = .59, SD = .26) or separate self-concepts (n = 17, M = .47, 
SD = .33). It is worth noting that their dilemmas were fully care-
focused, and all classified as needs of others type of dilemma. 
These results support Hypothesis 16 that prosocial dilemmas 
elicit more care-based judgments than antisocial dilemmas, with 
the exception of the conflicting demands dilemma at Time 2, 
repeating Wark and Krebs’s (1996, 1997), Wark (2000) as well as 
Haviv and Leman’s (2002) findings. Compared with Wark and 
Krebs (1996) who used a similar method, in this study the 
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antisocial dilemmas pulled stronger for justice orientation than in 
their study, whereas prosocial dilemmas pulled stronger for care 
orientation in their study. In fact, the percentage score of 54 for 
the conflicting demands dilemma at Time 2 does indicate a mixed 
rather than a care-based orientation. Furthermore, the social 
pressure dilemma here pulled for justice orientation, whereas in 
their study social pressure dilemma yielded roughly mixed scores 
for moral orientation. Nevertheless, the recent scores, except for 
social pressure dilemma, are roughly similar to those obtained in 
the studies that have used a more standardized method by asking 
participants to report definite types of real-life dilemma (Wark & 
Krebs, 1997; Haviv & Leman, 2002). 
A marginally significant finding that the connected women are 
focused on care orientation lends some support to Hypothesis 5 
that connected participants are most care oriented. It is in line with 
Lyons’s (1983) pioneering study as well as with Pratt et al.’s 
(1988) study, but not with with Pratt et al.’s (1991) study reporting 
positive association for men’s connected self-concept and the care 
orientation.  
The fact that women were more care-oriented or men more 
justice-oriented at Time 2, even after the type of dilemma is 
controlled for, is consistent with some recent findings (Wark & 
Krebs, 2000; Skoe & al., 2002) reporting that men view moral 
dilemmas as involving more justice-based issues than women. The 
gender-related focus at Time 2 was also evident in the proportions 
of women and men who showed 100% focus on care or justice on 
their real-life dilemmas. 33% of men used exclusive justice 
orientation (8% at Time 1) and correspondingly, 31% of women 
used exclusive care orientation (11% at Time 1). By contrast, only 
1 man (5%) used exclusive care orientation (at both times), while 
11% (Time 1) and 9% (Time 2) of women used exclusive justice 
orientation. These results resemble gender-related patterns 
reported by Gilligan and Attanucci (1988), as they found that 1/3 
of their respondents used only care or justice orientation, and more 
women than men showed gender-reversed orientation. Gilligan 
and Attanucci’s study did not however control for the effect of 
type of dilemma, as this study did. 
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7.3.5 Real-life justice reasoning  
Correlations between justice reasoning on real-life dilemmas and 
hypothetical dilemmas were r1(57) = .61 and r2(59) = .69, ps < 
.001. These correlations are higher than those found by Wark and 
Krebs (1997), reporting correlations of .35 between the 
Kohlbergian and antisocial dilemmas, and of .48, between the 
Kohlbergian and prosocial dilemmas, as well as those found by 
Carpendale and Krebs (1995) reporting correlation of .55 between 
the Kohlbergian and selling dilemmas. As can be observed from 
Table 16 (p. 176) increase in the MJI scores over time is followed 
by increase in real-life dilemma scores, indicating that level of 
justice reasoning on Kohlberg’s hypothetical dilemmas predicts 
moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas. It was predicted that 
prosocial dilemmas invoke higher reasoning than antisocial 
dilemmas (Hypothesis 17). This hypothesis was investigated 
through analyses of variance. 2 X 5 (Gender X Dilemma) 
ANOVAs with WAS scores as a covariate were conducted on 
real-life justice reasoning scores. The analysis of Time 1 scores 
revealed that a main effect for Dilemma was significant, F1(4, 45) 
= 4.27, p < . 01, whereas a main effect for Gender was not, F1(1, 
45) = 0.07, n.s., unqualified by any interaction effects. WAS 
scores as a covariate had a significant effect, F1(1, 45) = 23.83, p < 
.001. The analysis of Time 2 scores replicated findings for Time 1 
scores. A main effect for Dilemma was again significant, F2(4, 44) 
= 2.71, p < .05, as well as a main effect for WAS scores F2(1, 44) 
= 22.77, p < .001, whereas a main effect for Gender was not, F2(1, 
44) = 0.11, n.s, unqualified by any interaction effects. Post hoc 
comparisons pointed out that temptation dilemmas elicited lower 
justice reasoning than other types of dilemma at Time 1 and that 
social pressure and conflicting demands dilemmas elicited higher 
reasoning than other types of dilemmas at Time 2 (for further 
details, see Table 16, p. 176). Hence, Hypothesis 17 was partially 
supported. It is worth noting that the effect of Dilemma was 
significant even after the effect of the competence (WAS scores) 
was controlled. 
 
176 
 
Table 16. Means for justice and care reasoning on real-life and 
hypothetical dilemmas, moral orientation and role-taking as a function 
of type of real-life dilemma 
Dilemma n Justice
real-life
Justice
MJI 
Care 
real-
life 
Care 
ECI 
Care 
orien- 
tation 
Role- 
taking
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Time 1 
Trans 
gression 
7 344.00b 
(29.98)  
368.57a 
(46.61) 
1.89 
(0.28) 
2.13a, b 
(0.57) 
0.18a 
(0.19) 
3.00a, b 
(1.29) 
Temptation 17 283.94a 
(51.19) 
348.12a 
(65.07) 
1.78
 
(0.49) 
1.88a 
(0.36)  
0.49b 
(0.24) 
2.12a 
(1.11) 
Needs of 
others 
18 339.61b 
(64.51) 
367.83a 
(49.43) 
2.08
 
(0.31) 
2.22b 
(0.49) 
0.78c 
(0.23) 
2.89a, b 
(1.13) 
Conflicting 
demands 
6 391.00b 
(74.61) 
370.17a 
(72.61) 
2.50
  
(0.45) 
2.43b 
(0.53) 
0.71c 
(0.25) 
3.67b 
(0.52) 
Social 
pressure 
8 
 
378.13b 
(50.70) 
386.38a 
(60.31) 
2.44
  
(0.50) 
2.35b 
(0.45) 
0.28a, b 
0.21 
3.25b 
(0.71) 
Total 56 334.27 
(66.45) 
364.84 
(57.69) 
2.06 
(0.48) 
2.15 
(0.49) 
0.55 
(0.31) 
2.80 
(1.13) 
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Dilemma n  Justice 
real-life 
 
Justice 
MJI 
Care 
real-
life 
Care 
ECI 
Care 
orien- 
tation 
Role- 
taking 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Time 2 
Trans- 
gression 
15 332.87a 
(59.80) 
397.20a 
(44.16) 
1.90a 
(0.51) 
2.46b 
(0.35) 
0.30a, c 
(0.30) 
2.60a, b 
(0.99) 
Temptation 9 322.89a 
(57.58) 
387.33a 
(54.56) 
1.83a 
(0.35) 
2.11a 
(0.54) 
0.33a, c 
(0.25) 
2.22a 
(0.83) 
Needs of 
others 
21 345.62a 
(51.24) 
388.05a 
(2.08) 
2.31b 
(0.39) 
2.42b 
(0.41) 
0.74b 
(0.27) 
3.33b, c 
(0.73) 
Conflicting 
demands 
6 422.17b 
(47.16) 
427.50a 
(29.41) 
2.83c 
(0.41) 
2.69
 b, c 
(0.25) 
0.54b, c 
(0.19) 
3.83c 
(0.41) 
Social 
pressure 
6 396.67b 
(36.15) 
409.83a 
(34.52) 
2.75c 
(0.42) 
2.92c 
(0.24) 
0.17a 
(0.20) 
3.33b, c 
(1.21) 
Total 57 352.11 
(60.06) 
396.79 
(42.38) 
2.23 
(0.54) 
2.46 
(0.43) 
0.48 
(0.34) 
3.02 
(0.79) 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 Means on the same column that do not share the same subscript are 
significantly different at the p < .05 level or lower. Means on the same 
row type faced in bold are different at the p < .01 level or lower. 
 
Hypothesis 18 predicted that real-life dilemmas invoke lower 
justice reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas. In order to examine 
this hypothesis, 5 X 2 (Dilemma X Justice Reasoning) analyses of 
variance with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted 
on justice reasoning scores. The analyses revealed a significant 
within-effect for Dilemma at both times, F1(4, 51) = 3.89, p < .01, 
and F2(4, 51) = 3.58, p < .05. Post hoc comparisons revealed that 
temptation and needs of others dilemmas elicited lower justice 
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reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas at both times, and in 
addition, transgression dilemmas did so as well at Time 2 (see 
Table 16, p. 176). Hypothesis 18 gained only partial support, 
because social pressure, conflicting demands and transgression 
dilemmas (Time 1) elicited justice reasoning that was somewhat 
equal to hypothetical dilemmas. 
Hypothesis 19 predicted that participants on Stage 4/5 and 5 are 
consistent in justice reasoning across real-life and hypothetical 
dilemmas. This hypothesis was investigated through repeated 
measures ANOVAs on justice scores, with Global Stage as a 
variate. Global Stages varied from 2/3 to 4/5 for Time 1, and from 
3 to 4/5 for Time 2. 1 participant scored Stage 5 was included into 
Stage 4/5 in the analysis of Time 1 scores, and respectively, 1 
participant scored Stage 2/3 was included into Stage 3 in the 
analysis of Time 2 scores. A within-subject effect for Global Stage 
was significant for Time 1 scores, F1(4, 52) = 4.58, p < .01, but not 
for Time 2 scores, F2(3, 53) = 0.32, n.s. Post hoc comparisons 
revealed that respondents at Stages 3/4 and 4 showed lower 
reasoning on real-life dilemmas (Ms = 304.1 and 362.5, SDs = 
59.45 and 47.71) than on hypothetical dilemmas (Ms = 354.7 and 
401.3, SDs = .17.91 and 13.05), p < .001. Hence, the hypothesis 
that participants at the postconventional level (n = 6) are more 
consistent in justice reasoning gained support from Time 1 
findings. By contrast, at Time 2 they showed a discrepancy of half-
stage on average (n = 16, M = 441.4, SD = 19.00 vs. M = 404.5, 
SD = 53.59). It is worth pointing out that participants at Stage 4/5 
generated different types of conflicts at different times; at Time 1 
social pressure and conflicting demands dominated (67%), 
whereas at Time 2 they remained in minority (38%). These 
findings indicate that postconventional participants’ justice 
reasoning was also affected by the type of dilemma as well. (Too 
small cell sizes precluded the possibility to control for the type of 
dilemma in the analyses). 
Beyond the hypotheses, it was of interest to study whether 
participants reporting different types of dilemma differ from each 
other in terms of competence in justice reasoning, measured by the 
MJI dilemmas. For this purpose, 2 X 5 (Gender X Dilemma) 
ANOVAs on scores of MJI dilemmas were conducted. The 
analysis of Time 1 scores revealed a significant main effect for 
Gender, F1(1, 46) = 5.50, p < .05, and a nonsignificant main effect 
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for Dilemma F1 (4, 46) = 1.40, n.s., unqualified by interaction 
effects. The analysis of Time 2 scores again revealed a significant 
main effect for Gender, F2(1, 46) = 13.21, p < .001, and a 
significant main effect for Dilemma, F2(4, 46) = 3.46, p < .05, 
qualified by a significant Gender X Dilemma interaction effect, 
F2(4, 46) = 2.69, p < .05. Post hoc comparisons revealed that men 
obtained higher justice scores (WAS) than women at both times. 
According to the previous analyses, this gender difference is due 
to the Gender X Field interaction effect, where male nursing 
students exceeded female ones at both times. The Gender X 
Dilemma interaction was verified for women, as women reporting 
temptation dilemma obtained lower WAS scores (n = 2, M = 
297.00, SD = 30.41) than all others. In the total sample, however, 
participants reporting different types of dilemmas did not differ 
from each other in WAS, F(4, 52) = 1.29, n.s.. Hence, reporting 
temptation type of real-life dilemmas was associated with less 
mature justice reasoning at the second interviews (note however 
than n was only 2). Otherwise, the type of real-life dilemma did 
not predict the participants’ competence in justice reasoning. 
To summarize the findings, there was partial support for the 
expectation that prosocial dilemmas invoke higher levels of justice 
reasoning than antisocial dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997). 
Contrary to the hypothesis, transgression dilemmas did not elicit 
lower justice reasoning than prosocial dilemmas at the first 
interviews, and the needs of others dilemmas did not elicit higher 
reasoning than antisocial dilemmas at the second interviews. 
Moreover, current prosocial dilemmas did not straightforwardly 
pull for Stage 3 reasoning, and antisocial dilemmas for Stage 2 
reasoning, as Wark and Krebs (1997) found, but showed greater 
variation. This can be explained by the fact that the mean WAS for 
Wark and Krebs’s respondents was ½ Stage lower than the mean 
WAS for present participants (330.0 vs. 364.4 and 394.9 here). 
The present findings are also in line with several studies that 
have found that different types of actual dilemmas invoke lower 
reasoning than the MJI dilemmas (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995; 
Krebs, Denton & al., 1991; Krebs, Vermeulen & al., 1991). 
Nevertheless, conflicting demands and social pressure dilemmas 
invoked consistent reasoning with hypothetical dilemmas at both 
interviews, as well as transgression dilemmas at the first interview, 
contradicting Wark and Krebs’s (1996, 1997) findings concerning 
180 
 
these types of dilemma. (It is worth noting that Wark and Krebs’s 
participants responded in writing, and in the 1997 study, the types 
of dilemma were pre-determined. For example, participants were 
asked to recall and describe a dilemma dealing with two or more 
people making inconsistent demands on them, with implications 
for their relationships with each person. By contrast, in this study, 
classifications were made post hoc, and conflicting demands 
dilemma also involved demands between persons that were 
representatives of organizations with whom a participant does not 
necessarily have a personal relationship at all.) These findings are 
nevertheless compatible with the previous findings that some 
moral dilemmas, such as dealing with sexually transmitted 
diseases or AIDS (Conley, Jadack & Hyde, 1997; Krebs, 
Vermeulen & al., 1991) and objecting military actions (Linn, 
1995, 1996) invoke consistent justice reasoning with Kohlbergian 
dilemmas. The present finding also resembles closely Armon’s 
(1998) finding for adults’ real-life moral reasoning. Participants in 
her study, scoring at Stage 4 on average, showed high correlations 
of  .88 between MJI and real-life dilemma scores. Furthermore, 
moral events involving societal context evoked higher reasoning 
than moral events with interpersonal context, in accordance with 
the observation from the current data 
To conclude, these results support the claim voiced by Krebs, 
Vermeulen et al. (1991) and Rest et al. (1999) that justice 
reasoning is not so structurally homogenous as initially claimed by 
Kohlberg and his associates (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987; 
Kohlberg & al., 1983). Rather, individuals retain their previous 
stages while acquiring new ones, and as a consequence, moral 
reasoning may vary in real-life conflicts. Some support was 
obtained for Hypothesis 19 that participants at the 
postconventional level are consistent in their justice reasoning 
across different types of dilemma from Time 1 results. Time 2 
results, however, contradicted Kohlberg and Candee’s (1984) 
contention that postconventional reasoning is most homogeneous, 
and accordingly, remains constant across different contexts. It is 
nevertheless worth reminding that Stage 4/5 displayed by present 
respondents is not fully postconventional but rather a transitional 
stage. Hence, far-reaching conclusions cannot be drawn, also 
because of the small size. Finally, these results suggest that justice 
reasoning about real-life conflicts is not necessarily below 
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competence (measured by the hypothetical dilemmas) as was a 
case for approximately 25% (Time 1) and 22% (Time 2) of real-
life dilemmas (conflicting demands and social pressure). 
7.3.6 Real-life care reasoning  
Pearson’s correlations between care reasoning on real-life 
dilemmas and hypothetical dilemmas were significant, r1(57) = .63 
and r2(59) = .68, ps < .001. In order to further explore Hypothesis 
20 that care reasoning is consistent across real-life and 
hypothetical care dilemmas, repeated measures ANOVAs on care 
reasoning scores, with the type of dilemma as an independent 
variable, were conducted. The analysis of Time 1 care scores 
revealed a nonsignificant within-effect for Dilemma, F1(4, 51) = 
0.82, whereas the analysis of Time 2 care scores pointed out a 
significant effect, F2(4, 51) = 7.91, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons 
showed that transgression dilemmas elicited lower care reasoning 
than hypothetical care dilemmas at Time 2 (see Table 16, p. 177). 
Even though specific hypotheses were not set about some 
types of dilemmas invoking different levels of care reasoning than 
some others, the question was of additional interest. Similarly to 
justice reasoning, 2 X 5 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVAs, with 
scores of hypothetical care dilemmas as a covariate, were 
conducted on the real-life care reasoning scores. The analysis of 
Time 1 scores only revealed significant effect for care scores on 
hypothetical dilemmas as a covariate, F1(1, 45) = 18.89, p < .001, 
whereas a main effect for Dilemma remained marginally 
significant, F1(4, 45) = 2.20, p = .08. A main effect for Gender 
was nonsignificant, F1(1, 45) = 0.09, n.s., nor were there 
interaction effects. The analysis of Time 2 scores again revealed 
that an effect for covariate was significant, F2(1, 44) = 21.11, p < 
.001. A main effect for Dilemma was also significant, F2(4, 44) = 
4.08, p < .01, whereas a main effect for Gender was not, F2(2, 44) 
= 0.26, n.s., unqualified by any interaction effects. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that conflicting demands and social pressure 
dilemmas elicited higher care reasoning than other real-life 
dilemmas, and needs of others dilemmas elicited higher reasoning 
than both antisocial dilemmas at Time 2 (see Table 16, p. 177). 
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Beyond hypotheses, it was also investigated whether 
participants reporting different types of dilemma differed form 
each other in terms of competence in care reasoning, measured by 
hypothetical care dilemmas. 2 X 5 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVAs 
on scores of hypothetical care dilemmas pointed out significant 
effects for Dilemma for both times, F1 (4, 46) = 3.57, p < .05 and 
F2(4, 46) = 6.28, p < .001. A main effect for Gender was 
marginally significant for Time 1, F1 (1, 46) = 4.02, p = .051, and 
significant for Time 2, F2(1, 46) = 4.23, p < .05, unqualified by 
interaction effects. Post hoc comparisons revealed that participants 
reporting temptation real-life dilemmas scored the lowest on 
hypothetical care dilemmas at both times (for details, see Table 
16, p. 176). Furthermore at Time 2, those participants who 
reported social pressure dilemmas scored higher than all others 
except for those who reported conflicting demands dilemmas. 
Gender effects signify that men exceeded women at both times in 
hypothetical care reasoning. According to previous analyses, this 
gender difference is explainable by the Gender X Field interaction 
effect, as male nursing students obtained higher ECI scores than 
female nursing students at both interviews. 
To summarize, Hypothesis 20 that care reasoning remains 
consistent across real-life and hypothetical dilemmas was 
supported by the findings for Time 1, but failed to gain clear 
support from the findings for Time 2, as transgression dilemmas 
elicited lower reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas at this time. 
Further content analysis revealed that those dilemmas were mainly 
provided by law enforcement students, and they were work-
related, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. With 
this exception, the findings were consistent with the prediction, 
even though correlations between the real-life dilemma and 
hypothetical dilemmas were lower than reported in previous 
studies (Skoe, 1998). In addition, these results pointed out the 
effect for the type of dilemma at Time 2. More precisely, 
conflicting demands and social pressure dilemmas pulled upwards, 
and antisocial dilemmas pulled downwards, needs of others 
dilemmas being between them. It is worth noting that the effect for 
the type of dilemma was evident even after the effect of 
competence in care reasoning was controlled for. Moreover, 
findings imply that reporting temptation real-life dilemmas is 
associated with less mature care reasoning (both times), whereas 
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reporting social pressure types of real-life dilemma (Time 2) may 
signify mature care reasoning. 
7.3.7 Role-taking across dilemmas 
In order to investigate whether role-taking on real-dilemmas 
differs as a function of the type of dilemma, 2 X 5 (Gender X 
Dilemma) ANOVA on role-taking scores for each Time was 
performed. A main effect for Dilemma was significant for the 
scores of both times, F1(4, 46) = 4.17 and F2(4, 47) = 4.51, ps < 
.01, unqualified by interaction effects. A main effect for Gender 
was nonsignificant at both times, F1(1, 46) = 2.53 and F2(1, 47) = 
1.70, n.s. Post hoc comparisons pointed out that temptation 
dilemmas elicited lower role-taking scores than conflicting 
demands and social pressure dilemmas at Time 1. At Time 2, 
temptation dilemmas again elicited lower role-taking than all other 
dilemmas, except for transgression dilemmas that in turn elicited 
lower role-taking than conflicting demands dilemmas (see Table 
16, p. 176). 
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8. NATURE OF MORAL 
REASONING 
 
The goal of this chapter is to deepen the understanding of the 
nature of moral reasoning with the descriptive analysis of the 
interview data. For this purpose, I analyzed contents of self-
concept interviews and responses to the ECI dilemmas with regard 
to some relevant aspects that emerged from the above findings. In 
addition, I close-read responses to the mercy killing dilemma 
again, because this dilemma explicitly presents a conflict between 
the ethics of care and justice, and therefore may illuminate their 
interaction in moral thought. My explorations are largely qualified 
by the findings reported above, and thus my point is to put some 
flesh around the skeleton of the statistical analyses, in order to 
provide some deeper understanding about how the results make 
sense in the concrete moral reasoning. In addition, I will raise 
some observations that are more tentative but nevertheless might 
be of interest in terms of theory-building and future research. To 
sum up, my stance represents a form of qualitative research that 
attempts to explore, elaborate and systematize the significance of 
an identified phenomenon. Qualitative research regards 
interpretation process as the main tool of study, providing a bridge 
between research objects and our representations of them while 
acknowledging that gap still remains inevitable. Therefore a 
researcher has to make her way of interpretation visible (Banister 
& al., 1999). My interpretation process here is more theory-driven 
than data-driven, relying on the pre-existing knowledge. 
Nevertheless, in the analysis I relied on explicit verbal statements 
of participants, rather than attempted to go beyond their words, in 
order to avoid over-interpreting. For illustration purposes, I tried 
to choose such quotations and examples from the interview data 
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that are relevant to findings and theory-building, but nevertheless 
are not distorted or extreme, compared with the rest of data.  
While I had plenty of choices, verbal clarity was the criterion. So, 
quotations are exceptional in the sense that participants explicitly 
spell out what may remain implicit or fragmentary in others’ 
responses.  
With regard to the nature of care reasoning, I will explore 
how care development was reflected in participants’ self-
descriptions. I will also show different qualities of care reasoning 
in terms of self-assertion, which was more characteristic for 
women’s reasoning, and in terms of role-taking which was more 
characteristic of men’ s reasoning. My second goal in this chapter 
is to explore care reasoning in the context of justice reasoning. 
For this purpose, I calculated justice-related concepts on the 
hypothetical care dilemmas and scrutinized their context.  This 
makes sense from the viewpoint of validity, because arguably, 
care dilemmas can be solved through justice reasoning as well 
(Kohlberg & al., 1983). Finally, I also will explore how care and 
justice reasoning appeared on real-life dilemmas, relying on the 
typology of real-life dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1996) that was 
used in the preceding statistical analyses. 
 
8.1 Nature of care reasoning 
8.1.1 Selfishness and responsibility on the Self-
Concept Interview 
Gilligan (1982) observed that while women discussed actual moral 
conflicts, they used the words selfish and responsible, which she 
interpreted to denote the underlying moral orientation of care. 
Consistent with her observations, participants in this study, 
women as well as men, used frequently those words when 
discussing the hypothetical care dilemmas. However, when asked 
to “describe yourself to yourself” in the self-concept interview 
conducted at the second round of interviews, women generated 
descriptions related to selfishness and responsibility. Furthermore, 
the subsequent question about the changes happened in the past 5 
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years evoked descriptions of the shifts on the selflessness-
selfishness continuum that according to Gilligan (1982) reflects an 
increasing differentiation of self and other. So, the different ways 
of thinking about the question of selfishness inherent in 
relationships could be tracked from women’s self-descriptions, 
and furthermore, they had a close match with the levels of care 
reasoning, resembling many descriptions of women and 
adolescent girls in Gilligan’s (1982) and Gilligan et al.’s (1990) 
studies. 
In contrast to women, men’s self-descriptions lacked explicit 
self-evaluations in terms of selflessness and selfishness. Their self-
descriptions involved in turn moral concerns about fairness and 
honesty especially, even though these were not a coherent theme 
across all interviews. In order to understand men’s self-
descriptions in this study, a typology of socialization orientations 
among law enforcement students, found by Honkonen and Raivola 
(1991) is helpful. The present students described themselves 
primarily in terms of the social orientation, skilled in good 
interaction, conflict management and being social, or alternatively, 
in terms of the pragmatic orientation, being practical, energetic, 
and athletic, having emphasis on physical qualities. These two 
types overlapped to some extent, because also “sportsmen” 
defined themselves as social and enjoying being with people. The 
patriotic orientation, referring to the belief in one’s own capacities 
and with the mission to serve one’s country, was voiced only by 
one participant (who also appeared to be the only law enforcement 
student with the strong normative order orientation in justice 
reasoning). Many male law enforcement students stated that they 
had “calmed down” in the past 5 years. Similarly, current self-
descriptions echoed those found 10 years ago, as the descriptions 
referring to getting along well with people  were the most 
frequent, followed by the descriptions of being self-reliant, calm, 
and being virtuous (cf. Honkonen & Raivola, 1991). It is worth 
noting that male nursing and social work students (n = 5) did not 
generate reflections concerning selflessness-selfishness either, 
even though their self-descriptions were more focused on 
relationships than those generated by male law enforcement 
students. 
To account for this gender difference, the lack of self-
evaluation in terms of selflessness-selfishness among men might 
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be explained with the fact that their care development was not so 
pronounced over the 2-year period than that of women. 
Consequently, they might not have been able to reflect on the 
developmental change if this did not exist in the recent past. An 
additional explanation could be that men’s actual life situations, 
with the average age of 27 years, most of them being single, were 
also different from those of women with the average age of 31 
years, many of them having family, obviously raising moral 
questions related to self-sacrifice more easily. Moreover, many 
women reported undergoing big changes in their relationships and 
jobs that might have provided them with an insight into their 
moral development. With these reservations in mind, these 
observations fit in with the finding by Skoe and Diessner (1994) 
that care reasoning was more related to identity development of 
women than that of men, pointing out its relevance to women’s 
personality development in particular. The range of women’s care 
reasoning in this study covered both developmental transitions that 
bring out essential questions whether to be less selfish (Level 1.5) 
and whether to be more selfish than previously (Skoe, 1993) 
8.1.2 First transition - selflessness emerges 
In this data, participants who were scored at Levels 1.5 and 2 were 
predominantly female practical nursing students who stressed the 
importance of friendships and love and were ready to make big 
efforts to sustain their relationships. They valued attachment and 
social participation and seemed to view their own moral worth in 
terms of being or becoming a caring person as well, obviously 
partly derived from the ethics of nursing they had begun to 
internalize. As one student expressed: “Somehow one feels that 
one should be, like, you know, like helpful…, not like awfully 
mean… One would imagine that on a field like this … (one would 
be) like a little more understanding to other people than in some 
other field” (Participant 8). The following excerpt from a 20-year 
practical nursing student exemplifies how her self-image as a 
caring person is evolved in the context of close relationships. 
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Well in my mind I like do get along with different people and 
new people, and I really fight very rarely with anyone but my 
boyfriend (laugh) but that’s normal. But then I am kind of quite 
sensitive, so if someone says something in a mean way to me, 
even if not meaning it, so I start to think at once that what was 
that all about, and then I get hurt really easy… I feels like so 
wonderful when I can help another person. [So it is wonderful 
to help others?] Yeah. And if I feel that I have like succeeded in 
something.  [When have you felt like succeeding?] If some 
person has asked for my advice for example and then he or she 
comes for example after a couple of days to thank me and goes 
like thanks for saying that and she or he did that and… [If you 
think of time… five years back, what kind of changes have taken 
place in you] Five years? [Yes]  Just a moment, let’s see how 
old I was five years ago, I was fifteen…  Well, maybe I have 
learned to take more responsibility.  And at least learned to 
be more independent, but I don’t know if anything in my 
character (has changed). [What are the things you have started 
to take more responsibility for?] Well, like I have moved to a 
place of my own, and generally for myself. Perhaps like 
starting to think more about others.  Like now I often think 
about Mom and Dad… I think a lot how they feel and stuff… 
When I moved two and half years ago here I like did not think so 
much. But like today I think a lot about them. 42 
(Participant 19) 
Despite the other-oriented concern in this self-description, this 
participant’s care reasoning did not reach the conventional level 2 
with hypothetical dilemmas. This was typical of many female 
nursing students; their self-descriptions and real-life dilemmas 
convey signs of conventional ideals of caring, but they failed to 
evidence the solid Level 2 with hypothetical dilemmas. On 
average, female nursing students in this data represented a 
subgroup who consolidated Level 2 reasoning over 2 years, as the 
means of 1.9 (Time 1) and 2.2 (Time 2) indicate. The next 
                                                     
42In quotations three dots (…) signify that words or sentences are 
omitted, whereas two dots (..) signify that an irrelevant word or stattering 
is omitted. The interviewer’s talk is situated in brackets. 
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quotation comes from a student who showed a general shift from 
Level 1.5 to Level 2 during the education. 
I am reliable and honest to my friends. And I am my true self, do 
not try to put on an act or anything. And I am awfully helpful, 
I like to help people. [What do friends mean to you?] Well, they 
mean so much… Like I think they are really a vital think to me.  I 
couldn’t do without them. [What else (are you like)?] Well, I 
don’t know, what could I (say) [You said you were helpful] 
Yeah. Well, I like it if, for example, a friend comes to tell me 
something or… like asking for advice, so I like to help and 
stuff. So that I do not feel like why is that person there again. 
That I like to listen and help if I can.  
 (Participant 8) 
Furthermore, the subsequent passage from her real-life 
dilemma illustrates her emerging sense of the ethic of care, and 
her strivings to internalize it as a part of her self-identity. 
So I had this friend who… at one point started to go like down 
the hill, that is… there were these people who used drugs at 
times. And then the thing was that I was a good friend of this 
person, and then she… I was thinking now she will soon start to 
use drugs too, or like try them. And then one day she had tried 
them, and I was like what now. Because I am so against drugs. 
So that how… could I constructively talk to her so that she 
wouldn’t get hurt or anything, like feeling under attack or 
something… But when you take it up, then she will say that 
no, this is my life.  So don’t mess with me. So like I didn’t 
know what to do. [Yes. So you had this conflict there, you in a 
way did not like to interfere with here life?] Yeah, right. And if I 
didn’t interfere, or if I didn’t say anything to her, then she 
would think that nobody cares. So that this could have been 
the other alternative. [Well, what did you do in that situation?] 
Well, I did tell her my opinion and that she was also awfully 
clever herself and that kind of stuff. So she knew that she had 
done wrong and like she did not want to become a bum or 
anything. But there were these experiments and stuff. And those 
friends like that, it was easy (to try them)… We were quite a 
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bunch of people there then who knew about it and then she said 
why do you mess with my life and all that. But in the end when 
we kept talking about it, then she like hinted that it was so 
cool to have friends who care. [If you now think back, do you 
think you did the right thing to interfere?] Yeah, I think I did. 
[How do you know?]. Well, I wouldn’t like to, or of course I… I 
must not be like a mother figure, like do this and do that. 
But I think that a friend must tell what she thinks. And the 
other one should not be hurt so much when the other tries to 
give advice and stuff.  It was not like telling her off or 
anything… [What if you had not interfered, how do you think 
you would feel about it today?] I don’t know. If I had not 
interfered at all with her things, I might have like – I wouldn’t 
have had any talking situations with her and then she 
couldn’t have told her point about this business – so I might 
have a whole different picture. Like much more negative 
than now. 
 
The above example above is typical in the sense that the 
participants approaching Level 2 often pitted the moral imperative 
of taking care against not interfering in a person’s affairs (also 
denoting justice reasoning at Stage 2/3). Furthermore, it shows 
how the participant’s experience of being a caring person is 
validated by the acceptance of a cared-for person, as Noddings 
(1984) insisted. Consistent with this observation, conventional 
caring seemed to be associated with participants’ positive feelings 
about mutual relationships in general. Hence, conventional care-
takers tended to experience their relationships as gratifying, 
showing no signs of being bothered by the lack of self-other 
balance that is regarded to be inherent in Level 2 reasoning 
(Gilligan, 1982). These observations parallel Söchting’s (1996) 
findings, based on the measurement of projected interpersonal 
functioning, leading her to suggest that “perhaps the process of 
being there for others can also be so gratifying, especially for 
Level 2 persons, that they do not consciously experience their own 
exclusion in the self-other balance” (p. 63).  
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8.1.3 Second transition – selfishness reappears 
The second transition, from goodness to truth about relationships, 
will be explored here in terms of self-assertion. This viewpoint 
leans on the findings that women’s androgyny was positively 
related to levels of care reasoning at both pre-and post-interviews. 
As reported earlier, correlations between androgyny scores and 
care reasoning for women were significant (see Table 8, p. 130). 
In addition, on the second round, masculinity scores were also 
positively related to women’s care reasoning, and women at the 
Level 3 were more androgynous than others. Given that 
masculinity contributes to women’s androgyny, these findings 
underscore the point that masculinity, in terms of the BSRI items 
is critical for understanding women’s advances in care reasoning 
in this study. Due to a severe criticism raised against the validity 
of the BSRI, the masculinity scale is however interpreted to 
represent instrumentality and assertiveness and the femininity 
scale is interpreted to represent expressiveness (Hoffman & 
Borders, 2001), rather than representing valid gender roles in 
Finnish society. 
Given that women generally rated themselves as defending 
their own beliefs, having a strong personality, being independent, 
assertive, forceful and willing to take a stand, as well as having 
leadership abilities (means for all those items were more than 5 on 
a 7-point scale), it is not surprising that their self-descriptions 
especially at Levels 2.5 and 3 were filled with somewhat similar 
characterizations.43 In contrast with Gilligan’s (1982) study with 
women of roughly same age 20 years before, her participants were 
portrayed as struggling to seize psychological and social power in 
order to take control of their lives, whereas the present women 
seemed to have already seized this power. As Participant 51, 
refusing self-sacrifice when confronted with such demands in her 
actual dilemma put it:”I took my life into my own hands.” This 
general tendency became evident through women’s reported 
efforts to govern one’s own life, feelings of mastery, and in 
particular, through determined striving after personal goals. “Well, 
                                                     
43The Self-Concept Interview was administered first in the interview 
procedure and the BSRI was filled out after interviews and asked to 
return in some days, so the BSRI could not affect self-descriptions 
participants gave in the interview. The reverse is however possible. 
192 
 
I think I am persistent and diligent… I mean I know what I want. 
And I have to make an effort to get what I want but then I also get 
it” (Participant 40). Women often considered these capacities to be 
outcomes of personal growth in adulthood. 
During the past five years, there have been quite a lot of crises 
to go through. They have made me grow a lot. Also moving from 
the North here to the South has also been educational, it has 
made me like change. For example, one has to fight for one’s 
rights a lot more. You learn to defend yourself. I guess that is 
a great change. [What do you mean by having to fight for your 
rights?] Well, one is so used to… I think one has this basic 
feature of being awfully nice and then you … wish that things 
would go without too much fighting. So that things go like 
smoothly. Here among the large crowds of people you notice 
that there are so many opinions about these things. You have to 
in a way stand up to make your own voice hear. And not give 
in to the things the masses want. 
(Participant 33, Overall Level 3) 
In my mind I have at least this quite strong personality, I have 
like this strong self-esteem. And I am adult-like. Of course at 
this age one is an adult, one has seen and been through so many 
thins, and that must also made one stronger. I trust my own 
capacities and doings. What I start to do, I know that - or I 
have this solid confidence that I can do anything (laughter). 
Whatever I want and feel motivated for… And well, then in many 
jobs, projects and family, one lives as the female and (is) the 
one to bear the responsibility and the one taking care of 
things. And so in that sense too one gets that adulthood. 
(Participant 26, Overall Level 3) 
The second transition in care development (Level 2.5) means 
that the person starts to question the conventional goodness of 
protecting others at her/his own expense, leading to the re-
evaluation of the relationship between self and other. Questioning 
self-sacrifice makes self-concern reappear, as the person begins to 
ask whether it is selfish or responsible to include one’s own needs 
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into the concept of a caring person. The emerging new sense of 
responsibility places emphasis on personal honesty (Skoe, 1993.) 
Consistent with this view, women being scored at Levels 2.5 and 3 
often remarked that they have grown more selfish and that change 
was prompted or realized by life crises such as divorce or starting 
studies. Many women also noted that they did not find their 
previous life through others satisfying any more, which 
transformed their family relationships and work roles. 
[You said that you need to put on an act that… has this (change) 
something to do with other people?] Yeah, in a way, yes. And 
like things like work. Like I used to think it was wonderful 
when people kept asking all kinds of things, and now I just 
couldn’t care less. I tell them to ask someone else, that I like do 
not – I in a way… I used to live for other people a lot. [For 
other people?] Yes, I always tried to help others, and do as 
much as I could to sort out their business, and all that. I do no 
longer do that. I take responsibility for my own life. 
 (Participant 30, Overall Level 2.5) 
[If you think about the changes that have taken place in you over 
the past five years, what would you say?] I have become more 
selfish. I think considerably more about myself than I did five 
years ago. Somehow I used to like live through other people. I 
did not so much think what there was for me in what I did, but 
what other people got out of what I did, and thereby what I got. 
It is a good thing to (see) what one wants and not to live through 
other people. [How does that show in your life?] Well, I take 
decisions much more easily in respect of myself. I can decide 
the things, and like on my own grounds.  I did not motivate 
them to others, asking if they accept or not. If they don’t accept, 
it is their concern. It is not like you can be so selfish in every 
matter (but) (I) have my own life, work, studies and the like. 
(Participant 23, Overall Level 3) 
To further illuminate the complexity of self-concept, the 
subsequent quotation comes from a woman who was scored at 
Level 3 in care reasoning and also showed postconventional 
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justice reasoning at both pre- and postinterviews. She does not 
seem to be troubled with the problem of self-sacrifice any more, 
but instead is searching for truth that cannot derived from the 
absolute moral judgments. The discovering of this gray area has 
been regarded to denote passing the second transition (Gilligan, 
1982). 
What would I say about myself and what am I like? I have a bad 
mouth, that’s for sure. I am like… I shoot out truths, my truths 
which are not necessarily other people’s… Some people want to 
see so much good. And then there are these negative people who 
want to see so much bad. What I would like to find is the real 
truth, like that line in the middle. That things are neither this 
nor that. But then there is so much of everything… In certain 
situations I am really courageous and can be in command. 
But deep down I am afraid and have to, in a way, think over and 
consider things, and I get awfully easily anxious about 
injustice. They are also something I am afraid of, and there I 
am really sensitive… [If you think about the changes that have 
taken place in you over the past five years?] Maybe these. As I 
was saying that… Over the past five years my life has in a way 
cleared up. So that I have found good things. Things I really 
enjoy. And through them I have learned to have confidence 
in myself and to know… Or I think, I hope that I can do such 
things and see things in that way so that I feel like good about 
myself. 
 (Participant 21, Overall Level 3) 
This self-description is also illuminating in the sense that it 
illustrates a separate self-concept, lacking direct reflection on 
relationships. As reported earlier, separate self-concept was found 
to be frequent among participants and women at the highest levels. 
For many participants, reaching the highest level of care seems to 
be associated with the process of individuation rather than staying 
connected with others.  
To summarize, the theme of self-sacrifice seems to be 
essential for women’s self-reflection on their development. This 
self-reflective component further suggests that care development 
represents soft stage rather than hard stage development (Kohlberg 
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& al., 1983). If care development consisted of hard stages in the 
Kohlbergian sense, the individual should largely be unaware of it, 
which was not the case in this study. 
8.1.4 Assertiveness in care reasoning 
Consistent with significant correlations between women’s 
androgyny scores and levels of care, the theme of self-assertion 
was also evident in their high-level responses to hypothetical care 
dilemmas. They expected that protagonists would defend their 
own needs and opinions across all dilemmas. For example, Lisa, 
the protagonist in the unplanned pregnancy dilemma, was 
expected to be self-reliant and capable of taking care of her baby 
and herself, as well as capable of autonomous decision-making. 
She will probably be thinking that she cannot continue this 
relationship because this man is married, unless she wants to 
break up this marriage which this man is probably involved in. 
But this fact of being pregnant, one never knows, it might be the 
chance of her life. It is not like people did not have and raise 
children alone in the past too. That is not the end of 
everything. But if she decides to abort, it might be that she 
would also suffer from that idea. She should receive that child 
and see what comes along… [So you do not think abortion 
would be a good solution?] No. This does not tell, though, what 
this Lisa would think herself but you can also live in situations 
like this, especially a woman can (laughter). She is very 
talented in taking care of many things at the same time… 
This does not tell anything about the background, what this man 
wants and what Lisa wants.  [What would you like to know about 
it?] Well, does that man want to be…, does he, for example, 
want to recognize the paternity of the child. On the other hand, 
that has no importance. Even if he did not want, I believe that 
Lisa would cope with this child. She would not have to pay any 
attention to this man… So that if the man wanted to keep it 
secret and make an abortion and tell nobody. However, in my 
mind Lisa herself should think what she wants to do and then 
really make the decision, irrespective of the man, in that 
situation.             (Participant 24, Care Level 2.5) 
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Women’s responses were sometimes toned by so strong self-
assertion that it was difficult to sort out whether their 
considerations eventually reflected Level 2.5 or lower levels, 1.5 
or even 1. This was especially the case for the care for a parent 
dilemma, as self-assertive statements were about to mask a 
participant’s understanding of connection in relationships as “a 
two-way street” that is typical of higher level reasoning (Skoe, 
1993, p. 19). By contrast, men’s responses at the highest levels 
tended to lack equally strong need for self-assertion.44 This made 
their considerations sound more tolerant, as they also showed 
flexibility to take a parent in on the temporary basis. A male 
participant scored Level 2.5 provides an example of this relative 
easiness to handle a situation, by switching it to a test that might 
reveal truth about the relationship between a son and a father. 
Initially he objected taking a father in by saying: “Tomi needs to 
listen to himself. Perhaps a little to his father, too, but above all to 
himself” but then reconsidered that living together might be worth 
trying. 
[What would be the benefit?] Well, it says here that he (the 
father) would like to live with Tomi so he (the father) would at 
least learn if that could be rewarding. Is there a benefit? It is 
nice if he wants to move in. Tomi would also think, OK, let’s 
please Dad, let him come in for a while. He will see soon that 
                                                     
44This does not mean that men’s responses lacked assertion. At Time 
2, participants at Level 3 were more masculine than others across gender. 
Women’s verbalized assertion was however more striking, especially on 
the care for a parent dilemma. It has been widely argued that a 
relationship between a daughter and a mother is closer than that between 
a son and a father (e.g., Chodorow, 1978) and as a consequence, 
individuation process is more difficult for daughters. As one female 
participant reflected upon this dilemma: “The daughter might have the 
feeling that should I like do this for my own mother’s sake. Because my 
mother is lonely.  [What do you think, how does Tiina feel about that 
situation?]  It would be terrible. [What would be so terrible about it?] 
Well this thing, when I think that Tiina is so sure that she will not have 
her mother there and then how she would then break it to the mother. 
Whatever the way she tells it to her, the result is sure to be that the 
mother gets angry and is very hurt. And she would go like ‘I have taken 
care of you, and now I am left alone.’ Like using pity and stuff. For that 
reason I think it is quite a difficult situation.”(Participant 29B).  
  
 
197 
this will not work out. Anyway there would be an advantage 
to it.  Either in the sense that they would not see each other 
even that much, or then they would see each other more 
often. 
(Participant 48A, Level 2.5) 
Notably, women at Level 3 obtained higher masculinity and 
androgyny scores than women at other levels at Time 2. As a 
matter of fact, their mean for androgyny scores at Level 3 was 
negative, indicating somewhat gender-reversed role rather than 
androgyny with balanced femininity and masculinity. According 
to the ECI manual, the person at Level 3 may at times appear 
similar to Levels 1, and Levels 1.5, because of self-assertiveness 
and unwillingness to sacrifice self, even if she/he is also capable 
of considering other points of view and assessing the situation 
from various angles (Skoe, 1993). This seems to be the case for 
many female participants in this study. Even though they included 
both self and others into the compass of care, they still continued 
to defend their own needs, making their considerations to sound 
very decisive.  
So I think it goes like this: Marja has like noticed that her 
husband is demanding, selfish and insensitive and that he isn’t 
interested in needs and feelings, and she has tried to talk about it 
but is rejected. And then, there’s nothing to it, there is this social 
worker, Seppo, single, a free person, so Marja could just tell to 
her husband that this isn’t working and like, this is the plan 
now, there’s this Seppo in the picture and that I have like 
been thinking that I start to live with him. This is what I think, 
that it is right that you say to the other that this is how things are 
and then you start the other relationship, its’ better than leaving 
him behind his back. That’s cheating. But it’s not cheating if you 
tell about it. [Why is that not cheating?] It’s not cheating 
because, like, the other is informed about the situation. What 
the one doesn’t want and what the other does want. And if 
you want to, then you can try to influence it when you get the 
chance. So that you also give the other person a chance to think 
a little about his values and attitudes… [Do you think Marja can 
here do what she pleases?] Of course. Marja needs to do what 
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she thinks is the best thing to do, but so that she also gives a 
chance to her husband, so that she tells him about the situation. 
And at least, like, in my mind, when they go back so many years 
together, and two kids too, and all that, so the other needs to 
know about the intentions and objectives.45  
 (Participant 20B, Level 3) 
The theme of assertion was also apparent in real-life moral 
conflicts that the women at Level 3 reported. Half of those 
dilemmas (5 out of 10) involved a situation where the 
respondent’s values related to caring or other’s welfare were 
violated or threatened by the surrounding people, often by 
colleagues or superiors, and as a consequence, some of them 
engaged in assertive tactics to defend their viewpoints. In the 
following passage, the participant working in a kindergarten felt 
that her values of the child-centered approach were violated by the 
management, who prohibited children from taking their own 
candy to a trip. 
Then of course we had already talked with the children about 
these things, and then I had to take up the phone and discuss 
what to do then… I asked our boss for grounds for making this 
kind of decision. I then said and told her what we had agreed. 
The grounds were the following…  I said that at least I won’t 
any longer go along with that and take back my words just 
because you have decided (that) it’s like that the day-care 
(centre) offers the candy (during the trip). It’s not that we could 
not eat your candy, too, but I won’t any longer go back on my 
words. It’s really contradictory if I at this point start to say (that 
no). And then I said that it’s my opinion that the children need 
to, like, get oriented to this trip and think what to do and what to 
buy to take with them…  [How do you know that you have done 
the right thing?] I know it because I feel that it was right. And 
also if I had gone to the children and told them and the parents 
that listen now, you can’t take the candy after all. – “Sorry, this 
comes from upstairs, so that’s it” – I think that would have been 
(wrong) to me, too. I think it is so wrong from the start, this 
                                                     
45It is worth noting that the excerpt does not cover the aspects of 
sensitivity to needs evident on the response as well. 
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whole business… I think it is, like, important for the children 
that they get oriented with their bag of candy, like now we are 
off, and I have chosen these (candies). They have started to think 
about it, this thinking process has started.  It’s the only thing for 
them, here, for them to take.  
 (Participant 68B) 
To summarize so far, the quotations above aim to illustrate 
how women’s assertiveness was associated with their care 
reasoning. These observations are consistent with the present 
statistical findings, as well as Skoe’s (1995) results and her 
conclusion that high-level care reasoning requires “self-assertion, 
knowing what one thinks, and the ability or courage to make self-
chosen decisions in life” (p. 243). Similarly, Skoe’s suggestion 
that it might be necessary for women in particular to overcome the 
stereotyped gender role definition in order to reach a balanced 
concern for the welfare of others and self seems highly relevant to 
the female participants in this study.  
8.1.5 Role-taking on care dilemmas 
Participants’ role-taking on real-life dilemmas was found to be 
positively related to the levels of care reasoning. This relation was 
stronger for men than women (see Table 8, p. 130). This gender 
difference paralleled findings on justice reasoning, as role-taking 
was significantly related to levels of justice reasoning, but only for 
men. Hence, in this study, role-taking was more related to care 
reasoning than justice reasoning, and in general, more related to 
moral reasoning of men than that of women.46 Contribution of 
                                                     
46Even though scoring in the ECI procedure does not explicitly rely 
on measuring role-taking, it seemed to be of relevance to the scoring of 
real-life dilemmas. Role-taking levels 1 (a single point of view is 
provided) and 2 (two or more views, but incompatible with each other, 
are provided) were associated with care reasoning at Levels 1 & 1.5. 
100% (Time 1) and 91% (Time 2) of their responses were scored role-
taking levels 1 or 2.  By contrast, role-taking level 4, indicating full 
reciprocity between the different points of view, was typical of the 
highest care level: 83% (Time 1) and 79% (Time 2) deserved the highest 
scoring 4. Level 2.5 seemed to represent a mixture of role-taking of the 
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role-taking to levels of care reasoning was evident in other 
dilemma responses as well as real-life dilemmas. The lowest level 
of care reasoning is characterized by caring for self in order to 
ensure survival, centering on personal needs and wants (Skoe, 
1993). Accordingly, the lowest care level was often associated 
with the lowest role-taking level. If others’ points of view are even 
mentioned, the person assumes that they are to coincide with her 
own (Chap, 1986). 
[Do you think it could be in any way possible for that mother to 
stay to live with Tiina?] Not really. [Why wouldn’t it be 
possible?] At least I wouldn’t like to have my Mom stay in 
my place for the rest of her life. [Why is that?] I’m sure that 
that would start bugging me sooner or later. Of course I now 
live with my mother but when I am something like – perhaps 
after fifty years I will look for a place of my own. I’ll live there 
on my own or will take some animal. [Does it have any impact 
that his mother says that she is unhappy and lonely?] She 
should take a dog or another animal. Or a man. 
(Participant 14A, Level 1) 
Ingredients of role-taking were usually presented by those 
participants undergoing the first transition. They recognized that 
there might be also other points of view, provided by other 
persons within the dilemma, in addition to that of the protagonist, 
                                                                                                            
highest level 4 and 3 (the one character/viewpoint tries to understand 
another, but not vice versa). 80% (Time 1) and 100% (Time 2) of their 
responses at Level 2.5 indicated either level of higher role-taking. 
Finally, Care Level 2 was mostly associated with higher role-taking 
levels (70% for Time 1 and 79% for Time 2), but nevertheless covered 
lower role-taking levels as well.  A further exploration of Care Level 2 
dilemmas deserving lower role-taking levels revealed that they included 
conflicts where participants were guided by some internal moral 
principle or external rule of caring without paying attention to others’ 
point of view (Level 1) or  without trying to understand them even 
though recognizing them (Level 2). For example, one respondent had a 
dilemma, how to treat those prisoners who did not want to return into the 
cell for the night, causing a threat to the general safety of the prison and 
other prisoners, without considering offending prisoners’ point of view 
(Level 1). 
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but in the end they turned back to the needs of the protagonist. 
Participant 66 exemplified such deficient role-taking with her real-
life dilemma at the first interview. She was caught in a conflict 
whether to interfere with her friends’ experiments with drugs in 
order to help them, which involved the risk of losing their 
friendship. Finally she gave up her intentions of helping, with the 
justification that her friends are “sensible adults” after all. 
Well, that’s what I am thinking of, that is it right or wrong for 
me to interfere and say something. Like, if I say one way, then 
I will get this terrible yelling and complaining at my face. And 
then on the other hand, it seems like right that I think about 
them and it would be wrong that I mess with their life. Or 
that would be the sort of thing that would come out of it, and that 
could even mean a break so that… […Have you been in such a 
situation, so that you have been thinking whether you should 
interfere with some people’s…?] Yeah, I have. Like X, for 
example, well, we very like really close and then she started to 
mix with this wrong crowd… And then I started to notice that 
she starts to go somewhere, like with some really weird (people) 
with needles quite and… So I started thinking if I should start 
nagging. Maybe I have sometimes thought whether I did 
wrong there, that perhaps I should have nagged. Since now 
we have no contact. And now I can be really cold about that 
and say that I don’t even care. And you can see really clearly 
that she (friend) has gone down, like so down. [… Do you 
think you have done wrong there that you did not interfere?] 
Yes, maybe I have. Yeah. [How do you know that you have done 
wrong?] If you think, like if we were quite close so I could still 
have influenced it somehow. Yes. [Influenced what?] Well, like 
saying that c’mon. Like forget that and blah blah blah… I mean 
I should have at that point but.  For example, like now, if I see 
some… friends of mine who take that sort of thing (drugs). I 
really couldn’t care less. Because they know themselves what 
they up to, so do I have to mother them. They will soon 
understand when they are lying in the gutters somewhere.  
 (Participant 65A, Level 1.5) 
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Two years later, this participant again reported the same 
dilemma, but now from the Care Level 2 perspective. Her 
justifications for helping the friend (whom she mentioned in the 
first interview as”gone really down”) was based on the role-taking 
experience of putting herself into the friend’s place.  
This may sound stupid but I had – or we had, I mean this group 
had – this one friend. She really freaked out or something, like 
she had sent out these so-called emergency signals and many 
just closed their ears. Everyone keeps saying that she is over the 
edge and things are really bad, and I went along with the mass. 
I concluded that I cannot help either, nor can anyone else… 
If you think about this moment now, you think, gee I was stupid. 
That I should have acted in another way. That this person is in 
her own world. But now I have tried to call her more, and that 
sort of thing, because I left her when everyone else left her. 
[What was your criteria in this situation?] Well, maybe I started 
thinking what the others would think if I now call this person. 
And now that I think that one year has gone, I have grown – 
God, I have been stupid. [So why do you think it would be right 
to be in touch?] Well, I think absolutely already for the fact that 
if she had been a good friend to us all, why should we leave her 
on her own. Let’s say something happens to one of us, of 
course we will be there for him or her. Why on earth could 
we not do the same to this person?... [How would you now act 
in the same situation?] I would absolutely go to this person 
and (say) here I am, I won’t leave you. And in principle, this is 
what has happened too, I have made it. Like she calls and tells 
about her problems but somehow I am double-faced in the sense 
that I can’t always take it. But at least she has someone to talk 
to, among these old friends. But absolutely one should have 
then… [You really mean absolutely?] Yes. Later I started to 
think that what if this happens to me, if I collapse like this, 
will there be anyone for me? Perhaps this person will be 
there for me. So that one should never think of what the others 
might say. Many others have had regrets later, like, gee, I could 
have called or dropped by, like later now. No one forgets these 
things if she was a close friend. [Would there have been 
(earlier) something suggesting that you did the right thing not to 
contact her?] Well, it felt right then. [Can you say why it felt 
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right?] Because I thought that, phew, since nobody else is 
thinking about her, I will neither keep in touch with a crazy 
person like her. 
(Participant 65B, Level 2) 
Hoffman (2000) defines two types of role-taking: imagining 
oneself in the other’s place (self-focused role-taking) and focusing 
directly on the other’s feelings (other-focused role-taking), the 
latter being more cognitively demanding, and obviously more 
advanced in the developmental sense. In a similar vein, Kohlberg 
(1986) has argued that the simple role-reversal (putting oneself in 
another’s shoes, imagining what you would like in the other’s 
place) does not necessarily correspond to actual feelings of others. 
Instead, justice reasoning at the postconventional level is guided 
by respect for persons and more complex role-taking (the second-
order golden rule) that results in the recognition and validation of 
others’ feelings. Other-focused role-taking is equal to 
particularistic thinking that has widely been claimed to be 
pertinent to the ethic of care (e.g., Blum, 1991; Carse, 1998; 
Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988; Noddings, 1984). The distinction 
between two types of role-taking seemed to discriminate levels of 
care in this data as well. The following examples illustrate the two 
types of role-taking. Two participants were confronted with a 
similar type of loyalty dilemma in real life. A good friend betrays 
his girl/boy-friend, and a participant ponders on whether to keep 
quiet or to conceal an affair from that boy/girl friend (who is also a 
good friend of a participant). 
[Why did you think you should tell?] I thought it was the right 
thing to do since it was, after all, wrong against that person, 
thinking what had happened. And I think that person has the 
right to know. And if I think of myself, if that had happened 
to me, I would have liked to know… [Now afterwards thinking 
whether you did the right thing, so how do you.. know that you 
have done the right thing?] I think I did do the right thing since I 
did what my conscience told me to do, and that gave me a kind 
of pure feeling when I had none that. And in the end, things 
turned all right, nothing like that happened. 
(Participant 63A, Level 2) 
204 
 
[How do you know that you did not do the right thing by not 
interfering?] Well, I don’t actually know whether I did do the 
right thing or not… I may have done the right thing as far as I 
am concerned. Let’s say I did not get mixed up with it. On the 
other hand, from the point of view of that boy, it was wrong in 
the sense that he had the wrong idea of things all along. So other 
people knew things about her life which he did not know. But 
then again, I should know whether he would have liked to 
know about it. I mean I can’t know that, can I. Like it may be 
easier for him not to know. I have not figured that out. It is a 
very tricky one. 
(Participant 1A, Level 2.5) 
In the latter example, the participant’s care reasoning is 
characterized by cautious contextual reflectivity which was 
pertinent to care reasoning at the highest levels.47 Resembling 
Gilligan’s (1982) description of women, who were alarmed when 
asked to supply information about hypothetical dilemmas, many 
mature care reasoners complained that they did not know enough 
about the characteristics and intentions of the persons on a given 
dilemma. Instead of projecting themselves into the place of the 
protagonist they tried to figure out the particularities of persons by 
asking for further information or imagining different alternatives. 
In other-focused role-taking, responding can also be enhanced by 
personal information about another person’s character and 
condition, as well as any normative knowledge of how most 
people feel in a similar situation (Hoffman, 2000). 
I wonder whether Tomi should first find out why the contact is 
not so close, why is that. Since the father is lonely too and… 
maybe this is the father’s cry for help for saying that he is 
not happy and all that.  In order for the two of them to be 
happy – that is something to start from – I think Tomi should 
really find out why they are not so close to each other and 
that if they could be closer, would the father still like to move in 
                                                     
47This participant was scored Justice Stage 3/4 on the MJI dilemmas, 
thus suggesting that sensitivity to particularities was not derived from the 
constructs of postconventional justice reasoning but eventually from care 
reasoning.  
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to live with him. Or could they have some shared interest… 
drink lukewarm Tequila in the evening and listen to old Finnish 
dance music, say at the summer cottage. Like.. those would be 
the kind of things he should find out. 
 (Participant 56B, Level 3) 
Getting to know the particularities of persons seemed to be 
particularly important to the male respondents at the highest care 
levels who also showed postconventional justice reasoning. The 
preceding quotation came from a participant with WAS scores of 
460 at both times, showing sensitivity to the particularities of 
persons across all dilemmas. On the marital fidelity dilemma he 
questions whether the protagonist’s perception of his wife is 
correct. He further recommends communication as a means to get 
to know what kind of person a wife really is, as well as to improve 
the relationship. 
[Do you see the alternative for this Erkki to keep up this 
marriage?] Well, of course. Naturally there is that alternative. 
And that would be the best alternative, like finding a new 
happiness with the old wife, like that things would start suddenly 
going smoothly. Because many things are of course due to 
communication problems. But it is also true that there are 
these simply nasty persons. As for Erkki, I know that… It would 
naturally be the best alternative. [In your mind, what would be 
done to that end in this situation?] Well, precisely, whatever 
means this Erkki has, how can he sort things with his wife, 
like, is the wife really like that and does she want to be a 
person like that.. what Erkki sees her like. I mean, you have to 
get that thing cleared out first. And of course talking is the 
main thing there but whether that is with a marriage counselor 
or someone else, or even just them face to face… going on a 
holiday and quarrelling on some beach or any other alternatives 
there might be. But that is what needs to be cleared first so that 
he knows.  Because it can also be due to the fact that the wife 
is unh… like this because Erkki works all the and never 
brings her roses and.. spend real holidays. All they do is go to 
Tampere and visit some amusement part during the summer 
holidays, they never go to Lanzarote... Perhaps it is about such 
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things, since Marja is unhappy too. Perhaps she would like to 
have a job. 
(Participant 56B, Level 3) 
The next quotation from another participant at Level 3 
emphasizes the significance of communication as well. He strives 
for mapping the viewpoints of all claimants, by suggesting 
communication between all. In addition, typically for Level 3 
reasoning, even though he sees the protagonist as being 
responsible for handling a situation, he nevertheless resists self-
sacrificing solutions. 
[What do you think this Sami should do?] Certain arrangements. 
[Arrangements? What kind of arrangements would Sami do?] 
Well, first he should clear it with these women of his what kinds 
of arrangements they would be prepared to accept. That is, he 
should be honest here and patient and try to avoid.. or try 
not to abandon any of these three… Because that would 
cause.. great emotional suffering I think. To Sami, too, 
naturally to Sami too but in every case to all these people. So 
the easiest way out is not to leave anyone completely out in 
this case which, however, concerns that person too. These 
things easily turn out the way that some parties can talk it 
out together and one is left alone to deal with it. [So you 
think.. that Sami should sort this out with all of them, that is, 
with these two women?] Yes, and with himself too, to decide 
what he wants to do. There are many alternatives here, not all 
of them the usual ones, like living with two women and with the 
child of one of them… That might not work out so easily. 
[What?]. Well, the fact that this Sami is married with the wife 
and they would live all four together. [Would you, however, 
think that it would be a… feasible alternative among others?] 
Oh yes. Or I do not have any experience with these (matters) 
but… I am (looking at) this from the point of view of an 
outsider. When you look at it, it would probably not be a very 
happy solution due to the human characteristics.  It would 
hardly be realized either. […To what extent should Sami take 
these women into consideration, also in comparison to 
himself?…] Well, of course no.. not at the expense of his mental 
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health or other health, he should not get stuck with any of these 
situations. Like just because one is the mother of his child or 
anything. This being married.. with another woman is not, in 
my mind, as binding as the other (thing) which binds Sami, 
the fact that this other woman is the mother of his child, but 
– This is also an aspect that can be agreed upon with these two 
women, like also legally, and then he can lead the rest of his life 
as a single. Of course Sami would then have to pay a certain 
price. But this need not be like a sentence for Sami as 
concerns his own life. [You also said that in your mind, Sami 
would have more commitments towards this woman who is 
pregnant as compared to the wife?] Yes, more than anything 
towards that child… I don’t consider marriage to be more than 
an institution, or how do you put it nicely. It really does not 
represent anything.. great in this dimension we are here talking 
about. 
 (Participant 46B, Level 3) 
It is worth noting that this participant recognizes the unborn 
baby as a claimant too, so he also seems to overcome the here-
and-now bias in empathy (Hoffman, 2000). Moreover, typically 
for care reasoning at the highest level, he does not suggest one 
definite solution to the dilemma but considers many alternatives. I 
interpret this to be due to that participants at Level 3 tend to 
employ other-focused role-taking strategies (cf. Kohlberg, 1986) 
Because they do not project themselves into the protagonist’s 
place, they tend to remain uncertain about the particularities of 
hypothetical persons, and as a result show flexibility with regard 
to solutions, depending on the context imagined. Kohlberg and his 
associates (1983, 1990) also maintain that in actual moral 
conflicts, reversible role-taking cannot be based on “monological” 
interpretation of perspectives of self and others, but requires 
dialogue and social participation. These notions are relevant to the 
present participants at Care Level 3, because 24% (Time 1) and 
35% (Time 2) of them were also scored as postconventional 
Justice Stage 4/5 and accordingly, they showed similar patterns of 
role-taking across care and justice dilemmas. The next excerpt 
from the mercy killing comes from the Participant 46 quoted 
above. Through role-taking he judges the woman’s claim heavier 
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than that of the husband’s. In addition, even though he sees the 
ultimate decision lying in the woman’s hands, he nevertheless 
points out that the possibility for communication must be 
guaranteed for family members. 
[Do you think this woman has the right to take the final 
decision?] Well, there is no mention here about her close ones, 
who should also be involved but not in the sense but so that they 
could see her then, they should be able to see her when still 
alive. [So this woman is married. Should the husband have some 
role in the decision-making and if yes, what role?] Yes. But the 
husband’s rights are not sufficient either to demand that 
these really terrible pains should go on by keeping her alive. 
But this Doctor Miettinen, he can’t act on his own. Like he needs 
to talk it over with these family members who of course can at 
that point file a police report and interfere with what is going 
on. But in my mind this Miettinen must not act so that one day he 
just informs the woman’s husband that now she is dead. The 
husband and the other family can say their last words to her 
when she is still alive. 
 (Participant 46B) 
To summarize, this study provides evidence that advanced 
role-taking is characteristic for participants at Level 3 and 
postconventional justice reasoners in particular. This analysis is 
compatible with Kohlberg et al.’s (1983) assertion that care and 
justice reasoning are integrated at the postconventional level of 
justice reasoning. It seems obvious that complex role-taking skills 
required at the postconventional level of justice reasoning provide 
adequate tools to handle care dilemmas as well, and the other way 
around. In contrast with the interpretation that postconventional 
moral decision-making is solitary and free of personal constraints 
(Linn, 1996), present participants’ role-taking process relied on 
honest communication between persons involved in a conflict at 
hand. Notably, participants at Level 3 and women at Justice Stage 
4/5 obtained higher scores in emotional empathy and emotional 
empathy was positively related to care reasoning on real-life 
dilemmas (r(53) = .35, p < .01) at the second time of testing. 
Hence, both emotional empathy and role-taking seem to contribute 
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to the sensitivity to particularities of persons inherent in highly 
developed care reasoning. 
8.2 Care reasoning in the context of justice 
reasoning 
8.2.1 Justice reasoning on hypothetical care 
dilemmas 
As the starting point of this study, the ECI was considered as a 
validated measure of care-based reasoning (Skoe, 1998). 
Accordingly, the scoring of hypothetical care dilemmas did not 
present remarkable difficulties, so that the features of dilemma 
content could be matched with the descriptions in the ECI scoring 
manual. Still, some questions emerged in the process of data 
analysis, due to the peculiar characteristics of this sample. First, 
even though there was no empirical basis to assume that law 
enforcement students are deficient in care reasoning, their high 
scoring was nevertheless in a surprising conflict with the 
prevailing view of chauvinist police officers (Hiltunen, 1999) and 
Gilligan’s (1982) arguable position that men focus on justice at the 
expense of care. The statistical analyses suggested that the key to 
their high performance was advanced role-taking that has been 
regarded as a crucial element in justice reasoning (Kohlberg, 
1984). Moreover, Kohlberg et al. (1983) have argued that 
“dilemma situations involving such special relationships can be 
handled by a universalistic justice ethic of respect for persons or 
rules and with the concepts of reciprocity and contract” (p. 20). It 
is conceivable that the ECI dilemmas can be conceptualized from 
the justice perspective as well, as they implicitly include 
conflicting rights. For example, the moral problem whether the 
young woman/man ought to take a lonely parent to live with 
her/him can easily be considered a justice dilemma in Finnish 
society, because caring for elderly does not necessitate living 
together, due to societal arrangements through social services and 
health care. 
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The haunting question emerging at this point was that whether 
the men, mainly prospective police officers in this study, actually 
solved care dilemmas through justice reasoning. Postconventional 
male participants’ responses conveyed signs of particularistic 
thinking that are common to the ethic of care and the ethic of 
justice at the postconventional level. Both share the moral 
imperative that other persons ought to be treated as ends 
themselves, the ethic of care seeing the other person in 
relationship to self and others and the ethic of justice seeing the 
person relating to others through agreement and mutual respect 
(Kohlberg & al., 1983). In addition, contrasted with justice 
reasoning, contributions of role-taking to care reasoning have been 
considered more doubtful. Putting oneself in another’s place may 
be simple projection of one’s own viewpoint (Gilligan, 1982) and 
role-taking with several people may compromise responsiveness 
inherent in care reasoning (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). Therefore 
investigating justice thinking with care dilemmas seemed 
warranted. For this purpose, the frequency of participants making 
justice-based arguments at least on one hypothetical care dilemma 
was calculated. The words duty/obligation and right(s) and 
references to laws and contracts were taken as indicators of 
justice-based arguing. Additionally, the word undeserved that 
emerged in law enforcement students’ interviews was considered 
to represent justice reasoning. Explicit statements of reciprocity 
were also counted, if participants invoked them spontaneously. 
(There was an occasional probe question, such as whether a child 
has a duty to help her/his parent).48 
The analysis revealed that 48% of women and 47% of men 
used justice-based arguments at least once on the first round of 
interviews, the proportion being roughly similar across 
educational subgroups. On the second round, 44% of women and 
50% of men generated justice-based argument(s). Among women, 
social work students voiced them more (56%) and practical 
nursing students less (30%). Justice judgments were most 
frequently elicited by the care for a parent dilemma, followed by 
the marital fidelity dilemma. It also appeared that men generated 
                                                     
48Initially, I scored several care dilemmas according to Lyons’s 
(1983) procedure. Dilemmas pulled strongly for care orientation, so that 
using that classification did not seem relevant. 
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less justice reasoning with the unplanned pregnancy and marital 
fidelity dilemmas than women, whereas the care for a parent 
dilemma elicited considerations of duties and rights among both 
genders.  
Justice-based arguments were given for different reasons. It 
seemed that at the levels of 1.5 and 2, rights were referred to in 
order to restrict the protagonist’s selfish tendencies. For example 
in the unplanned pregnancy dilemma, participants argued that the 
man or his wife has the right to be informed about Liisa’s 
pregnancy, or that the unborn child has the right to have both 
parents. Participants at the highest levels of development voiced 
rights-based arguments in favor of the protagonist, such as she/he 
has the right to have a happy life, or to make autonomous 
decisions about their lives. On the marital fidelity dilemma, 
women tended to argue that Marja (Betty), having only one life, 
has the right to personal happiness, whereas men remarked that 
excessive suffering, that is, being desperate and “tortured” in an 
unhappy marriage for years, even for the sake of the children’s 
welfare, might be “a bit” too unfair or undeserved. Participants at 
the highest levels also often argued that a child has no official duty 
or obligation to take care of her/his father, whereas participants at 
the conventional or self-oriented levels hardly made any explicit 
references to duties at this point.  
Justice-based arguments, even though evoked by almost half 
of the participants, did not occur across all dilemmas. Only two 
participants (Time 2) argued predominantly from the justice 
perspective across all three dilemmas. One of them emphasized 
fairness as a procedure of solving moral conflicts, and another 
emphasized the duty to take care of dependent ones. Both were 
Stage 4 justice reasoners. In general, it seemed that justice-based 
judgments complemented care reasoning, rather than providing an 
alternative framework for problem-solving. This complementary 
role was perceived in the way participants nevertheless focused on 
the dynamics of relationship. As an example, Participant 50 at 
Level 3, being capable of distinguishing the needs of self and 
others, critically points out that Tomi does not have any duty to 
provide housing for his father, but recommends doing that on a 
temporary basis in order to restore the relationship. 
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[What do you think Tomi should do?] Well, in this situation he 
should perhaps talk man-to-man and see what it is all about. 
Of course the father might want to live with Tomi but if Tomi 
preferred to live alone and he has his own life at this point… [So 
you think it is important to discuss it?] Yes, it is very important 
at this point. And there must be some reasons for the father to 
come behind his son’s door at that point, so they should both 
try to understand each other. So if the situation is like that 
the father needs help or needs someone, then also Tomi 
should take time to understand his father. [So you think that 
even if Tomi wanted to live alone or independently, he cannot 
just turn the father away from his door?] Of course he can turn 
him away, what keeps him from doing that. He is not obliged to 
provide for the father or accommodate him.… One would 
imagine that the father and the son would talk that much 
with each other that they would come to the core of this 
situation and think about it. [Why is it important to come to 
the core of the case?] Well, there is of course the possibility 
that it would mean the end of their relationship. If Tomi tries 
to close the door and the father tries to stop the door with his 
foot, one has to give up in the end. If their relationship means 
anything to them, then they will surely try to sort it out.  
(Participant 50A, Care Level 3) 
Especially powerful justice arguments were mostly expressed 
at the transitional Level 2.5, which is compatible with Gilligan’s 
view (1982) that self-sacrificing ethic inherent in Level 2 is 
transformed through recognizing one’s own rights. Participant 45 
provided an example of such a justice-driven transition. When 
reflecting upon the marital fidelity dilemma, he proposed that 
Erkki have a relationship with his lover and stay married, 
justifying it by the argument that the relationship between Erkki 
and Marja is unfair, as Marja is not doing her own part in the 
relationship.49 
                                                     
49This participant was another of the two participants who had 
achieved the postconventional justice transition before entering the 
postconformist care transition. As reported earlier, the reverse pattern 
was found for the majority of participants at the postconventional level. 
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Well, I see two alternatives here. I think there is a more or less 
complete dead end here. I mean whether Erkki is going to 
divorce his wife, and then how many persons are going to be 
hurt through that divorce. So he would have the children. The 
mother would most probably get the children. Or then, would he 
then just have this Maarit to cheer him up… like lead a double 
life with this Maarit. And if Maarit knows that Erkki has a wife 
and she would give the chance for Erkki to lead this double life. 
I think this text too describes the situation that Erkki and Marja 
have done talking, that he has surely tried to discuss things with 
the wife.  Now it is up to Erkki to decide what he will count on, 
will he let himself be unhappy and live only for the good of 
the family or should he live a little for himself, too. So that if 
the wife is like described in this text, I think the wife is hurting 
Erkki all the time through her behavior. So Erkki is trying to 
console himself a little with Maarit, and in this case I think that 
it is not so wrong after all. So would it be any surprise to the 
wife, if she learned about this, that the man is cheating her. If 
she is such an insensitive cold fool. […Which would in your 
mind be the better solution: the fact that Erkki remains with the 
children and continues this unhappy marriage or that he… 
would divorce?] Well, that’s easy. Neither is a good solution. In 
this case I would not opt for the divorce. [Why?] Well, maybe 
for the children’s sak. [So you think that … if you were Erkki, 
you could stay on for the sake of the children?] Uhm. [.. So as 
you said, you do not find this extra-marital affair to be so 
terribly wrong?] Well, yes, not in the sense – but what gives the 
wife the right… not to be interested in Erkki and his needs 
and to be so insensitive? And why should Erkki then 
consider the wife’s feelings, like what would she think of him 
being unfaithful?… So if Erkki is not to blame, this wife is in a 
way also partly to blame for what is going to happen to them. 
(Participant 45B, Level 2.5) 
As reported earlier, 24% (Time 1) and 35% (Time 2) of 
participants at the highest level of care were also postconventional 
justice reasoners. Consequently, they could be expected to 
generate similar postconventional judgments about care dilemmas 
as well. The most frequent argument that participants at Stage 4/5 
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evoked as a response to the mercy killing dilemma was the 
criterion judgment 29 (Life): “[The doctor should give the woman 
the drug, or the husband should not interfere with the decision] 
because autonomy in making life decisions ought to be respected 
or guaranteed as a fundamental right”, followed by criterion 
judgments 28 and 26. “[The doctor should give the woman the 
drug] because if the quality of life is so low that it doesn’t meet 
minimal criteria for what we mean by human life, then mercy 
killing is not morally wrong” and “[The doctor should give the 
woman the drug] out of respect for the woman’s dignity as a 
person who has judged that a life no longer meaningful to be 
maintained.” These considerations bear relevance to mature care 
reasoning dealing with the issues of the quality of life and one’s 
own responsibility for improving it. Nevertheless, participants 
evoking those judgments on the justice dilemmas did not 
consistently evoke them on the care dilemmas. This might be 
partly due to that systematic probe questions were not addressed to 
the justice concerns on the ECI dilemmas. When participants 
nevertheless expressed those arguments, they were concerned with 
the right of making autonomous moral choices. For example, 
Participant 38, who was struggling with the question, whether 
placing her child in a psychiatric ward violates the child’s 
fundamental rights, raised the theme of moral autonomy across all 
care dilemmas, in addition to the real-life and the mercy killing 
dilemma. When considering the care for a parent dilemma, she 
concludes that there is a general obligation to take care of human 
beings to some extent, but the right of making autonomous 
decisions is a heavier claim.50 
Why is it that you can’t give your mother (marching orders)? 
Your mother, your father or some relative, sister or brother. 
There’s the thing, you’re so close to them, it’s some kind of 
obligation, I think. [Obligation?] Some kind of. What could 
you call it? A common obligation, you’re expected to do it. 
It’s maybe an emotional bond… I suppose Tiina should take 
                                                     
50One explanation for the emergence of justice judgments on care 
dilemmas might be that the mercy killing dilemma, when presented 
before the ECI dilemmas, might have had some priming effect. The 
check of dilemma order in the procedure revealed that there was not such 
priming effect. 
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her mother for the night, but then she has to make it clear that 
the mother cannot stay there. I don’t think parents can totally 
control their child’s life all the time, be a part of it all the time. 
But you can’t show them the door either, directly. You can’t do 
that to anyone. You have to take care of people, all people, 
really. At least your nearest and dearest… [What if a couple 
of weeks go by and the mother still wants to live with Tiina? 
What should Tiina do then?] Weelll… Then Tiina could get a 
little angry already and tell the mother to go. If the mother 
doesn’t have a home to go to, then that complicates things. But 
maybe she should hold her mother’s hand and go to the city 
housing office. Or if she had the money, she could go with the 
mother to rent an apartment. But you’d think that a person of 
Tiina’s age wouldn’t want to live with her mother. I’d say Tiina 
has the right to tell her mother to go.. [On what basis does she 
have the right?] Autonomy, I guess. You have the right to 
decide on your own life. 
(Participant 38A, Level 2.5) 
8.2.2 Care as an imperfect duty of human bonds 
Nunner-Winkler (1984) proposed that the ethic of care and the 
ethic of justice represent different kind of duties. The ethic of 
justice constitutes perfect, negative duties that can be defined as 
not acting, such as not interfering with others’ rights. Those duties 
can be formulated in a way that binds everyone. On the contrary, 
the ethic of care constitutes imperfect, positive duties that do not 
prescribe specific acts, but only formulate a maxim to guide 
action, caring for others. Because imperfect duties require more 
than not acting, in other words, doing something, it is impossible 
to determine completely which amount of caring meets the moral 
criterion. Because this categorization of duties seemed relevant to 
the present interview data, I will present some notions about them 
that might be of interest in terms of theory-building. 
The care for a parent dilemma invoked most duty-based 
considerations in this study. For some respondents, taking a parent 
in on a temporary basis constituted a perfect duty in order to 
guarantee a minimum level of care which is based on the 
reciprocal helping between a child and a parent across the lifespan. 
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On the other hand, there were many respondents who 
acknowledged that caring for a parent is a duty but had difficulties 
in defining what kind of duty it might be.51 
[Why would you have to take the mother in for a while?] Well, 
you have to take care of your family, and so on. If she has this 
kind of problem, then you have to help always. [Does it have to 
do with duty?] Well… I wouldn’t say so. The word duty has a 
negative sense to it. Well, I don’t know… Yes, yes it is a kind of 
a duty. I think you should have the duty to look after your kids 
and on the other hand, if the parents need help when you’re 
grown up, it’s your duty to help them. But in a positive sense, 
like look after them… […What’s a negative duty?] Well, if you 
only see it as an obligation. I’ll do this, because it’s my duty. If 
there’s no feeling involved. That’s when it’s a bad thing… 
[What kind of feeling?] That you care about the other person. 
 (Participant 51B, Level 3) 
As the above quotation illustrates, the participant feels obliged 
to follow the imperfect duties in the circle of the family, but 
further argues that those duties must be validated with appropriate 
feelings of concern. The constant feature appeared to be that the 
sense of care-related obligation was connected to the existence of 
relationships. Following Noddings (1984, p. 86), participants felt 
obliged to care, if there was a possibility of “completion in the 
other”, that is, there was a real or a potential relationship present. 
This was particularly evident on the unplanned pregnancy 
dilemma, when many participants imagined the connection 
between the unborn child and the potential parent, leading to the 
considerations of responsibility involved. 
                                                     
51Considerations implying to the imperfect duties were not counted 
as justice-based duties in the preceding analysis. This was because 
participants were uncertain whether there was really a duty in the proper 
sense involved. They used such expressions as “not really a duty”, “a sort 
of duty”and “positive duty”. 
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 [How important would you say the child is in this?] Well, the 
child is the most important thing in the situation. [Why?] Well, 
as I said earlier, the child is Sami’s child. It’s his flesh and 
blood. And the child needs both parents in my mind, at least 
in the beginning. 
 (Participant 62B, Level 2) 
I’d first recommend an abortion, but if that wasn’t possible, then 
OK, I’d go and see the child. I’d try and be a model for a 
father. Then we’d have to figure out the visitation rights and 
things. You can’t like go and visit the child once a year, like I’m 
your father, hi. Here’s some candy for you, see you. [Why can’t 
you be like that?] It’s against my nature. Then it could be 
anybody’s child, if you only see them like that. It would be 
nice to see them developing and so on. [The children?] Yes. 
But having a child also involves the relationship to the 
mother. The relationship to the child’s mother has to be good. 
It’s almost half of the feeling, when you have made 
something together.  
(Participant 45A, Level 2) 
According to Noddings (1984), the moral imperative to care is 
bound to potential mutual relations. When the relation is absent, 
not yet established or refused, the moral imperative remains 
hypothetical: “I must care, if I wish to (or am able to) move into 
relation” (p. 86). Many men presented this kind of thinking with 
the care for a parent dilemma. They framed the situation as a 
welcome opportunity for the protagonist to re-establish a 
relationship with his father. In general, both genders regarded the 
parent-child relationship as self-evident, whereas considered 
relationships between adults (between the protagonist and the 
husband/wife, lover) in more contractual terms.  
Furthermore, if participants interpreted relationships between 
adults on a dilemma as ended or hopeless, they rapidly shifted 
their focus on the child or children (the unplanned pregnancy and 
marital fidelity dilemmas). This was typical of participants at 
Level 2 and of men in particular, who tended to see the suffering 
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protagonist quite powerless to change the situation, contrary to the 
participants at higher levels. Instead of seeing relationships as a 
two-way street, to which both parts can make contributions, they 
tended to see a protagonist being in a deadlock and then focused 
instead on the children’s welfare. Alternatively, they emphasized 
that a protagonist has to work properly on a conflict, in order to 
learn from it and avoid mistakes in the future.  
Well, there’s this talking again, you should talk. His life 
(Erkki’s) does not improve at all, if you leave a relationship 
unresolved. He has these issues he should talk about with his 
wife. He leaves them unresolved and starts a new relationship, 
and the same issues will come up in the new relationship. [What 
should Erkki talk about with Marja?] Of his own feelings and 
then listen to her feelings, really listen to them with his heart. 
And also, there are all kinds of great places, all kinds of 
counselling where there are professionals who tell you what you 
should talk about.  
(Participant 34A, Level 2). 
Gilligan (1982) argued that care reasoning at Level 2 is based 
on the adoption of socially shared norms and expectations, 
providing women with the ethic of self-sacrifice. Whereas social 
norms do not dictate such ethic for men, the content of care 
reasoning at Level 2 was of particular interest. For example, 
Söchting (1996) observed from her data of Canadian university 
students that there appeared to be dogmatic persons, mainly men, 
tending to refer to external rules and authorities as guidelines for 
behavior rather than consider the actual people involved. They 
tended to be scored at Level 2, even though they did not show 
authentic caring style, because they were not primarily self-
concerned either. Hypothetical care dilemmas in this study did not 
present such scoring problem with men (in fact, some women’s 
responses were difficult to score because of dogmatism).52 Even 
                                                     
52The absence of this problem might be due to that present 
participants were not very dogmatic in justice reasoning either. In terms 
of Kohlberg’s orientations, strict adherence to social norms and laws, 
embedded in the normative order orientation, was infrequent. Initially 
participants were also scored according to the heteronomous (Type 
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though women’s expressions about self-sacrifice were more 
common than those of men, the genders share a similar language 
of responsibilities. 
[You said that Sami should be responsible, why is this 
responsibility so important?] It always takes two to make a 
child. It’s because of the woman. The child is a part of both, 
both the man and the woman. But I think in our society you 
hear a lot about men shirking their responsibility. It is also a 
matter of upbringing, the father is also very important to the 
child. The mother is the most important, but the father is also 
important. I’d say there are too many single mothers in our 
society, fatherless children. And especially for a boy, it’s very 
important. If the boy grows up only with a mother, then he 
misses a father figure. What’s a man, how does a man do 
things. The boy is a bit clueless about that. 
 (Participant 12A, Level 2) 
To summarize this and the previous chapter, the aim was to 
explore how care-oriented the care reasoning measured by the ECI 
eventually was. My conclusion is that the hypothetical care 
dilemmas pulled for care reasoning across gender and field of 
education. Obligations of care were often conceptualized in terms 
of imperfect duties that were validated by feelings of concern and 
willingness to help. However, this “voluntary” acting was seen as 
a necessity for relationships to continue. A bond between a parent 
and child was regarded as the primary caring relationship. 
Furthermore, the role of justice thinking, when it emerged, 
was supplementary to care reasoning for most participants. As 
Kohlberg et al. (1983) noted, considerations of care sometimes 
intruded into the hypothetical justice dilemmas and were used as 
supplements rather than alternatives for justice solutions, this 
                                                                                                            
A)/autonomous (Type B) distinction on the MJI, having the freedom of 
choice and the independency of external authority as critical criterions of 
autonomous thinking. 37% (Time 1) and 39% (Time 2) of them were 
scored Type B that is more frequent than found in the initial U.S. 
longitudinal study, 16-36% of participants representing Type B among 
19-33 years (Colby & al., 1987). Interrater reliability with 16 dilemmas 
was 90%. 
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seemed to be conversely true in this study. Nevertheless, when 
respondents sometimes presented justice-based arguments, it gave 
a special sound to moral reasoning. This was the case for Level 
2.5 arguments especially, as the protagonist’s right of protecting 
their own needs and welfare was defended. The overview suggests 
that participants tended to differentiate the “micromorality” of 
personal relationships from the “macromorality” that focuses on 
the formal structures of society, embedded in roles, laws, 
institutions and general practices (Rest & al., 1999). This further 
indicates that care and justice constitute overlapping yet different 
moral domains. 
8.3 Moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas  
8.3.1 Overall view on findings 
In this chapter, the nature of moral reasoning will be explored in 
the context of real-life reasoning, according to the typology of 
real-life dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1996). Quantitative analyses 
showed that the type of dilemma participants chose to discuss was 
critical for the nature of moral reasoning in many ways. First, 
different types of dilemma elicited different amounts of care and 
justice reasoning. In accordance with the prediction, prosocial 
dilemmas tended to elicit more care-based reasoning than 
antisocial and social pressure types of dilemma, replicating 
previous results (Haviv & Leman, 2002; Wark & Krebs, 1996, 
1997, 2000). Second, some types of dilemma elicited levels of 
moral reasoning consistent with hypothetical dilemmas, whereas 
other types of dilemma elicited lower levels of moral reasoning 
than the hypothetical dilemmas. More specifically, dilemmas 
involving conflicting demands, social pressure and reacting to 
transgression (Time 1) elicited the same level of justice reasoning 
as Kohlbergian dilemmas, whereas dilemmas involving reacting to 
temptations and to the needs of others, as well as reacting to 
transgressions (Time 2) elicited lower reasoning than Kohlbergian 
ones. Hence, the prediction that real-life dilemmas invoke lower 
reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas did not gain unequivocal 
support. Rather, social pressure and conflicting demands types of 
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dilemma tended to elicit homogeneous reasoning with 
hypothetical dilemmas, in line with some previous studies with 
similar type of dilemmas (Linn, 1995, 1996). The effect of the 
type of dilemma on the levels of care reasoning was less evident, 
but still significant at Time 2, when social pressure and conflicting 
demands tended to pull upwards and antisocial dilemmas 
downwards. Moreover, transgression dilemmas elicited lowered 
reasoning than hypothetical care dilemmas (see Table 16, p. 176). 
Finally, the type of dilemma participants chose to discuss as a 
real-life dilemma was related to their moral competence in care 
reasoning. Participants reporting temptation dilemmas obtained 
the lowest scores on the hypothetical care dilemmas on both times 
of interviewing, whereas those reporting social pressure dilemmas 
obtained the highest scores on them at Time 2. In other words, 
real-life concerns about being pressured (to behave against one’s 
identity or values) indicated more advanced care reasoning, 
whereas being troubled with one’s selfish temptations indicated 
the least advanced reasoning. As a matter of fact, the relation 
between competence in care reasoning and the type of a real-life 
dilemma coincide with the scoring procedure of care reasoning 
(Skoe, 1993). According to the manual, at the highest level of care 
(3) “in solving a conflict, the person will follow her/his own inner, 
self-chosen principles rather than the opinions of other” (p. 21) 
and “consider the welfare and effects on several people” (p. 22), as 
was evident with social pressure and conflicting demands 
dilemmas. Dilemmas involving reaction to the needs of others 
seem to be relevant for Level 2: “Conflict arises specially over the 
issue of hurting and others are helped or protected often at the 
expense of self-assertion” (p. 13). In turn, moral struggle centered 
on whether to obey one’s selfish temptations is characteristic for 
Level 1.5 transition: “although there is some concern for other 
people, survival of the self is still the main aim” (p. 10). At Level 
1, real-life reasoning might be characterized by personal pragmatic 
dilemmas, trying to ensure personal happiness and avoiding 
difficulties, which was pertinent to some extent for antisocial 
dilemmas. In this study, however, participants tended to resolve 
their dilemmas against selfish tendencies favoring more prosocial 
solution, resulting in higher than self-oriented scores. 
The aim of the following analysis is to examine the nature of 
moral reasoning across different types of dilemma, and to map 
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potential inducement of moral reasoning within each type of 
dilemma. While this study largely replicates the previous findings 
that moral orientation usage is influenced by the type of dilemma, 
my analysis will focus on more novel findings related to the 
developmental aspects of moral reasoning. In addition, because 
work-related dilemmas reported by law enforcement students 
proved to be a special sub-set of transgression dilemmas, they will 
be discussed in detail in the context of transgression dilemmas. 
8.3.2 Needs of others dilemmas  
Real-life moral conflicts were classified as reacting to the needs of 
others type of dilemma, “if a participant feels conflicted about 
whether or not he or she is responsible for engaging in some 
proactive behavior in another’s behalf and what his or her duties 
are toward the person in question” (Wark & Krebs, 1996, p. 224). 
Needs of others dilemmas were the most frequent type of real-life 
dilemmas at both pre-and postinterviews (32% and 37%), as 
Figure 4 (p. 166) displays. 
Needs of others dilemmas typically involved two persons, a 
participant and another person, and a participant was thinking 
about how to help him/her, or alternatively, what are her/his 
responsibilities towards a person in question. Furthermore, they 
also involved considerations whether and how to respond to needs 
of others at the expense of one’s own needs or interest, raising the 
question of self-sacrifice (see Appendix C). In general, needs of 
others dilemmas invoked judgments of care that was consistent 
with respondents’ competence in care reasoning (measured by the 
ECI). This is conceivable because needs of others dilemmas can 
be regarded as prototypical care dilemmas, pulling strongly for 
care orientation, as found in statistical analyses (see Table 16, p. 
176). On the other hand, participants’ justice reasoning with needs 
of others dilemmas was lower than their actual competence 
(measured by the MJI). This seems to be explainable by the fact 
that needs of others dilemmas focus on the dyadic relationship and 
accordingly, solutions are sufficiently justified by Stage 3 and 3/4 
judgments embedded in interpersonal morality (Wark & Krebs, 
1997). Typical needs of others dilemmas lack multiple claimants 
and larger societal context. The wider sociomoral perspective, in 
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terms of a group membership, of an organization or of the society 
appeared to be irrelevant in the context of the dilemma, and 
consequently, sophisticated justice concepts were unnecessary for 
problem-solving, consistent with Armon’s (1998) observations. 
Well, I was in a situation where I thought my brother needed 
care. But on the other hand, I was strongly on my brother’s side 
and I felt I wronged him when I let outsiders know that he needs 
help. That was a conflict situation. [What was the conflict in the 
situation?] That my brother might get mad at me. And on the 
other hand I felt I had to help. (Stage 3, Form A, Life, CJ #13, 
[Heinz should steal the drug] because he shouldn’t just sit back 
and watch her die, Colby & al., 1987, p. 26). And then again, I 
wasn’t sure whether he really needed help. If I help him, he 
will get mad at me and calls it quits. (Stage 2/3, Form B, 
Contract, CJ #12, [It is important to keep a promise] that you 
will keep your friendship, p. 536). But then I felt it in myself that 
I had to contact an outsider… [How did you know afterwards 
that you had done the right thing?] Because now my brother is 
receiving treatment. That told me that I did the right thing. [Why 
was this hospitalization the right solution?] Because otherwise 
others in my family would have suffered. (Stage 3, Form B, 
Life, CJ #14,[The doctor should give the woman drug] because 
it would be better for the people close to woman to put her out of 
her suffering, p. 305). 
(Participant 22A, Real-life Justice Stage 3, MJI Stage 3/4, Real-
life Care Level 2, ECI Level 2, Moral Orientation 1.00).53 
 
                                                     
53The texts in the brackets refer to the matches on the MJI manual, 
according to which real-life justice scores were calculated (CJ = criterion 
judgment). In the end of the quotation, Real-Life Justice and Care Levels 
are mentioned, as well as the respondent’s scoring on the MJI and the 
ECI. The Moral Orientation score refers to scoring according to Lyons’s 
(1983) coding scheme, yielding scores from 0 (exclusive justice 
orientation) to 1.00 (exclusive care orientation). It is also worth 
reminding that the quotations do not cover all the material the scoring is 
based on, but the scoring, especially concerning care reasoning, has taken 
place in the context of the whole dilemma. 
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Notably, some dilemmas nevertheless elicited judgments 
consistent with the respondents’ competence. They attempted to 
evaluate what the respondent’s responsibilities are towards the 
person in need. Hence, the lowered justice reasoning was not a 
rule across all needs of others dilemmas, because considerations of 
care were sometimes grounded even in postconventional 
judgments, such as acknowledging a responsibility for another 
person’s moral development (Stage 5, Form B, Authority, CJ #31, 
Colby & al., 1987, p. 606) or respecting another as an individual, 
human being (Stage 5, Form B, Authority, CJ #32, p. 607). The 
next quotation demonstrates how the respondent integrates care 
and justice thinking in his work-related dilemma. 
Of course it wasn’t a big moral dilemma, this situation. Just a 
criminal case, where I was involved in the investigations, and I 
had to consider which is the right thing to do, to follow the 
procedure or to follow the victim’s wishes and from their 
starting point, so that they could be as happy as possible. So 
the question is whether to follow bureaucracy, to get the things 
off your own back and they will proceed on their own 
somewhere some time, or that the victims can feel that they’re 
relieved. That they’ve received a small compensation for the 
crime. I came to the conclusion that the latter is more 
important. Our starting point is to make the victims as 
happy and as satisfied as possible with the situation. [Why do 
you think it was the right solution?] Well, I believe that’s what 
the police is here for. We should not be a big institution where 
things just keep churning along, but I believe in helping the 
victims. We’re not social workers either, but the means we have 
in helping, we try and use them to help as much as possible. 
We try to catch the criminals and try and get the 
compensation the plaintiffs want, and we try to see to it that 
the criminals get their punishment. We want to ensure that if 
the victims have some kind of claim for compensation, that they 
have a chance of getting some at some point. Of course we 
want to catch the person (the criminal) and to follow the 
procedure in this. (Stage 5, Form B, Punishment, CJ #53 [The 
doctor should be turned in] because if we can assume a just 
legal system operating, citizens ought to abide by due process as 
provided by that system, Colby & al., 1987, p. 514). These are 
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the things, and we want the victims to feel that someone is in 
charge of their cases and that it’s not lost in the machinery 
[Can you tell us what this case involved?] it was a fraud case, 
with old people, pensioners, war veterans etc. It involves great 
sums of money being cheated from them. [And if you left it at 
that, you think the case would not proceed, is that what you 
think?] Well, of course it will proceed, but there are so many 
ways to do it… The police wants to help recover the funds lost 
to the criminals, to help in realizing the compensation claim if it 
is at all possible, but within legal limits, of course. And there 
is the point that the perpetrator will get the punishment they 
deserve from their crimes. That goes hand in hand. It’s quite 
clear, that if you steal a car once, or if you steal a car a hundred 
times, there is a difference in the perpetrator’s attitude to these 
deeds.  
 (Participant 56B, MJI Stage 4/5, Real-Life Justice Stage 4/5, Real-Life 
Care Level 3, ECI Level 3, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
In addition, the above quotation shows how the participant’s 
caring attitude does not compromise his demand to uphold the 
principles of justice. Following Kohlberg et al. (1983), 
postconventional reasoning seems to provide the non-relative 
context “within which individually varying personal decision-
making take place” (p. 25). This example gives evidence of the 
integration of care and justice at the postconventional level, 
consistent with Kohlberg et al.’s (1983, 1990) conviction.54 
                                                     
54The quotation also exemplifies principle-based care thinking 
typical of higher-level moral reasoning particularly with social pressure 
dilemmas in this study. Moreover, in other parts of interview, this 
respondent emphasized imperfect duties as follows: “Well, it’s that 
commitment, as I said earlier. Doing things to the best of your ability. If 
you have an opportunity, you take it. You don’t take the easy way out, but 
find the easiest way to do the best thing, that’s what I want.” 
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8.3.3 Connected self-concept and needs of others 
The present statistical analyses found that women with connected 
self-concept tended to generate more care-oriented responses than 
women with mixed or separated self-concepts, consistent with the 
prediction. Notably, all but one of their dilemmas were classified 
as needs of others dilemmas, and all but one of their dilemmas 
were scored 100% care oriented. In fact, even though connected 
self-concept was the least frequent mode of self-concept in the 
total sample (17%), it was as common as others (33%) among 
those who reported needs of others dilemmas.55 With regard to 
connected men (n = 3), it is worth pointing out that two of them 
showed a particular concern for care on their police work-related 
dilemmas. (Their dilemmas were not, however, scored as care-
oriented but mixed, because they involved transgression-related 
issues eliciting justice considerations as well). In a nutshell, the 
overview of dilemmas of connected participants was that they 
represented particularly authentic care reasoning.  
To exemplify this “connected” reasoning, a law enforcement 
student told a complex work-related conflict that started as he tried 
to stop an adolescent girl kicking shop windows on his patrol. He 
tried to calm the girl down without success, and then decided to 
take her home. The girl’s mother however refused to take the girl 
in, so he was compelled to take her into the police station 
overnight. This caused a moral dilemma, because he had just 
meant to do good, but ended up hurting her even more. However, 
while considering other alternatives, he did not see any option of 
letting her out on the street, because: “if another outsider sees it, 
then (he or she) will think that we don’t interfere with that kind of 
stuff, so it could give a wrong picture. Like why is the police just 
patrolling and driving round and doing nothing.” 
                                                     
55An one-way ANOVA revealed that needs of others dilemmas 
reported by connected respondents tended to be more care-oriented (n = 
7, M = 0.93, SD = 0.19) than those reported by separated respondents 
(n = 7, M = 0.61, SD = 0.24) or mixed ones, (n = 7, M = 0.68, SD = 
0.28). F(2, 18) = 3.47, p = .053, marginally significant. 
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But I felt bad about it, to have to close such a young… in the 
cell, and then after my night shift I was thinking if she was 
awake… like I have to go and say a few words to her but she 
was sleeping, like so tight, and I though so what the heck. But 
it’s sure that she was left with this (image) of the police, if this 
was the first time for her with the police, to have, like, something 
concrete to do with the police, I think she was left with a really 
bad impression that like these coppers are real dickheads. 
Like, with these… there is no use working with these ever, 
like contribute to their job. (Stage 3, Form C, Contract, CJ 
#12, [Cheating is worse than stealing] because it makes a worse 
impression with others, Colby & al., 1987, p. 819). [Yes. Why do 
you think that this was the impression she was left with?] Well... 
at no point did she give in. She was so persistent, didn’t yield, 
didn’t listen. In the morning I then though I would take a look 
at (her) arm. Like, damn, she must have sore arms. And she is 
bound to have a moral hangover in the morning. I was 
thinking that.. she was so against us in the evening, so I thought 
that in the morning I could say a few words, like when she was 
sober, then talk a little. Tell her things, and perhaps make 
her understand why she ended up here, so that perhaps she 
would then understand. I was left with this feeling that she 
probably did not, in the end, get it. Being so furious, although 
we tried to tell her very calmly what it was all about... [.. You 
said that one could have interfered in some other way?] Well, I 
don’t know how much we should have crawled to take that 
situation.  We did… first open the window and ask what was 
wrong with her and why she would be kicking that window. And 
what we got right away was this burst at our face. We thought 
that, just a minute, now we have to get out of the car and ask 
really what was going on. So what could it be. And then there 
was this, that much came up, that there was probably this 
(situation). That the parents… that the parents were, like, in the 
middle of a divorce, and then it seemed like the mother had 
another man. Well, that must have influenced the relationship 
between the mother and the daughter. But then at one point 
the girl said that she had… a friend that had died or something. 
That whether that would then… that, like, she had then been 
drinking a little, and then she would have had this awful moral 
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hangover. Like that way she would have become… quite 
depressed and then become aggressive, and then this… 
situation was simply – that there was no way she could release. 
She just wanted to get it out of her chest.  
(Participant 58B, Real-life Justice Stage 3/4, MJI Stage 4, Real-life Care 
Level 2, ECI Level 2.5, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
The above quotation highlights the active nature of care 
orientation and its emphasis on communication, which was 
characteristic for the needs of others dilemmas in general. 
Upholding relationships is used as a moral criterion, as the 
respondent anticipates the possibility of the future relationship 
between the girl and police officers. Furthermore, he constantly 
focuses on the feelings of another person and self, which seemed 
to be a distinguishing feature for moral conflicts reported by 
connected participants. 
[What’s to stop you (from divorcing?] I don’t want to hurt 
anyone. Somehow I just care too much, I can’t take his (the 
husband’s) pain (Stage 3, Form A, Life, CJ #13 [Heinz should 
steal a drug even if he doesn’t love his wife] because he should 
still care about her, Colby & al., 1987, p. 26)… [Why is it wrong 
to live so that you could be satisfied yourself?] Well. I don’t 
think it’s wrong, but it’s so – it’s so difficult, for twenty years is 
such a long time, your feelings have become almost symbiotic. 
[Why is it not right that you stay in it? (the marriage)] I cannot 
return feelings that I don’t feel myself. So I think it is 
artificial. And I don’t think that’s right either. (Stage 3, Form 
A, Life, CJ #13, [Heinz should not steal if he doesn’t love his 
wife], because there would not be the same feelings of 
attachment, of there would be no close relationships, p. 75) 
(Participant 16B, Real-life Justice Stage 3, MJI Stage 3/4, Real-life Care 
Level 2, ECI Level 2.5 Moral Orientation 1.00) 
It was characteristic for the moral conflicts reported by the 
connected women that the needs of others and self were bound to 
each other and even intertwined. This indicated difficulties to 
separate self from others that was also evident in the self-concept 
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descriptions. Strikingly, two participants explicitly remarked that 
co-dependency was a personal problem for them. 
Well, it was such a dependent relationship, I didn’t even 
realize how I was treated in it. Like he (the husband) was one 
of those alcoholics. This was the pattern. I always lived with the 
guilt, that I’m the reason for it… So I took it onto myself. “I 
must be a bit strange, because nobody can stand being with me” 
- before I realized that it is his own way of making me feel 
guilty. It is easier for him to act and do things. [If you think of it 
afterwards, did you make the right decision?] When I divorced? 
[Yes.] Yeah. [How did you know that?] I feel so much better. 
 (Participant 29B, Self-Concept Interview) 
It seemed that the easy access to others’ emotional states made 
moral conflicts difficult to solve in a satisfactory way. For 
example, a female participant told that she had made self-sacrifice 
on behalf of her husband’s interests, while they were deciding 
where to settle to live permanently. She was caught by her 
realization that her seemingly right decision turned out to be not so 
right.  
[On the other hand you say that you did the right thing?] Yes. In 
his point of view (the husband’s) [It was right in his point of 
view?] Well, maybe not totally for me... I keep storing up these 
thoughts and I take it out on him and he must suffer from it, 
because I have this, I am fed up with this thing (Stage 3, Form B, 
Life, CJ #12, [The doctor should give the woman the drug] 
because the doctor should be thinking about it from her point of 
view, Colby & al., 1987, p. 12)… [Which do you think is better, 
to take other’s into consideration or to take yourself into 
consideration?] Well, on the other hand, it’s right to take 
yourself into consideration, because... the other person 
affects the matter as well. So that if I don’t pay any attention 
to my needs, and I don’t feel good, then the other person 
does not feel good either. Somehow one should reach a kind  
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of compromise, a solution, where both would feel good at 
least partially. So I can’t give a clear answer of which would be 
the right thing to do. 
(Participant 1B, Real-life Justice Stage 3/4, MJI Stage 4, Real-life Care 
Level 2.5, ECI Level 3, Moral Orientation 1.00) 
To summarize so far, the preceding quotations underscore 
Gilligan’s (1982) claim that the fluidity of self-other-boundaries in 
women renders the others’ feelings and emotional states easily 
accessible, making them prone to respond to the others’ needs 
(Chodorow, 1978). Accordingly, participants with connected self-
concept tended to see a moral conflict arising from relationships, 
showing sensitivity to others’ feelings and needs, and reporting 
personal distress as a consequence of others’ discomfort. They 
also tended to use their feelings and intuitions as an ultimate 
criterion of moral rightness of their solutions. Consequently, one 
might expect that connected participants were more empathic than 
others. This was however not the case, as reported above. (Instead, 
those scored separated obtained the highest scores on the QMEE). 
My suggestion is that their frequent feelings of uneasiness might 
have mitigated their empathic capacities on the whole. Most of 
them were undergoing the 2.5 Level transition, even though they 
tended to reason in conventional terms in real-life conflicts. In 
general, these observations imply that there exists an unusual 
approach to actual moral problems with relating to other people, as 
has previously been described by Gilligan (1982) and Lyons 
(1983, 1990) and according to my interpretation, this approach 
largely reflects the given ideals of care orientation.  
8.3.4 Conflicting demands dilemmas  
A real-life moral conflict was classified as reacting to conflicting 
demands type if the participant was faced with two and more 
people making inconsistent demands on him or her, often with 
implications for their friendship, and she had to decide whom to 
help or whose expectations to fulfil (Wark & Krebs, 1996). 
Additionally, dilemmas involving conflicts between imagined, 
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potential claimants were classified into this category. Conflicting 
demands dilemmas represented the least frequent type of real-life 
at both pre- and postinterviews (11%). Their scarcity is regrettable 
in terms of Kohlberg’s model, because they represented true 
Kohlbergian dilemmas in the sense that they dealt with the 
conflicting claims between disputants, real or imagined. As can be 
observed from Table 16 (p. 176), conflicting demands dilemmas 
were sophisticated in many respects. They elicited the highest 
levels of justice and care reasoning, as well as the highest levels of 
perspective-taking. Moreover, when reflecting upon those moral 
conflicts, participants tended to use their full moral capacity, both 
in terms care and justice. They also tended to invoke both modes 
of moral orientation (Time 2). As an example, the following 
quotation comes from a participant who was confronted with 
multiple claimants in her actual dilemma. She was considering 
selling an enterprise (restaurant) but realizes that it might be 
against potential claims by employees. 
Morally it’s when you make independent decisions and you think 
you make them for yourself, but they’re often very difficult. They 
affect your family and your loved ones… In a sense it would be 
an easy solution for us in that situation, it would be a safe and 
familiar thing, but there are also third parties involved. Their 
lives would also change. That’s the kind of thing I think about. 
I’ve told my own truth. I’ve told and hoped that I could continue 
my life without having to think about it… And then I think 
about what it means for the others, what consequences will 
there be. They’re the issues I think are… Do I have the right 
to continue my own life, or to make decisions which will 
affect others in turn? [How do you think it will affect other 
people’s lives?] It will have direct, personal consequences for 
my family, and my husband is a foreigner. His family is very 
involved in it. Whatever belongs to my husband also belongs to 
his family. And it doesn’t only affect us, it affects his relatively 
large family here in Finland and also our employees. The 
employees, who have given a lot to us. Do we have the right 
to tell them: “Thank you, we won’t be needing your services 
and you any more”? We’ve helped many of them in a way 
already, since many of them are foreigners. We expect that 
when we help them get a job, they can enter the society and 
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the system partly because of us, partly because of their own 
actions. (Stage 4/5, Form A, Contract, #37, [Father has no have 
the right to demand the money] because the father freely 
assumed a responsibility to keep his promise, Colby & al., 1987, 
p. 228). [Do you have the right to make such a decision?] I think 
we do. [Why do you think so?] Because this is my life. No-one 
else will pick up my life or take it further. Of course I 
understand that we have to consider it, because there are 
other factors involved, and that’s the problem in this... (Stage 
5, Form B, Life, CJ #29, [One has not duty to live] because 
although anyone contemplating suicide ought to consider his or 
her obligations and responsibilities as a whole, the ultimate 
responsibility must be left up to the autonomous decision of the 
individual, p. 322). [Do you think you should continue it (the 
restaurant) or not?] If I think of myself, it would be my dream 
to continue until we can retire, we could run it in the family and 
with the conditions and goals that we have. But if I think of my 
husband, then I definitely think he would have more to offer to 
himself, he could go further in life. Now he has gotten everything 
out of it. Anyone can see it. He’s gotten everything out of it. He 
founded the company and ran it for ten years, putting in an 
infinite amount of work. Therefore I am totally ready to give up 
my dream. That phase of our life is now over and we have to 
move on to the next. 
(Participant 21B, Real-life Justice Stage 4/5, MJI Stage 4/5, Real-life 
Care Level 3, ECI Level 3, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
 
Care and justice principles are closely integrated in this 
respondent’s postconventional moral reasoning. She is capable of 
taking the perspective of employees as potential claimants, and 
empathizing with them. According to Hoffman (2000), empathy’s 
role on moral dilemmas involving many claimants is nevertheless 
double-edged. On the other hand, it helps in identifying 
everyone’s needs and thus contributes to the just solution. On the 
other hand, multiple empathizing may lead to intense guilt feelings 
towards those whose needs were neglected in the ultimate 
decision-making. The respondent quoted above, however, seems 
to overcome this difficulty by arguing that she is ultimately 
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responsible for her life. She demonstrates the ability to control her 
own life and to make difficult decisions with responsibility and 
care for both self and others (Skoe, 1993). 
In the preceding example, the ethic of care took the form of a 
principle. In some other dilemmas care reasoning stemmed from a 
careful observation of particularities of persons that was then 
complemented with justice thinking. The following quotation from 
Participant 39 illustrates such work-related conflict. Her conflict 
emerged when she was leading a discussion group for alcoholic 
women and one of the group members started to blame a worker 
she did not know.  
There was this one woman who was really mean to the detox 
centre worker, and she expected me to somehow join her in 
mocking the woman. But I felt like what can I say to her, I 
cannot put her down, she’s (other worker) a total stranger, 
(but) I cannot underestimate her (experience) in this. She was 
clearly in a bout of suffering, she wanted to get it out of her 
system… And I kept thinking about what to tell her.. I tried to get 
out of the situation, I didn’t want to deliberately put anyone 
down or belittle the problems of this person, because to her 
the problems were very real (Stage 5, Form B, Authority, CJ 
#32, [The most important thing a mother should consider is] that 
the other person is a person of worth whose point of view should 
be respected (Colby & al., 1987, p. 607)… It could be that this 
(other worker) didn’t interfere so forcefully as it was presented, 
but you never know. And (I) just then tried to be impartial, 
so that the other person doesn’t get the feeling I’m not 
listening to her.  And then again, why should I condemn a 
stranger? It’s not the goal of an AA meeting to condemn 
anyone… [What if it was true, what this patient said?] I believe 
it was true for her. On the other hand, I believe that the 
person could have taken the cold facts in another situation 
much easier, but she was there, shaking and trembling, 
coming into detox. She had a moral hangover and didn’t feel 
too good. And then this person (another worker) lays it out for 
her so directly – of course it’s all facts, I think she only told the 
facts, - but.. how should I put it – it must have been horrible 
for the patient to hear that in her state of regret… Or maybe 
she expected to be treated with kid gloves at least, not hearing 
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out right that you look like you’ve been drinking for many weeks 
now. This person (staffer) had apparently told it like that. “You 
won’t be any good any more.” That’s what she had said, that 
she was hopeless. I tried to tell her that there are no hopeless 
cases and everyone has hope. No matter what the situation is, 
whether it has to do with alcoholism or any other situation in 
life. And I felt good myself, as well. She was so distressed when 
she came in. But when we talked about it, I could tell clearly 
that she thought: Good, now I got this off chest, now I can ask 
for another therapist if I feel uncomfortable… [What did you 
think, did the other staff member act correctly?] I don’t know. I 
wouldn’t have handled it like that. [Why wouldn’t you have done 
so?] Well, I got this feeling… It’s difficult to say, when I don’t 
know that person, I don’t know anything about her except her 
first name, nothing else. But it came to my mind that maybe her 
work is gotten to be so routine, that she doesn’t see any 
individual differences in the patients. What’s good for 
someone, an honest lashing, it’s not good for others, who need a 
much gentler approach... [When you think of your solution 
afterwards… How can you tell you did the right thing?] I can’t 
tell by anything else, except the immediate feedback from the 
patient was such, she was visibly relieved in the situation, she 
didn’t continue her anxious tirade, but she found other things to 
talk about, not just going on about the same thing. The 
feedback from her was that it was good I said so, and she had 
felt she wasn’t any good any more, that she’ll hang herself etc… 
I can’t tell her that, there are many solutions to problems. Not 
to all problems, there are some solutions to some problems. But 
the patient was now satisfied with it and her anxiety lessened 
there. I feel that it was the right thing to do, or how should I 
put it. 
(Participant 39A, Real-Life Stage 4/5, MJI Stage 4/5, Real-Life Care 
Level 3, ECI Level 2.5, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
As the quotation shows, the respondent’s high sensitivity to 
the needs of the client is complemented by the attempt to maintain 
impartiality towards the accused co-worker when judging the 
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situation.56 This example is consistent with the finding that visiting 
nurses were able to balance the ethics of care and justice in their 
moral conflicts with clients (Gremmen, 1999). The present real-
life dilemma further indicates that the fully-fledged care reasoning 
does not mean rejecting impartiality which has been the subject in 
the ongoing philosophical discussion (Carse, 1998; Rudnick, 
2001). The conflicting demands dilemmas in this study suggest 
that the balancing of care and justice is possible through effort and 
contemplation. 
8.3.5 Social pressure dilemmas 
Real-life moral conflicts were classified as social pressure 
dilemmas, if the participant felt pressured, either implicitly or 
explicitly, by another person or group to engage in identity-
inconsistent behaviors that violate his or her values (Wark & 
Krebs, 1996). Like conflicting demands dilemmas, they were 
infrequent across time (14% and 11%). The infrequency of social 
pressure dilemmas in this study, compared with Wark and Krebs’s 
(1997) study, may partly be due to the strict scoring; dilemmas 
were scored as social pressure only if a participant referred to 
internalized values or identity issues. Thus, dilemmas involving 
social pressure but lacking reference to internal moral standards 
were not classified into this category.  
In addition to the infrequency, social pressure dilemmas share 
many characteristics with conflicting demands dilemmas. They 
both invoked higher care and justice reasoning than other types of 
dilemmas, as well as higher perspective-taking than especially 
temptation dilemmas (for details, see Table 16, p. 176).57 
                                                     
56The comparison of these two responses to conflicting dilemmas in 
terms of empathy is of interest, because the former, Participant 21, 
obtained very high scores (85.3) in emotional empathy, whereas the 
latter, Participant 39, obtained exceptional low scores (10.6). 
57Social pressure dilemmas elicited somewhat lower level of 
perspective-taking than conflicting demands dilemma and their variance 
was greater especially at Time 2 (the difference did not however reach 
statistical significance). In light of closer reading, this difference seems 
to be due to that while some respondents were using their internalized 
values or principles as an exploring base for moral problem, they were 
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Furthermore, the participants’ reasoning on those dilemmas was 
equal to their reasoning on the hypothetical moral dilemmas, and 
on the second round of interviews, the participants reporting social 
pressure dilemmas were more competent than others in care 
reasoning. Hence, also social pressure dilemmas appeared to 
resemble Kohlbergian dilemmas, because they were motivated by 
internal moral standards, values or principles that are highly 
valued within Kohlberg’s model. Not surprisingly, the means of 
WAS for social pressure dilemmas were around 400 (see Table 16, 
p. 176), which coincides with the definition of Stage 4 as a 
morality of conscience. At this stage, reasons for doing right are 
based on the imperative of conscience to meet one’s defined 
obligations (Colby & al., 1987). 
Social pressure dilemmas were distinct from conflicting 
demands dilemmas, because they elicited more justice-oriented 
arguments, being extremely justice-focused at Time 2. 
Paradoxically, some social pressure dilemmas were scored as 
100% justice oriented, simultaneously being scored Level 2 or 
beyond in care reasoning. As Appendix C reveals, social pressure 
dilemmas contained values and principles related to others’ 
welfare that participants aspired to uphold, and tended to elicit 
care reasoning at the highest levels. According to Lyons’s (1983) 
coding scheme, these expressions were however scored to 
represent the justice orientation (standards/rules/principles for self 
and society), leading seemingly to the contradictory results.58 The 
following quotation exemplifies how the participant defines 
promoting caring among team members as his value to begin with, 
providing the exploration base for his moral conflict. 
                                                                                                            
more concerned about upholding their moral character or personal 
integrity through moral decision-making and less concerned about 
others’ perspectives or viewpoints. 
58Social pressure dilemmas elicited a strikingly high amount of 
perfectionist judgments (68%) at Stage 4 and beyond. According to 
Colby et al. (1987) the perfectionist orientation emphasizes perfection of 
the self and others as moral beings: attainment of dignity and autonomy, 
good conscience and motives, harmony with self and others, and they 
claim that it represents care orientation, embedded in justice reasoning. 
These findings again indicate that the ethic of care is conceptualized 
differently wihin Lyons’s and Kohlberg’s moral orientations.  
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Well, I think that when you have a certain team, you should 
trust the team and believe in yourself and support one 
another. But there’s been a culmination… in a few months 
there’s been a hunt against one specific worker. Other staff 
members are convinced that they cannot work with him and that 
he’s not qualified to work in our community and along our 
ideology.  At the same time they commend him for being so good 
in follow-up work and suggest that he could do his work from 
within another unit and under that unit. Away from our unit. I 
was like I went along the whole show. If that was what it takes, 
to get rid of Mike, then good. (Stage 4, Form C, Life 
preservation, CJ #21 [The captain has a right to order a man to 
go on the mission] as long as it is for greater good of the whole 
company, Colby & al., 1987, p. 690). Now that I think about it 
more, I think that hell, this guy has more potential than many 
other family social workers. I had to reverse my opinion. And 
the situation is a bit funny now, because the work community is 
now mad at me, because they say I didn’t support them till the 
end and was not in with them with my heart. This whole 
situation is a lot against my own moral concepts and values.  
[What about it?] Well, I guess it’s really that because we 
don’t have the right to choose our clients, so we don’t have 
the right to choose the staff either. If the city is so crazy 
they’ve given a job to someone, they must have found him to 
be competent. (Stage 5, Life Quality, CJ #36, [The captain 
should not order a man to go on the mission] because ordering a 
man does not recognize a person’s claim to equal treatment, p. 
653). A work community has to find the existing resources in 
any member of the staff and start building the community 
from there… [When you think about changing mind, what was 
it that made you change your attitude?] It was basically a sort 
of pondering and analyzing the situation a bit more, I came 
to the conclusion that it has nothing to do with the quality of 
work performance nor skills, it’s more about everything else. It 
was boyish quarrelling, arguing and being cheap. The main 
issue was not the content, I think it was a witch hunt. I’ve talked 
a lot with Mike, and we don’t really have a different attitude to 
work performance. I believe in his skills and his strengths, and 
I came to the conclusion that we have not allowed him to 
utilize them as a team. (marginal Stage 4/5, Form B, Authority, 
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CJ #28, [Louise should tell her mother about Judy’s lie] because 
Louise ought to be concerned about her sister’s development as 
a person, p. 603). So I have come to the conclusion that this 
process is not going along the right track any more. 
Therefore I can change my mind and satisfy myself and do 
what’s right to me, what feels right. (Stage 4/5, Form B, Life, 
CJ #27, [The doctor should give the woman drug] if mercy 
killing is right according to his moral standards, p. 319). [Was 
that difficult for you?] Well, I don’t know. Not in the sense that it 
is quite easy to make the decisions and take that 
responsibility. On the other hand, I knew the consequences, that 
it would turn to angriness, snide remarks and such. The director 
blamed me for not standing behind them fully, and my team was 
angry at me for not standing behind the director, when we had 
agreed to do that and written it down. I told them it was them 
who wrote and planned the whole thing. I didn’t sign anything, 
and never swore that I’d support your agenda, but didn’t deny it 
either. But that was enough for me and I changed my mind. 
 (Participant 27B, Real-Life Stage 4/5, MJI Stage 4/5, Real-Life Care 
Level 3, ECI Level 3, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
Present social pressure dilemmas suggest that caring for others 
or promoting their welfare can serve as a principle a moral agent is 
committed to follow (cf. Flanagan, 1991). Consequently, they 
often presented conflicts between care and justice. The justice side 
of a dilemma often concerned rules or social conventions 
embedded in work or religious communities that can be justified 
by conventional justice judgments. When participants realized that 
those rules or conventions were harmful to some people, they 
constructed or invoked principled judgments of care, as the 
following quotation from the respondent working in an old 
people’s home exemplifies. 
I have to think whether I want to blame the hurry and do like 
others, or should I just do like I see it best, even though others 
would look at me angrily or think that it was a stupid thing to do. 
The controversy is for example if I feel that someone is treated 
wrongly. Or that clients are treated wrongly, if you think of 
human dignity for example… People go about their work 
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doing it the way they’re used to doing it. There’s some kind of 
tired routine and the feeling that they don’t think about the 
person at all. (marginal Stage 5, Form B, Authority, CJ #32 
[The most important thing a mother should consider] is that the 
other should be respected as an individual human being, Colby 
& al., 1987, p. 607)… The spirit there is not good, and I’m in a 
way an outsider, I’m doing hourly work only, so I try to balance 
there and not to hurt anyone. I want to be good towards the 
clients, but I don’t want… them (other workers) to think that 
I try to be better than the others. (Stage 3, Form B, Authority, 
CJ #13, [The most important thing a father should consider] is 
to try to understand the other, p. 254)… [How do you know 
afterwards that you’ve done the right thing?] My conscience 
tells me. Or I notice for example that the client is happy… 
[Well, what if you act like the others, do you have a feeling of 
doing the right or the wrong thing?] No, I know that I’ve acted 
wrongly… When I think of my own performance and look at… 
how I do things, then… I know it myself. And I feel really bad 
when I go home and realize that I’ve been a real shit. Really! 
 (Participant 31A, Real-Life Justice Stage 4, MJI Stage 
3/4, Real-Life Care Level 3, ECI Level 2.5, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
It seemed that the degree of tension between care and justice 
was a function of the participant’s current stage in justice 
development, and respondents at Stage 4 tended to experience this 
tension as highest. A person at Stage 4 is capable of taking the 
generalized perspective of society or community, such as of a 
work organization, with the idea that “the pursuit of individual 
interests is considered legitimate only when it is consistent with 
maintenance of the sociomoral system as a whole” (Colby & al., 
1987, p. 28). At the worst, Stage 4 reasoners are torn between their 
pangs of conscience to go against the social, legal or religious 
system and their calling to take care of some particular 
individuals. Because both viewpoints are seen as right, the moral 
conflict seems to remain irresolvable. Alternatively, the person 
may deem her devotion to care as “selfish” or to represent the 
“personal point of view”, and thus consider the viewpoint of the 
social system more legitimate. In this data, the mercy killing 
dilemma identified this contradiction among several Stage 4 
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reasoners.59 The next excerpt comes from the Participant 31, 
quoted above, whose real-life conflicts included powerful clashes 
between her ideals of caring and the viewpoint of conventional 
justice.  
[Should the woman have the right to make the final decision?] 
Yes. [Why the woman?] Because it’s her life… [Do you think 
it’s morally wrong to give that drug?] It is wrong, because the 
law forbids it. I don’t know, that makes it wrong. [But still 
you think the doctor should give it to her?] Well, why should… 
If it was not forbidden in the law, then the doctor should give 
it. [But it is forbidden?] Then they cannot give it. You just suffer. 
[Even though you think the woman has the right?] Should have 
the right, well… They’re two-sided things, like… I for 
example would allow the drug for this woman. [Well, this 
Miettinen said that he followed his own conscience in giving the 
medicine. Should a person breaking the law be punished, if they 
follow their conscience?] Well, it cannot be helped. He has 
known that he breaks the law when he went along with it. It has 
nothing to do with whether they follow their conscience or 
                                                     
59Actually, Finnish law does not prohibit aid-giving in suicide, but 
the position of professionals as aid-givers is controversial, and there are 
not precedents either (Lindberg, 1998). Initially dilemmas were scored 
heteronomous (A) and autonomous (B) types of thinking according to 
Colby & al’s (1987) procedure. Because autonomous thinking includes a 
choice for granting the woman’s request, it indirectly measures whether 
care-based judgments are considered heavier than rights-based judgments 
derived from the legal framework. 40% (Time 1) and 31% (Time 2) of 
participants were scored to represent autonomous type of thinking with 
the mercy killing dilemma. A substantial drop in the percentages at Time 
2 is due to social work and practical nursing students. 55% of nursing 
students and 38% social work students were scored autonomous in the 
first interviews, whereas respective percentages were 38% and 15% after 
the 2-year education. To compare, among law enforcement students 
autonomous thinking somewhat increased over time (30% vs. 39%). 
These changes may be explained in terms of adopting professional values 
and norms that prohibit active euthanasia. Compared with a 
contemporary survey, 49% of Finnish population and 34% of nursing 
staff would allow aid in suicide for a person with a lethal cancer 
(Lindberg, 1998). Hence, students’ values seem to reflect general values. 
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whether it is fair. That’s the way it is. [So it doesn’t make the 
situation different?] No, it doesn’t. It cannot. Well, of course if 
you think emotionally, and what would feel fair to you, it’s 
totally different from how you can operate in this society… 
[Is the society a relevant factor in this?] I think it is. [Why?] 
Well, it’s what defines the rules and laws… Of course you get it 
from home. There are laws and punishments for this as well, like 
Thou shall not kill etc. But since there are rules that make the 
society work, then you just have to follow them, whatever 
you personally think of the issue. You have to change the law, 
if you want to. 
(Participant 31B, MJI Stage 4. ECI Level 2.5) 
Compared with respondents at Stage 4, respondents at Stage 
4/5 seemed to be less disturbed by the contradiction between law 
and their personal moral values, and showed more autonomy in 
their decision-making. As Participant 45 put it: “I feel that my 
organization is like the jury and I am like the judge in Doctor 
Jefferson’s case. I have to consider their opinion, and then make a 
decision of my own.” 
There have been many situations where you have to think about 
what is the role of a working person in the organization. It 
determines the duties and the pressures and directs the 
decisions you make. But we also have a strong role of the man-
on-the-street, you think differently, you think whether it’s 
reasonable or necessary to take the matters to the direction that 
our profession would dictate or demand… If we take an example 
from the past weeks… At the courthouse a woman was going 
through security, and she had a Maze with her. There’s no 
explanation that helps in that, it fulfilled the criteria of a 
crime… My superiors on the deciding level would have 
demanded some kind of measures against the (crime). (We) 
decided not to give her a fine. It would have been morally and 
altogether wrong… It’s not an end itself to give a fine or a 
sentence. That was a small mistake, a lapse, it would have been 
unreasonable to punish for something like that. (Stage 4/5, Form 
C, Morality., CJ #29, [Valjean should not be reported] because 
the judge should interpret the law according to the ultimate 
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purpose of the law, not just the letter of law, Colby & al., 1987, 
p. 737)… [What was a conflict for you with that?] Well, 
whether I act for the good of organization or for the good of 
human beings. 
(Participant 48B, Real-Life Justice Stage 4/5, MJI Stage 4/5, Real-life 
Care Level 3, ECI Level 3, Moral Orientation 0.25) 
This response show how at Stage 4/5, moral and legal points 
are differentiated and subjective morality emerges. Present social 
pressure dilemmas altogether suggest that postconventional 
structures of justice thought are critical for care reasoning in order 
to “win” under social pressure. Postconventional transition 
provides persons with growing capacity to evaluate social codes 
and laws according to the degree they preserve universal rights 
and values (Colby & al., 1987). This was evident in the responses 
of the present postconventional reasoners, as they tended to 
prioritize values serving others’ welfare over conforming to social 
norms actual situations. 
8.3.6 Temptation dilemmas  
A real-life dilemma was classified as the reaction to temptation 
type of dilemma, when the participant was faced with temptation 
to meet his or her needs, fulfil his or her desires, acquire resources, 
advance his or her gain by behaving dishonestly, immorally, 
unfairly or ungratefully (Wark & Krebs, 1996). Temptation 
dilemmas comprised 30% (Time 1) and 16% (Time 2) of all 
dilemmas, being more common at the first round of interviews 
(see Figure 4, p. 166). As Appendix C presents, temptations to 
commit illegal transgressions were infrequent. Instead, the present 
temptation dilemmas were focused on the conflicts between self-
interest and social responsibility. They involved considerations of 
consequences of one’s dishonest or selfish action to significant 
others or relationships, in terms of others’ welfare (causing harm 
or suffering) or expectations (making them disappointed, 
destroying trust). These considerations were pitted against selfish 
temptations that in turn were justified by low stage justice 
judgments. Usage of self-serving judgments contributed to the 
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finding that justice reasoning was lower than participants’ 
competence, consistent with previous studies (Wark & Krebs, 
1996, 1997). Participants in this study nevertheless tended to 
resolve temptation dilemmas in favor of others rather than 
themselves, in contrast with Wark & Krebs’s (1997) findings with 
their younger and less mature sample of university students. In 
other words, another part of temptation dilemmas pulled for lower 
stage reasoning, but because participants preferred socially 
desirable justifications, they tended to obtain justice scores around 
Stage 3 (see Table 16, p. 176)60 
I’ve been doing sports all my life, and that had relatively strict 
rules. For example, you don’t go partying on the night before the 
game etc. There have been a couple of conflicts like that, there 
have been friend’s parties or something on a Friday night and 
then on Saturday we’ve had a game. Well, that is a real 
dilemma. It’s just it. (unelaborated Stage 2/3, Form B, 
Authority, CJ #11, friends should go places together, Colby & 
al., p. 585)  [How have you solved the dilemma?] Usually I 
haven’t gone, but a couple times the temptation has been too 
much, and I’ve gone to the party. But haven’t partied as hard as 
I would have under normal circumstances. [How do you know 
afterwards that you’ve done the wrong thing?] Well, maybe it is 
my conscience talking. [Why is it so important not to go and 
party?] Maybe it’s because if you party and drink, you can’t do 
your best in the game the following day, or anywhere else, not 
the same as you could have done if you prepared for the game 
properly. And it’s wrong for the rest of the team, team-mates, 
it’s wrong for them… If you have agreed to certain rules, 
you should try and follow them. (Stage 4, Form C, Life 
preservation, CJ #22, [A soldier should not have the right to 
refuse an order] because the soldiers have agreed to abide by 
the rules of army, p. 692). 
                                                     
60This trend also caused difficulties in scoring, because some 
participants just mentioned a temptation they had encountered, without 
giving explicit justifications why to give in to it. 
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 (Participant 61B, Real-Life Justice Stage 3/4, MJI Stage 4, Real-Life 
Care Level 2, ECI Level 2, Moral Orientation 0.00) 
As Appendix C shows, most temptation conflicts are relatively 
easy to resolve from the sociomoral point of view. If they were 
presented in a form of hypothetical dilemmas to participants, they 
obviously generated higher stage justice judgments. It however 
seems that the moral difficulty within antisocial dilemmas 
concerns practical consequences of decision-making for self rather 
than moral judgment, and those consequences may be severe 
(Haviv & Leman, 2002; Wark & Krebs, 1997). Accordingly, many 
participants anticipated real consequences for themselves and their 
relationships that can be sufficiently justified by unelaborated 
lower stage judgments, such as not taking too great risks to lose a 
job or a friend. Moreover, it is worth noting a respondent usually 
tells about the past conflict, justifying her/his response afterwards. 
As a consequence, given judgments may serve excuses for self-
interested choices and may actually indicate failures in the 
components of moral motivation (not prioritizing moral values to 
others) or moral character (not having the toughness to carry out 
the morally right course of action) rather than in moral judgment 
per se (Rest & al., 1999).61 
                                                     
61As examples of self-serving justifications participants gave 
following Stage 2 judgments: one should commit an illegal act if one is 
desperate (Form A, Life, CJ #8, Colby & al., 1987, p. 19), one should 
not do something (on another’s behalf), because it would be taking too 
great a risk (Form A, Law, CJ #8, p. 70)] or one should keep out of 
other’s business (Form B, Authority, CJ #7, p. 531). On some dilemmas, 
temptation to follow mates’ immoral behavior was justified by Stage 2/3 
argument that friends should stick together, and go places together 
(Form B, Authority, CJ #11, p. 585). As examples of higher stage 
reasoning on temptation dilemmas, nevertheless usually below the 
participants’ competence, participants justified their own wishes as a 
parent against a child’s will by that one has her best interests at heart or 
she is doing her best to bring up her child (Stage 3, Form A, Authority, 
CJ #14, p. 256), or that the parent is the head of the household and 
should be obeyed (Stage 3/4, Form B, Authority, CJ #21, p. 595). 
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Temptation dilemmas nevertheless displayed different patterns 
for care and justice reasoning. Contrasted with justice reasoning, 
temptation dilemmas did not elicit care reasoning below 
participants’ competence (see Table 16, p. 176). Furthermore, 
those participants who reported temptation dilemmas were the 
least competent in care reasoning. Participants’ involvement with 
selfish temptations appeared to characterize their actual struggle 
with the first transition in care development, especially at Time 1. 
They tended to criticize their opinions or behavior as selfish which 
signals a new understanding of the connection between self and 
others (Skoe, 1993). According to Gilligan (1982), the transition 
from selfishness into responsibility actually denotes a move 
towards social participation, as the following quotation indicates. 
This is not a big thing, it just came to my mind first. There must 
be other things. That weekend we were supposed to go visit our 
old grandmother in Joensuu, and I didn’t feel like going, I had 
all kinds of parties… I didn’t want to go, but I had to, almost. 
Or didn’t really have to, but… I did think about what to do 
about it, to go or not to go. But then finally I did go. I don’t go 
there that often, and with friends, I can do things all the time. 
[Why did you have to go to Joensuu?] Well, our family should 
have… My dad and my sister and brothers went, and I had to go 
as well… It was a long time since we saw her (marginal Stage 
2/3, Form A, Contract, CJ #9, [It is important to keep a 
promise] because the person promised has expectations up, 
Colby & al., p. 201). [What was the conflict there?] I wanted to 
be with my friends, we had all kinds of fun lined up for the 
weekend (Stage 2/3, Form B, Authority, CJ #11, [The most 
important thing a daughter should consider] is that she and her 
mother should stick together, or go places together, p. 585). 
[What made you decide it was more important to (visit)?] Well, 
my grandma is so old, she won’t live too long. And I hadn’t 
been there for a long time.  
 (Participant 67B, Real-Life Justice Stage 2/3, MJI Stage 3, Real-Life 
Level 1.5, ECI Level 1.5, Moral Orientation 0.50)  
It is worth pointing out that temptation dilemmas invoked 
equal amounts of care- and justice-based considerations on the 
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first round of interviews (M1 = 0.49, SD1 = 0.24). This implies that 
temptations can be confronted through both the care and justice 
perspectives, the care perspective stressing the importance of 
attachment, and the justice perspective stressing the importance of 
not harming others or violating their rights, as the preceding 
quotations indicate. In the following quotation, the respondent 
shows a blend of both orientations. 
[Why is it wrong to drink?] Because it takes everything. As long 
as you’re alone, you don’t do anything wrong. You don’t harm 
others, but when you have other people around you, kids and 
wife (Stage 3, Form B, Law, CJ #12, [A person has a duty to 
live] because it’s selfish to commit a suicide when other people 
need you, Colby & al., p. 350)… And anyway, your work suffers 
and everything, if you’re drunk all the time. [So it’s not wrong if 
you live alone or if it doesn’t affect other people’s life?] It’s not 
right either, but it’s only your own problem. If you sit in the 
middle of a forest alone or drink in the middle of a glacier, then 
it doesn’t bother others at all. [What’s in it then, when you 
said that it affect other people’s lives, why’s that wrong?] Well, 
of course, there are other people in the world beside yourself. 
[Why do you have to take others into account?] Well, it is like 
that when there are other people. You have to get along with 
others. And family life is no life, if one person is moving in 
other circles. It requires responsibility from all people.  
(Stage 4, Form B, Authority, CJ  #23,[The most important thing 
for a mother to consider] is that  members of a family have a 
responsibility to consider the overall welfare of the family as a 
system, p. 597). And also at work, it’s no good if someone is 
absent from work because they’re drinking. When you’re 
having fun, you still have to consider others. 
 (Participant 17A, Real-Life Justice Stage 3/4, MJI Justice Stage 3/4, 
Real-Life Care Level 1.75, ECI Level 2, Moral Orientation 0.25) 
In a nutshell, the present dilemmas indicate that resisting 
immoral temptations which are harmful to other people are 
common moral problems. Temptation dilemmas do not seem to 
require advanced justice concepts to be resolved. The respondents 
relied on less mature but obviously sufficient lower-stages 
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judgments, employing Stage 2 and 2/3 judgments in favor of a 
temptation, and Stage 3 judgments in favor of a prosocial solution. 
In addition, temptation dilemmas seem to reflect the 
developmental transition towards conventional caring and 
therefore are obviously experienced as genuine moral problems. 
8.3.7 Transgression dilemmas  
A moral conflict was classified as reacting to transgressions - type 
of dilemma, if it dealt with making a decision about how to react, 
what to do about a transgression, injustice, crime or violation of 
rules that has occurred (Wark & Krebs, 1996). Transgression 
dilemmas comprised 13% (Time 1) and 26% (Time 2) of all real-
life dilemmas. Increase over time is due to the fact that law 
enforcement students reported work-related transgression 
dilemmas at Time 2, instead of temptation dilemmas. The total 
amount of antisocial dilemmas, however, remained the same over 
time. 
Wark & Krebs (1996, 1997, 2000) have consistently found 
that antisocial dilemmas, transgression dilemma included, pull for 
justice orientation. This study replicated these results (see Table 
16, p. 176). Nevertheless, illegal transgressions with the strongest 
pull for justice orientation were not the only issue. Transgressions 
in relationships, such as cheating, infidelity or breaking promises 
were mentioned as well (see Appendix C). Notably, they were 
constructed in terms of justice, mainly involving violations of 
reciprocity. These dilemmas also elicited some considerations of 
care, because they prompted the question of whether to repair and 
continue a relationship despite the transgression. Violations of 
reciprocity caused feelings of hurt that further led some 
respondents to consider how to protect self. 
Well, the fact that I have gotten into these conflicting situations 
in relationships is that I am by nature trusting and naive in 
relation to other people. I imagine that everybody will act the 
same way I do, and then I’m amazed and surprised when they 
don’t. So like if I have been the giving party and then I don’t 
receive from others the things I would hope to receive, then I 
get mad. But on the other hand I think that I don’t have the 
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right to ask for more from anyone… more than they can 
give… I thought that we’re good friends with a girl, whom I was 
helping and supporting. I would have needed help myself when 
my mother got ill, had a stroke and died. I expressed my 
disappointment to her. We tried to address the matter, but it did 
not bring any results... She was in a situation and didn’t have 
the readiness for such friendship and support that I would 
have needed in my situation. (Stage 3/4, Form A, Morality, CJ 
#22, [The judge should be lenient] because in Heinz’s case there 
were special circumstances or considerable emotional stress, 
Colby & al., 1987, p. 124)… This person is now in the 
backrow of my acquaintances. [She’s no longer a friend?] I 
won’t be a friend either to people who betray me. It was she 
herself who thought that she betrayed me. But I was 
disappointed in her. That’s it. I protect myself... and go to my 
other (friends). I don’t expect any reciprocity from her. 
(Stage 3/4, Form C, Contract, CJ #23, [The cheating is worse 
than stealing] because it breaks a loyalty or betrays a trust 
between people, p. 831). 
(Participant 20B, Real-Life Justice Stage 3/4, MJI Justice Stage 4/5, 
Care Level 2.5, ECI Level 3, Moral Orientation 0.75) 
This example illustrates lowered justice reasoning when the 
respondent does not employ potential higher-stage judgments, 
typical of transgression dilemmas in general that tend to elicit self-
serving judgments together with temptation dilemmas.62 
                                                     
62Participants raised Stage 2 and 2/3 self-serving justifications, such 
as one should keep quiet about friends’ transgressions, because if one 
tells, one may get into trouble with one’s friends (Form B, Contract, CJ 
#8, Colby & al., 1987, p. 532), because nobody wants the reputation of 
telling on everyone, or being two-faced (Form B, Contract, CJ #12, p. 
536) or because friends should stick together, help each other and go 
place together (Form B, Authority, CJ #12, p. 585). In terms of loyalty to 
the group, Stage 3 and 3/4 justifications were also raised, for example 
one as a member of a group should keep quiet about others’ 
transgressions, in order to promote caring, compassion or concern 
among people (classmates) (Form C, Life (Quality), CJ #22, p. 640). 
Transgressions violating friendship were condemned on the basis that a 
transgressor should be concerned about the feelings and welfare of the 
people who love her (Form B, Law, CJ #12, p. 350), or because cheating 
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Another outstanding and diverse group among transgression 
dilemmas were those reported by law enforcement students who 
served as police officers during their training period (n = 9).63 
Hence, they had the legal position and, as a matter of fact, had an 
official duty to intervene transgressions - that were committed by 
people they did not personally know. In this sense, they are 
different from “ordinary” transgression dilemmas that often 
involved personal relationships. This distinction seems to be 
crucial for understanding different findings at Time 1 and at Time 
2. Namely, transgression dilemmas elicited lower reasoning in 
both modes of moral reasoning at the latter time and work-related 
dilemmas reported by law enforcement students contributed to this 
difference. To be exact, their care reasoning about transgression 
dilemmas was ½ level below their competence on average (M = 
1.90, SD = 0.51 vs. M = 2.46, SD = 0.35). This was the case for 
justice reasoning as well (M = 332.87, SD = 59.80 vs. M = 397.20, 
SD = 44.16). 
To understand why law enforcement students’ moral reasoning 
was lower, several explanations emerged from the interview data. 
First of all, with regard to care reasoning, these dilemmas lacked 
established relationships. Without knowing the particularities of 
persons, care reasoning seems to be reduced to general feelings of 
sympathy or mercy towards an impersonal client (a victim or an 
offender) that can elicit Level 2 reasoning at its best. Due to their 
                                                                                                            
will hurt one’s faith in human nature (Form C, Contract, CJ #12, p. 350) 
Respondents also expressed judgments of forgiving, such as another is 
only human, or make mistakes too (Stage 3, Form A, Authority, CJ #22, 
p. 833) or another should not be punished severely, because the 
circumstances should be taken into account in judging the seriousness of 
another’s crime (transgression) and therefore the severity of punishment 
too (Stage 3/4, Form B, Morality, CJ #25, p. 421). Also one’s 
responsibility for moral guidance was expressed: As an older brother, 
one is at least partially responsible for the moral training and character 
development of one’s younger brother (Stage 4, Form B, Authority, CJ 
#26, p. 601). 
 
63It is worth to remind that not all work-related dilemmas were 
classified as transgression dilemmas. Some of those dilemmas were also 
classified as needs of others, conflicting demands or social pressure 
dilemmas, according to a respondent’s interpretation of a moral conflict 
embedded in a transgression. 
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impersonal nature, without focusing on any single person’s needs, 
transgression dilemmas actually tend to present a scoring problem 
within the ECI, akin to that Söchting (1996) reported and 
discussed previously in the context of hypothetical dilemmas. 
After all, transgression dilemmas do not appear to be care-focused, 
and emerging relationships are interpreted primarily in terms of 
justice, as the following quotation illustrates. 
It’s (moral conflict) related to situations at work. I could 
probably pinpoint it to one situation in particular. It comes up 
regularly. It has come up in principle, when you think of our 
assignments. it’s how you judge the use of force. And what 
would be the correct thing to do by the book. The situation is 
very often like this, when addicts have needles on them. Every 
time we clean them from their possessions, we ask whether they 
have needles (in their pockets). And often the client neglects to 
tell you that they have needles, which is at the moment one of the 
biggest risks in this profession. You could get some kind of 
infection on duty. And there is no punishment for them if they 
don’t tell about (the needles). It’s an unwritten rule that we’ll 
teach them a fatherly lesson after that. It could be a small 
slap or something, but it teaches them to remember it. (Stage 
3, Form B, Punishment, [The judge should punish the doctor] to 
make him realize he did wrong, Colby & al., 1987, p. 478). And 
there’s no other way to punish for it, and some… give a 
spontaneous lesson and a show. Hopefully that helps them to 
remember the next time to tell about them then. [What’s the 
show then?] Well, it depends on the person. If the needle bites 
into your hand, then it’s a slap. You don’t stop to think whether 
it’s right to hit or not… [What do you think? Is it right to use 
force in that situation?] Well, at least I see it quite… In my own 
moral opinion, it is the right thing to do. If you’ve explained 
the rules before. And the other person doesn’t respect the 
rules then. I don’t know if it would be right to just complain 
about it then, “well, how come you didn’t tell us about this”. 
You didn’t tell that it would go like this. And then we’d go away, 
and that would be that… When we say to them: “Tell us now, if 
you have needles in your pockets”, and then they say that they 
will tell, they know to tell. And if they don’t tell and you find 
(needles), you know that something can happen to you later… It 
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doesn’t mean there’s a big fight or anything, but it’s a little 
something… The attitude changes radically after that. 
There’s no trust in the situation any more. (Stage 3/4, Form 
C, Contract, CJ #23, [The cheating is worse than stealing] 
because it breaks a loyalty or betrays a trust between people, 
Colby & al., 1987, p. 831)… I’ve had situations myself, that at 
the last minute before sticking my hand into a pocket, my partner 
sees the needle, sticking out of the pocket. That makes you really 
angry. 
 (Participant 53B, Real-life Justice Stage 3/4, MJI Stage 4/5, Real-life 
Care Level 1.5, ECI Level 2, Moral Orientation 0.50) 
The preceding quotation is also illuminating in the sense that it 
demonstrates lowered justice reasoning, typical of transgression 
dilemmas in general. This respondent generated postconventional 
reasoning about the MJI dilemmas, i.e. evidencing the 
understanding that a promise is a necessary form of social 
agreement that is essential for people in order to live together in 
the society (Colby & al., 1987, CJ #40, p. 567). 
[Do you think that people in general should keep their 
promises?] Yes, you have to keep it. [Why?] It wouldn’t work at 
all if people didn’t respect the contracts, not even oral contracts. 
If you have to change it, then you have to honestly negotiate 
about changing the situation after that. [You said that it 
wouldn’t be any good. What do you mean by that?] Yes. If 
people came and went and just made spoken agreements with 
each other and then it wouldn’t happen. It could jam the cogs 
of society on the long run at least. 
 
The law enforcement students tended to solve transgression 
dilemmas through conventional justice concepts, even those at the 
postconventional level. It seems that invoking postconventional 
reasoning requires taking the time to reflect, and that only happens 
occasionally. Another postconventional respondent started his 
dilemma with conventional judgments but then proceeded to 
postconventional ones, but obviously this only happened 
afterwards. These observations underscore the fact that in actual 
moral dilemmas, people tend to derive arguments from lower 
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stages, besides their present stage (Krebs, Vermeulen & al., 1991). 
Even though law enforcement students reasoned below their 
competence on transgression dilemmas, they nevertheless avoided 
low-stage self-serving judgments, in contrast with other 
participants. 
Instead, an obvious reason for lowered reasoning among law 
enforcement students appeared to be somewhat low role-taking. 
The means for their work-related transgression dilemmas was M = 
2.44 (SD = 1.01), to compare with conflicting demands dilemmas 
M = 3.83 (SD = 0.41). This actually means role-taking when two 
perspectives are recognized but seen as incompatible (Level 2) or 
when two perspectives are recognized and one tries to understand 
another but not vice versa (Level 3) (Chap, 1986). The consistent 
observation across all work-related dilemmas was that those 
perspectives were that of the participant and that of other 
policemen, their superiors or the police organization. This in turn 
implies strategic role-taking (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984) when 
law enforcement students adopted a viewpoint of the law 
enforcement institution, rather than that of clients, i.e. citizens, 
transgressors and victims. It also seemed that a clash between the 
viewpoints of other policemen and that of clients, shared by a 
student, usually ended up with the policeman’s viewpoint 
dominating. These observations suggest that strategic role-taking 
in novice police officers’ work takes place at the expense of 
“moral” role-taking, and therefore limits care and justice reasoning 
to some extent. Strategic role-taking nevertheless seemed to take 
different forms according to respondents’ sociomoral perspectives. 
At Stage 3/4, police officer trainees were concerned about 
disapproval and approval by fellow officers and authorities, and 
therefore wanted to do the correct thing from their viewpoint, 
whereas at Stage 4 they were more concerned about maintaining 
the reputation and credibility of the police force. As Participant 57 
put it: ”The citizens should have a positive view of the police 
force. We should be able to be flexible and to present a good 
picture of the Finnish policemen’s professional skills. To prove 
that the police is not always the strict one, but can look between 
their fingers in some cases and to advise them to fix something.” 
Finally, respondents at Stage 4/5 generated more flexible 
interpretations about transgression-related conflicts, leading to 
other dilemma classifications in most cases (67%). They seemed 
  
 
253 
to be less troubled with strategic role-taking, and tended to 
interpret differences between citizens’ viewpoint and that of the 
police institution as a tension between citizens and law (for 
examples of this, see the needs of other dilemmas  and social 
pressure dilemmas sections). 
To summarize so far, the analysis of transgression dilemmas 
revealed that they were disparate in content. In addition to issues 
of legality, they dealt with transgressions in relationships. This 
indicates that justice reasoning also covers the interpersonal 
domain, which is thus not governed by care reasoning alone. 
Secondly, dilemmas involving impersonal relationships, such as 
police work-related dilemmas, presented a scoring problem in 
terms of the Ethic of Care Interview, because they did not 
necessarily address the needs of anybody in particular. Thirdly, the 
content analysis suggested that reduced justice reasoning in 
transgression dilemmas is induced by the strategic role-taking 
effect that seemed to invoke particularly Stages 3 and 3/4 
judgments, related to good reputation and the solidarity among 
cops. Besides strategic role-taking, reduced care reasoning seems 
to be due to the impersonal nature of transgression dilemmas that 
allows only some room for considerations of the particularities of 
persons and consequently, their needs. 
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9. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The departure point of this study was to explore the ethic of care 
as a different voice from the ethic of justice, as it was presented by 
Carol Gilligan (1982). In a Different Voice yields two different 
interpretations of the ethic of care. First, care is interpreted to 
constitute a different orientation in perceiving and construing 
moral dilemmas. This interpretation has dominated the field of 
research for the last two decades when exploring orientation usage 
in moral conflicts and dilemmas. This study, however, focuses 
more emphatically on the second, largely neglected interpretation 
that the ethic of care has a developmental path of its own. 
Different levels of care-based reasoning, measured by the Ethic of 
Care Interview (Skoe, 1993), have been claimed to constitute the 
developmental sequence. According to this interpretation, care 
reasoning serves moral judgment, equal to justice-based moral 
reasoning. However, the moral orientation approach has its place 
in this study as well in the context of real-life conflicts, and 
therefore relations of these two approaches will be discussed from 
the perspective of methodology. 
The discussion will be organized in four sections. First, I will 
discuss what my findings tell us about care reasoning as a different 
voice, as distinguished from justice reasoning. Secondly I will 
consider findings on care development in the context of justice 
development. In the third part, I will reflect upon what the new 
findings tell us about the real-life moral reasoning, particularly 
care reasoning.  Finally, I will present some suggestions for future 
education and research. In order to organize the discussion, I have 
not been able to avoid repeating some of the main findings.  The 
discussion will however focus on more general aspects, because 
the findings have already been discussed in the connection with 
previous research in the results section. I will start with assessing 
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the limitations of this study, in order to give a frame of reference 
for evaluating the significance of the results. 
9.1 Limitations of this study 
The greatest limitations of this study are associated with the 
empirical design. First, confounding gender and education made 
the interpretation of statistical analyses inconvenient. Even though 
investigating gender differences was not the primary goal of this 
study, gender is a meaningful factor to control for in most 
psychological studies and in studies on morality in particular. I 
ended up with interpreting gender differences in terms of 
education.  Furthermore, I initially chose practical nursing and 
social work students in order to cover all the potential variance in 
care reasoning. Despite this, I decided to treat them as different 
subsamples, because social work students appeared to be a more 
sophisticated sample in some respects. This led to the use of 
small-size subgroups with less statistical power. From the 
statistical viewpoint, a more appropriate design would have been a 
larger sample with a balanced proportion of genders, for example 
20 female and 20 male social work and law enforcement students. 
Due to the gender bias in these professions, this kind of sample 
would however have been quite tedious to find. 
The participants represented 30-50% of their educational 
groups. Albeit their obviously high motivation indicated by 
volunteering to participate, I consider them to be fairly well 
representative of their respective student groups. According to my 
observations, a sampling for practical nursing and social work 
students was more or less random, as those with flexible time-
tables volunteered to participate. Whether they represent the total 
Finnish population is indeed questionable. As results showed, all 
student groups, except for female practical nursing students, 
scored higher in moral reasoning than the Finnish or Scandinavian 
population in general (Helkama & al., 2001; Skoe, 1998) In 
addition, female practical nursing and social work students were 
more advanced in emotional empathy than women in general 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). The sample was also exceptionally 
androgynous. On the other hand, the aim of this study was to 
validate care development. For this purpose, this sample from 
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outside the usual university student context, including actual 
future care and justice experts as participants seems to be 
appropriate. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of law enforcement 
students in terms of age and moral reasoning, as well as the lack of 
development (even though expected) led to somewhat bland 
results that should be confirmed by a more representative sample 
in future. 
The size of this sample (N = 59) is comparable to other 
longitudinal studies in moral development. Obviously, with regard 
to real-life dilemmas, assigned to five different categories, a larger 
sample might have yielded more reliable results. This difficulty is 
due to the fact that my initial purpose was not actually to study 
real-life moral reasoning. Real-life dilemmas as a part of the ECI 
nevertheless caught my full interest, and I could not help starting 
to explore them (and this proved to be a time-consuming task!). 
The reliability of results is improved by the fact that dilemmas 
were administered twice, and both times yielded very similar 
results. In order to utilize the data completely, I analyzed the 
dilemma contents as well. 
Reliability and validity of measures have already been 
discussed in the previous chapter. To summarize briefly, in 
general the measures were comparable to previous studies. Chap’s 
role-taking was established without prior consideration, and due to 
its sparse scale (only 4 levels were employed), results concerning 
role-taking might be interpreted only as approximate. The validity 
of certain measures will be discussed in detail in interpreting 
results. Because I myself conducted all interviews as well scored 
all the dilemmas, I paid special attention to avoid scoring bias 
favorable to hypotheses. In particular, a rather unexpected 
emergence of postconventional reasoning on the second round of 
interviews led to additional checks of scoring. Especially the 
euthanasia dilemma tended to pull for postconventional stages in 
this sample.64 This can obviously be explained by some cultural 
factors. Finnish culture strongly emphasizes individualism 
(Kortteinen, 1992) which justifies powerful defending of 
individuals’ rights. During the research there was a wide public 
discussion on patients’ rights in the national health care, and 
                                                     
64At both times the euthanasia elicited higher judgments than the 
court dilemma,  t(1, 58) = 2.98 and t(1, 58) = 3.27, ps < .01 
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euthanasia was also legalized in the Netherlands at the same time. 
This casts doubt on some cases in which the high scores might 
actually reflect plain verbal capacity to use ethical jargon available 
in public discussion, instead of authentic moral reasoning.  
The data collection in this study has some weak points as well. 
Because participants were allowed to fill the paper and pencil-
measures by themselves after interviews, conditions were not 
uniform to all participants. The initial purpose was that 
participants had filled them in the connection with the interviews, 
but this proved to be too time-consuming. As a result, they 
returned them afterwards and some did not return them at all, 
leading to missing data. This failure is however mitigated by the 
fact that paper and pencil measures, the QMEE and the BSRI are 
standardized measures, and proved to be internally reliable in this 
study as well.  
With regard to theory-building, a measure of life events should 
have definitely been included into the measure set. As I have 
repeatedly pointed out, care development is supposed to be 
critically tied to crisis experiences. Still, the systematic 
investigation of this observation is lacking to date. I missed this 
opportunity as well. Even though some interviews were filled with 
the descriptions of subjective crisis experiences, the data is not 
reliable enough for drawing any far-reaching conclusions in this 
issue.  
With regard to real-life moral reasoning, the decision to study 
real-life moral conflicts also from the justice perspective was 
made after the data was collected. This meant that while I was 
interviewing, I did not focus on justice reasoning, and therefore 
did not ask additional questions that might have facilitated scoring 
afterwards. As justice reasoning remained somewhat intuitive for 
some dilemmas, so did the scoring as well. Particularly moral 
judgments for the non-chosen issue tended to remain implicit. On 
the other hand, my unawareness of this research aspect in the 
interview situation guaranteed that I had no temptation to push 
participants to use higher stage reasoning. In this sense, I regard 
the real-life moral dilemmas generated in this study very 
authentic. Even though participants tended to elaborate few justice 
judgments, instead of multiple ones, it seemed enough to structure 
moral reasoning and even orient moral action. 
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It is also worth noting that 8 participants did not generate a 
real-life dilemma on the first round. My own interpretation is that 
5 law enforcement students might have been less motivated to 
participate. In addition, 5 students were scored to represent the 
consolidated levels of 2 and 3 on other dilemmas. Consequently, 
being at the balance, they might have been less prone to 
experience and report moral conflicts. I decided not to push them, 
in order to maintain rapport. Nevertheless, this failure weakened 
the reliability of data somewhat, when one of them was classified 
as regressed at Time 2, due to his reasoning about his real-life 
dilemma. 
The richness of the interview data invited me to explore it in 
more depth. Instead of plainly setting results into the context of 
former research, I turned to the data to listen to what it tells us in 
its own terms, letting participants speak in their own voices. The 
descriptive analysis of the nature of moral reasoning combined the 
quantitative approach with the qualitative one, as I tried to 
explore, elaborate and systematize the phenomena identified with 
statistical analyses (Banister & al., 1999). Because my exploration 
across the data was guided by theory rather than being purely data-
driven, I tried to pay additional attention to what was inconsistent 
with my presuppositions, in order to avoid biased interpretations. 
The reliability of this kind of analysis must be verified through a 
systematic and reflective stand by a researcher. At the end of the 
day, it is up to reviewers and readers to evaluate the reliability. I 
would like to emphasize that the purpose of the descriptive 
qualitative analysis in this study is to reveal subtle variations that 
statistics cannot detect, and thus provide better understanding of 
the results. Pure quantitative analysis runs a risk that the view 
provided by findings is oversimplified and moreover, misses the 
richness of moral reasoning. However, in order to confirm the 
notions and ideas that emerged from this study, systematic future 
research is needed. 
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9.2 In the different voice 
9.2.1 Self-concept and the ethic of care 
One of the most fascinating ideas presented within the care 
framework is that the differing moral quality of care stems from 
the connected conception of self evolving in the web of 
relationships (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Lyons 1983). 
Fluid self-other boundaries would make other people’s feelings 
more accessible particularly for women, thus equipping them with 
more advanced emotional empathy, whereas men’s self-concept 
would become more separate as a result of the separation-
individuation process in the early childhood. The present results, 
however, indicate that the contribution of connected self-concept 
in the domain of care is far more modest than expected. In this 
study, only 16% of participants, mainly prospective care workers, 
possessed connected self-concept. Thus, connected self-concept 
seems to be rare among young adults, paralleling findings in 
another adult sample (Pratt & al., 1990).  
Self-concept was not related to gender, in contradiction with 
Lyons’s (1983) pioneering findings. In contradiction with the 
prediction as well, the most advanced in emotional empathy were 
not participants with connected self-concept, but instead, 
participants with separate self-concept. Based on Gilligan’s (1982) 
theory, it was also predicted that participants with separate self-
concept are the least developed in care reasoning, whereas 
participants with mixed self-concept are the most advanced, 
participants with connected self-concepts falling between them. 
The only statistically significant finding, albeit a marginal one, 
was that connected women reported more care-oriented real-life 
moral conflicts than other women. Their moral conflicts were 
focused on how to respond to others’ needs, and consequently 
elicited predominantly considerations of care. Their average 
reasoning was at Level 2.5, indicating reappearance of concern for 
protecting their own needs in relationships. 
The content analysis of real-life moral conflicts shed further 
light on the significance of the self-concept. The theme of 
conflicted self-sacrifice, related to specific events in life, such as 
divorce and death cases, emerged in the moral conflicts that 
260 
 
connected women reported. They constantly expressed attachment 
to their closest people, who were mainly family members. The 
severity of the moral conflict seemed to lie in the experiences of 
difficulties in separating their own needs from others’ needs. Their 
expressions can be interpreted to indicate weak and even 
enmeshed self-other boundaries. Still, despite their 
overwhelmingly emotional tone and apparent sensitivity to others’ 
needs, they surprisingly did not obtain the highest scores in 
emotional empathy. One explanation might be that proneness to 
empathic over-arousal has compromised their empathic capacities. 
In line with this explanation, they expressed feelings of uneasiness 
originating from their relationships.  
To summarize, moral conflicts reported by women with 
connected self-concept closely resemble the prototypical 
descriptions of the care ethic as the female moral voice in 
literature. The present results nevertheless suggest that self-
concept alone, at least according to Lyons’s (1983) framework, 
does not provide an adequate theoretical base for the ethic of care. 
The open-ended interview might not be an accurate measure of 
self-concept, and even inter-rater reliabilities have not been found 
to be very high (80% in this study). For example, it is 
controversial whether such responses as “I am empathic” or “I am 
skilled in relationships” represent connected or separate self-
concepts. An alternative explanation is that they may reflect 
different verbal styles rather than actual relation to others. My 
interpretation for the profoundly caring voice that emerged in the 
connected participants’ interviews is that the self-concept 
interview succeeded in classifying them as connected because 
those participants were currently focused on relationships in their 
lives, due to crises or significant life events they were undergoing. 
Unfortunately, the self-concept was measured only on the second 
round of interviews, so this study cannot address the question 
whether the self-concept was stable over the 2-year period. 
Nevertheless, connected participants reported different types of 
conflict and were not exclusively care oriented in the beginning of 
their studies. Given that connected self-concept and care 
orientation were associated, this indirectly suggests that self-
concept is not particularly stable, but rather, may fluctuate 
according to life events, as Pratt et al. (1990) suggested. It seems 
nevertheless probable that extreme connectedness does not 
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provide a person with exceptional empathic capacities, but rather, 
may undermine them, due to excessive personal distress that 
experiences of engulfing or confused boundaries between self and 
others may invoke.  
9.2.2 Gender roles and moral reasoning 
Gilligan (1982) took the position that the ethic of care represents 
women’s moral voice, and the traditional feminine goodness is 
crystallized in Level 2 reasoning. Studies by Söchting, Skoe and 
Marcia (1994) and Skoe (1995) have completed this view; by 
pointing out that androgynous gender role encompassing both 
feminine and masculine traits is characteristic for women’s care 
reasoning at the advanced levels. This study replicated their 
findings accompanied with insignificant findings for men. Thus, 
the present results contribute to Skoe’s (1995) interpretation that 
in order to include also themselves into the compass of care, 
women have to give up traditional feminine gender role and 
acquire traditional masculine characteristics. I would like to 
emphasize traditional at this point, because gender roles were 
measured by the Bem Sex Role Inventory (1981), whose validity 
to measure modern gender roles has been questioned with 
accumulating empirical evidence (Hoffman & Borders, 2001). 
Ballard-Reisch and Elton (1992) recommended that other-oriented 
and self-directed would be more appropriate definitions, and this 
study is favorable to their suggestion. High androgyny scores 
seemed to stand for the capacity to taking care of others, as well as 
to guide self in difficult situations. 
Actually, this result reflects Gilligan’s (1982) original theory, 
as she suggested that women have to grow more assertive in order 
to be able to defend their own needs. Thus, one can conclude that 
both the ECI and androgyny measure the same dimension. 
Gilligan did not however explicitly point out the link between 
androgynous gender role and mature care reasoning, as Skoe 
(1995) did. Given my interpretation that androgyny here stands for 
growing assertiveness and self-direction, these results give 
additional support for the contruct validity of the ECI. 
Notably, femininity was negatively associated with levels of 
care reasoning for women on the first interviews. In other words, 
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the expressiveness or other-orientation that the BSRI femininity 
scale measures does not alone seem to guarantee the progress to 
the highest care levels. In keeping with these findings, Söchting 
(1996) concluded that affective interpersonal maturing is not 
necessary for care development beyond Level 2, but cognitive 
autonomy becomes more important. Some other studies have also 
identified the contributions of androgyny to the realm of morality. 
Harter, Waters, Whiterell, and Kastelic (1998) found that 
androgyneous adolescent girls spoke their minds more often than 
feminine girls in public contexts. In turn, Skoe et al. (in press) 
found that androgynous participants reported taking more helpful 
actions than others, and in addition, they were similar to feminine 
participants in being highly considerate, and similar to masculine 
participants with low personal distress. To sum up, following Skoe 
et al. (in press) androgynous gender role seems to be advantageous 
in the domain of interpersonal morality. In particular, it seems to 
provide women with the assertion to defend their own needs. 
Women’s strong self-assertion became evident when 
considering moral dilemmas, in addition to the BSRI scores. This 
was especially the case on the second round of interviews, when 
women at the highest level of care were the most androgynous, 
and women’s scores at Levels 2.5 and 3 actually indicated 
emphasis on the gender-reversed masculine side. These 
observations prompt the question of why women need such 
powerful assertion. These results can be the object of this study, 
but at the same time they are compatible with recent sociological 
accounts. Women’s strong position in Finland has its historical 
roots in the agricultural society, where the hard work was divided 
equally between genders in the past (Korhonen, 2003). At the 
same time, however, this position is marked by essential self-
sacrifice. According to Matti Kortteinen (1992), women’s self-
sacrifice originates from the wife’s responsible role as the primary 
care-taker of the family during and after the Second World War. 
Personal questioning of this historical ethic is likely to lead to 
conflicts and ruptures in relationships, antagonism and ambivalent 
feelings. Kortteinen argues that the conflicted ethic has two 
potential solutions: chronic depressive self-sacrificing or 
alternatively, aggression. This further suggests that in order to 
overcome the cultural heritage of self-sacrifice, Finnish women 
have had to adopt extremely assertive roles and tactics in their 
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lives. It is possible, that the female participants’ toughness in 
defending their own or their clients’ needs in this study reflect this 
kind of cultural heritage.  
The only separate finding for men was that those at Level 2 
scored marginally higher in femininity than others on the second 
round of study, consistent with Gilligan’s (1982) position. Sparse 
findings for men imply that, contrary to women, “progress” in 
gender roles, that is, achieving androgynous gender role by 
balancing masculinity with femininity is not necessary for men in 
order to become mature in care reasoning. Hence, there may exist 
alternative, not so traditionally feminine ways to realize the care 
ethic among men. These results, even though replicating previous 
ones (Söchting & al., 1994; Skoe 1995) are however approximate, 
because the sample of men was small and obviously biased 
towards androgyny.  
Another striking gender-related notion arose from the self-
concept interviews. Women tended to describe personality 
changes in terms of changes in their selflessness-selfishness, 
whereas the men’s interviews lacked such descriptions. Women’s 
descriptions quite possibly reflected the progress in care 
development, being consistent with the findings on the ECI, and 
the lack of those descriptions among men might be partly 
attributed to the fact that most of them did not show particular 
progress over the 2-year period. Nevertheless, even those who 
progressed did not describe themselves in terms of selfless-
selfishness-continuum as women tended to do. To further 
emphasize this point, it seemed that care development was more 
conscious and far more reflected among women than among men. 
This observation is again consistent with the previous finding that 
levels of care reasoning are more related to women’s identity 
development than that of men (Skoe & Diessner, 1994). Again, 
this sample is too biased to make far-reaching conclusions, 
because women’s and men’s life situations differed as well. Many 
women had a family with children, whereas most men were single 
without children, so the contexts of self-descriptions were 
different. However, these observations indicate that further 
research of gender differences in terms of care and identity 
development is warranted. Following Flanagan (1991, p. 233) 
moral self-concept may have a considerable impact on what one 
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notices, on how one expresses oneself, on how one acts, and how 
one leads one’s life.  
Söchting, Skoe and Marcia (1994) have also suggested that the 
lack of findings for men concerning gender roles and care 
reasoning may be due to the methodological restrictions of the 
ECI. The ECI dilemmas were originally planned for women and 
later modified for men by changing the gender of the protagonist. 
For example, on the unplanned pregnancy dilemma, the female 
protagonist Lisa who is pregnant is in a far more difficult situation 
than the protagonist Derek (Sami) whose lover is pregnant. 
Söchting et al. (1994) recommended designing dilemmas more 
appropriate for men in order to ensure the validity of the ECI for 
men. Söchting (1996) observed also that there was a sort of 
scoring problem concerning dogmatic responses that were invoked 
mainly by men, tending to be scored at Level 2, despite the 
apparent insensitivity to others’ needs. As discussed previously in 
the context of the results, in this study there were no such 
difficulties with hypothetical dilemmas. Instead, men’s care 
reasoning seems to be similar to women across dilemmas and 
levels, with slight qualitative differences in paternalistic rather 
than “maternalistic” emphasis, and men tended to give up efforts 
to solve interpersonal conflicts between adults more easily than 
women, particularly at Level 2. (This can also be a matter of 
verbal style). Given that Level 2 reasoning originates from the 
conventional morality prevalent in the society, norms concerning 
caring for parents and especially children are obviously somewhat 
similar for women and men, at least on the ideological level in the 
Finnish society. Consequently, the ECI dilemmas succeeded in 
pulling for care reasoning for both genders. The proportions of 
justice-based arguments on ECI dilemmas were almost similar for 
genders as well. To conclude, the ECI was quite accurate in 
measuring men’s care reasoning. It is another issue whether the 
competence measured by the hypothetical dilemmas is related to 
actual situations of caring, and this is a problem for both genders. 
Masculinity was found to be associated with justice reasoning 
across gender and time, and this association was especially 
powerful for men on the second round of the study. Past studies 
have reported mixed results, as some studies have found 
associations between masculinity and justice reasoning (e.g., Pratt 
& al., 1984) and some others have not (Skoe, 1995; Wark & 
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Krebs, 1996). Because most men in this study were law 
enforcement students, it is plausible that the vocational 
socialization underlies this association. In other words, the more 
masculine the future police officers are, the more advanced they 
are in justice reasoning, because obviously both characteristics are 
supported from socialization agents, among which the police 
culture seems to be the primary one (Honkonen & Raivola, 1991). 
In this study, advanced participants’ high-level masculinity was 
reflected in their determination and stamina to settle their real-life 
moral conflicts. These findings are in line with Linn’s (1996) 
study, as she pointed out that objecting soldiers’ decision-making 
about to refuse serve as combatants in a war they deemed unjust 
required not only sophisticated moral thinking but ego strength 
and courage to stand alone. 
The related finding to the issue of gender roles was that 
separate self-concept was common at the highest care and justice 
levels. This suggests that individuation processes may contribute 
to balance-seeking between the others’ and one’s own needs at the 
highest care level, rather than relational processes, as Söchting’s 
(1996) study with the more adequate methodology suggests. As 
Grace Clement (1996) argues, the highest level of care seems to 
promote moral autonomy, as the individuals’ identities are not 
completely bound up with their relationships. In the context of 
care moral automomy means ability to examine critically 
relationships and find inclusive solutions for moral problems, 
rather than individualistic and detached decision-making. Given 
that participants with postconventional justice reasoning tended to 
be the most mature in care reasoning, the difference between 
autonomies embedded in each ethic might be theoretical rather 
than empirical. This study suggests that postconformist care 
reasoning may quite closely resemble postconventional justice 
reasoning both sharing autonomous decision-making and attention 
to sustain relationships (Kohlberg & al., 1983; Linn & Gilligan, 
1996).  
Finally, one of the most striking characteristics of this sample 
was the high androgyny in general. The present sample, consisting 
of young Finnish adults, proved to be more androgynous than the 
larger Finnish adult sample, consisting of different vocational 
backgrounds, roughly ten years before (Högbacka & al., 1987). 
Unfortunately there were no recent studies available to compare 
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whether this sample was particularly androgynous in the current 
Finnish context. It is however indicative that no differences were 
found between the gender-related fields of education that represent 
traditional feminine and masculine vocations. Still, it is a 
commonly held assumption which is supported with empirical 
evidence that strong masculinity is a characteristic of Finnish 
police officers (Honkonen, 1999) and the recent police culture 
(Korander, 1999). The long form of the BSRI that includes such 
items as “athletic” and “competitive” might have better captured 
the police officers’ apparent physical masculinity. Nevertheless, 
the lack of education-related differences is a sign of the cultural 
chance in gender role assumptions in Finland over the last 
decades. One indication of this change is that at the moment of the 
writing both the president and the prime minister were women 
(May, 2003). In line with this conclusion, participants appreciated 
both stereotypically feminine and masculine traits. 
9.2.3 Role-taking and moral reasoning 
Role-taking is considered to constitute a cornerstone for justice 
reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Selman, 1980), whereas its 
contribution to care reasoning seems somewhat controversial in 
the light of past theory-building attempts (Gilligan & Wiggins, 
1988; Noddings, 1984). Spontaneous role-taking with real-life 
dilemmas was found to be related to both modes of moral 
reasoning for men, and to care reasoning for women. Compared 
with previous studies (Pratt & al., 1991; Skoe & al., 1996), the 
associations for men were exceptionally powerful. Men’s apparent 
and often explicitly out-spelled role-taking in this study is 
possibly, at least partly, explainable in terms of their professional 
socialization. Seeing events from several viewpoints is a crucial 
skill in police work, as many law enforcement students remarked 
in their self-concept interviews. Given the powerful pre-
socialization in police profession (Honkonen & Raivola, 1991) 
obviously men in this sample are more skilled in role-taking than 
men on average. Supporting this explanation, the association 
between role-taking and moral reasoning strengthened over the 2-
year educational period. Nevertheless this gender-related finding 
is not unique; Eisenberg et al. (2001) have recently found that 
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perspective-taking predicted prosocial reasoning for adolescent 
boys but not for girls. It might be that the readiness to take the 
viewpoint of the “generalized other” is more relevant to men’s 
moral reasoning than that of women, as Gilligan (1982) 
anticipated. On the other hand, women’s mature moral reasoning 
might be more characterized by affective empathy, as this study 
suggests. 
The content analysis of dilemmas revealed that they included 
two types of role-taking, which Hoffman (2000) defines as self-
focused and other-focused. Other-focused role-taking tries to see 
and even experience things as someone else actually sees and 
experiences them and therefore requires relevant information of 
the other person and her/his situation. This kind of role-taking was 
apparent at the highest levels of care, as participants were cautious 
in their interpretations, wanting to know more about the details of 
persons and a situation at hand. My conclusion is that they tried to 
see things in terms of the protagonists or other people, refraining 
from projecting themselves onto their place. This kind of fine-
grained role-taking approaches the postconventional second-order 
Golden Rule, postulated by Kohlberg, (1981, 1986), involving 
respect for another’s feelings. Accordingly, participants with 
postconventional competence employed other-focused role-taking 
strategies, but participants below this level, while being mature 
care reasoners, did so as well. Hence, mature care reasoning seems 
to be qualified by other-focused role-taking that can be interpreted 
to denote a more detailed understanding of persons as particular 
individuals, as the ethic of care dictates (Blum, 1991). 
The theorists of care have maintained that cognitive-based 
role-taking compromises caring. More precisely, self-focused role-
taking through putting oneself in others’ place, has been claimed 
to be latently egocentric, as it entails the tendency to confuse one’s 
perspective with the objective standpoint (Gilligan, 1987). 
Moreover, Gilligan and Wiggins (1988) have argued that cognitive 
perspective-taking may lead to passive acceptance of victimizing, 
because it provides the moral agent with multiple lenses to view a 
situation at hand. The present results, however, indicate that role-
taking seems to be more central to care reasoning than to justice 
reasoning, which can also operate through other elements besides 
role-taking (Colby & al., 1987). Given that cognitive perspective-
taking is inherent in role-taking, its usage is not inevitably 
268 
 
accompanied by flaws in the realm of care reasoning. Perspective-
taking as such is morally neutral and can be used for both right 
and wrong purposes (Kohlberg, 1984), as it is to some extent 
under the individual’s voluntary control (Hoffman, 2000). In 
concrete terms, one can hardly deny that other-focused 
perspective-taking in particular is helpful in searching for the 
balanced solution, when the needs of several persons are 
conflicted with each other. Notably, care reasoning at the self-
oriented and conventional levels may be based on simple role-
taking as well. Through putting oneself in another’s shoes, a care-
taker can confuse their own needs with those of another. 
These observations concerning two types of role-taking are 
nevertheless preliminary, because they were based on spontaneous 
role-taking. No attempt was made to scrutinize role-taking with 
systematic probing in interviews and the content analysis was 
made post hoc. Relations between role-taking and care reasoning 
should be re-examined with more appropriate measurement in 
order to ensure the reliability of findings. 
9.2.4 Emotional empathy and moral reasoning 
Empathy has been argued to be congruent with the ethic of care 
(Hoffman, 2000) and affective-based empathy in particular has 
been argued to be characteristic for it (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). 
Based on the previous theory-building, two alternative predictions 
were provided. It was predicted that high emotional empathy is 
associated with conventional caring, participants at Level 2 being 
more empathic than others. On the other hand, it was also 
predicted that emotional empathy may increase with care 
reasoning in a linear way. Moreover, based on the previous studies 
it was hypothesized that emotional empathy is related to self-
reported femininity. This proved to be true for both genders and at 
both times of testing, replicating some current results (Eisenberg 
& al. 2001; Carnal & al., 1998; Skoe & al., in press). Indeed, the 
rest of results on emotional empathy appeared to be quite 
complex. Participants at Level 2 were not more empathic than 
others at either time. The alternative prediction about the linear 
relation did not gain support from correlation analyses either. 
Instead, a surprising finding emerged on the second round of the 
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study. Participants at the highest level of care were the most 
empathic and this difference hold across gender. Furthermore, it 
revealed that participants at the highest level were the only ones 
that had increased emotional empathy over the 2-year period. 
Affective-based empathic capacities are obviously not so 
closely connected with care-based reasoning as philosophical 
analyses suggest, emphasizing emotionalism as an distinguishing 
mark of the care ethic (Blum, 1988; Carse, 1991). Nevertheless, it 
seems rational to assume that emotional empathy indicates a 
definite aspect of care-based morality, because it has been found 
to be associated with helping and altruistic behavior (see Davis, 
1994; Eisenberg, 2000), even though it has also been claimed to 
represent general emotional reactivity (Chlopan & al., 1985). 
Empathy obviously contributes to the domain of moral sensitivity 
rather than to that of moral judgment (Rest & al., 1994, 1999). 
Given that care reasoning represents moral judgment, the loose 
and occasional connections between the ECI and emotional 
empathy are understandable. 
Participants at Care Level 3 scored the highest in emotional 
empathy only after the 2-year education. My interpretation is that 
the continuing exposure to care-related issues through education 
has activated these participants’ potential empathic capacities. At 
the highest level of care, the individual is no longer confused 
about selfishness and responsibility, and therefore she or he is able 
to take care of herself or himself as well as others (Skoe, 1993). 
She or he is freer to empathize with others and can recognize 
subtle, even non-verbalized needs through emotional empathy. 
The balance between self and others indicates that the person is 
capable of dealing with personal distress, and thus is less prone to 
empathic over-arousal. This capacity may also be connected with 
other-focused role-taking that mature participants in care 
reasoning tended to use. Seeing others in their own terms, rather 
than imagining oneself in their place, is less likely to lead to 
empathic over-arousal (Batson, Early & Salvarani, 1997; 
Hoffman, 2000). In addition, if over-arousal actually intensifies 
motivation to help in committed relationships, as Hoffman 
proposes, the most mature care-takers at Level 3 seem to be very 
sophisticated in terms of empathy. Namely, their real-life 
dilemmas revealed committed relationships, professional and 
personal ones. Conceivably, the established balance between self 
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and others at the highest level of care provides the most adequate 
structure for affective-based empathy to blossom. The alternative 
or complementary explanation would be, given the QMEE 
measures the individual’s conception of self, that the most mature 
participants were the most motivated in seeing themselves as 
empathic. 
Emotional empathy was found to be positively related to care 
reasoning about real-life dilemmas on the posttest. Moreover, 
emotional empathy was positively related to justice reasoning for 
women, and women at Stage 4/5 were the most empathic. This is 
consistent with Kohlberg, Boyd and Levine’s (1990) contention 
that postconventional morality provides individuals with advanced 
sympathy to see others in their terms, through the understanding of  
them as persons and through the understanding of general facts of 
their condition. In essence, significant findings at the posttest 
indicate that emotional empathy was organized differently through 
participants’ experiences over time. Obviously the participants had 
learned to utilize their empathic capacities in real-life conflicts. In 
addition, the most mature participants in care reasoning and the 
most mature women in justice reasoning had enhanced their 
overall empathy. This further suggests that affective-based 
empathy is regulated by moral cognition (embedded in different 
developmental levels) rather than the other way around, consistent 
with Kohlberg et al.’s (1983) position. 
To summarize, these results suggest that emotional empathy 
and care reasoning represent distinct aspects of care-based 
morality, emotional empathy representing a clearly feminine voice 
whereas care reasoning at the highest levels is more or less 
“masculine”, in terms of self-direction. It is worth pointing out 
that female nursing students and social work students scored 
higher in empathy than women on average (Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972) or Finnish students in technology and business (Myyry & 
Helkama, 2001). Thus, a different pattern for emotional empathy 
and care reasoning might have emerged in a more representative 
sample. Women’s high emotional empathy can possibly serve as a 
motivational base for their choice of care-oriented vocation in the 
current sample.  
It is worth reminding that the QMEE is a self-report measure, 
which imposes some reservations on interpreting the results. The 
QMEE may reflect individuals’ willingness to fit the ideal-self 
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expectations rather than actual responsiveness. The huge gender 
difference, also evident in this study, may signify women’s 
willingness to present themselves as empathic in accordance with 
the socially accepted feminine gender role (Eisenberg & Lennon, 
1982). Given that androgyny seems to be the most favored gender 
role orientation in this sample, this explanation seems less 
plausible. Empathy is however highly valued within nursing and 
social work educations, so social expectations and internalized 
values might have influenced self-ratings to some extent.  
I would like to emphasize that these results as such, derived 
from correlations between different measures, do not refute the 
position that care reasoning is qualified by affective-based 
empathy. Possibly care dilemmas elicit direct empathic reactions, 
but within individuals’ limits. Actually, recent findings by Skoe, 
Eisenberg and Cumberland (2002) are congruent with this 
assumption, as they found that participants’ usage of care 
orientation in real-life dilemmas was associated with feelings of 
sympathy. Investigating empathy in actual care-related situations 
with more objective measures should be a next step in future 
research. 
9.3 Moral development 
9.3.1 Progress in care and justice reasoning 
 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether care 
reasoning, measured by the ECI, forms a developmental sequence.  
Because care reasoning (measured with the complete ECI 
procedure) has not been studied with longitudinal data before, it 
made sense to measure justice development as well, in order to 
compare features of development. For this purpose, care and 
justice-oriented student subsamples were selected and interviewed 
at the beginning of the studies (within two months) and 2 years 
after. It was predicted that all student groups will progress in 
justice reasoning, due to well-established findings that education 
promotes justice development, at least up to Stage 4 (Kohlberg & 
Higgins, 1984; Nucci & Pascarella, 1987). It was also predicted 
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that practical nursing and social work students progress in care 
reasoning. The rationale behind this prediction was that education 
serves as a facilitating factor for potential development, because 
caring is the constant theme across most courses, and training 
periods may offer strong care-related experiences. Practical 
nursing students were studying for their first vocation, and most of 
them were in late adolescence at the pretest. So, it was expectable 
that their age-related care development was still in process, due to 
big changes in their relationships. In turn, social work students 
were studying for a second-career program, indicating their 
willingness to progress in their careers from the grass-root level 
upwards. My former personal observation was that starting studies 
in such a second-career program in adulthood is linked to personal 
crises, which in turn has been argued to promote care development 
(Skoe, 1998).  
As predicted, all student groups progressed in justice 
reasoning, and this progress exceeded the natural speed of justice 
development in young adulthood found previously. Still, progress 
among law enforcement students was marginal in terms of general 
increase in moral maturity scores (15 points). However, 35% of 
them showed an increase of ½ stage that can be considered a 
psychologically meaningful increase. My conclusion is that the 
progress for them was real, and as a group, law enforcement 
students progressed modestly. Law enforcement students’ moral 
reasoning was relatively high already on the first round of 
interviews, so Stage 4 may have served as the ceiling for 
development in this educational context. Kohlberg and Higgins 
(1984) have argued that development after Stage 4 requires, in 
addition to moral conflicts, more extensive role-taking 
opportunities and personal experiences of responsibility in the 
context of work. Thus, postconventional development is 
intermittent within education, especially in the absence of specific 
educational interventions. In total, nine students showed the shift 
to postconventional reasoning over the 2-year period, and most of 
them were social work students in their thirties. Average ages for 
participants that scored Stage 4/5 were 32.5 (Time 1) and 30.4 
years (Time 2). Only one participant reached Stage 5 and only in 
the first interview. So, those participants were experiencing 
postconventional transition rather than were pure Stage 5 
reasoners. The fact that none of the participants reached Stage 5 
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(even none of the seven who were at the transitional stage in the 
beginning of the studies already) underscores the difficulty of 
postconventional transition. It seems reasonable to expect that the 
potential consolidation of Stage 5 takes place later in the situations 
where individuals are genuinely responsible for choices that 
influence the welfare of other people (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984). 
It is also worth pointing out that controlling for the effect of age 
removed the effect for repeated measures, suggesting that the 
effect of education is confounded by other factors (Nucci & 
Pascarella, 1987). 
Social work and female practical nursing students progressed 
in care reasoning, consistent with the expectation. Even though 
law enforcement students did not show statistically significant 
increase in the t-test, analyses of variance failed to show that their 
longitudinal change were different from those of practical nursing 
and social work students. Still, many more of practical nursing 
(50%) and social work students (45%) showed at least the increase 
of ½ level, compared with law enforcement students (26%). I 
conclude that these findings give moderate support for the 
assumption that law enforcement students’ progress was less 
pronounced than those of practical nursing and social work 
students. This conclusion seems conceivable in the light of the 
presumptions that growth in care reasoning originates from crisis 
experiences that have been successfully worked out (Gilligan, 
1982) and that practical nursing and social work education with 
the emphasis on care issues provide cognitive-emotional means to 
cope with such crises. As was the case for justice reasoning, 
controlling for age removed the effect for repeated measures in 
care reasoning, but qualified by marginally significant Gender X 
Field of Study interaction effect, showing that female practical 
nursing and social work students progressed, irrespective of age. 
That is, there was some support for my expectation that care-
related education facilitate care development. This in turn makes 
progress in these educational contexts less irregular. I would like 
to underscore that not all students progressed in care reasoning, so 
education seems to serve as a facilitator rather than being the 
primus motor of development.  
I want to note that the general level of care reasoning in this 
sample was roughly similar to previous studies (cf. Skoe, 1998) in 
the beginning of education, whereas after the 2-year period, it was 
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higher when even 27% were scored at the highest level of care. 
This exceptionally high level is mainly due to the contribution by 
social work students. Because they can be regarded as a sort of 
care experts, these findings gives additional support for the ECI as 
a valid measure of care-based moral reasoning. 
9.3.2 Characteristics of moral development 
In order to confirm whether care levels form a developmental 
sequence, it was hypothesized that participants progress in the 
invariant sequence without skipping any developmental levels. 
The hypothesis of invariant sequence was confirmed for both 
modes of moral reasoning. In total, 5% of the participants skipped 
one ½ level in care reasoning, whereas 3% of them skipped one ½ 
stage in justice reasoning at either time of testing. Skips in both 
modes of moral reasoning took place within single interviews. To 
sum up, on the first round of the interviews, 97% of the 
participants met the criterion of the invariant sequence for both 
modes of moral reasoning, whereas on the second round, 98% met 
the criterion for care reasoning and 100% for justice reasoning. 
The Piagetian criteria for developmental stages involve the 
demand for structural wholeness as well. Therefore, the 
consistency of moral reasoning across different dilemmas was 
investigated. With regard to both measures, between-dilemma 
correlations were somewhat lower than reported in other 
consistency findings (Colby & al., 1987; Skoe, 1998). With regard 
to care reasoning, this slight heterogeneity is mainly due to real-
life dilemmas that yielded somewhat lower scores than other 
dilemmas. Later analyses revealed that there was one type of 
dilemma in effect, particularly in the second interviews when 
dilemmas dealing with transgressions invoked significantly lower 
care reasoning than other types of dilemma. In turn, the euthanasia 
dilemma tended to invoke higher reasoning than other justice 
dilemmas and some practical nursing and social work students 
gave occasional incoherent Stage 5 responses. 
The consistency was defined as ½ stage/level that allows the 
individual to hold transitional and full stage/level reasoning at the 
same time. According this criterion 76% (Time 1) and 78% (Time 
2) of participants showed consistency across the four ECI 
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dilemmas. In comparison, 81% (Time 1) and 78% (Time 2) 
showed consistency across the three MJI dilemmas. When the 
real-life dilemma was dropped, the consistency for the ECI 
dilemmas was as high as 95% at both pre- and postinterviews. 
Conversely, when the real-life dilemmas are taken into 
consideration, the heterogeneity of justice reasoning appeared to 
be of considerable degree, as only 53% (Time 1) and 38% (Time 2) 
showed consistency across all four dilemmas. Seemingly higher 
consistency in care reasoning is however mitigated by the fact that 
a narrower, 5-point scale measures care reasoning, whereas a 9-
point scale measures justice reasoning (even though adults’ moral 
reasoning does not usually cover the lowest stages). The sensible 
conclusion may be that the consistencies of care and justice 
reasoning are of the roughly same degree on the hypothetical 
dilemmas, whereas with real-life dilemmas the consistency of 
justice reasoning decreases drastically. 
Kohlberg et al. (1983) have argued that care development 
represents the soft stage rather than the hard stage development 
that presupposes irreversible progress. Gilligan (1982) pointed out 
that crises involve potential for both growth and regression, even 
though the characteristics of regression remained unclear in her 
writings. Care reasoning has also been found to be related to 
Loevinger’s ego identity development (Skoe & Lippe, 2002) that 
Kohlberg et al. (1983) used as an example of soft stage 
development. Consequently, the prediction was that there would 
be more regression cases in care development than in justice 
development, which actually should not have regression cases. 
Results revealed that there were two cases with the actual drop of 
½ stage within justice reasoning (according to the global stage 
classification there were four regression cases, but for the two of 
them the drop was less than 17 WAS points). Respectively, two 
participants dropped ½ level and one participant dropped 1 level 
within care reasoning. Hence, 3% of the participants regressed in 
justice reasoning, whereas 5% regressed in care reasoning. The 
number of regression cases was roughly similar, so the hypothesis 
did not gain any support. 
With regard to the question of regression, I still would like to 
raise the point that according to my observations, regression seems 
to be a real option in care reasoning. The interviews of regressed 
participants revealed frustration and even cynicism that was 
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strongest for the participant who regressed most. A follow-up 
interview revealed that he had been undergoing a severe crisis 
that, according to Gilligan (1982) may lead to loss and despair. In 
the absence of care from others and self, the person may retreat to 
defend the survival of self and her or his previous care ethic is 
potentially transformed into moral nihilism. This participant 
seemed to end up in this kind of situation and he even gave up his 
career as a care worker. What was interesting, however, that 
simultaneously he progressed in justice reasoning and later on, 
showed recovery in the follow-up check interview. This suggests 
that care development entails a certain motivational component, in 
addition to the cognitive one. My interpretation is that the 
participant was not willing to use his apparent role-taking 
capacities in his regressive “nihilist” state. Speculatively, possibly 
more skilful probing would have pushed this participant to use his 
capacities more. However, I deem this inappropriate, because the 
essence of care is sensitivity to the needs of other people in 
different situations. An indifferent and uncaring attitude towards 
hypothetical persons in the dilemmas quite possibly reflects an 
actual attitude in real-life situations. Does regression transform 
patterns of thought or is regression more a matter of motivation? 
How lasting can the regressed state be? These questions are left to 
be answered in future studies. 
In light of these parallel findings, it is difficult to conclude that 
care and justice would represent different types of development. 
Recently, the nature of justice development has been questioned as 
well. Rest et al. (1999) have argued that Kohlberg misinterpreted 
Piaget’s developmental criteria, and consequently, they 
recommend substituting the construct of stage with the construct 
of schema that does not differentiate rigidly the structure of moral 
thought from its content. The assumption that latter stages 
transform earlier stages leading to homogeneous reasoning has 
also been challenged with empirical evidence (e.g., Krebs, 
Vermeulen & al. 1991, Krebs, Carpendale & al., 1991). Because 
Kohlberg et al. (1983) regarded the aforementioned assumptions 
as criteria for hard stage development, it paradoxically seems that 
nowadays justice development is seen as representing soft stage 
development, even though the hard stage model is supported as 
well (see Walker, 2002). This study with the interval of two years 
is nevertheless inadequate in exploring the nature of development 
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in more specific terms. Most longitudinal studies investigating 
hard stage development have tested participants with 4-year 
intervals over long periods (Armon & Dawson, 1998; Colby & al., 
1987). In addition to the shortness of the time interval, most 
participants were full-time students, which makes it impossible to 
differentiate “natural” change from the effect of education that 
may be artificial to some extent (recall that controlling for age 
removed differences between pre- and posttests). In sum, this 
study suggests that care development parallels justice 
development, but a detailed investigation of its nature is required. 
9.3.4 Relation between care and justice development 
Initially Gilligan (1982) argued that care and justice represent 
separate and alternative paths of developments. Contradicting this 
assumption, care and justice reasoning were relatively strongly 
related to each other in this study. The relation was even more 
pronounced for real-life dilemmas than for hypothetical dilemmas. 
The strong relations in this study can partly be explained in terms 
of high variation in justice reasoning, from Stage 2 to Stage 5. In 
addition, the present participants might actually be more oriented 
towards morality issues in general, rather than care and justice, as 
I presupposed. Choosing social work and law enforcement 
profession may signify general prosocial orientation that serves 
both ethics of care and justice in the end. Motives for becoming a 
police officer include willingness to help others (Honkonen & 
Raivola, 1991), and respectively, the recent strategy for social 
work education emphasizes empowering clients and promoting 
social justice (National Strategy for Polytechnic Education in 
Social Services, 2000). The relative synthesis of care and justice 
reasoning was most apparent at the highest levels of development. 
The analysis of work-related dilemmas further suggested that the 
most mature participants tended to use both modes of reasoning 
and tried to integrate them in order to achieve satisfactory 
solutions, irrespective of education. 
In brief, the above results indicate that care and justice partly 
share the same underlying basic line of development. Some 
tentative proposals for this development are now available. Skoe 
and Lippe (2002) have suggested, by referring to Snarey (1998) 
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that certain factors of ego development, such as cognitive style, 
impulse control and character development, may underlie both 
modes of development that both regard as a departure point for 
leaving self-oriented concern. Also progress in role-taking seems 
to contribute to both modes of development (Skoe & al., 1996). 
The more skilled the individual is in taking another person’s point 
of view, the more developed sense of care and justice she or he 
has. The current findings imply that role-taking is even relatively 
more relevant to care competence than to justice competence. 
More careful research is required to look into this rather surprising 
finding in light of previous literature that defines role-taking as 
essential for justice development in particular (Gilligan, 1982; 
Kohlberg, 1984). 
This study suggests that the highest levels of care are usually 
attained before the highest levels of justice within the individuals’ 
developmental schedule. Three participants had attained the 
highest level of care even at Justice Stage 3. In turn, participants at 
Stage 3/4 showed the widest range of levels in care development. 
In light of this data it seems that entering postconventional 
transition in justice reasoning requires that the individual has 
already entered postconformist/conventional transition in care 
development or does that simultaneously. This data still suggests 
that this order is not inevitable, as two participants had reached 
Stage 4/5 without having passed the respective transition in care 
development yet. 
Postconformist transition in care development emerges earliest 
at Justice Stages 3 and 3/4 and was usually completed when 
entering Stage 4/5. Emerging subjective moral standards at Justice 
Stage 3/4 coincide with the subjectivism at Care Level 2.5. This 
became evident in some participants’ responses as they argued that 
a protagonist in a dilemma has to help others if she would feel 
responsible for doing that, or if she believes what she is doing is 
right from her viewpoint. Among current participants, the 
transition towards the highest level of care was nevertheless most 
strongly combined with Stage 4 in justice development. 
Interestingly, this combination means increasing critical attitude 
towards the conventions of caring and self-sacrifice in 
relationships, whereas the society is still seen as a conventional 
social order that deserves unquestionable support. 
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This combination proved to be psychologically painful to 
some participants in their real-life conflicts, when norms and 
justice principles held by institutions violated or threatened actions 
of care. Their moral conflicts seemed to remain in unsolvable 
tension, when non-conventional effort to take care of (oneself or 
others) were experienced as subjectively right but simultaneously 
wrong from the justice perspective. Due to its painfulness, this 
kind of moral conflicts may profoundly stimulate justice 
development in the long run. Criticism and emerging subjective 
morality within relationships is generalized to concern institutional 
and societal arrangements as well. A couple of dilemmas that 
presented such a conflict in this data gave a clue that a single, even 
though difficult conflict is not sufficient to transform justice 
thinking from conventional into postconventional. Rather, it might 
be that postconventional transition takes place gradually through 
accumulating experiences of similar kind of conflicts. 
To conclude, it is possible that postconventional transitions in 
both care and justice development reflect general growth in the 
understanding of moral rules as human constructions open to 
critique (see Skoe, 1998 for further elaboration). This data 
suggests that transition begins in the domain of care and then 
spreads into the domain of justice. As the ethic of care mainly 
concerns everyday personal relations and the ethic of justice 
concerns more abstract institutional and societal relations 
including strangers, it is likely that transition takes place first in 
the former domain. Transition may also be affected by the content 
of social and societal norms and ideologies. For example, Snarey 
(1998) observed that mature Israeli kibbutz founders at Stage 4/5 
experienced a tension between their need to become more caring 
of and fair to themselves as individuals versus their need to 
continue caring and protecting the rights of other kibbutz 
members. This implies that if self-sacrifice is inherent in the 
ideology, maybe people undergo postconventional transition in 
care and justice thought simultaneously. Societal norms may 
provide differing approaches to the ethic of care in different 
societies, traditional societies placing emphasis on the ethic of 
self-sacrifice, or the welfare of community (Czyzowska & 
Niemczynski, 1998), and western societies placing emphasis on 
rights of individuals. With regard to cultural differences, Shimizu 
(2000) found that Japanese male adolescents saw caring as a 
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communal responsibility and combined care and justice in their 
moral thought. In keeping with Gilligan (1982), the present 
findings nevertheless indicate that advances in justice 
development facilitate care development, obviously because they 
provide individuals with the cognitive tools to justify their own 
needs in the larger societal context. 
In addition, personal experiences and different circumstances 
in life may contribute to individuals’ time-tables and relation 
between care and justice development. There were two 
participants (law enforcement students) at Stage 4/5 with 
conventional care reasoning, and three participants (practical 
nursing students) at the highest care level combined with Stage 3 
justice reasoning. Perhaps different exposure to care and justice 
issues during life makes one or the other of moral developments 
more salient. The societal context may have impact on divergent 
developments as well. In societies where the issues of caring 
belong to the private sphere of household (and women) and issues 
of justice belong mainly to the public sphere, progress along either 
path of development is more likely (cf. Tronto, 1991). On the 
other hand, in societies where the spheres of care and justice 
overlap in the sense that taking care of the dependent, such as 
children, the elderly and the sick, is supported and guaranteed by 
the society, individuals’ care and justice development are likely to 
more connected with each other. Nevertheless, this study suggests 
that care and justice reasoning are likely to integrate at Stage 4/5, 
as the proportion of participants at Care Level 3 sharply increased. 
According to Kohlberg et al. (1983, 1990) this postconventional 
integration is possible, because rigid applying of rules and norms 
is replaced by more flexible principle-driven thinking, 
accompanied by the respect for people’s dignity. The present 
findings clearly support this view.  
Those participants who were at conventional Justice Stages 
3/4 and 4 showed a range of levels from 1.5 to 3 in care 
development. If these results are generalized to the whole 
population, the majority of which holds a mixture of Stages 3 and 
4 reasoning (Colby & al., 1987), it follows that care development 
is actually more informative in terms of individuals’ moral 
capacities than justice development. Most people do not reach the 
postconventional justice stages at all, and those who do, do not do 
that until in late twenties or thirties at the earliest (Armon & 
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Dawson, 1997; Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984). Indeed, the highest 
level of care is likely to be more attainable, even though not 
common (Skoe, 1998). This further confirms Gilligan’s (1982) 
position that the ethic of care is of uttermost significance to real-
life morality. 
It seemed that the more just one is, the more caring one is. It is 
easy to imagine stereotypes of caring but unjust persons and vice 
versa (Flanagan, 1991). In this study, the most striking examples 
were two participants with the Justice Stage 4 and Care Level 1.5 
combination, and three participants with the Stage 3 and Level 3 
combination. Maybe a widely-known stereotype of highly just 
person who are insensitive or even cruel in relationships implies 
Stage 4 thinking that inspires a strong sense of justice through 
adherence to social norms and laws (Rest & al., 1999) rather than 
more flexible thinking in postconventional terms. Respectively, 
the stereotype of a caring person who remains blind to social 
injustices may illustrate a conventional caretaker who limits 
her/his caring activities to her/his own family members, rather 
than being a reflective care-taker. It would be of interest to try and 
find some extreme cases with the full postconventional Stage 5 
reasoning combined with immature care reasoning, but my guess 
is that they scarcely exist. 
Nuances of the ethics of care and justice have constantly been 
under discussion. For example, Lawrence Blum (1991) argues that 
sensitivity to injustices derived from principled thinking does not 
guarantee sensitivity to violations of dignity in actual situations. In 
turn, Alice Carse points out (1998) that impartial principle-driven 
thinking may override attention to differences pertinent to the 
ethic of care. In general, the fine-grained philosophical debate 
about which is better or more adequate, care or justice, misses the 
point that both capacities can be possessed by the same individual. 
In terms of psychological realism, if a morally motivated person is 
capable of recognizing everyone’s needs and balancing them, why 
would she/he not do that, instead of just calculating them from the 
dispassionate, abstract justice perspective? In this study, many 
participants incorporated both aspects in their real-life conflicts. 
Instead of withdrawing, the postconventional participants 
recommended honest communication as a means of solving 
conflicts, and considered sustaining relationships an important 
moral criterion. Quite remarkably, the revised definition of 
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postconventional morality of justice does not convey isolated 
moral decision-making, guided by abstract moral principles as the 
only way of judgment. Rather, postconventional thinking means a 
process where moral agents are involved with in open debate in 
order to validate their moral ideals (Rest & al., 1999.) 
One additional observation in this study was that many 
participants at Stages 3 and 3/4 still showed self-oriented care 
reasoning at Level 1.5. Consequently, Stage 3 reasoning, being 
characterized as showing concern for others, keeping mutual 
relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude (Colby 
& al., 1987) does not fully match conventional care. Actually, 
only 32% of Stage 3 judgments are care-oriented (Wark & Krebs, 
1996). Thus, the care aspect embedded in Stage 3 seems to have 
been overestimated in previous literature. Obviously the other-
oriented concern therein does not fully reflect the essence of self-
sacrifice but rather signifies initial understanding of the first-order 
Golden Rule as a moral guide. By contrast, the importance of 
another’s point of view is often evident already at Care Level 1.5, 
but the person does not follow it for selfish reasons. One 
additional explanation would be that the MJI dilemmas are more 
hypothetical than the ECI dilemmas, making moral problem-
solving with them easier, when actual consequences remain more 
implicit. 
To summarize, the present results verify that care development 
measured by the ECI and justice development, measured by the 
MJI represent different, albeit interrelated developmental paths. 
Even though considerations of care, relationship, and interpersonal 
trust are represented as norms and elements at each stage in the 
MJI scoring scheme (Colby & Damon, 1983), the MJI and the ECI 
measure different aspects of interpersonal morality. Because the 
MJI remains insensitive to the dynamics of relationships, it is not 
suited to revealing the developmental path of care. To crystallize 
the most important conclusion from this study, care reasoning 
seems to be a true developmental phenomenon in its own right. 
Levels of care reasoning did not only represent different modes of 
problem-solving that are evoked when encountering moral 
conflicts (Brown, Tappan & Gilligan, 1993), but in addition, 
constituted a developmental sequence in this sample. 
  
 
283 
9.4 Real-life moral reasoning 
9.4.1 Moral orientations in real-life moral conflicts 
Real-life dilemmas as a part of the ECI procedure offered a chance 
to investigate real-life moral reasoning in the context of this study. 
Wark and Krebs’s (1996) classification proved to be sensitive to 
the content of the real-life dilemmas and it was used for 
investigation purposes. Antisocial and prosocial dilemmas were 
roughly equally presented in the current data, whereas social 
pressure dilemmas were in the minority at both pre- and 
postinterviews. Even though participants did not show consistency 
in the type of dilemma they reported at different times, the 
proportion of each type remained similar across time. This 
indicates that care-oriented, prosocial, and justice-oriented, 
antisocial conflicts are a salient part of real-life morality, giving 
rise to two different moral voices. Practical nursing and social 
work students as well as women in general reported more 
prosocial conflicts than law enforcement students and men, who in 
turn reported more antisocial conflicts. Hence, the expected 
gender- and education-related choices emerged at both pre- and 
post-interviews, but it is worth re-emphasizing that individuals per 
se did not report similar types of conflicts at different times. In 
other words, even though in general law enforcement students 
were more focused on antisocial conflicts, and nursing and social 
work students were more focused on prosocial conflicts, this does 
not indicate that single individuals fit into this generalization 
rigidly over time.  
Real-life dilemmas were approached from two different 
perspectives, in terms of moral orientation and development. 
Lyons’s (1983) procedure was used to classify the content of 
moral conflicts, and consequently, it was of interest to explore, 
whether participants are consistent in orientation usage over time, 
which should be a case, if the proposed internal moral orientations 
existed (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Results revealed from 
modest to moderate consistencies for social work and law 
enforcement students and men in general. Law enforcement 
students systematically shifted towards justice orientation over 
time, which explains their greater consistency. Law enforcement 
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students’ strengthened emphasis on justice orientation may denote 
an evolving “police personality” with a somewhat rigid approach 
to moral issues (Morgan, Morgan, Foster & Kolbert, 2000). 
However, social work students and most law enforcement students 
used a combination of both orientations at both times, so their 
consistency cannot be interpreted to signify an alternative internal 
focus on care or justice, as Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) defined 
“orientation”. 
Past accumulating research has verified that the most 
important predictor of moral orientation is the type of dilemma 
(Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Consistent with the prediction, moral 
orientation was related to the type of moral conflict participants 
chose to discuss. Antisocial conflicts tended to invoke justice-
based considerations, whereas prosocial conflicts tended to invoke 
care-based considerations, replicating the findings of Wark and 
Krebs (1996, 1997, 2000) as well as Haviv and Leman (2002). 
Instead, social pressure dilemmas invoked basically justice-based 
considerations, somewhat inconsistent with Wark and Krebs’s 
(1996, 1997) findings. On the second round, gender was 
associated with moral orientation usage, in addition to the type of 
dilemma. Men invoked somewhat more justice-based arguments 
than women across all but social pressure dilemmas. However, 
because education and gender were confounded, one cannot 
distinguish whether orientations were actually gender or 
education-related. Apparently education and socialization effects 
have made law enforcement students oriented to recognizing 
justice issues, and respectively, practical nursing and social work 
students have grown more sensitive towards care issues. These 
analyses nevertheless did not remove the dilemma effect. 
The above findings underscore the notion by Jaffee and Hyde 
(2000) that the content of dilemma is of crucial importance when 
studying real-life reasoning. Because the type of dilemma has not 
been controlled for in past studies, they have led to false 
conclusions particularly with regard to gender differences. 
Similarly, it makes no sense to investigate associations between 
the orientation usage determined by the type of dilemma and 
developmental measures. Consequently, it was not a surprise that 
moral orientation usage and the ECI and the MJI were not 
systematically related to each other in this study (even though 
occasional significant positive correlations between care 
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orientation and levels of justice reasoning among men emerged). 
What was more surprising was that moral orientations were not 
related to levels of moral reasoning with real-life dilemmas either. 
Most strikingly, social pressure dilemmas that were scored highly 
justice-oriented elicited the highest levels of care reasoning. This 
suggests that Lyons’s (1983) Moral Orientation Interview and the 
ECI measure different aspects of care-based reasoning. 
Closer analysis revealed that within social pressure dilemmas, 
care was crystallized in values and principles that were scored to 
represent justice orientation. This observation is significant to the 
fundamental question whether the ethic of care can take the form 
of principles. The early philosophical analyses of the ethic of care 
contrasted care with principled thinking, as “to care is to act not by 
fixed rules but affection and regard” (Noddings, 1984, p. 245). 
Flanagan (1991) argues against this non-cognitive bias by pointing 
out that caring has to be guided by beliefs, principles and ideals in 
order to be extended to strangers, and Hoffman (2000) defines 
principle-based caring as another form of care besides the 
empathy-driven caring. The individual may internalize the general 
principle of always considering others, and as a result, expression 
of this principle through acts of care affirms the ethical self. 
Actually, internalized caring gives the individual more choice and 
control and makes him or her feel more responsible, argues 
Hoffman (p. 18). The picture emerging from this study is 
congruent with the views presented by Flanagan and Hoffman. 
Those participants who feel obliged to follow their values or moral 
ideas seemed to be ready to make even long-term efforts in order 
to protect or enhance welfare of other people. Their activities were 
not necessarily directly involved with others through immediate 
responding to their needs, but took place in the background. 
Because they nevertheless wanted to ensure the well-being of 
others, I interpret such activity to represent a valid form of care. 
Hence, the present results support the position that the ethic of 
care can take the form of a principle through internalizing values 
that serve welfare of other people. 
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9.4.2 Heterogeneity of justice reasoning 
Based on extensive past evidence, justice reasoning about real-life 
dilemmas was predicted to be lower than reasoning about 
hypothetical dilemmas. Consistent with the prediction, temptation, 
transgression (Time 2) and needs of others dilemmas elicited lower 
levels of justice reasoning, whereas by contrast, social pressure, 
conflicting demands and transgression (Time 2) dilemmas elicited 
similar levels to hypothetical dilemmas. Hence, the results were 
qualified by the effect of dilemma type again.  
A thorough content analysis revealed some obvious reasons 
for the effect of dilemma type. First, the unexpected finding that 
over 20% of the dilemmas activated participants’ full competence 
in justice reasoning seems to be explainable in terms of their 
complexity. Conflicting demands dilemmas involved complicated 
situations that were difficult to handle and resolve satisfactorily. 
Consequently, participants were pushed to use their whole role-
taking capacity, as the highest scores on role-taking indicated. In 
turn, social pressure dilemmas provided a slightly different view, 
where moral conflicts originated from a clash between 
participants’ values and demands by other people or by 
surrounding institutions. Participants seemed to be forced to find 
well-grounded explanations for their deviant opinions or actions. 
These two types of dilemma resemble the Kohlbergian 
dilemmas and thus are easy to interpret in terms of Kohlbergs’s 
model. Conflicting demands dilemmas were qualified with 
judgments trying to maximize welfare of all people involved, and 
social pressure dilemmas were dominated by perfectionist 
judgments with striving to uphold the integrity of moral self, or to 
promote harmonious relationships. Even though these dilemmas 
were in the minority, their existence verifies that the 
“Kohlbergian” justice reasoning does have validity in real life, 
consistent with some past studies (Walker, DeVries & Treventhan, 
1987; Walker & al., 1995). Thus, Kohlberg’s model is not only an 
academic ivory-tower enterprise, as has widely been claimed (e.g. 
Gilligan, 1982; Krebs, Denton & al., 1991). One conceivable 
explanation for these results is the methodology which differs 
from Wark and Krebs’s (1997) methodology as well as from their 
results. The participants in this study were allowed to generate 
their real-life conflicts freely, which increased the likelihood that 
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they reported personally significant conflicts. Moreover, dilemma 
classifications were derived from the participants’ subjective 
interpretation of the situation. To sum up, these results suggest 
that when the moral agent perceives elements of conflicting rights 
or needs, or alternatively social pressure that threatens to violate 
personal moral integrity, a problematic situation turns out to be a 
hard, in the Kohlbergian sense genuine, moral dilemma.  
In order to understand the lowered justice reasoning with other 
types of dilemma, the needs of others dilemma seems to be the 
easiest to explain. The needs of others dilemmas concerned 
personal relationships, often with one person, and the core of the 
conflict was how to respond to the needs of another in the best 
way, or how to balance the needs of self and another person. No 
societal contexts were mentioned or questioned that might have 
given rise to higher-stage judgments, consistent with Armon’s 
(1988) observations. It is an open question whether there actually 
were such concerns present, but the participants failed to perceive 
them. However, the result that participants reporting needs of 
others dilemmas were not significantly less mature in justice 
reasoning than those reporting conflicting demands and social 
pressure dilemmas implies that it was not indeed the case. It is also 
worth pointing out that participants generated occasional higher-
stage judgments. This further suggests that reasoning about needs 
of others is not inevitably bound to Stage 3. Concerns of care were 
conceptualized as questions of upholding the other’s moral 
autonomy or respect for dignity, which deserve even Stage 5 
scoring. This again affirms Kohlberg’s et al.’s (1983) conviction 
that care and justice aspects are integrated in mature moral 
thought. 
In antisocial dilemmas, a moral conflict was centered on 
whether to follow one’s selfish temptations in terms of satisfying 
own needs (mainly temptation dilemmas) or in terms of  preferring 
a line of action that  costs the least for oneself (mainly 
transgression dilemmas). These kind of self-serving judgments 
earn low stage scores within the MJI. Even though the participants 
tended to prefer more prosocial counter-judgements pulling for 
higher stages, their scoring on real-life dilemmas remained 
significantly lower than on their hypothetical dilemmas. Moral 
difficulty seems to originate from a troublesome social situation 
rather than from cognitive difficulties. Following Wark and 
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Krebs’s (1997) interpretation, real-life moral conflicts with actual 
consequences are hard to cope with, and moral motivation is not 
the only motivational factor in effect. Consequently, people have 
to justify their selfish behavior by self-serving judgements because 
it is simply more difficult to justify them with more sophisticated 
judgements.  
Another complementary interpretation emerged from the 
analysis of antisocial dilemmas. These dilemmas typically involve 
refraining from acts that are harmful to others. This kind of 
antisocial behavior is regulated by rules and norms in society, and 
people follow them without much contemplation (Krebs, 
Vermeulen & al., 1991). Related to this issue, Hoffman (2000) 
argues that Kohlberg’s theory ignores an essential question of how 
children gain control of their egoistic desires in the first place. 
According to him, the basic lesson not to harm others or not to 
break rules is usually learned in early childhood through 
internalization processes. The child internalizes prosocial norms 
through discipline, love withdrawal and induction practices given 
by parents, making conformity rewarding in its own right. As 
prototypical antisocial dilemmas deal with temptations to break 
quite concrete rules and norms, they may trigger childhood-based 
guilt that is enough to stop intentions of wrong-doing. In case 
wrongdoing still happens, individuals tend to temper their guilty 
feelings with immature justifications, stemming from childhood 
moral structures. There is usually neither psychological space nor 
need to take the group or society-level perspective, so moral 
reasoning remains simple. 
The work-related dilemmas reported by law enforcement 
students provided, however, a different point of view to 
transgression dilemmas. The police officers’ duty is to maintain 
legality, and accordingly, their dilemmas pulled for conventional 
justice stages with the purpose to uphold the order in society.  It 
seems like minor illegal acts were interpreted as small deficits in 
the social order, which have to be repaired with professional skill.  
Another factor that seems to regulate law enforcement students’ 
moral reasoning were expectations of other officers, higher-
ranking superiors, and the police organization, congruent with 
Morgan et al.’s (2000) observations. Hierarchical organizations 
like the army seem to lower moral reasoning through strategic 
role-taking focused on anticipating the viewpoint of those in more 
  
 
289 
powerful positions (Krämer-Badoni & Wakenhut, 1985). 
Obviously, strategic role-taking is a natural part of police 
socialization as well, at least in the beginning (see Honkonen & 
Raivola, 1991). Accordingly, novice police officers’ judgments 
concerned the maintenance of good personal reputation in the eyes 
of the other cops (Stage 3) or the integrity of police organization 
(Stage 4). As a result, their conventional-level reasoning about 
transgression-related dilemmas, despite the strategic role-taking 
effect, seems to be more advanced than that of civilians, such as 
university students, who are more concerned with practical 
consequences for the self (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997). In 
addition, some law enforcement students, especially 
postconventional ones, interpreted transgression situations 
differently, as they recognized clients’ needs or hidden conflicting 
rights. Some students even generated the prior-to-society 
perspective when reflecting upon their dilemmas. In a way they 
seemed to step momentarily outside of “the system” they were 
fully aware of. To conclude, these results suggest that minor or 
moderate offences that police officers meet in their work (and that 
troubled them to some extent) are usually interpreted as 
disturbances in social order pulling for conventional justice 
reasoning. However, from time to time the context of 
transgression is interpreted differently, and reflective thinking 
elicits the police officer’s postconventional capacity. The small 
number of dilemmas in this study cannot clarify when or why this 
happens, but more systematical research is needed to answer to 
this important question. 
9.4.3 Consistency of care reasoning 
One of the most important claims Gilligan (1982) raised in In a 
Different Voice was that care reasoning is more relevant to 
women’s everyday morality than justice reasoning. Accordingly, it 
was predicted that participants’ care reasoning about real-life 
dilemmas would be consistent with their reasoning about 
hypothetical care dilemmas. This prediction was supported, with 
the exception of transgression dilemmas on the second round of 
study. Despite the consistency, the dilemma effect was present as 
well. In other words, social pressure and conflicting demands 
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dilemmas elicited higher care reasoning than needs of others 
dilemmas which in turn elicited higher reasoning than both 
antisocial dilemmas. This order is implicit in the scoring 
procedure of the ECI. Perceiving conflicting needs between 
several people or following internal self-chosen values signify the 
most mature reasoning, whereas focusing on the needs of others 
usually indicates traditional, often self-sacrificing caring. Finally, 
the orientation to fulfil own needs at the expense of others’ that 
often takes place with antisocial dilemmas denotes the least 
mature care reasoning (Skoe, 1993.) These congruent findings 
lend further support for the internal validity of the ECI. 
To my mind, even more convincing support for the validity of 
the ECI was the fact that the type of dilemma predicted 
participants’ level of care reasoning measured by hypothetical 
dilemmas. Those who reported real-life conflicts about resisting 
selfish temptations were the least developed (both times), whereas 
those reporting about social pressure were the most developed 
(Time 2). This suggests that the current developmental level the 
individual has achieved influences the kind of conflicts she or he 
perceives and interprets as moral challenges in real-life. On the 
other hand, participants’ capacity in justice reasoning seems to be 
irrelevant to the content of dilemma. These results support 
Gilligan’s (1982) position that care reasoning has a central role in 
real-life morality.  
The above findings shed some new light on the interpretation 
of lowered justice reasoning about real-life dilemmas, antisocial 
dilemmas in particular. In terms of justice, such moral reasoning 
can be seen as immature and childish, even non-moral, but from 
the care perspective, those conflicts are hard to resolve, and thus 
proper in the moral sense. The different dynamics of relationships 
is argued to lie beneath moral struggles, so moral problems reflect 
actual basic relation between self and others. From the care 
perspective orientation to one’s own needs can be seen as an act of 
ensuring the survival of a fragile self. In turn, a conflict of 
overcoming temptations can be interpreted as an important sign of 
development that indicates willingness to be attached to others (cf. 
Gilligan, 1982). Thus, moral reasoning that is inferior in terms of 
justice can be seen as a valid moral enterprise in the context of 
care development. 
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Transgression dilemmas however broke the coherent picture of 
care reasoning in this study. Namely, transgression dilemmas 
elicited lower care reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas at the 
second interviews. A careful content analysis revealed that there 
were several potential explanations for lowered reasoning. First, 
transgressions related to relationships were seen as violating the 
“traffic rules”, such as reciprocity, embedded in social bonds. 
Such experiences produce feelings of hurt and injustice in the 
victim who turns to protect self. Notably, a conflict seems to be 
interpreted mainly in terms of justice, even though the repairing of 
the relationship is potentially considered as well. Secondly, the 
transgression dilemmas provided by law enforcement students 
were of impersonal nature, including unknown citizens. In those 
conflicts, there was a lack of information about particular 
characteristics of persons involved that seems to be prerequisite 
for care reasoning beyond Level 2. In the absence of specific 
knowledge, care reasoning at its best includes general feelings of 
pity and compassion towards strangers. Another reason for law 
enforcement students’ lowered work-related reasoning might be 
that they prioritized just or right action from the perspective of 
police culture, and consequently did not pay attention to clients’ 
(victims’ and law-breakers’) needs. Police ethics also emphasizes 
impartial and equal treatment of all citizens, and sees sympathy-
driven responding to a law-breaker’s needs as a secondary task 
(Ellonen & al., 2000). 
The present transgression dilemmas actually raised the 
question whether they constitute a realm of morality where the 
ethic of care is far less important and in some cases even 
irrelevant. This was realized in the scoring problem some 
dilemmas presented. How should such responses be classified that 
indicate neither recognizing and responding to the needs of others, 
nor to the needs of self? If transgressions are interpreted as 
disturbances of societal order, such non-recognition is likely to 
happen. It is worth noting that law enforcement students generated 
the usual care reasoning with hypothetical care dilemmas, which 
eliminates the possibility that their uncaring responding originated 
from their internal disposition, such as dogmatism. Perhaps illegal 
transgression dilemmas belong to the realm of social or legal order 
that is regulated sufficiently by low-stage justice judgments 
among lay-people (cf. Krebs, Vermeulen & al., 1991) and by 
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conventional judgments among police officers. In addition, among 
both there is little space for care considerations. It seems to be 
possible to extend the interpretation towards care through 
searching for more information about the persons involved, but it 
seems to require additional effort, and it does not eliminate the 
justice concern within a dilemma. Obviously transgression 
dilemmas represent more “macromorality” issues than “micro-
morality” issues (Rest & al., 1999). Nevertheless, justice 
reasoning also has a mandate in the realm of personal relationships 
that involve violations of trust, agreements and obligations. Hence, 
care and justice seem to constitute overlapping moral domains. 
To crystallize the preceding discussion, moral conflicts in real-
life appear to be multifarious. Current participants’ moral 
reasoning about their real-life conflicts could be adequately 
understood through the two moral voices, care and justice that 
indicate their dominant position in the western, north-European 
culture. In order to understand real-life morality, the importance of 
the type of dilemma cannot be overemphasized, in agreement with 
Haviv and Leman’s (2002) conclusion. This study corroborates the 
current view (Rest & al., 1999) that within justice reasoning, 
earlier structures of moral thought are retained and used as well, 
and as a consequence, justice reasoning can vary according to the 
type of moral conflict. On the contrary, partly due to its 
consistency, care reasoning lies in the heart of real-life morality. 
The main thread is after all that care and justice tend to 
complement each other in real-life, reinforcing rather than 
contradicting each other. 
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9.5 Towards understanding real-life morality 
9.5.1 Suggestions for practical nursing and bachelor-
degree social work education 
A good care worker has an empathic character and can examine 
a client’s situation in a holistic way. She is able to solve 
problems for the benefit of all participants in a situation, and 
she is broad-minded as well. 
 (Participant 40) 
All the educational programs involved in this study have set 
definite ethical skills as targets of education. It is worth pointing 
out that even though this study investigates moral development in 
the context of education, it is not intended for examining the effect 
of education on moral development. For that purpose, the present 
empirical design without control groups is inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, the findings provide some insights into the 
education. My point in this section is to give some suggestions, 
based on the results about students’ development at the general 
level, rather than giving feed-back about the education they have 
undergone. 
First of all, practical nursing and bachelor-degree social work 
students shared high empathy. This is not surprising, because 
social work students were already secondary-level care workers 
when entering the school. Practical nursing students’ empathy did 
not however increase over the 2-year period, but even dropped 
somewhat, yet not significantly. The observation that education 
even in helping professions does not improve empathic capacities 
is by no means novel (Arangie-Harlem, 1999; Diseker & 
Michielutte, 1981). It is still a bit surprising given the fact that one 
of the official goals of the practical nursing education in particular 
is to promote empathic skills (Ministry of Education, 1998). Loss 
in empathy scores may reflect disillusionment with professional 
ideals, which often happens in the course of development, as the 
future work becomes more realistic. At this point it is again worth 
keeping in mind that the QMEE is a self-report measure. The 
effect of actual increase in empathy might be reflected in self-
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conceptions with some delay. Indeed, social work students’ 
empathy increased marginally significantly over the 2-year 
education. This finding can be explained by another finding that 
only the most mature students in care reasoning showed gains in 
emotional empathy, and among social work students there were 
plenty of them. As a matter of fact, this suggests that in order to 
promote empathy, education should promote care reasoning 
towards the highest level. Among second-program students in the 
social and health care, the care transition 2.5 is obviously 
common, as students have begun to question the ethic of self-
sacrifice, characteristic for basic care work.  
Promoting empathy as such is a desirable but challenging goal 
for education. Highly empathic workers are apparently warm, 
supportive and communicative in their client relationships (Davis, 
1994). They are however prone to the over-arousal effect of 
empathy that may lead them to protect themselves instead of 
responding to the needs of clients (Hoffman, 2000). Because 
emotional empathy functions prosocially within certain intensity 
limits, it would be useful to train students to cope with empathic 
distress, by using role-taking and simulation exercises. 
Clarification of feelings between self and other is especially 
important to those at the conventional level of care, in order to 
help them to protect themselves against emotional overload. With 
regard to coping with empathic over-arousal, promoting other-
focused rather than self-focused role-taking should be a primary 
target. Kohlberg’s second-order Golden Rule, allowing to 
experiment with others’ thoughts and feelings, could serve as a 
kind of ideal for empathy training. 
The benefits of empathy are also not so obvious, because it 
tends to be biased towards persons who are familiar to the 
empathizer and immediately present in the situation (Hoffman, 
2000). In order to overcome these biases, moral reasoning skills, 
such as reciprocity, should be promoted in the first place. In 
addition, with regard to nursing education in particular, fostering 
growth in justice reasoning is highly recommended in order to 
correct nurses’ tendency to base their ethical decision-making on 
personal subjective values. Instead, they should learn to employ 
higher-stage reflective thinking (McAlpine, 1996.) 
Mere exposure to ethical issues does not guarantee moral 
growth, but educational interventions are necessary. Norman 
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Sprinthall (1994) has advanced the model of Deliberate 
Psychological Education (DPE) that might be fruitful for 
enhancing both care and justice development in the context of 
professional education. The most crucial element in the model is 
reflected role-taking. Within practical and social work education, 
students have access to personal experiences of role-taking 
through their lengthy training periods. Direct encounters with 
clients must be accompanied by reflection that provides a 
cognitive framework to make the experience more understandable 
and meaningful to the student. Tutoring, keeping personal 
journals, small-group discussions and relevant readings provide 
opportunities for such reflection. Sprinthall further points out that 
in order to induce moral growth, atmosphere created by the 
educator must be supportive yet challenging. The educator shall 
question old ways of problem-solving through adequate responses 
to students’ reflection. Because both the DPE as well as dilemma 
discussions are effective (see Nucci & Pascarella, 1987), it would 
be useful to incorporate tutored small-group discussions about 
ethical dilemmas into the model as well. As acknowledged, 
systematic exposure to higher-stage arguments from peers and 
instructors is inductive to justice development (Rest & Narvaez, 
1994). 
Care-related education, such as practical nursing and social 
work, should sustain the care development of students. For this 
purpose, guided self-reflection should be an integral part of a 
tutoring system. Reflecting upon personal crises and ethical 
problems would facilitate care development towards higher levels. 
Cognitive-emotional support should also be provided, because 
occasional life crises may cause moral impairment and even lead 
to giving up one’s career as a care-taker. Apparently the focus of 
intervention should be adjusted to students’ current developmental 
level. Those below Level 2, like young practical nursing students 
in this study, need encouragement to adopt norms and values of 
care work, as well as support for self-regulation in caring 
activities. In turn, care-takers at Level 2 are tempted lean toward 
self-sacrifice and paternalism and may confuse clients’ needs with 
their own needs, and therefore need self-reflection skills. Finally, 
those at Levels 2.5 and 3 are apparently more troubled with 
contradictions between their ethic of care and institutional 
demands or limitations they encounter. Consequently, I consider 
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promoting justice development equally important to them, and to 
social work students in particular. Advanced justice reasoning may 
be crucial in their future management jobs that entail positions of 
responsibility for several people rather than concrete care-giving. 
Care-takers must make judgments about needs and conflicting 
needs, extending their awareness into the social and political 
context (Tronto, 1993). Therefore, implementing the ethic of care 
requires both modes of moral reasoning.  
Furthermore, Tronto (1993) argues that care workers are in the 
key position in transforming the ethic of care into a political ideal, 
by making it more visible and grounded in public life. Congruent 
with her vision, the new national strategy maintains that current 
social services should be re-evaluated in terms of clients’ 
fundamental rights (National Strategy 2001-2004). Care workers 
are able to change social institutions and practices only after the 
realization that their justifications are not natural but created by 
human action (Tronto 1993). In turn, this kind of realization is best 
provided by postconventional justice reasoning (Rest & al., 1999). 
Consequently, promoting growth in justice reasoning is of utmost 
importance in order to empower students to move towards this 
mission.  
Empathy and reflective thinking constitute a personal basis for 
care work of high quality. Those capacities can however be lost as 
a result of work-related frustration and burnout that is relatively 
common in the field of social and health care. Clients often project 
their frustration and rage, stemming from feelings of dependency 
and helplessness, on care workers. Care workers may get enraged 
by their own unmet suppressed needs, even such trivial ones as not 
having breaks or lunch-time. Furthermore, they are at risk of 
misusing their power, making clients permanently dependent, 
instead of supporting their autonomy (Tronto, 1993.) Therefore, 
providing high-quality care requires opportunities for critical self-
reflection and support from co-workers, and time and money 
resources allocated by work organizations. Work counseling 
individually and within teams should be an integral part of 
education and work. 
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9.4.2 Suggestions for law enforcement education 
[What’s important in police work?] Well, you have to know 
what’s written in the law. And also to be able to think with 
common sense. To know what society and what people expect. 
The ability to deal with these two things, the law and common 
sense, people’s expectations. (Why is it so important to take the 
customer’s expectations into account?) Well, because we should 
be able to help people with advice, instructions and orders. (It) 
makes our work more flexible, and you don’t have to keep 
staring at the law book all the time. And it’s easy to work with 
people, if you can see the issue from the other person’s 
perspective and not just see yourself as the enemy. 
(Participant 45) 
Police officers occupy professional positions of power, and their 
moral reasoning has a direct influence on everyday life. Their 
tasks involve helping, mediating and crisis intervention as well. 
Therefore promoting moral growth among students in police 
education is a matter of great importance (Morgan & al., 2000.) 
The present results revealed that law enforcement students did not 
progress in care reasoning and their development in justice 
reasoning was not substantial either. Secondary education tends to 
promote moral growth when it increases role-taking opportunities 
and involvement with cognitive-moral conflicts (see King & 
Mayhew, 2002; Nucci & Pascarella, 1987). It is well known that 
law enforcement students’ orientation to their studies is pragmatic, 
and the education focuses on teaching basic vocational skills. 
There seems to be less space for reflection, even though reflection 
skills have been increasingly emphasized as the education has 
been expanded (Honkonen, 2000).  
The modest educational achievement is however tempered 
with the fact law enforcement student’s already evidenced 
relatively high levels of moral reasoning when entering the school. 
Given that most of them displayed Stage 4 reasoning at that time, 
the postconventional transition would have been the next step. 
However, as Kohlberg and Higgins (1984) demonstrated, 
postconventional transition requires experiences of sustained 
personal responsibility for self and social responsibility for others 
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that usually emerges only after education in the context of work. 
In addition, postconventional transition requires that person starts 
to define self in universal terms of being human rather than in 
terms of a particular social role (Ries, 1992). Quite the contrary, 
law enforcement trainees are eager to identify with expert police 
officers and to adopt their roles and values, and critical attitude 
towards the organization is uncommon (Honkonen, 2000). 
Nevertheless, current law enforcement students, mainly those with 
emerging postconventional thinking, made critical remarks on the 
police institution. 
It is possible that Finnish police culture generally prevents 
rather than encourages a shift towards postconventional reasoning. 
Korander’s (1999) study identifies both positive and negative 
features of the Stage 4 justice ethos in the current police culture. 
High solidarity among the police officers and their shared aim of 
maintaining status quo in society as their primary function may 
work against reforming tendencies. There seems to be an apparent 
match between the prevailing ethos and patterns of moral thought 
novice police officers hold, conceivably reinforcing each other. In 
line with this conclusion, Kiehelä (1997) found that law 
enforcement students’ and expert police officers’ attitudes towards 
crimes were astonishingly similar. In the negative extreme, the 
justice ethos embedded in Stage 4 justifications may serve as a 
bedrock for fundamentalist ideologies, such as extreme 
nationalism nurturing xenophobia (Rest & al., 1999). Congruent 
with these warnings, Korander (1999) recommends that promoting 
tolerance towards minorities and self-reflective understanding of 
police culture should be among the main targets within law 
enforcement education. 
With regard to care reasoning, even though most law 
enforcement students did not make any progress, they nevertheless 
demonstrated high-level reasoning at the conventional level and 
beyond (only 9% scored at the self-oriented level). As a matter of 
fact, they were evidently caring in terms of moral thought, albeit 
in terms of emotional empathy they were on the average (men) or 
somewhat below (women). Maybe police profession actually 
offers males an adequate and a socially favorable way to actualize 
their caring tendencies. These findings are in line with Kiehelä’s 
(1997) results, as he found that among Finnish expert police 
officers, professional orientation included the aspect of social 
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service, together with the aspect of control. Kiehelä concluded that 
attitudes within the police community are favorable to the 
implementing of non-repressive, service-oriented forms of 
policing. This study points to the same direction. Modern models 
of community policing entail face-to-face work and enable more 
permanent relationships with citizens that in turn may energize the 
caring aspect embedded in daily work. In this sense, the feature of 
Tarzan (Honkonen, 1999) seems to be a suitable metaphor for 
renewed community policing. Being lord Greystoke as well, the 
physically strong, masculine Tarzan feels responsible to protect 
and help weak ones in the asphalt jungle.  
Whether and how to promote moral growth wthin the police 
education seems to be a complex matter in the light of this study. 
Because law enforcement students have pre-socialized towards 
their forthcoming vocation already when they enter the school, 
education may clearly reinforce or extinguish pre-existing 
personal qualities (Honkonen & Raivola, 1991; Kiehelä, 1997). 
This seems to be a case for moral capacities as well. If there is any 
serious aspiration to improve law enforcement students’ current 
level, systematic intervention models designed to promote 
personality development, such as the DPE, are needed. Besides 
ethical conflicts, there are multiple stressful factors directly related 
to the police working personality. Cynicism arising from 
frustrating encounters with repetitive offenders and few promotion 
opportunities to higher ranks (Honkonen, 1999) risk high quality 
in policing and moreover, undermine the potential care ethic. On 
the other hand, the Finnish police force is an exceptionally highly 
valued among citizens in international comparisons (Kestereen, 
Mayhew & Nieuwbeerta, 2000), and consequently public 
expectations towards police officers might be pressing.  
In fact, Morgan et al. (2000) found that the DPE model was 
successful in fostering growth in justice reasoning among law 
enforcement trainees, who were guided to reflect upon their work-
related moral dilemmas. With regard to the ethic of justice, 
increase of postconventional thought is imperative, because it 
supports personal moral responsibility and decreases the strategic 
role-taking (cf. Ellonen & al., 1999). Observations from this study 
indicate that postconventional capacity clearly improves the 
quality of ordinary police work. Due to the briefness of education 
and its pragmatic emphasis, intervention models designed to 
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facilitate postconventional transition would be easier to implement 
than the DPE. Ries (1992) has promoted such a model with 
promising results. In brief, the model starts with the Socratic 
dialogue and the elaboration of philosophical and identity-related 
concepts and then proceeds into moral issues, teaching students to 
apply rational thinking to moral issues. Ries’s model is 
exceptional in the sense that it also aims at intervening in identity 
confusion that is often associated with postconventional transition. 
Finally, more attention should be paid to the risk of cynicism 
embedded in police officers’ everyday work. The work 
environment should provide opportunities for peer support and 
extended reflection, for example through guided supervision and 
counseling in small groups.  
9.5.3 Suggestions for future research 
It has been argued that in order to give the ethic of care a status 
equal to the ethic of justice, care development has to be verified 
with empirical evidence (Puka, 1990). My study has continued this 
work, initiated by Skoe and her associates, by exploring the 
longitudinal data to find out whether the levels of care reasoning 
form a developmental sequence across time. The answer is 
affirmative, nevertheless raising many new questions I have 
identified throughout this discussion. In brief, naturally more 
longitudinal studies with female and male participants from 
different backgrounds are needed. Men in particular should be 
included in samples, as men’s development in this study remained 
rather vague. Gender differences in moral self-concept and 
identity development deserve further study, as well as the 
determinants of care development. How do life crises exactly 
relate to growth in care reasoning? When and how does regression 
in care reasoning occur, and what is it like exactly? How would it 
be possible to facilitate, support or promote care development 
through educational interventions? Finally, links between affective 
empathy, role-taking and care reasoning should be scrutinized 
with sophisticated measures. 
The research suggestions listed above are relevant to moral 
and ethical questions in everyday morality. Quite a lot has been 
revealed about the internal competencies of individuals, but less is 
known about how people use those capacities in real-life 
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situations, such as in work-related moral problems. For example, 
the moral atmosphere in work-places, providing varied 
opportunities for role-taking may be a significant factor in adults’ 
moral reasoning. This study suggests that both care and justice 
thought contribute to the real-life morality. In order to understand 
the interplay between them and their actual implications for actual 
people, morality should be increasingly explored in the real-life 
context. What constitutes a moral action is a challenging issue for 
morality researchers.  
Lastly, I would like to pinpoint why exploring real-life 
morality is so critical from the care perspective. The definitions of 
the ethic of care include reciprocity in relationships. If response 
and acknowledgement from those who are cared for ultimately 
validate care, care-giving and receiving should be investigated in 
the first place. If the ethic of care truly represents a new branch of 
the ethic of relationships (Veatch, 1998) that cannot be reduced to 
other ethics but that exists in its own right, a more social 
psychological approach is necessary. 
The most important thing is being there, supporting. [Why is that 
so important?] Maybe it is a basic drive of each person or 
something, everyone wants to be accepted, to be cared for… 
There are different forms of care. There is the care between 
spouses, between children, between colleagues and other people. 
You can’t say that only one form is the right one. The main thing 
about it is that the other person is important to the other one, 
somehow unique and individual, even though you cannot say 
that you’re only for me… But at the moment when you are with 
that person, the presence is a sort of evidence of being 
committed to that person, and if the person has difficulties, I will 
not reject that person. 
(Participant 39A) 
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Appendix A 
The Ethic of Care Interview dilemmas 
Real-Life 
 
The question is asked in several ways: Have you ever been in 
a situation where you weren’t sure what was the right thing to do? 
Have you ever had a moral conflict? Could you describe a moral 
conflict? Followed by a consistent set of questions: Could you 
describe situation? What were the conflicts for you in that 
situation? What did you do? Did you think it was the right thing to 
do? How did you know it was the right thing to do? 
 
Unplanned pregnancy 
Lisa/Derek (Liisa/Sami) 
 
Lisa is a successful teacher (social worker/police officer) in 
her late twenties who has always supported herself. Her life has 
been centred on her work and she has been offered a permanent 
position for next year. Recently she has been involved in an 
intense love affair with a married man and now finds that she is 
pregnant. 
 
Derek is a married, successful teacher (social worker/police 
officer) in his late twenties. His life has been centred on his work 
and he has been offered a permanent position for next year. 
Recently he has been involved in an intense love affair with a 
single woman who has just told him that she is pregnant and that it 
is his child. 
 
What do you think Lisa/Derek should do? Why? 
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Marital fidelity 
Betty/Erik (Marja/Erkki) 
 
Betty/Erik, in her/his late thirties, has been married to 
Erik/Betty for several years. They have two children, 8 and 10 
years old. Throughout the marriage Betty has been at home, 
looking after the house and the children. For the last few years 
Betty/Erik has felt increasingly unhappy in the marriage 
relationship. She/he finds her husband/his wife demanding, self-
centred and insensitive as well as uninterested in her/his needs and 
feelings. Betty/Erik has several times tried to communicate her/his 
unhappiness and frustration to her husband/his wife but he/she 
continually ignores and rejects her/his attempts. Betty/Erik has 
become very attracted to another man/woman, Steven/Carol 
(Seppo/Maarit) a single teacher (social worker/police officer). 
Recently, Steven/Carol has asked Betty/Erik for a more intimate, 
committed relationship. 
What do you think Betty/Erik should do? Why? 
 
Care for a parent  
 Kristine/Chris (Tiina/Tomi) 
 
Kristine/Chris, a 26 year-old woman/man, has decided to live 
on her/his own after having shared an apartment with a 
girlfriend/friend for the last three years. She/he finds that she/he is 
much happier living alone as she/he now has more privacy and 
independence and gets more work and studying done. One day her 
mother/his father, whom she/he has not seen for a long time as 
they do not get along too well, arrives at the doorstop with two 
large suitcases, saying that she/he is lonely and wants to live with 
Kristine/Chris. 
What do you think Kristine/Chris should do? Why? 
 
Note. Published by the permission from Eva Skoe. 
Professions were modified according to participants, and Finnish 
names were used. 
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Appendix B 
The Moral Judgment Interview dilemmas 
Mercy killing 
 
There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there was 
no treatment known to medicine that would save her. Her doctor, 
Dr. Jefferson (Miettinen) knew that she had only about six months 
to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good 
dose of a painkiller like morphine would make her die sooner. She 
was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods 
she would ask Dr. Jefferson to give her enough drugs to kill her. 
She said she couldn’t stand the pain and she was going to die in a 
few months anyway. Although he knows that mercy killing is 
against the law, the doctor thinks about granting her request. 
Should Dr. Jefferson (Miettinen) give her the drug that would 
make her die? Why or why not?  
(Standard probe questions are asked). 
 
Doctor at Court 
 
Dr. Jefferson (Miettinen) did perform the mercy killing by 
giving the woman the drug. However, another doctor saw Dr. 
Jefferson give the woman the drug and reported him. Dr. Jefferson 
is brought to court and a jury is selected. The jury’s job is to find 
whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The 
jury finds Dr. Jefferson guilty. It is up to the judge to determine 
the sentence. 
 
Should the judge give Dr. Jefferson (Miettinen) some sentence, or 
should he suspend the sentence and let Dr. Jefferson go free? Why 
is that best?  
(Standard probe questions are asked). 
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Loyalty  
 
Judy (Kati/Jussi) is a 12-year old girl/boy. Her mother 
promised her that she could go to a special rock concert coming to 
their town if she saved up from paper route and week money so 
she would have enough money to buy a ticket to the concert. She 
managed to save up 100 marks it cost plus another 50 marks. But 
then her mother/his father changed her/his mind and told Judy that 
she had to spend the money on new clothes for school. Judy was 
disappointed and decided to go to the concert anyway. She bought 
a ticket and told her mother/his father that she had only been able 
to save 50 marks. That Saturday she went to the performance and 
told her mother/his father that she was spending the day with a 
friend. A week passed without her mother/his father finding out. 
Judy then told her older sister, Louise (Niina/Jussi) that she had 
gone to the performance and had lied to her mother/his father 
about it. Louise wonders whether to tell their mother/father what 
Judy did. 
 
Should Louise, the older sister/brother, tell their mother/father 
that Judy had lied about the money or should she keep quiet? Why 
or why not?  
(Standard probe questions are asked). 
 
Note. Dilemmas are adapted from Colby, Kohlberg & al. 
(1987). Finnish names have been used. Some modifications have 
been made according to Finnish culture on the loyalty dilemma. 
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Appendix C 
Themes of real-life moral conflicts according to type 
of dilemma 
Time 1 Time 2 
 
Antisocial dilemmas 
Reaction to transgressions 
 
A decision must be made about how to react, what to do about 
transgression, injustice, violation of rules that has occurred. 
 
A participant must decide 
(a) how to react to 
• a brother who apparently uses 
illegal drugs (how to guide him 
back into “the narrow path of 
law”)  
• a girlfriend having an affair 
with somebody else 
• a physician who treats a patient 
in a prejudiced way 
• minor transgressions 
committed by adolescents, 
such as travelling without  
paying for a valid ticket 
• a prisoner who refuses to 
return to his cell at night  
(b) how to tell about a homicide of 
a close relative to one’s own 
children in a way in order to avoid 
excess prosecuting of killers 
(c) whether to report class-mates’ 
transgressions, such as mocking 
and shop-lifting to teachers  
(n = 7) 
 
A participant must decide 
(a) how to react to 
• a trouble-making friend at 
a party 
• a friend who does not give 
any help and support in 
reciprocity. 
• a friend who may be 
involved with drug abuse 
and trafficking 
• a teacher who threatens 
not to take one’s child to a 
trip with other pupils 
• shop-lifting by peers (as a 
child) 
• minor traffic 
transgressions (as a police 
officer) 
• a disabled driver who 
parks his car on a place 
for disabled people 
without a validation card 
• a colleague who treats an 
adolescent transgressor in 
an unjust way 
• a drug addict who lies 
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 about not having needles 
in a pocket while being 
arrested  and investigated, 
running a risk to infecting 
a police officer 
 
(b) how to arrest a suspect in a 
right way (3) 
(c) how to commit an 
investigation in such a way that a 
maximal amount of crimes could 
be revealed 
(d) how to treat a drunken 
driver, causing a threat to innocent 
people and oneself 
(e) whether to forgive a 
father’s  suicide 
(n  = 15) 
 
Reaction to temptation 
 
A participant is faced with temptation to meet his or her needs, fulfil 
his or her desires, acquire resources, advance his or her gain by 
behaving dishonestly, immorally, unfairly, ungratefully. 
 
A participant feels tempted to  
 
• cross the road with hurry 
as an excuse, while lights 
are red  
• have a dog as a pet even if 
she has no time to take 
care of it 
• join classmates who mock  
innocent victims and 
commit minor 
transgressions 
• lie to a parent about 
spending time with a 
girlfriend 
• have fun with friends at 
night and not to obey 
parents’ demands to come 
home at the agreed time 
A participant feels tempted to 
 
• go out and drink with 
friends at the expense of 
concentrating in a game 
scheduled for the 
following day 
• spend a weekend with 
friends instead of going to 
see an old grandmother 
with other family 
members 
• move away from home 
against a grandparent’s 
will 
• change one’s life style 
with the implications of 
disapproving one’s parents  
• date a friend’s girlfriend 
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• conceal from parents a 
noisy party held in their 
absence 
• resist parents’ reasoned 
wish to leave an indecent 
boyfriend 
• move away from home 
against parents’ 
expectations (2) 
• finish taking piano lessons 
against parents’ will 
• force her child to take 
piano lessons, when it is 
primarily her own interest 
• mug an ex- girlfriend’s 
new boyfriend for revenge 
• have an abortion for 
economical reasons while 
one has initially wanted to 
have a child 
• continue drinking when it 
causes suffering to family 
members 
• hide one’s love affair from 
a wife, while a wife has 
just confessed her own 
• tell some confidential 
matters told by a 
neighbour to his wife  
• spread rumours about an 
acquaintance’s personal 
failures  
(n = 17) 
• be unfaithful to a 
girlfriend 
• conceal an affair from a 
girlfriend 
• break a promise given to a 
child because of 
economical reasons. 
• ignore wife’s opinion 
about the punishment of a 
child 
(n = 9) 
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Prosocial dilemmas 
Reacting to the needs of others 
 
A participant feels conflicted about whether or not he or she is 
responsible for engaging in some proactive behaviour in another’s 
behalf and what his or her duties or responsibilities are toward the 
person in question. 
A participant feels 
conflicted/troubled how to 
help/respond to 
• a sick child when doctors 
give contradictory advice 
for caring 
• a trouble-making 
adolescent with 
psychological problems 
• a child in an alcoholic 
family 
• a brother using drugs 
while parents are unaware 
about the problem 
• a sister attempting a 
suicide 
• a handicapped friend with 
psychological problems  
• a handicapped friend with 
a dominating mother 
• a friend who believes to 
be pregnant and considers 
abortion 
• an acquaintance who 
wants to have a closer 
friendship than the 
participant does 
• a child who does not want 
to disclose his secret to 
another parent even if it 
could be beneficial to him 
 
A participant feels 
conflicted/troubledhow to 
help/respond to 
• a terminally ill friend (2) 
• a friend experimenting 
with drugs 
• a friend using drugs, 
while other friends are 
indifferent to the problem 
• a drunken client in an 
out-patient setting 
• a sister who has 
confidentially told to be 
abused by her boyfriend 
• an acquaintance who is 
abused by her husband 
• an aggressive adolescent 
being arrested, having 
problems with a mother 
• an old man who fell down 
when dancing at a 
wedding party (a 
participant is a bride) 
 
A participant considers 
whether/how to respond to 
needs of others, often family 
members, at the expense of 
one’s own needs or interests 
• when a child threatens to 
commit a suicide 
• when a girlfriend wants a 
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A participant feels conflicted 
whether to 
• help a friend using drugs, 
while other friends are 
indifferent to the problem 
• tell outsiders that a 
brother needs psychiatric 
care 
• allow a son to buy cards 
that are not appropriate 
for children, in order to 
promote social interaction 
with his peers 
 
A participant considers 
whether/how to respond to needs of 
others, often family members, at the 
expense of one’s own needs or 
interests 
• when starting further 
studies  
• when considering a 
divorce 
 
A participant considers what 
are her/his responsibilities towards 
• a father in a divorce 
situation  (whether to live 
with him) 
• a partner’s child in 
upbringing 
• a child in a need of 
psychiatric treatment 
(n = 18) 
more committed 
relationship than oneself 
• whether to divorce (2) 
• whether to move to 
another town and start 
further studies as a single 
parent 
• whether to move to 
another town because of a 
husband’s interesting job 
• whether to live with a 
mother after a father’s 
death in order to comfort 
and help her 
• whether to maintain a 
contact with a client at his 
request after finishing a 
practice period 
 
A participant considers what 
are her/his responsibilities towards 
• a grown-up daughter 
asking advice 
• children in divorce, with a 
risk of losing father 
• children whose father has 
committed a suicide, when 
a mother is not going to 
tell the truth to them 
• victims of a cheating 
crime, who are retired and 
veterans of war  
(n = 21) 
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Reacting to conflicting demands 
 
A participant is faced with two or more people making inconsistent 
demands on him or her, often with implications for their friendship, and 
must decide whom to help or whose expectations to fulfil. 
 
A participant must make 
a decision about 
 
• which one of 
divorced parents to 
spend Christmas 
holidays with 
• whether to be loyal 
to a friend or to tell 
her boyfriend/his 
girlfriend about 
her/his affair (2) 
• whether to have an 
abortion while 
persons involved, 
including a potential 
child and oneself, 
might have 
conflicting demands 
on a decision 
• whether to start 
further studies, while 
needs and demands 
of family members 
contradict each other 
• how to balance a 
client’s demand to 
get emotional 
support and a 
colleague’s claim for 
impartiality, while a 
client has been hurt 
by that colleague 
(n = 6) 
 
A participant must make a decision 
about 
• whether to keep a promise to a 
child who disclosed his friend’s 
drug abuse, or whether to 
discuss with a mother of that 
friend 
• whether to sell an enterprise 
when it might have 
contradictory consequences for 
oneself, other family members 
and employees 
• whether to have abortion while 
persons involved, including a 
potential child and oneself, 
might have conflicting demands 
on a decision 
• how to respond to relatives 
making inconsistent demands, 
with attempts to have a 
participant as a mediator to 
solve their conflict 
• how to act in a situation where 
clients’ rights for self-
determination and psychical 
safety, as well as a professional 
view of a participant are 
conflicted how to act in a 
trouble-making situation in a 
bus, while other passengers, a 
bus-driver, colleagues and 
oneself might have 
contradictory expectations how 
one has to react to 
troublemakers as a policeman 
(out of duty) 
(n = 6) 
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Social Pressure Dilemmas 
 
The participant feels pressured, either implicitly or explicitly, by 
other person or group to engage in identity-inconsistent behaviour that 
violates his or her values. 
 
A participant feels pressured  
• by an acquaintance to 
accept the religious norm 
that blood transfer is 
prohibited, even in the case 
of small children. 
• by an ex-husband and 
society to continue her 
former job with secure 
income while she wants to 
start a new job that serves 
better clients’ interests, as 
well her own personal 
growth. 
• by her colleagues to engage 
in such care-giving routines 
that violate elderly patients’ 
human dignity and one’s 
conscience  
• by one’s friends to obey 
their advice to continue a 
dating relationship 
• by her colleagues to rear 
children in a day-care 
setting in a way violating 
one’s values. 
• by others to divorce  
• by other band members to 
use drugs  
• (being a teacher substitute) 
to pay extra attention to one 
pupil that is against one’s 
value of equality  
(n = 8) 
 
A participant feels pressured  
• by a supervisor and a 
teacher at a work 
placement to change his 
personal view of 
personal learning “as a 
travel to inner self”  
• by authorities at a day-
care setting not to 
contact parents of a 
troubled child and not to 
tell honestly about 
his/her difficulties  
• by authorities at a day-
care setting to forbid 
children to take goodies 
for a trip violating her 
value of child-centred 
pedagogy 
• by colleagues to take 
money from a cash-box 
for her leaving party  
• by a work team to force 
another worker to leave a 
work-place  
• by police authorities to 
take some action towards 
a transgressor that does 
not ultimately serve the 
good of human beings 
(n  = 6) 
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Appendix D 
Examples of developmental shifts in care reasoning 
on the care for a parent dilemma 
 
Time 1 
 
 
Time 2 
 
Level 1 Level 1.5 
(Tiina) should… tell 
honestly how happy she is as 
she realizes that she lives alone. 
So that her mother does 
understand that she is not so 
welcome as she imagines… 
[Why is it important to tell?] If 
she (mother) is not told, she 
(Tiina) is increasingly uptight 
all the time and she feels that 
she wants only to irritate her 
(mother)… Tiina feels better, 
when she is able to tell that… 
Well, she may take her in for 
just a while, but not as any kind 
of roommate, of course. If she 
has really enjoyed living alone, 
she has a right to live alone and 
be independent, hasn’t she? 
[Why should the mother be 
taken in for a while?] Well, in 
principle she shouldn’t, not 
even for a while, but until she 
gets in somewhere else… for 
the first night. [Why?] Unless 
there is a hotel nearby. 
(Participant 35) 
(Tiina) should tell her 
mother very honestly that it is 
nice you dropped in but not for 
a longer time, anyway. And she 
tells honestly about these 
feelings, that is, how nice and 
happy it is to live alone and 
what the advantages of living 
alone are. And although the 
mother is lonely, she is sure to 
try to find some friends 
elsewhere. (Tiina might) try to 
take mother to some places 
where she may perhaps make 
friends [Why should Tiina do 
that?] She does not necessarily 
have to (do that), but if the 
mother is not able to do that 
kind of things herself. (Tiina) 
would be perhaps motivated by 
that she can get rid of her. Tiina 
may also leave mother alone 
and tell her to take care of her 
business by herself. 
(Participant 35) 
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Level 1.5 
 
Level 2 
 
I think she should 
explain to her mother that 
she has been living with her 
friend for so long time so 
that she wants to be alone. 
Well, she (mother) may live 
with her for a while… at 
least she can little by little 
explain away like that. [Why 
must Tiina take her in for a 
while?] Well, she can’t leave 
her outside the door. If the 
mother has no place to go, 
one cannot dump one’s own 
mother to sleep in stairs. 
[Why?] Because she is your 
own mother. She has not 
dumped you to sleep on the 
stairs either. [What reasons 
have Tiina give for that she 
does not want to live with 
mother?] They are not 
getting along well, for 
example. And she wants to 
be alone. 
(Participant 15) 
 
 
I think Tiina should take the 
mother in and try to at least 
agree with her on not to remain 
to live there for many years. She 
would get over the worst, if she 
were really lonely. I think, she 
should agree with the mother for 
a while on that mother would 
anyway live somewhere nearby, 
so that (Tiina) would have more 
time for herself. [Why should 
mother live there for a while 
anyway?] Well, in order to get 
their relationship straightened 
out. She is her mother anyway. 
She has however - well, not 
exactly a duty but something 
like that. If my mother came, 
and even if we had had a terrible 
quarrel, I would take her in after 
all. She is my mother anyway. I 
think that one should always 
straighten relationships out, at 
least try to do that. [Why is that 
so important?] Of course it is 
important. I cannot even 
imagine that I would not talk to 
my mother or that she would be 
alone in old people’s home 
when she grows old.  
(Participant 15) 
Level 2 
 
Level 2.5 
 
(Tiina) is sure not to reject 
her mother at once that this it 
is not going to work… but she 
might probably say, “well, you 
can stay for a while”. Or she 
would not probably say even 
that. Maybe if she said 
Even if this mother were 
very lonely and wanted to 
stay, in my opinion, Tiina 
should not take her in to live 
there. Tiina is already 26 years 
old and she is now adult 
herself as well. And there is 
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something very strictly or 
something the mother would 
be hurt. But I would try 
together to find something for 
her to do at her own home, 
consider alternatives what she 
could do and encourage her to 
do something with persons of 
her age, weaving or 
something. And since they 
have talked for a longer time, 
for example a couple of days, 
you might say very nicely that 
I would like to live alone… 
Because it has certainly 
demanded much courage of 
the mother to arrive with her 
suitcase at the door of her 
daughter. [How should Tiina 
respond to that mother does 
plead to the loneliness?] Well, 
in a way Tiina probably feels a 
bit guilty of that her mother is 
lonely, because she is her 
mother. After that she thinks 
over her doings and thinks that 
(she) might do more often 
something together with her. 
But certainly her mother lacks 
something to do in the 
daytime; one should find a 
solution for that. [Is it Tiina’s 
job to help to find a solution?] 
Well, I do not know whether it 
is her job, but she can support 
her, can’t she? And she is sure 
to do that barely out of duty 
feelings, because she is her 
mother, because she would not 
like her mother to be alone 
anyway. Certainly, I suppose. I 
do not know if this is a duty, 
but it comes out so naturally 
that you want to help. 
 (Participant 36) 
also this point that they have 
never got along very well, so 
that they will not do now 
either… Although she is 
Tiina’s mother, Tiina’s should 
tell to her mother 
constructively and friendly 
that it is better after all that the 
mother lives on her own and 
Tiina on her own. [Why is it 
better in that way?] Well if 
you consider that she is 26 
years, and mother is maybe in 
her fifties, it does not work in 
such a way as Tiina was young 
and mother was a mother 
while Tiina was still living at 
home. There are two fully 
independent women now. And 
because there are no other 
reasons but mother is only 
lonely. Sometimes mothers 
and fathers may live (with 
their children) when they are 
old and demented, so that to be 
cared for. If I were Tiina, I 
would not take her in. [What 
makes difference if you have a 
mother with dementia?] In 
some way if she is demented 
and there is such a very good 
mother-daughter relationship. 
Often children take care of 
their parents out of pure 
love… [What if the mother 
just keeps telling that she is so 
lonely and unhappy and she is 
not about to leave?] I do think 
that Tiina should be hard and 
say no. We can visit each other 
but this is my home and your 
home is somewhere else. If I 
were Tiina, I would not accept 
that. 
(Participant 36) 
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I think it does pay for 
Tomi to take a father in for a 
while. He (ought) not to 
decide right away, saying to 
father’s face, like “you, old 
man, get out of here” or 
something like that. At this 
stage he would have a good 
reason to improve his 
relationship with his father. 
[Because of that he should be 
taken in?] Yes. It would be 
smart, if he does improve the 
relationship now. Look, he 
would say to his father, that 
let’s see, how this is going to 
work. You may stay for a 
while. But (Tomi) does not 
promise him a permanent stay. 
After that their relationship 
would be improved much and 
so on. After they have no 
quarrel anymore or something 
like that, this issue can 
properly be brought up. (He is) 
a grown-up man, 26 years old, 
and really just got rid of his 
roommate, and he needs also 
some privacy. He says that 
they can go playing squash 
now and then, have a beer and 
everything. But he wants to be 
alone, and he has a girlfriend. 
It would be rather awkward if 
father were hanging around all 
the time close by. I think one 
should take advantage of this 
situation when father is 
coming with his suitcases. 
You can say, “just come for a 
while until you will find some 
other place” or something like 
that. [You think it does not 
pay to say strictly no to father 
at once?] No, because it means 
Tomi should tell to his dad 
not to unpack all the suitcases 
yet. Let him stay there for a 
couple of nights, in order to 
get to know each other again, 
if they have had a slightly 
remote relationship, but not for 
many years anyway. Let’s say, 
he allows him to spend a 
couple of days and live 
there… Father should cope 
with it. 26-year-old young man 
would like to be alone at this 
stage, and live his own life, so 
that not to necessarily clutch at 
father’s and mother’s skirts. 
[Why do you think it is 
important to get to know each 
other?] Well, it is important to 
get along well with your father 
and so on, isn’t it? And if you 
get to know your father 
properly, perhaps have a chat, 
so he may perhaps understand. 
If you say to him that “daddy, 
it is not appropriate now to 
live under the same roof”, if 
you tell him off like “sorry, 
you can not come here”, they 
can certainly not get along 
with each other for a while 
again. That is sure. [Do you 
think it is important to get 
along with one’s father in 
general?] It is not, let’s say, 
such a necessity but it is nice 
to get along well with one’s 
folks, isn’t it? It is the basis, of 
course. [Suppose that the 
father says he does need Tomi 
so much that he wants still live 
with Tomi after those a few 
days?] It is maybe a difficult 
question for Tomi. It will be 
okay anyway. But if he is man 
  
 
335 
that you abandon your own 
father and it is awful. I think it 
is a hard situation for father. 
His own son saying something 
like that. [So, one should take 
the father in for a while, 
improve their relationship and 
after that tell it?] Just right 
away when he comes he 
should be told straight that 
only temporarily or something 
like that. [Why?] Otherwise 
the father can expect too much 
from that. If he lived with you 
for a couple of weeks and … 
you suddenly told father to 
clear off, father would just 
(wonder) what is going on 
now. In other way he would 
have some time to prepare for 
this situation for those weeks. 
He would have time to psych 
up for the whole thing. That is, 
his son does not dump him 
because he is his own father 
and they had a quarrel, but 
because he wants to be alone 
and have the privacy of his 
own. If he says right away 
when father arrives at the door 
that he wants to be alone and 
needs the privacy of his own, 
and if father is smart enough, 
he will conclude that he 
(Tomi) does not necessarily 
want to be alone. He just does 
not want to spend time with 
me. 
(Participant 44) 
 
enough, he will - I think he 
should say just coldly that - 
because it is anyway, they 
both are adult men and - It is 
not going to work that daddy 
is hanging around there. [Do 
you think children have a duty 
to help their parents?] Well, I 
do not know whether it is just 
a duty. It is - or probably you 
can call it a duty. Certainly if 
the child is able to help, so (s) 
he should help her or his 
parents, especially when they 
grow older. But I think one 
cannot pretend to be such a 
case in his forties, because one 
is not able to pay the rent and 
is not getting along well with 
some woman again. So that 
one is going to move again 
into Tomi’s flat. You cannot 
do that. [You did say (first) 
that it is not a duty. What can 
you call that?] Well, that is 
what I am just wondering at. 
What would it be? It depends 
on everyone. Not everyone 
wants to do even that. Some 
people think that they have 
just been brought up and that’s 
it, there is no relationship 
involved. It is up to everybody 
to decide what name of the 
game is. I think, however, that 
it is pretty nearly a duty, but it 
cannot be called that in 
general. [Why do you think it 
is nearly a duty?] Well, 
parents have given so much. 
Of course we did not ask to be 
born, but they have given so 
much and sacrificed all - well, 
not their all adulthood but 
anyway, they have sacrificed 
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much, in order to help me to 
grow this kind of person. That 
is not much to ask, if you help 
your parents too. It is okay. 
(Participant 44) 
 
 
Level 2.5 
 
Well, at first he is sure to 
advice father to stay overnight 
at a hotel and perhaps after 
that starts to discuss and think 
over what is going on. [Why 
would this be a good 
solution?] Well, if he comes 
without announcing anything 
in advance, father or not 
father, if he just shows up 
surprisingly behind the door 
and if it is even such a person 
you do not get along well 
with, it is unnecessary to take 
the risk of letting them unpack 
and staying the night here right 
away. [What is the risk 
involved there?] It is probable 
that getting along is 
nevertheless going to be 
improved… Unclear things 
must at least be sorted out 
until you can start to rebuild a 
relationship. [You think it can 
not be built in such a way that 
Tomi takes his father in to stay 
overnight?] Maybe it can work 
in that way too, but I have my 
doubts about it, very much. 
[So, you said that the father 
could be sent to a hotel. What 
about if the father hasn’t got 
money?] Well, in that case he 
may also stay the night in the 
hall. But well, I do not know. 
Relatives are always so 
Level 3 
After his initial chock 
Tomi should invite his father 
in and open a discussion… 
what he wants and what the 
father wants. If Tomi wants to 
continue independent living 
alone, in my opinion, he 
should make (a decision) 
relatively quickly in a few 
days. Even though he lets the 
father spend some days there 
and discusses and thinks over 
the issue and takes his time, he 
should express relatively 
quickly to the point that 
staying for a longer time is not 
for good nor desirable. [Why 
is it important to do that so 
quickly?] I think that it is just 
unnecessary to drag issues out. 
In principle, you can say that 
after a half an hour, but if you 
would like to (understand) 
your father who has been lost 
for a long time…so that they 
get to understand each other 
and other’s views and he gets 
to know, how to express that 
in such a way as to avoid to 
hurt so badly. [Why is it 
important after all?] Well, 
overall you should not hurt 
other people so much… It is 
just important because I regard 
interaction skills and 
interaction between two 
people as the spice of life. So 
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difficult in this respect. 
Because are we always just 
duty bound to help and 
support and understand 
relatives? That is, if relatives 
behave in a strange and bad 
way, do we always have the 
duty to be the helper? If they 
have not got along well with 
each other, I really do not 
regard as a sign of good 
judgment on the father’s side 
that he suddenly springs up 
with his suitcases behind the 
door, so that -[You said that 
one should think over this 
situation. So, has Tomi a duty 
to think over the situation with 
his father?] Well, in principle 
he has not a duty to do even 
that. That is, if Tomi is not 
interested, he may roughly tell 
his father to keep going to the 
next stairs. But on the other 
hand, such a particular 
understanding and helping 
one’s fellow men, especially 
relatives and father – I do 
think that people have to get 
along with each other. That 
way I see that every human 
being has a particular duty to 
take care of his or her 
relationships and to keep 
caring for them. 
(Participant 27) 
 
Certainly she should just 
tell that she is happy and 
wants to live alone. 26-years 
old, so she should have the 
courage to tell to her mother 
that she wants to be alone. 
[Why?] I do think that a 26 
year-old (daughter) can grow 
it (life) cannot be based on that 
you want to hurt somebody.  
(Participant 27) 
Well, the mother has 
arrived there now. At least she 
must be allowed to come in 
with the suitcases. [Why?] 
Well, supposedly she is in an 
emergency, because she has 
come there with her 
suitcases… Then you have to 
talk about why she suddenly 
shows up with those 
suitcases… a sort of 
emergency. [What if mother is 
not in a concrete emergency?] 
Well, if she does not get along 
too well and she suddenly 
shows up with suitcases, one 
starts to suspect that 
something has pushed her to 
come… What are those things 
in the background of 
loneliness? Is there even such 
a serious matter? You should 
sort mother’s life out, what is 
in fact going on there, 
shouldn’t you? If it is such a 
matter that somebody else can 
help too. It is probably not 
helped by living with Tiina… 
Why is she so lonely all of 
sudden? Or has she always 
been lonely? Or has it been 
suddenly changed when Tiina 
has been living alone, has 
mother grown lonely because 
of that? Has this opportunity 
made her lonely? [Do you 
think that this point has some 
influence on making a 
decision whether to live with 
the mother?] Of course if she 
is undergoing a terrible crisis, 
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independent from her mother 
by now. That the mother… is 
alone for some reason is not a 
sufficient reason for to start 
living with daughter. It is 
certainly possible to find 
something else to alleviate this 
loneliness. This loneliness can 
be removed in some other 
way. [What should Tiina do in 
this very concrete situation 
when mother is there with her 
suitcases?] Well, of course she 
cannot be (turned out) in the 
night (a laugh). Well, probably 
she might be taken in for a 
couple of days, and this issue 
might be worked out, what is 
involved there. But I do 
believe that the mother could 
understand after all, after she 
has been allowed to stay there 
and wear off her worst 
loneliness with her daughter. 
Then she realized why she 
couldn’t stay there forever. 
[What if she would not realize 
that?] Well (laughter), then I 
feel about that this mother has 
a problem, such a problem that 
has its special causes. So, 
mother should probably be 
taken to see a doctor unless 
she does not realize that. Well, 
not so outspokenly, but 
anyhow. I do think that sooner 
or later she is going to 
understand that, if she would 
like to understand that.  
(Participant 40) 
 
she will be kept there for a 
while. Maybe what is in the 
background does have 
influence on (decision 
making). I think so… Well, 
she is her mother anyway. If 
she (mother) feels very bad, 
supposedly everybody should 
let her/his mother and father in 
from behind the door for a 
couple of days. It would be 
human, even if they had a very 
poor relationship; at least I feel 
so. [Is it of any significance 
that she has a poor relationship 
with her?] Perhaps it has 
demanded quite a lot from the 
mother to come to the door 
with her suitcases. It is not 
said here why is that they do 
not get along very well with 
each other. Is it due to mother, 
daughter or both? Possibly 
both. So, I regard it as a kind 
of asking for help, anyway. 
“Here I am, look at me”… I 
just feel that it would have 
demanded a great deal of her.  
(Participant 40) 
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Appendix E 
Examples of regression cases on the marital fidelity 
dilemma 
 
Time 1 
 
 
Time 2 
Care Level 2 
[What do you think Erkki should 
do?] This says that he has been 
communicating with his wife. You 
get the feeling that he has been 
transmitting morse code or 
something, but not talked to her. He 
should tell her what is wrong and then 
discuss the problem. It could be that 
he thinks that if he leaves for example 
his hair brush there, that the wife 
understands what the problem is. But 
maybe it doesn’t work like that... 
They should talk about what’s wrong 
and ask the other one what the 
problem is. Or if there is a problem: It 
could be that both only think that the 
other one has a problem and does not 
talk. And then they don’t have any 
problems at all. [So you think that 
there’s nothing problematic in this 
situation?] It seems like a normal 
family…. [Why do you think it is 
important to try and continue the 
relationship?] There are children 
involved, 8 and 10 years old, not 
adult yet, it could be very hard for 
them. In a sense you can’t even 
imagine how hard it is, since I don’t 
have experience of it myself... And if 
your mother is the ice queen and she 
remains at home, that could be very 
Care Level 1.5 
[What do you think Erkki 
should do?] It’s the same 
thing, to talk to his wife about 
what’s wrong and what they 
can do about it. And if they 
can’t do anything about it, 
what is the alternative then. 
Because… They have 
children, and if Marja and 
Erkki decide to divorce, the 
situation has to be explained 
to the children, that it is not 
their fault, but they don’t… I 
don’t regard it sensible to 
stay in a marriage that 
doesn’t work, just because of 
children. [Why don’t you see 
it as sensible?] It’s a life 
sentence then... You’re stuck 
in the same house, in 
different rooms and neither 
one likes being with the other 
one, and it’s not good for the 
children to live like that. If 
the marriage doesn’t work 
and you have a better-
working relationship with 
another person, then go there. 
[Why is it important to agree 
about things?] Because of the 
children, so that they can be 
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hard. We’ve talked about it in 
psychology, the kids will feel they’re 
to blame. Or then the parents 
badmouth the other parent when the 
children visit them. I don’t think it 
will be very constructive to childhood 
from there on. It’s a bit... maybe the 
children can sense it too, that the 
parents sleep in separate rooms and 
watch the TV at different times, in 
separate rooms. The children maybe 
see different situations at their 
friend’s places, when the parents are 
in the same room and talk to each 
other as well. That would be a hard 
act to do for 30 years… You should 
be able to fix this by talking. If your 
own marriage doesn’t work, then you 
consider the other alternative... If it 
really looks like it won’t work any 
more, then there you go. But leaving 
the kids is like... Must be a difficult 
situation for Erkki as well.  
(Participant 49) 
with both parents when 
necessary and that you don’t 
have a situation where the 
father badmouths the mother 
and vice versa. [Why do you 
think they have to talk about 
it in this situation?] As I 
understood it, Erkki has not 
expressed… he has tried to 
express, but has not told 
outright that he doesn’t like 
living and being with her. 
[Do you think Erkki should 
try a bit more in this situation 
or is this enough?] Well let’s 
say that through discussions 
with Marja it would become 
that she has tried to express 
her feelings, but Erkki didn’t 
understand. So maybe it is 
mutual, they haven’t talked 
but tried to tell it with sign 
language that this does not 
work.  
  (Participant 49)  
Care Level 3 
He should think about whether this 
relationship gives him everything… If 
the wife is not interested in him any 
more, then he should talk with the 
wife. Tell her honestly that this has to 
change. And if it doesn’t change, then 
he cannot go on. I think that everything 
should start with discussions with the 
wife and the children. [What should 
the discussion reveal in order for Erkki 
to be able to make a decision?] It 
should reveal whether the situation will 
remain the same for the rest of their 
lives, will it work… This depends a lot 
Care Level 1.5 
If the wife is not at all 
interested in like anything, 
then I would start saying 
and telling her that if you 
aren’t at all interested, then I 
will be leaving. See you. 
The children are coming to 
the age where the wife will 
be able to manage alone 
with them. I don’t see any 
reasons why one should 
torture oneself and ruin your 
life by being with the same 
woman. [So you think the 
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on the wife, whether she intends to be 
cold and indifferent toward her 
husband. That’s what decides this. The 
wife’s attitude and what could be done 
about them. If the husband has 
continuously hinted that he is unhappy 
with this and this, and the wife hasn’t 
cared about it, then I think it is more 
the wife’s fault. I think the wife should 
be willing to try as well. I feel that one 
should try and rescue a marriage as 
long as you can, but both partners have 
to be willing to try it. If they just say 
”let’s try it”, it won’t work. [What 
should the wife do to demonstrate her 
willingness to try?] She should be 
more interested in her husband. Again, 
I think the key here is discussion that 
they talk between them and try and 
find different solutions. Maybe they 
have grown apart during the years. 
They should rekindle their relationship. 
How they do it is their own business. 
Maybe they should have counselling, 
maybe not, maybe they can do it alone. 
I know so little about the situation, it’s 
difficult to say. [What should you 
know about it?] Whether this situation 
is from Erkki’s point of view or his 
wife’s. I should listen to what they 
have to say. I think that because the 
wife has been at home all her life, so I 
would think that kind of role creates a 
lot of pressures. Her social relations 
may be quite restricted. Just being with 
the kids, and in the evening, the 
husband comes home and wants to 
have dinner. Maybe I should know 
more about this and talk about it… I 
think that quite often the children are 
forgotten in this kind of much 
situation. One must talk with the 
children will manage?] 
Children that age can 
manage alone, that should 
not be a problem. [What if 
the children are opposed to 
Erkki leaving?] I don’t 
know how they will arrange 
things there. Whether the 
children will visit him or 
live with him all the time or 
what. They’re quite 
complicated issues. 
Children are quite difficult 
cases. [What is the 
importance of Maarit in all 
this?] I would think Erkki 
should almost try 
something... Not by 
betraying, but by telling his 
wife that if you’re not 
interested, then so long. 
Bye! And try to find 
something else, because this 
situation has gone on for 
years, at least for a long 
time. So I couldn’t take it 
for too long. [Should Erkki 
try and patch things up with 
his wife?] Yes, if he tells 
her first that I will leave if 
you don’t start being 
interested in this or 
something. And then he 
could try once more, 
apparently he has been 
trying to tell this for some 
time now. But the wife 
hasn’t been interested in 
this, she turns all his efforts 
down, that’s what it says 
here. It makes you think that 
maybe the wife has 
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children. Neither of them is a teenager 
yet, they’re at a good age, if there is a 
good age for divorce at all. The 
children have to be thought about, and 
then the wife, and then the fact how 
they’re going to survive and handle it. 
So it’s really the psychological side of 
the kids and the wife that you have to 
think about very much. 
 (Participant 18) 
something going on on the 
side as well. Maybe he 
should hire a detective or 
something.  
(Participant 18)
 
